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 This thesis is a study in the history of ideas which discusses the work and 
thought of the Unitarian biblical critic, classical historian and philologist John 
Kenrick (1788-1877).  It examines evidence to suggest that during his productive 
life Kenrick made an intellectual transition from the ideas of the radical English 
Enlightenment to the more Romantic perspectives of the nineteenth century.  The 
first part of the discussion as a whole is concerned largely with the nature of the 
context from which Kenrick emerged as a thinker while the second is related to 
Kenrick’s own changing ideas.  Chapter two reveals the monist philosophical and 
theological tendencies which supported the Socinian beliefs of the polymath 
Joseph Priestley (1733-1804), who was the dominant influence on Unitarians in 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. This discussion of Priestley’s 
thought, which is brought into relief by means of a comparison with that of the 
moral and political philosopher Richard Price (1723-1791), has two objectives, 
the first to reveal something of the context of Unitarianism of the time and the 
second to establish a foundation from which the nature and extent of later 
intellectual change may be measured.  
        Chapter three concentrates on another aspect of the Unitarian context 
closely connected to Socinian beliefs, and that is the tradition of historical biblical 
criticism which contained the seeds of a new historical consciousness. The fourth 
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chapter is an analysis of the relationship between these radical Unitarian biblical 
critics and scholars in Germany and discusses some similarities and differences 
between the two sets of thinkers.  Chapter five focuses upon John Kenrick 
himself and the integration of his Unitarian historical biblical ideas with elements 
of German thought on the interpretation of classical myth. It points out the 
implications for his own ideas in terms of the development of Romanticism and 
cultural relativism.  Chapter six is concerned with Kenrick’s historical approach to 
language and shows how it may be compared with the ideas of the German 
philologists of the time.  
        The seventh chapter is an account of Kenrick’s opinions on the truth of 
Genesis and the origins of man. It considers in what ways the uneasy 
relationship between theology and the science of the mid-nineteenth century 
helped to bring about changes in his thought which linked it to a transformed 
Unitarianism and also to the intellectual milieu of the later nineteenth century. 
Chapter eight concludes the thesis with an assessment of the nature and extent 
of the changes which had taken place since the domination of the ideas of 
Joseph Priestley. The thesis offers a study of the transition in thought of an 
eminent scholar whose work has never been examined before. It opens up some 
new perspectives with regard to the linkages between the radical English 
Enlightenment and the historical consciousness and Romanticism of the 






        The proposal that I should embark on a thesis related to the history of ideas 
was made on the completion of my undergraduate degree as a mature student at 
the University of Stirling.  I had written my final-year dissertation on the work of 
the late nineteenth-century idealist philosopher Thomas Hill Green (1836-1882) 
and decided that I should like to take on the challenge of another topic in the 
same field. It was suggested that the subject of Unitarianism in the late eighteen 
and early nineteenth centuries might prove a fruitful area in which to pin down a 
topic for research. The idea was to find a way to compare aspects of 
Unitarianism’s earlier dry rationalism to the more Romantic ideas of its later 
adherents. After many months of study in the fields of philosophy and theology 
and more than a few ‘dead ends’, I decided to look closely at the work of the 
Unitarian historian and philologist John Kenrick (1788-1877) in the hope that I 
might find evidence of an intellectual transition. The following thesis is the result 
of that research, the early period of which was assisted by a grant from the 
Carnegie Trust. 
 Without the patience, encouragement and enthusiasm of my supervisor, 
Professor David Bebbington, this thesis would never have been completed.  
Professor Bebbington has been generous with his superior skills and profound 
insight into a complex topic and he must have despaired many times of my 
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wandering thoughts and the various intellectual cul de sacs in which I found 
myself.  He has also shown me great kindness during difficult times, when my 
husband’s illnesses threatened to make me despair of ever reaching a 
conclusion to my research and writing.  The debt I owe to him is one which may 
be expressed in the simplest of ways. Quite frankly, I am absolutely certain 
beyond any doubt that without his kindness, understanding and encouragement, 
I would never have made it. His keen eye having scrutinised this text on many 
occasions it only remains for me to say that any errors it contains are entirely my 
own. 
 I also owe a great deal to others in the academic world, most notably my 
good friend Dr Martin Fitzpatrick in Aberystwyth, whose unfailing support, advice, 
sense of humour and generous book-lending have contributed so much to the 
end result here.  Dr Fitzpatrick’s former co-editor on the journal Enlightenment 
and Dissent, Dr D.O. Thomas, was also one of the ‘great and good’ in that 
wonderful Welsh town.  Sadly, Dr Thomas, or ‘D.O.’ as he was fondly known, 
died last year. Despite her bereavement, his widow Beryl Thomas was kind 
enough to help me with her transcription of a portion of John Kenrick’s shorthand, 
which appears in the Appendix to the thesis. I should like to express my gratitude 
to Beryl for her willingness to help at such a difficult time and also for all her hard 
work. I am also indebted to Dr David Wykes, Director of Dr Williams’s Library in 
London, who has also been a valuable source of encouragement over the years.  
He has shown great interest in this thesis and single-handedly persuaded the 
library trustees to allow part of the Kenrick Papers collection to be transported to 
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the care of Stirling University Library for a large part of the research period. This, 
I believe, was the very first time in the library’s history that permission had been 
given to allow manuscripts to leave the premises in Gordon Square.  I am very 
grateful to Dr Wykes and the trustees for this privilege. Not only that, but at Dr 
Williams’s Library I was permitted to record a great deal of manuscript material 
relating to John Kenrick on digital camera. As I live far from London, this was of 
enormous assistance in the compilation of the thesis. I am aware that in this too I 
was greatly privileged, for I believe the use of new technology in this way was 
also a ‘first’ for Dr Williams’s. 
        For much assistance and information on the foreign publications of works of 
Joseph Priestley I am indebted to John Stephens, of Waterfields antiquarian 
bookshop in Oxford. John, sadly, died earlier this year, but I am sure that his 
enthusiasm, generosity of spirit and encouraging ways live on in all who knew 
him. My thanks must go also to Andrew Hill of the Unitarian Historical Society, 
who was generous with his advice, bibliographies and his book lending. 
 I am grateful also to Sue Killoran and Joyce Meakin at the library of Harris 
Manchester College in Oxford.  These two wonderful ladies I shall remember with 
great fondness, for their amazing expertise in librarianship is matched only by 
their sense of humour! I should also like to mention the kindness of Ian Flett and 
his colleagues at Dundee Archives. They have the distinction of keeping the 
northernmost copies of the First Series of the Monthly Repository (1806-1826), to 
which I was allowed unlimited access, thus eliminating the need for many trips to 
Manchester. 
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 To Mrs Anne Kenrick, of Edgbaston, Birmingham, I am grateful for a peek 
at the family papers, which revealed some interesting facts about the life of an 
older John Kenrick, circa 1850.  Despite suffering a terminal illness, Mrs 
Kenrick’s husband, Hugh Kenrick, was insistent that I visit their home to see the 
papers. I shall always remember his brave demeanour, sense of humour and his 
interest in the thesis. 
 My thanks must also go to my friends and neighbours who have been 
staunch and supportive throughout all the tribulations of the last few years.  They 
are Alison Brown on our much-loved Isle of Tiree, Tom and Margaret Brown, 
Jennifer and Bud Cook, Michael and Betty Gent, Elma and Grant Lindsay, 
Marian Pallister, David and Sheila Rhodes, Heather and Bob Wallace and Pam, 
and in Germany, my young friend Dr Silke Strickrodt, who was correct to tell me 
on one memorable occasion that I should ‘get some order into my life’.  
       Much gratitude goes to my friend Patricia Meldrum, a fellow mature student 
who graduated with her PhD in history last year. Pat and her husband John have 
also faced the efforts of research and the burdens of putting it all together in a 
coherent form. They were always well aware of all the pitfalls, and their advice, 
prayers and encouragement have been beyond price.  
 Most of all, however, my thanks goes to my husband Alan.  During his 
illnesses of the last three years he has never given me anything but support and 
encouragement to finish the thesis. Throughout all the hospital visits, treatments 
and, finally, the life-saving operation, his courage and stoicism always put my 
weaknesses to shame. My own many days and nights struggling at the computer 
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in despair were nothing in comparison to the sufferings he has endured over the 
years. Without him I should have been lost and it is to my dear Alan and his kind, 















A note on usage. During the historical period to which this thesis relates, the vast 
majority of writers were male.  Writers of the period commonly used gendered 
language, for example ‘man of the people’, and in doing so reflected the language 
of the age. For this reason I have decided to avoid following modern politically 
correct usages. ∗
                                                 
∗ My sincere thanks to Roy Porter, The Enlightenment (Basingstoke, 2001), p. x.  
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 In the summer of 1851 a cousin of the classical historian John Kenrick 
made a very brief note in her diary about a visit by him to her family in London 
and also of a trip to ‘the Exhibition’ on 12 May.1 Like six million others in Britain, 
Kenrick, who was aged sixty- three at the time, would not only have witnessed at 
the Crystal Palace the spectacular pumps and steam engines of the Industrial 
Revolution, but also would have wondered at  the crafts, artefacts and exhibits 
sent by many different races of the world. One unforgettable lesson of the Great 
Exhibition of 1851 2 was that there was little uniformity to humankind. Instead, 
there existed an amazing diversity of people, not all of whom had advanced in 
terms of ‘civilisation’ at the same pace. 
 All the exhibits, from the stuffed Indian elephant accompanied by human 
figures given to Queen Victoria by the Nazim of Moorshedabad, to the primitive 
raffia mats gifted to the exhibition by the Queen of Tahiti, 3 would have appeared 
to Kenrick as physical proof of the sheer scope and breadth of human diversity. 
The fact of an amazing variety of peoples throughout the world had given force to 
the arguments about the origins of man in his work An Essay on Primæval 
                                                 
1 The visit was recorded in the diaries of the long-lived Rebecca Kenrick (1799-1889) which are contained 
in private family papers owned by Mrs Anne Kenrick, of Edgbaston, Birmingham. Mrs Kenrick is the 
widow of Mr Hugh Kenrick, a descendant of a brother of John Kenrick. I was very privileged to be allowed 
to see Rebecca Kenrick’s diaries just days before Mr Hugh Kenrick’s death in Birmingham in 2002. 
2 The Great Exhibition opened at the Crystal Palace on 1 May 1851 and closed on 11 October that same 
year. There were almost eight miles of display tables, many showing exhibits from ‘civilised’ nations, but 
others offering artefacts from the European colonies. 
3 George W. Stocking, Victorian Anthropology (New York, 1987), pp. 2, 3. 
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History, published five years previously. 4 For John Kenrick and others the Great 
Exhibition revealed evidence of a lack of uniformity in humankind and showed 
instead the diversity of races and groups of men. 5 It emphasised in a practical 
and colourful way a multi-faceted perspective on mankind which seemed far 
removed from Enlightenment ideas on the unity of humanity and a uniform march 
of progress towards civilisation and perfection. Instead, it served as an illustration 
of the uniqueness of cultures and a form of development of mankind which was 
more characteristic of views formulated in the Romantic Age. 
 It is with these and other ideas in mind that this thesis will explore and 
discuss the work and thought of the classical historian and philologist John 
Kenrick with regard to the nature of his transition from Enlightenment to 
Romantic thought. Kenrick was born in Exeter on 4 February 1788 and died in 
York on 7 May 1877, aged eighty-nine. He was a Rational Dissenter and a 
Unitarian who during the earlier decades of the nineteenth century was regarded 
as the most eminent scholar of his denomination. As a child he was taught by the 
Dissenting minister and classical scholar Charles Lloyd (1766-1829) and at age 
twelve he was admitted as a student for the ministry to the Dissenting Academy 
at Exeter which was run by Kenrick’s father, Timothy Kenrick (1759-1804), a 
scholar and biblical critic. 
 Timothy Kenrick ran the academy with the help of Joseph Bretland (1742-
1819) until his own death in 1804, and a year after that it was closed. The young 
John Kenrick received part of his early education there, and heard lectures given 
                                                 
4 John Kenrick, An Essay on Primæval History  (London, 1846). 
5 See chapter seven, below. 
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by his father and Bretland on Latin, Greek and Hebrew. Bretland  also taught 
history and Timothy Kenrick lectured on metaphysics, morals and logic and on 
theology, Jewish antiquities, ecclesiastical history and critical assessments of the 
New Testament. The library, which had been inherited from the previous 
academy, contained almost two thousand books on philosophy, theology, history, 
geography, natural philosophy and many other subjects. It also had many works 
by writers of the Dissenting tradition and volumes by foreign authors, mainly 
French and a very few German.  The German works on the list were by the 
orientalist J.D. Michaelis, Johann Albrecht Bengel (1687-1752), who was one of 
the first to treat the New Testament critically, and Johann Lorenz von Mosheim 
(1694-1755), the ecclesiastical historian whose work was consulted by Joseph 
Priestley. 6
 Kenrick attended Glasgow College for three years from 1807 and 
graduated in May 1810 not only with distinctions in logic, ethics and natural 
philosophy, but also with a deeper knowledge of classical thought which had 
been acquired in the private Greek classes of Professor John Young. After 
leaving Glasgow he accepted the offer of a tutorship in classics, history and 
literature at Manchester College in York. In 1840, when the college was moved 
from York to Manchester he was appointed professor of history and kept this 
chair until 1850. He retained a close association with the college until his death in 
1877.  A sensitive and perceptive account of Kenrick’s life is given in a memoir of 
the historian written by the Unitarian theologian James Martineau (1805-1900). 
                                                 
6 Exeter College Library List, Harris Manchester College Library, Oxford, MS. MNC Misc 4. For the 
influence of Mosheim on Priestley, see chapter four below. 
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Martineau clearly had great admiration for Kenrick’s intellectual abilities and 
described his history lectures as ‘models of selection, compression and 
proportion’ which presented a concrete play of incident and balance of passions 
‘but never led, by any dazzling generalization, to weave the true events into a 
false drama of the past’. 7  
 Kenrick is an important subject for study in the history of ideas of the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries for a number of reasons. Firstly, he 
was a Rational Dissenter and Unitarian, which meant that he was part of an elite 
tradition of intellectual radicalism, free-thinking in theology and open to new 
ideas. The denomination was small, but its intellectual influence was significant 
and much greater than its size would suggest. Stephen Prickett remarks that at 
the end of the eighteenth century the Unitarians constituted an intellectual elite 
amongst Nonconformity and that the Dissenting Academy at Warrington was 
probably academically superior to both Oxford and Cambridge. 8  
 Unitarianism emerged from the old English Presbyterian congregations as 
a radical, anti-Trinitarian force whose ranks were composed of liberal thinkers.9  
However, significant doctrinal change within Presbyterian chapels was 
accompanied by a dramatic decline in their numbers, and by 1800 there were 
only about 200 of them in England. One explanation of this is that the typical 
                                                 
7 James Martineau, In Memoriam : John Kenrick (London, 1877), p. 21. 
8 Stephen Prickett, ‘The Religious Context’, in Stephen Prickett (ed.), The Romantics (London, 1981), pp. 
119-120. 
9 Three histories of Unitarianism are worth some study. There is an older, but very comprehensive account 
by Earl Morse Wilbur entitled A History of Unitarianism in Transylvania, England and America 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1952).  A much more recent study is by Leonard Smith, The Unitarians, A Short 
History(Arnside, Cumbria, 2006). Both of these feature the early Unitarianism in Poland and Transylvania. 
Also of  value is the work by C. Gordon Bolam, Jeremy Goring, H.L. Short and Roger Thomas, entitled 
The English Presbyterians : From Elizabethan Puritanism to Modern Unitarianism (London, 1968). 
 4
Presbyterian chapel maintained lax attitudes to membership which served to 
hasten the decline in numbers. 10
 Another factor which undermined the success of the Presbyterians and 
later the Unitarians as a denomination was the dynamic of inclusion. In the early 
decades of the eighteenth century Presbyterians had become very open to 
heterodox opinion. In 1756, for example, the Arminian John Taylor, when 
opening a new chapel in Norwich, said ‘ We are Christians and only Christians … 
We disown all connection, except that of love and goodwill, with any sect or party 
whatsoever’. 11 This practice of inclusion was related in particular to the belief of 
the seventeenth-century theologian Richard Baxter that in order to exert 
influence on an individual that person must be inside rather than outside the 
movement. Baxter acknowledged the legitimacy of different faiths, including 
Catholicism. 12 A century later the policy of inclusion developed under the mantle 
of Enlightenment reason and liberalised doctrinal discourse to encourage belief 
in a simple faith founded upon a rational interpretation of the scriptures. 
However, although this ‘catch all’ principle of Presbyterianism-Unitarianism 
weakened the denomination’s sense of communal religious identity, it 
transformed it into a depository of diverse opinion. 
                                                 
10 Alan Sell, Dissenting Thought and the Life of the Churches (San Francisco, 1990), p. 151. For a short but 
very useful account of the emergence of Rational Dissent and Unitarianism, see R.K. Webb, ‘The 
Emergence of Rational Dissent’, in Knud Haakonssen (ed.), Enlightenment and Religion (Cambridge, 
1996). 
11 John Taylor quoted in John Seed, ‘Theologies of Power : Unitarianism and the Social Relations of 
Religious Discourse, 1800-1850, in R.J. Morris (ed.), Class, Power and Social Structure in British 
Nineteenth Century Towns (Leicester, 1986), p. 115. This remark of Taylor’s is also quoted in J. 
Drummond and C.B. Upton, Life and Letters of James Martineau (London, 1902), p. 12. 
12 Raymond Holt, The Unitarian Contribution to Social Progress in England  (London, 1938), pp. 292-294. 
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However, if the dynamics of inclusion worked against Unitarianism as a 
denomination, they functioned in a beneficial way for Unitarianism as an 
intellectual movement. Unitarianism, which in the late eighteenth century was still 
illegal, may not have established a recognisable niche within the theological 
clutter in England, but it did form an intellectual microcosm endowed with radical 
and innovative ideas which was to spread far beyond the limited denominational 
boundaries over the next century. Evidence of this may be found in the first 
series of the Unitarian journal The Monthly Repository, published from 1806 till 
1826. 13  The columns of the journal were packed with opinion on topics in 
theology, literature, politics and biblical criticism and were open to contributors 
from all sides of whatever controversy happened to be raging at the time. 14 John 
Kenrick, as part of all this ferment, had access to the most innovative theological 
ideas of his age and to an intellectual milieu which was not afraid to express 
opinion and initiate inquiry.  
The most effective instruments in the dissemination of the radical ideas of 
Rational Dissent in the second half of the eighteenth century were the Dissenting 
academies, 15 which welcomed not only students for the ministry but the lay 
scholars on whom the academies depended so much financially. The principles 
                                                 
13 A full set of the first series of the Monthly Repository may be found in Dr Williams’s Library in London. 
The northernmost set of this early series is held by the City Archives in Dundee.  
14 For a comprehensive analysis of the journal and its contents, the only one ever written, see Francis E. 
Mineka, The Dissidence of Dissent, The Monthly Repository, 1806-1838 ( Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 
1944). 
15 An analysis of the Dissenting academies was published in 1931. See Herbert McLachlan, English 
Education Under the Test Acts (Manchester, 1931). See also Alexander Gordon, ‘Early Nonconformity and 
Education’, in Alexander Gordon, Addresses Biographical and Historical (London, 1922), pp. 67-89. For 
more recent comment see Martin Fitzpatrick, ‘This Candid and Liberal Method: The Teaching of 
Philosophy in the Liberal Dissenting Academies of the Late Eighteenth Century in England’, in Colin R. 
Richmond and Isobel M. Harvey (eds), Recognition : Essays Presented to Edmund Fryde (Aberystwyth, 
1996), and also David Wykes, ‘The Contribution of the Dissenting Academy to the Emergence of Rational 
Dissent’, in Haakonssen (ed.), Enlightenment and Religion. 
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of the academies were founded upon free inquiry and the open discussion of 
theology and all other topics on the curriculum. These included classics, history, 
geography, chronology, mathematics, morals, ecclesiastical history and biblical 
criticism, to name only a few of the wide and varied number of subjects.  
It was the theologian and teacher Philip Doddridge (1702-1751) who 
initiated the liberal teaching methods which were to guide the intellects of the 
Dissenters and their successors.  His method was to present all sides of the 
argument and then leave students to make up their minds about which was the 
most persuasive. This form of teaching was carried into the latter decades of the 
eighteenth century and into the nineteenth by two close relatives of John Kenrick. 
It was readily adopted at the Daventry and Hackney academies by Thomas 
Belsham (1750-1829) , who later became John Kenrick’s step-uncle, and later by 
John Kenrick’s own father Timothy Kenrick at the Exeter academy attended by 
his son from 1800. Thus from early in his life, John Kenrick had been fully 
acquainted with the frame of mind of Rational Dissent, which was one of free 
inquiry, open discussion and a form of learning based upon the most liberal 
principles.  His approach to scholarship was open-minded and highly susceptible 
to any new ideas which would support his radical theological position. 
 In general terms, Rational Dissent and Unitarianism were important 
manifestations of a strain of rational Enlightenment thought which carried new 
ideas in theology and philosophy all the way from the era of John Locke to the 
early decades of the nineteenth century and beyond. 16 John Kenrick’s early 
                                                 
16 The value of the tradition of Rational Dissent-Unitarianism and the liberal thought it produced has never 
received the recognition it deserves. Unitarians have written about Unitarians, it is true, and one of the 
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intellectual life was part of this tradition. It had been dominated also to a great 
extent by the archetypal English Enlightenment figure, the polymath Joseph 
Priestley (1733-1804), whose Socinianism was adopted by many who followed 
him, including Belsham, Timothy Kenrick and John Kenrick himself.  Priestley’s 
religious position was integrated with both his natural philosophy and his 
materialistic necessitarian and associationist ideas, many of which had been 
founded upon the work of the philosopher David Hartley (1705-1757).  Priestley’s 
great synthesis of philosophy, natural philosophy and theology was a unique 
form of thought which underpinned his attempts to prove the simple humanity of 
Christ and to undermine other ‘irrational’ orthodox doctrines, such as the 
atonement.  
Chapter two of this thesis consists of a comparison between the ideas of 
the Socinian Joseph Priestley and those of his friend and fellow radical thinker, 
Richard Price (1723-1791), who was an Arian in theology. Price, of course, was 
the mathematician and moral philosopher who supported the French Revolution 
in a sermon entitled Discourse on the Love of Our Country in 1789, to which 
Edmund Burke replied in his famous Reflections on the Revolution in France. 
                                                                                                                                                 
finest examples of this is the work of the biographer Alexander Gordon, Addresses Biographical and 
Historical.  A more recent example is Dennis G. Wigmore-Beddoes’ Yesterday’s Radicals: A Study of the 
Affinity Between Unitarianism and Broad Church Anglicanism in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, 
1971). Aspects of Rational Dissent are explored in Haakonssen (ed.) Enlightenment and Religion. In 
addition, later Unitarians have been viewed in social, political and cultural terms. See John Seed, 
‘Gentlemen Dissenters : the Social and Political Meanings of Rational Dissent in the 1770s and 1780s’, HJ,  
28, 2, 1985, pp. 299-325. See also John Seed, ‘Unitarianism, political economy and the antinomies of 
liberal culture in Manchester, 1830-1850’, SH, vol. 7, Number 1, January 1982, pp.1-25. Also valuable is 
Howard Wach, ‘Unitarian Philanthropy and Cultural Hegemony in Comparative Perspective: Manchester 
and Boston, 1827-1848’, JSH, vol. 26, no. 3, 1993, pp. 539-557. Although perspectives such as these are 
useful, there has been little written on the ‘bigger picture’ of the contribution of Unitarianism to 
philosophical and religious change. 
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 The objective of this analysis is to bring into relief the originality of 
Priestley’s thought, which forms a distinctive reference point in relation to 
changes in Unitarianism over the following decades. By comparing Priestley’s 
monism with aspects of the dualism of Richard Price, Priestley’s thought is 
highlighted in a way which has never been attempted before. Much has been 
written about Priestley and Price, and some aspects of them have been 
evaluated in comparative terms, 17 but there has never been a holistic 
comparison of their respective frames of mind. The depth and completeness of 
Priestley’s monism ought to be understood, for it pervades every area of his 
thought. It encompasses his theology, his philosophy of determinism, the nature 
of moral knowledge, the physical world and the nature of matter and, finally, his 
political system. The objective here is to expound Priestley’s monist synthesis in 
opposition to Price’s dualism as a foil, in order to bring to light the extent of the 
fundamental differences between the two frames of mind.  It is not Price’s 
position, but Priestley’s great synthesis of God, man and nature which identifies 
the point from which intellectual change within the Unitarian movement over the 
next three or four decades may be measured. Also, in philosophical terms, it was 
the opposing position to that of the dualism adopted by John Kenrick at the 
culmination of his own intellectual journey. 
In the latter decades of the eighteenth century Priestley’s theological 
position dominated Unitarianism. However, by the 1830s and 1840s Priestley’s 
monism, necessitarianism and dry rationalism were challenged by the Unitarian 
                                                 
17 See chapter two below.  See also the journals devoted largely to these two thinkers, the Price-Priestley 
Newsletter (1977–1980) and Enlightenment and Dissent (1982-2002). See also chapter two, below.  
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theologian James Martineau, who argued for a more spiritual form of faith 
incorporating individualism, the soul and emotion. Martineau had been influenced 
by Coleridge and Kant and returned to a dualist perspective in terms of religious 
belief and a more Romantic sense of the role of feeling in the worship of God. 18
 Priestley’s singular frame of mind underpinned his theology and also his 
desire to prove its validity historically, and this served as an important motivation 
for a more intensive use by Socinians of a rational form of historical biblical 
criticism. This method employed in the interpretation of scripture marked the 
scholars of Rational Dissent as Enlightenment thinkers who were continuing an 
approach to scripture which had been in many ways inspired by John Locke. 
These radical scholars moulded a tradition of scriptural interpretation which 
filtered its way down through the eighteenth century until it was consolidated by 
Joseph Priestley in his work An History of the Corruptions of Christianity, which 
was first published in 1782. 19
John Kenrick is important also in this context, for from an early age he 
provided a major contribution to this Enlightenment tradition of historical biblical 
scholarship. In chapter three an attempt is made to outline some aspects of the 
tradition of Socinian historical biblical criticism  carried down through the 
eighteenth century by scholars such as Nathaniel Lardner (1684-1768). Little has 
                                                 
18 The best analysis of Martineau’s transition from the older form of Unitarianism to a new spirituality is by 
Ralph Waller. See ‘James Martineau : The Development of his Religious Thought’ , in Barbara smith (ed.), 
“Truth, Liberty and Religion”: Essays Celebrating 200 Years of Manchester College (Oxford, 1986).  See 
also Ralph Waller, ‘James Martineau : His Emergence as a Theologian, His Christology, and his Doctrine 
of the Church, with Some Unpublished Papers’, Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of London, 1986. For 
a comprehensive biography see J. Estlin Carpenter, James Martineau, Theologian and Teacher: A Study of 
his Life and Thought (London, 1905). 
19 The edition of Joseph Priestley’s History of the Corruptions of Christianity  which is cited throughout 
this thesis is the one which was published by the British and Foreign Unitarian Association in London in 
1871. 
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been noted even by Unitarian writers about this tradition and its implications for 
religious thought in England. It rejected the orthodox idea of plenary inspiration 
and attempted to rationalise by historical interpretation the truth of the scriptures. 
It employed a rational, historical method in  which Christ emerged as a 
‘humanised’ historical figure in accordance with the Socinian belief in his simple 
humanity. Kenrick’s involvement in this particular mode of interpretation, which 
tried to unravel the origins of a simple Christian faith unspoiled by centuries of 
dogma and ‘corruptions’, marked him as a rational Enlightenment scholar in the 
Socinian mould. It also showed his participation in a form of historical 
interpretation of the scriptures which contained within it the seeds of a new 
historical consciousness.  
 Kenrick’s importance as a radical scholar is further emphasised by the 
fact that he was open to the influence of German thought. The cross-current of 
ideas between German critics and the radical English biblical scholars, including 
Kenrick, is discussed in chapter four. Although the subject has not gone entirely 
unnoticed, there has been virtually no research done on the relationship between 
these two sets of radical biblical critics, English and German, in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. There was a significant exchange of 
ideas between the two, evidence for which may be seen in the early series of the 
Monthly Repository and also in articles by John Kenrick himself over the early 
decades of the nineteenth century. Some writers have touched upon the subject 
with regard to the Unitarian involvement, 20 but there has never been a study to 
                                                 
20 See John Rogerson, Old Testament Criticism in the Nineteenth Century : England and Germany 
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assess the nature of the cross-fertilisation of ideas and the motivation for the 
affinity between the two sets of thinkers. This seems strange, for John Rogerson, 
for example, has emphasised that acquaintance with German Old Testament 
criticism in England, which could be traced back to the 1790s and possibly even 
further was ‘at its deepest and keenest in the Unitarian circles’. 21 Despite this 
recognition of the importance of the connection, however, the theme is never 
developed in his work, and as with other brief accounts of Unitarian criticism 
either on its own terms or in connection with German writers, it is either 
marginalised or virtually ignored. 
John Kenrick was uniquely equipped to engage with the ideas of German 
scholars. As a teenager, he was taught German by the eccentric writer and 
composer, Thomas Foster Barham (1766-1844), and went on to become an 
expert in the language by the time he studied in Göttingen and Berlin in 1819-
1820. Kenrick’s engagement with the ideas of German critics such as the 
orientalist J.D. Michaelis (1717-1791), the theologian and pioneer of historical 
criticism J.S. Semler (1725-1791) and the later writer J.G. Eichhorn (1752-1827), 
meant that he was in touch with a historical method in relation to the scriptures 
which was radical and innovative, and indeed very like that of the Socinian critics.  
Not only that, but the German Enlightenment movement in historical 
biblical criticism has been regarded by some historians of recent years as laying 
                                                                                                                                                 
(London, 1984), E.S. Shaffer, ‘Kubla Khan’ and the Fall of Jerusalem : The Mythological School in 
Biblical Criticism and Secular Literature 1770-1880 (Cambridge, 1972) and Frida Knight, University 
Rebel:The Life of William Frend 1757-1841 (London, 1971). For essays which take a more general view 
but do not mention the Unitarian factor, see S.W. Sykes (ed.), England and Germany. Studies in 
Theological Diplomacy (Frankfurt am Main, 1982). 
21 Rogerson, Old Testament Criticism, p. 158. 
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some of the foundations for the German historicist consciousness of the 
nineteenth century. This was shown by Peter Hanns Reill in his analysis of these 
lesser-known German scholars 22 who paved the way for a rational appraisal of 
scripture, and whose work was a magnet for Socinians of the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries. Reill’s view was that the German Enlightenment, or 
Aufklärung, which began later than the English ‘age of reason’, had more 
continuities with Romanticism than had previously been imagined. These 
scholars, according to Reill, helped to pave the way for a sea change in historical 
thinking and for the formation of the kind of historicism which many feel took root 
in its fuller sense only in Germany. Reill argued that the German Enlightenment 
was not simply a poor imitation of the French or English models, but had its own 
particular characteristics which were not completely in intellectual opposition to 
the ideas of historians of the German Romantic Age. 
There were many differences between the radical English scholars and 
the critics of Germany, and some of these are outlined in chapter four. For 
example, while the Germans belonged to the tradition of Pietism, the 
seventeenth-century religious reform movement based upon intense spiritual 
experience, the radical English critics followed John Locke’s empiricism, and his 
dicta about the inherent rationality of faith as found in the scriptures. However, 
there were also many common factors between the two sets of scholars, both of 
whom wanted to save religion by their reasoned approach to historical study of 
scripture and its manuscripts. 
                                                 
22 Peter Hanns Reill, The German Enlightenment and the Rise of Historicism (Los Angeles, 1975). 
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The importance of Kenrick’s engagement with German thought on historical 
criticism was that he assimilated nevertheless some ideas of a movement in 
scholarship which prefigured the historicist thought of the nineteenth century in 
Germany.  
Of equal importance with regard to German thought was the fact that 
Kenrick was a classical scholar and historian. It is also the case that, once again, 
Kenrick has been ignored by works on the history of classical studies, 23 despite 
the fact that Kenrick’s two major historical works, Ancient Egypt Under the 
Pharaohs  and Phœnicia,24  were, in method and structure, of notable originality. 
Importantly for the development of his thought the Germans had applied the 
method of interpretation of classical myth to the understanding of the Old 
Testament. This was an interpretative journey which began with J.G. Eichhorn’s 
thoughts on Genesis and culminated in 1835 with the publication in Germany of 
D.F. Strauss’ Leben Jesu which, of course, argued that the events related in the 
gospels had been mythically inspired by the hopes of the Jewish people. 
Consequently, during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries 
there was an overlap between ideas about classical myth and those believed to 
have been created by writers of the ancient Hebrew manuscripts, those relating 
to Genesis in particular. Chapter five traces the outlines of a confluence of ideas 
between the historical biblical critical method of John Kenrick and German 
opinions regarding the interpretation of classical myth. This establishes a link 
between the Enlightenment thought of the radical English scholars and a more 
                                                 
23 He receives no mention, for example, in Frank Turner’s analysis of classical studies, The Greek Heritage 
in Victorian Britain (New Haven, 1981). 
24 John Kenrick, Ancient Egypt Under the Pharaohs (London, 1850) and Phœnicia  (London, 1855). 
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Romantic idea of the nature of myth and its implications for historical and cultural 
development. 
 Like almost all his contemporaries, Kenrick was steeped in the classics 
and also in the interpretation of the Bible. His encounter with German thought on 
two particular aspects of the relationship between history and myth directed the 
course of his intellectual development in a significant way. In this context, of the 
relationship between the scholars of Rational Dissent, who were Enlightenment 
thinkers, and the critics of the German Aufklärung, the work of John Kenrick is 
particularly important. There are no studies to date which attempt to trace 
continuities between these radical English biblical critics and the historical 
consciousness of the nineteenth century. Consequently, the integration of 
aspects of his thought with German reflection on the subject of myth and its 
relationship to historical development deserves close attention. 
Myth and its contribution to the uniqueness of peoples and their cultures 
leads naturally to the idea of language also as a binding force on nations and 
communities.  In his approach to the understanding of the development of 
language it would appear that Kenrick was influenced to a very large extent by 
German thought and by the ideas of the philologers he encountered during his 
study year in Germany in 1819-1820. The contention of chapter six is that his 
views of the historical nature of language complemented those he had already 
developed on the nature of the relationship between history and myth. Together, 
they consolidated ideas on cultural relativism and also on literary criticism which 
were related to Romantic thought. Kenrick’s philological works on the grammar of 
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Greek and Latin 25 were completed in the years after his studies in Germany and 
were very much influenced by the method of Carl Gottlob Zumpt (1792-1849), 
with whom he collaborated to produce several works in English.  
The value of John Kenrick’s scholarship as a study of intellectual transition 
in the history of ideas in this period is highlighted also by the fact that from both 
historical and religious perspectives he engaged with the controversies initiated 
by the new techniques in the geological, physiological and ethnological sciences 
of the mid-nineteenth century. Orthodox belief in the truth of Genesis was 
seriously challenged by the discoveries of these disciplines. Kenrick’s response 
to these new findings and their relationship with scripture guided him towards 
aspects of later nineteenth-century ideas on race and the origins of man, and 
also to a new approach to religious belief.  Although the significance of these 
earlier decades with regard to the relationship between science and religion has 
always been overshadowed by the beginning of the Darwinian era of evolutionary 
biology with the publication of Origin of Species in 1859, they are nevertheless 
important.  There was a great deal of controversy and diverse opinion about 
human origins and the development of races before Darwin’s famous work was 
published. 26 This subject John Kenrick explored in his Essay on Primæval 
History, published in 1846, and in several articles which appeared a few years 
later.  His conclusions on the subject linked his thought with racial theories of the 
later nineteenth century.  Furthermore, his reinterpretation of the relationship 
                                                 
25 See bibliography. 
26 See Hannah Franziska Augstein, Race: The Origins of an Idea, 1760-1850 (Bristol, 1996). Augstein 
provides an excellent introduction to excerpts from writers of the period on the subject of race and the 
origins of mankind. 
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between religion and science resulted in a perspective on the essence of faith 
which was also more in tune with later nineteenth-century thought. 
The task of tracing the intellectual transition of an Enlightenment scholar 
who professed to an ultra-rational religious creed to his acceptance of a more 
Romantic form of thought is fraught with difficulties. The myriad of changing, 
conflicting and contrasting influences which constituted the background to his 
own Unitarian context were highly complex. It would seem, therefore that the 
best way forward in advance of the analysis is to isolate some of the key 
characteristics of the historical and Romantic thinking of the early nineteenth 
century period. 
 In relation to Kenrick’s intellectual development there are several key 
themes and sets of ideas, the identification of which will be useful in the 
understanding of the nature of the transition of his thought. Firstly there is 
historicism, that form of understanding of the past and its development which 
was closely related to the Romantic Age, particularly in Germany. The essence 
of historicism was that there existed a fundamental difference between the 
phenomena of nature and those of human history. The abstract classificatory 
methods of the natural sciences were inadequate for the study of the human 
world, in which no historical deed may be judged by standards external to the 
situation in which it arises, but must be judged in terms of its own inherent 
values. Whatever arises in history is per se valuable. 27 Historicism implied the 
unique in nations and cultures, each possessing its own internal principles, and 
                                                 
27 Georg C. Iggers, The German Conception of History (Middletown, Conn., 1968), pp. 5,8. 
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appreciated  diversity, relativism and organic forms of development rather than 
mechanistic processes. 
               The second theme is what we conceive of the idea of Romanticism 
itself, which was more related to the productions of literature by means of 
individual emotion, feeling and imagination. Also to be taken into account here 
was that particular brand of associative English Romanticism, a compromise with 
empiricism, which had been derived from a synthesis and coalescence of sense 
impressions of the external world. Kenrick’s thought interacted with elements of 
these themes and ideas, in some instances rejecting certain perspectives, in 
others accepting them in whole or in part, depending upon his own intellectual 
and theological position at a given time and in certain circumstances.   
That frame of mind which was generally very different from the ideas of 
later historicists was characteristic of the radical English Enlightenment which 
initiated the historical scholarship in which John Kenrick was schooled.  At its 
heart was Lockean empiricism founded on the idea of sense impressions to 
which was applied reason. Reason was common to all humanity and therefore all 
men had the power to access universal truths and the precepts of a common 
morality. One clear example of this comes from Joseph Priestley, who 
enthusiastically quoted Bolingbroke (1678-1751) as stating the view that there 
were certain principles and rules of life and conduct which must always be true 
‘because they are conformable to the invariable nature of things’. 28 These 
principles would be distinguished and collected by the historian, who would soon 
                                                 
28 Lord Bolingbroke, quoted from Letters On the Study of History  (1752), letter iii, p. 53, in Joseph 
Priestley, Lectures on History and General Policy (London, 1793), p. 48. 
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form a general system of ethics and politics on the surest foundations ‘on the trial 
of these principles and rules in all ages, and on the confirmation of them by 
universal experience’.29
 In the atomistic world of the Enlightenment, society was studied as a 
science on the basis of supposedly self-evident truths about the common nature 
of man. The social order was a reflection of physical nature and because the 
universe was a machine, the best model for society was a mechanistic one. 30 
Likewise, the history of man, which exhibited the operations of nature and of 
God, was famously compared by Joseph Priestley to ‘the experiments made by 
the air pump, the condensing engine, or electrical machine’. 31 Priestley saw the 
mechanism of history as educative and exemplary and as forming the anticipated 
experience which would ensure the universal, linear progress of the moral 
improvement of mankind towards perfection.  
Thus the kind of historical thought which would have pervaded John 
Kenrick’s very early intellectual experiences was a set of ideas which accepted 
uniformity in human nature, universal truths and moral laws discovered by 
abstract reason. This was also a mechanistic view of the world derived from the 
natural philosophy of the period and a perception of history as the facilitator of 
mankind’s march along the same route towards the moral ideal. If one is allowed 
a mental picture of this frame of mind, it would be easy to give the mind over to 
such images as the separate, individual, tiny pinpoints of atoms, the sharp 
                                                 
29 Ibid. 
30 John B. Halsted (ed.), Romanticism  (London, 1969), p. 10. 
31 Priestley, Lectures on History, p. 46. 
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corners and regular functions of machines and the straight, teleological lines of 
progress and uniformity. 
Contrastingly, the concepts which encompassed the historicist position 
were fluid, perpetually changing and developing on their own terms.  The core 
assumption of this Romantic view of the past was that all cultures were moulded 
by history and that the customs and beliefs of any group of people were the 
products of their own historical experience. 32 Nature was the source of that 
which was eternal and constantly recurring, whereas the world of man was in a 
perpetual state of motion,flux and change. 33 In this view, therefore, the concept 
of natural law and an attendant perception of the universe in terms of timeless, 
absolute truths were wrong. 34 No longer valid was the idea of a world governed 
by a static, abstract, universal natural law and by the mechanistic, causal 
processes posited by the French Enlightenment, 35 or indeed the machine-like 
concepts of the historical world presented by Joseph Priestley. 36
 Abstract assumptions about the universality of reason and morality were 
replaced by a growing appreciation of the diversity to be found within concrete 
historical circumstances. The historian became concerned with the realities of 
human experience and with actual persons, groups and particular contexts. This 
involved a concrete understanding of historical phenomena rather than any 
recourse to abstract causal explanation.  It was argued that every abstraction or 
                                                 
32 David Bebbington, Patterns of History: A Christian Perspective on Historical Thought (Vancouver, 
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34 Ibid., p. 5. 
35 Friedrich Meinecke, Historism : The Rise of a New Historical Outlook (London, 1972), p. x. In his 
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36 See note 30, above. 
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systematic pattern of thought detracted from the living reality of history and 
although the historian could not entirely dispense with generalisations, where 
they were used they had to be related to the historian’s subject matter. 37 This 
approach to history was one which appreciated man’s actual experiences and 
the triumph of the concrete over abstractions, theories and stylised conceptual 
patterns. 38
In addition, historicist thinkers discovered the moral and cultural relativism 
which became a crucial feature of Romantic thought in relation to historical 
development. 39 The rejection of universal precepts meant that values arose 
within the circumstances of a historical situation 40 and had to be judged on that 
basis alone. Every culture or society had to be viewed as a complex of its own 
values 41 and these were different from the mores of other societies.  Because 
each society’s values were formed from within its own culture and context, such 
values were timebound and unique and consequently no individual or action 
could possibly be judged by standards which were external to that situation. Such 
mores had to be assessed only in terms of their worth within the context from 
which they had evolved 42 and ought  to be judged on their own terms and 
without reference to standards which had been formulated outwith that particular 
society’.43  
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 Likewise Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886), who was perhaps the greatest 
historicist mind in the practice of history, 44 reminded scholars to separate the 
study of the past as much as possible from the passions of the present. 45  Ranke 
is credited with the most famous statement in all historiography. He wrote that 
although history has been assigned the task of judging the past and instructing 
the present, all he himself wanted to accomplish as a historian was to ‘show only 
what actually happened [wie es eigentlich gewesen]’, 46  and in doing so he 
eliminated the judgemental factor from the historical analysis. 
The judgement of men in past ages must take account of all the 
surrounding influences of period and context. As Lord Acton told his listeners at 
Cambridge in 1895, the times, the class from which men sprang, the schools, the 
preachers, all such influences must be taken into account in the historian’s 
judgement of past ages for ‘we have no common code; our moral notions are 
always fluid’. 47 Should this principle not be recognised by historians, they would 
find themselves guilty of judging the past by the present and for the Romantic 
mind that that is the prime historical fallacy. 48 Thus the historical ideas of the 
Romantic Age recognised the past in its own right and discouraged attempts to 
distort it from the perspective of the present.  
The fluid conceptual outlines of Romantic historicism were in vivid contrast 
to the mechanisms of the eighteenth century English Enlightenment. Human 
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activities were no longer understood in terms of static institutional structures but 
rather as cultures in different stages of development.  Historical forms were 
social organisms, associations of men, each of which had its own laws of growth 
and its specific nature. These historical forms developed on their own unique 
terms and therefore could not be taken apart and reassembled like some kind of 
conceptual mechanism which was controlled by universal causal laws. 49  
One of the main arguments of this thesis is that the writings of John 
Kenrick revealed some aspects of this historicist frame of mind. The nature of 
historicism was quite different from the ‘march of mind’ ideas of English 
Enlightenment thought. However, it has been contended that historicism reached 
its full expression only in Germany 50 and that English writers had been prepared 
to ‘assimilate its insights only in small doses’. 51 Nevertheless, historical thought 
in England was not completely remote from the historicist outlook. The exception 
to the rule 52 was that group of historians and Germanophiles known as the 
Liberal Anglicans. 53  Duncan Forbes identified them as a group whose 
sympathies lay with aspects of the historicism of the Romantic Age.  This group 
contained thinkers such as Thomas Arnold (1795-1842), the headmaster of 
Rugby school, and Henry Hart Milman (1791-1868), whose controversial work, 
History of the Jews, 54 emphasised the primitive nature of the early Jewish 
nation.  Forbes pointed out that these writers had been influenced by Vico’s 
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philosophy of mind which had argued that each people’s mental state was 
specific at any given moment in history, and that it altered over time.  
Other important scholars among the Liberal Anglicans were Julius Charles 
Hare (1795-1855) and Connop Thirlwall (1797-1875). Hare’s essay Guesses at 
Truth, the first part of which was published in 1827, expounded a Romantic view 
of historical thought which was quite startling for its time. He wrote that a 
historian ought to be ‘much of a poet…else his narrative will be flat, fragmentary 
and confused’. 55 He added that historians were prone to write from the 
perspective of reason, but ‘Dwelling amid abstractions, the Understanding has no 
eye for the rich varieties of real life, but only sees its own forms and fictions’. 56  It 
was Hare and Thirlwall who translated the History of Rome by B.G. Niebuhr in 
1828, and who in 1832 and 1833 edited the short-lived but important journal on 
classical philology the Philological Museum, to which John Kenrick contributed 
three articles, including one on Vico. The Liberal Anglican thinkers were 
concerned with biblical criticism, the German approach to philology and its 
assumptions about the interdependence of thought and language, and also the 
historical-philological method in the understanding of the history of ancient 
civilisations.  
At the heart of Forbes’ analysis is the idea that there was a deep gulf in 
the early decades of the nineteenth century with regard to historical thinking 
between the Romantic view of the Liberal Anglicans and the approach of the 
work of the Utilitarians and Whigs, whom he described collectively as the 
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Rationalist historians of the eighteenth century. On the Romantic side were 
Arnold, Milman, Hare and Thirlwall, with their fluid, relativistic and organic 
perspectives which historicised the development of language, thought and 
morality.  Their mentors were Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772-1834), Thomas 
Carlyle (1795-1881), Niebuhr, and the Germans Leopold von Ranke and Karl 
Otfried Müller (1797-1840). 57 On the other side were Edward Gibbon (1737-
1794), Henry Hallam ( 1777-1859), the historian of Greece George Grote (1794-
1871) and Thomas Babington Macaulay (1800-1859), in whom Forbes 
recognised belief in the static nature of morality. 58 In positioning the Liberal 
Anglican thinkers in opposition to historians such as Macaulay, Forbes’ analysis 
provides a good reference point for the generation of a form of thought which 
was not generally favoured by well known English historians. 
Historicism was the historical wing of the Romantic movement, particularly 
the German version, and in a lesser sense the English as epitomised by the 
Liberal Anglicans. However, as Marilyn Butler points out, English Romanticism 
itself is impossible to define precisely because the term itself is, in her view, 
‘unsound’. 59 It is applied to English writers of the first quarter of the nineteenth 
century who did not identify themselves as Romantics, and with the exception of 
Coleridge, English writers did not have close contact with writers of the German 
Romantic school who were conscious of themselves as part of a literary 
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movement. 60 Thus in the early decades of the nineteenth century the English 
and German Romantic movements were, to a great extent, separate entities. 
 Apart from the mass of critical literature devoted to the English poets of 
the time, there are two other aspects of English Romanticism which deserve 
mention here.  The first is the transition from the neo-classical to the Romantic in 
terms of literary appreciation and the second that form of English Romantic 
thought which was derived from the associative processes of Enlightenment 
empiricism.   
The transition from neo-classical aesthetics to a very different style of 
criticism and appreciation of beauty came at the onset of the Romantic Age. The 
eighteenth century had been concerned with that form of critique based upon a 
search for an ideal, universal and timeless perfection in art and literature.  Its 
foundations were in classical antiquity and it required an adherence to rigidly 
employed uniform standards which reflected the glories of the ancient world. 61 In 
contrast to the universal norms and correct standards of taste presented to the 
critic by neo-classicism, the Romantic theorists offered a new emphasis on the 
unique, the particular and that which was historically ‘localised’, its characteristics 
related to time and place. 62 Also was born the primitivist idea that great art could 
be produced by the simple and uncultured rustic ‘folk’ and by the natural, 
uneducated  genius who was untainted by the abstractions and complexities of 
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civilisation. 63  Thus was Romanticism given over to the idea that not all was 
founded upon reason, that there was room also for the irrational, the original and 
the emotion and feeling which activated people in their creative lives. 
Imagination also had a great part to play in this new outlook on human 
experience.  For the Enlightenment intellectuals, Lockean empiricism had proved 
a problem when it came to understanding man’s capacity to imagine and create. 
How could the mind achieve such things if it was merely a ‘blank sheet’ on which 
were written the results of experience of the external world? There had to be 
some innate power to coalesce these experiences together and form them into 
the flights of imagination, the pleasures and pains of emotion and the 
appreciation of beauty.  
The doctrine of the association of ideas, perfected by the eighteenth- 
century philosopher David Hartley ( 1805-1757) and his ardent admirer Joseph 
Priestley, was adapted by the early English Romantics to enable them to 
synthesise the experiences of sense.  The idea of the blank sheet had been 
replaced by one of an innate mental facility which brought together and 
coalesced sense experience to create something entirely new in the realms of 
imagination. For example, the poet William Wordsworth (1170-1850) indicated 
that both fancy and imagination served to modify, create and associate. 64  Like 
that of Coleridge, the essayist William Hazlitt (1778-1830),  the philosopher and 
reformer John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) and others, Wordsworth’s idea of the 
imaginative process was a curious combination of the empiricist thought of the 
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English Enlightenment and the subjectivity of the Romantic Age.  The English 
Romantic mind had found a way to adapt the mechanisms of the eighteenth 
century to the emotion and subjectivity of the nineteenth and, employed in this 
way, British associationism supported the later tendency to emphasise the new 
importance of individual feeling. 65
The idea of the adaptation of the mechanistic laws of association to the 
creation of imagination and feeling is a vivid example of the transitional 
processes which take place in the nebulous world of ideas. As John B. Halsted 
points out, ideas seldom move as systems. The historian of ideas must take the 
circumstances of writers and thinkers into account, for the ideas of the past form 
the context, and innovations are usually realignments of what thinkers have 
learned already. 66 The relationship, therefore, between the English 
Enlightenment and the Romantic Age is, like any other period of philosophical 
change, not easily delineated. Like the enigmatic partnership of association and 
imagination, the two sets of ideas were often in a state of transition which was 
never effectively resolved one way or another.  
However, early analyses of Enlightenment thought tried to show it as a 
homogeneous philosophical movement which gave way in time to another 
definite period, that of Romanticism. The emphasis was on the conviction that the 
two different frames of mind presented very different sets of ideas. The 
Enlightenment in England was mechanistic, empiricist and atomistic. It glorified 
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reason, which was possessed by all humanity in the same degree, as the 
ultimate solution to all human problems and equated the findings of natural 
philosophy with the characteristics of the social order. Romantics believed in the 
reality and diversity of human experience rather than the uniformity of universal 
abstractions, and in the spirituality of nature and the feelings of the heart rather 
than dry rationalism.  Although there is much truth in these descriptions, early 
analyses gave little thought to the idea that neither philosophical movement was 
completely homogeneous.  Ernst Cassirer’s account, first published in Germany 
in 1932, was one which concentrated on reason as the philosophical core and its 
dissemination by major thinkers. Typical of this form of analysis was Cassirer’s 
first chapter entitled ‘The Mind of the Enlightenment’, which implied a collective 
rational consciousness of its ‘theory of knowledge…its philosophy of nature…its 
psychology…its theory of the state and society...its philosophy of religion 
and…its aesthetics’. 67   
Peter Gay’s two-volume study of the Enlightenment ,68 published in the 
later 1960s, was written in a similar vein and perceived the philosophy of the age 
in terms of the ideas of the greatest thinkers and as homogeneous in its nature.  
He described the Enlightenment as a ‘family of philosophes…a cultural 
climate…on which they attempted to impose their program’.69 Similarly, Paul 
Hazard’s treatment of the age dealt with specific thinkers and themes and called 
the eighteenth century the ‘age of universal criticism’, once again attributing to it 
                                                 
67 Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment (Boston, 1965), p. 36. 
68 Peter Gay, The Enlightenment: An Interpretation. The Rise of Modern Paganism (London, 1967) and 
Peter Gay, The Enlightenment: An Interpretation. Volume 2, The Science of Freedom (London, 1970). 
69 Gay, Rise of Modern Paganism, p. xii. 
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a unity which probably it did not deserve. 70 Although these studies are valuable 
as points of reference in a complex world of ideas, they never seek to 
comprehend the motivation for certain modes of thought or the reality of how they 
alter over time. 
The apparent unity, however, was fractured by some works which 
presented contributions from various authors on different perspectives of 
Enlightenment thought. For example, in a collection of essays published in 1965, 
Isaiah Berlin wrote on the German critic, poet and philosopher J.G. Herder 
(1744-1803) in an Enlightenment context while Alfred Cobban assessed its 
relationship to the French Revolution. 71 This pattern of assessing this 
philosophical movement from very different perspectives is followed in one very 
recent book on the Enlightenment. It sustains its treatment of the Enlightenment 
into periods, national contexts, and topics as diversified as popular culture, 
economics, law, government, politics and many others.  The theme of this work is 
one of many diverse Enlightenments perceived from a large number of different 
angles, 72  and is a complete deconstruction of the idea of the philosophical 
monolith conceived by early historians. 
Initially, however, the whole idea of a unitary philosophical movement 
known as the Enlightenment was dramatically undermined by the publication, in 
1976, of Henry May’s work, which broke down Enlightenment thought into 
categories and tested this method on the eighteenth-century Enlightenment in 
                                                 
70 Paul Hazard, European Thought in the Eighteenth Century (Gloucester, Mass., 1973). 
71 Earl R. Wasserman (ed.), Aspects of the Eighteenth Century (Baltimore, 1965). 
72 Martin Fitzpatrick, Peter Jones, Christa Knellwolf and Iain McCalman (eds.), The Enlightenment World 
(London, 2004). 
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America. 73 After this, a new school of thought came into being which 
emphasised the national and contextual nature of Enlightenment thought. Roy 
Porter’s works, published in the 1980s considered both the Enlightenment and 
the Age of Romanticism from this perspective. 74 In his introduction to the work 
on Romanticism, however, Porter argued in favour of the idea that despite 
national variations there were persistent themes in Romantic thought which 
tended to give some unity to the movement. He believed that the Romantic mind 
rejected, for example, the general in favour of the particular, the material for the 
spiritual, the mechanical for the organic and perceived art not just as a product of 
the standards of taste but as ‘the spontaneous outpourings of transcendent 
genius’. Romanticism then was not, as some believed, no more than ‘disparate 
intellectual and cultural currents, eddying in the late eighteenth century and the 
first half of the nineteenth’, but an identifiable frame of mind which crossed 
national European borders. 75 In this analysis  unity was detected in national 
diversity and important traits of Romantic thought were seen as reasonably 
clearly defined.  
When attempts were made to chart the relationship between Romanticism 
and its rational predecessor, however, the task appeared to some historians 
even more complex, more frustratingly blurred and more nebulous than ever, for 
there could never be clear breaks between different eras of thought.  John B. 
Halsted, whose analysis is compelling, wrote that in the consideration of the 
                                                 
73 Henry May, The Enlightenment in America (New York, 1976).  
74 Roy Porter and Mikulas Teich (eds.) The Enlightenment in National Context  (Cambridge, 1981). See 
also  Roy Porter and Mikulas Teich (eds.), Romanticism in National Context (Cambridge, 1988). 
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relationship between Enlightenment and Romantic thought there was a 
transference and use of old doctrines in new contexts, of old forms of 
understanding to accommodate the new and this should ‘force us to keep in mind 
how slow and incomplete are revolutions in thought and how strongly the past 
persists’. 76
As the idea of unity in Enlightenment thought was gradually undermined, 
there came into being new perspectives on the role of religion in the Age of 
Reason. Early studies such as Gay’s had emphasised the decline of religious 
belief and the critical stance of the Enlightenment towards religion during the 
period and consequently assessments of the relationship between religion and 
Enlightenment were few and far between.  The view of the Enlightenment as a 
fiercely anti-religious period, however, has changed.  This is primarily due to the 
fact of the realisation by modern historians that the relationship between religion 
and reason was far more complex than to be based upon the deistic beliefs of 
the French philosophes. 77  
There have been three studies published in recent years in which religion 
and its co-existence with Enlightenment thought have been brought closely into 
focus. A selection of essays edited by Knud Haakonssen which are based upon 
Rational Dissent, later Unitarianism, of the late eighteenth century connects the 
ideas of this radical group to many aspects of the society of the time. 78 The 
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contention of B.W. Young’s volume Religion and Enlightenment in Eighteenth 
Century England : Theological Debate from Locke to Burke is that the English 
Enlightenment was clerical and intellectually conservative in nature, but also not 
averse to stimulating controversy.  It set out to study the arguments within the 
clerical culture rather than the usual ones between clergy and liberal Christians. 
79 The most recent work to explore the subject of religion and reason is one by 
S.J. Barnett which discusses the view that deism was the ‘intellectual solvent’ of 
the eighteenth century. 80 Thus it would appear that the place of religion, whether 
liberal or orthodox, in the Enlightenment is an area of research which is currently 
under expansion, 
There are two studies of religion and Enlightenment in the German context 
which ought to be mentioned here. The most recent, by Thomas Albert Howard, 
explores the thought of the German theologian W.M.L. de Wette (1780-1849) 
and the Swiss-German historian Jacob Burckhardt (1818-1897).  Howard’s 
objective in the study of these two men is to make the point that historicism and 
secularisation did not constitute a break with Europe’s religious heritage. De 
Wette was a theological radical and a historical biblical critic. Burckhardt was a 
theologian turned historian. Through their ideas Howard maintains that his book 
explores the centrality of religious concerns in the emergence of the secular 
historical consciousness. 81  
                                                 
79 B.W. Young, Religion and Enlightenment in Eighteenth-Century England :Theological Debate from 
Locke to Burke (Oxford, 1998). 
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 In linking historical biblical criticism with the secular historical 
consciousness of the nineteenth century, the second study is in many respects in 
a similar vein. Peter Hanns Reill’s The German Enlightenment and the Rise of 
Historicism  brings to light aspects of the German Enlightenment through the 
work of writers and historical biblical critics such as J.D. Michaelis ( 1717-1791), 
J.S. Semler (1725-1891) and many others. Reill’s analysis deals with a specific 
group of thinkers in a particular context, whose ideas were disseminated through 
the creation of that form of historical consciousness related to German 
Romanticism. 82  It is also Reill’s concern to emphasise the importance of 
religious change and its influence over the philosophical, historical and cultural 
outlooks which blossomed in the Romantic Age. This work is particularly relevant 
to  this thesis because it deals with the work of German scholars whose ideas 
were well  known to the radical thinkers of English Unitarianism. 
 The study which follows here, of the nature and extent of the transition of 
the thought of the Unitarian historian John Kenrick from an Enlightenment 
background to an acceptance of more Romantic forms of thought, is different, 
however, in that it deals with the thought of one person rather than a group. It is a 
microcosmic analysis of aspects of one scholar’s intellectual development in the 
early decades of the nineteenth century. It does share with Reill’s study the 
desire to show how religious concerns, deeply felt, are able to influence the re-
formation of old ideas into an accommodation with the new.  The thought of John 
Kenrick did undergo a significant degree of transformation from Enlightenment 
values to Romantic ideas during his productive lifetime. These changes were 
                                                 
82 Reill, The German Enlightenment. 
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brought about by a number of influences, but of great importance to the direction 
of his thought were the concepts of the Unitarianism to which he adhered all his 
life. John Kenrick’s experience is a good example of how religious beliefs are 
able to project themselves into secular thinking and alter the course of the 
development of a single mind in some ways which may be quite unexpected. 
 Because the Unitarian tradition and its theological beliefs were of great 
influence on Kenrick in his encounters with other intellectual forms, the thesis is 
structured in a particular way.  The first three substantive chapters are in the 
main related to aspects of Unitarianism in general, while the following three are 
concerned with the thought of John Kenrick himself. The structure owes much to 
the idea of the importance of context in the history of ideas in the work of J.W. 
Burrow, A Liberal Descent. 83 Burrow argued that it is less than helpful to 
concentrate exclusively on the work of an individual historian without close study 
of the context in which he worked. Those who do so miss a point that is central to 
intellectual history, which is that understanding a past author requires not simply 
attention to his context, but very close attention.  The study of contexts 
themselves need examination of other texts and authors in order to establish the 
intellectual framework within which the object of study worked. Burrow argues 
that this approach will help to produce a ‘sense of the complex ways in which 
individuals respond to, assimilate and reshape the materials of their intellectual 
milieu’. 84
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        With the importance of the context in mind, the method of the thesis also 
owes a great deal to the advice of  Quentin Skinner to the historian of ideas. The 
historian should be directed towards an understanding of ‘seeing things their 
way’ and attempting to discover the intentionality and motivations which lay 
behind each utterance of the subject of study. 85 Skinner believes correctly that if 
we wish to understand any text we ought to be able to give an account not 
merely of the meaning of what was said or written, but also of what the writer 
may have actually meant  by saying what he did. 86 The understanding of texts 
presupposes the grasp of what they were intended to mean and of how that 
meaning was intended to be understood by others at the time. 87 This cannot 
happen unless the writer of the text is understood within his own context. 
 Both Burrow and Skinner emphasise in their own way the crucial 
importance of context in the history of ideas. The following study of John 
Kenrick’s thought has been structured around their arguments for two reasons. 
Firstly, the objective here is to establish the fact that Socinianism of the kind that 
Joseph Priestley expounded was a unique form of religious thought which was 
centred upon a monistic perspective on reality. It took this form for particular 
theological reasons and it projected these into the significant tradition of historical 
biblical criticism in Socinian circles which had grown during the eighteenth 
century in England.  Secondly, the context  having been firmly established, it will 
become clear that in some instances the framework, or conceptual ‘shape’ of this 
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form of religious belief was maintained by John Kenrick when he encountered 
other intellectual influences during his life.  The Unitarian frame of mind was 
dominant in his response to changing intellectual circumstances and 
consequently was responsible for accommodating and reshaping some of the 
new ideas in certain distinctive ways.  
         Thus, Burrow’s method is useful, for the establishment of a context which 
includes textual evidence from other writers gives a validity and understanding of 
the ideas of the emergent writer when he encounters fresh influences. Skinner’s 
view is invaluable also. It is crucial to understand the Unitarian frame of mind, for 
otherwise the historian would be unable to grasp how and why Kenrick re-
moulded other ideas in the way that he did.  The use of these methods in tracing 
the  interactions between Kenrick’s Unitarianism and other intellectual influences 
of the time goes a long way to revealing that the contrast between Enlightenment 
and Romantic thought is often over-emphasised by more general studies. 
 This study of John Kenrick’s work and thought involved not only readings 
of his own published and unpublished material, but also required the scrutiny of 
texts by other writers, including Joseph Priestley, Richard Price and others of the 
Unitarian persuasion.  A full list of material relating to them and to Kenrick himself 
is given in the bibliography, but some general points merit discussion here.  
Between 1807 and 1868, John Kenrick published articles and books on biblical 
criticism, classical philology, ancient history, archaeology, Unitarianism and many 
other topics.  His philological works, on Greek and Latin grammar, were 
published in the years following his studies in Germany in 1819-1820.  His 
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historical works were written later. Primæval History appeared in 1846, and his 
other two major historical works, Ancient Egypt Under the Pharaohs  and 
Phœnicia, were published 1850 and 1855 respectively.  
         Primæval History was not so much a historical work as the results of a 
radical thinker’s encounter with the problem of Genesis in the face of the new 
discoveries of geology, physiology and philology of the mid- nineteenth century. 
Kenrick was a brilliant scholar and usually a writer of well-structured and 
coherent arguments, but this particular work, which is rather opaque, requires 
some effort to ascertain his opinions on the controversial subjects he has tackled. 
Not only did it reveal something of his views on the validity of the ancient Hebrew 
writings, but it also indicated what were his opinions on the origins of man and 
the relationship between religion and science. The other two histories, of Egypt 
and Phœnicia, are more straightforward in their content, but are nevertheless 
ahead of their time in that they follow a method of separating out for particular 
attention many different aspects of the ancient states. Later, in the 1850s and 
1860s were published collections of papers, discourses and articles on biblical 
criticism, history and archaeology. 88 The content of these short works on 
historical criticism show how his views on the fundamentals of Unitarian theology 
remained consistent for many years. This gives force to the argument that when 
‘re-formations’ of his thought did take place, they did so when the tenets of the 
Unitarian tradition were still dominant in his mind. 
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 In addition to these separate works there are a number of sermons and 
more than ninety journal articles and reviews which were published over a period 
of sixty one years. They appeared in the Monthly Repository, Christian Reformer, 
Philological Museum, Prospective Review and other journals  and were written 
on a wealth of topics. 89 They ranged from an early appreciation of the German 
critics J.J. Griesbach (1745-1812), Michaelis and Semler, to reviews of the work 
of English historians such as George Grote and T.B. Macaulay. Kenrick wrote 
articles on such diverse topics as Roman obelisks and daemoniacal possession 
in India, on the languages of ancient Greece, on Jewish coins and Hebrew 
palaeography. Also, like many of his contemporaries in the Unitarian 
denomination Kenrick often engaged in controversies on many issues and in 
such articles his views are more often than not very clearly stated. 
 Unpublished manuscripts relating to Kenrick’s life and work are to be 
found in Harris Manchester College in Oxford, where there is a wealth of 
correspondence between himself and his friend George William Wood, the 
trustee of Manchester College.  Although these letters were written mainly on 
practical matters, they give some evidence on Kenrick’s fascination for German 
literature. There were many requests from Kenrick to Wood for the payment of 
bills for the purchase of German books through agents in London and 
Manchester. There are also Kenrick family documents in the Sharpe Papers, in 
the library of University College, London, which include Kenrick’s own 
recollections of his early life, written for his wife in the 1870s. There is some 
correspondence with Charles Beard (1827-1888), the Unitarian who edited the 
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Theological Review, in the library of the University of Liverpool and a few 
personal letters are to be found in the John Rylands University Library in 
Manchester.  
         The largest amount of personal material, however, is kept in Dr Williams’s 
Library in London. This collection contains early essays, including his ‘A 
Specimen of the Application of Historical Principles to the Explanation of the 
Greek Mythology’, written in 1816. 90 This particular essay gives clear evidence 
of the integration of some important ideas with those of the Greek classical 
mythologists.  It was, fortunately, written in longhand, which was sadly not the 
case with the bulk of the material in the Kenrick Papers in Dr Williams’s Library. 
Most of it, including seventeen notebooks containing lecture notes compiled 
during Kenrick’s  teaching career at York and other bundles of folios, including 
those of notes taken in Germany in 1819-1820, were written in Rich’s shorthand. 
There is an appendix to this thesis which explains the background to this form of 
shorthand and the problems it poses for the modern scholar, problems which 
have not been entirely insurmountable. In the appendix is the transcription of an 
important page of a body of material entitled ‘German Literature’.  A full list of all 
John Kenrick’s published and unpublished works, along with those authors who 
provided the context for his intellectual development, is to be found in the 
bibliography. 
 The purpose of this thesis is to trace, through the work of John Kenrick, 
the outlines of his transition from the context of the eighteenth century 
Enlightenment to the more Romantic ideas of the nineteenth century. These 
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ideas emerged in his treatment of ancient history and myth, in his understanding 
of language and in his views on the origins of man and the relationship between 
reason and faith. The contention here is that the work of John Kenrick reveals an 
intellectual journey from the rational, mechanical, monist milieu established by 
Joseph Priestley in the later eighteenth century to a new frame of mind 
dominated by a dualist perspective on reason and faith which reflected the ideas 
of the latter half of the following century. It is hoped that the thesis will show 
something of how his Unitarianism interacted with various complex forms of 
influence from both German and English Romantic thought to produce this new 
frame of mind. The method here is to consider to a considerable extent the 
context from which John Kenrick emerged as a scholar and thereafter how that 
affected his historical and theological conclusions. This study, unlike many which 
are devoted to the generalisations of the interaction between the Enlightenment 






 THE RADICAL INTELLECTUAL BACKGROUND : A DIVIDED LEGACY 
 
 
 The ideas of Rational Dissenters, whose successors were to become 
known as Unitarians, were an important source of radical English Enlightenment 
thought from the early decades of the eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth century. 
However, this group cannot be seen in terms of philosophy, politics or theology 
as a homogeneous body of thinkers.  A key characteristic of Rational Dissent 
was the principle of free inquiry, and consequently these influential intellectuals 
presented many different perspectives on the issues of the period. Within this 
wide spectrum of new ideas in the eighteenth century, however, may be detected 
two distinctive strains of radical thought which had polarised by its closing 
decades. 
 It is important to determine the nature of these, for one of them provides a 
point of reference from which the changes which had taken place by the mid 
nineteenth century in Unitarian thought in general, and in John Kenrick’s in 
particular, may be assessed. That strain of thought which forms a base from 
which to consider the nature and extent of change is the one related to Joseph 
Priestley (1733-1804). Priestley’s frame of mind is important to understand also 
because he was a towering influence on Rational Dissent and Unitarianism 
throughout this earlier period, and also well into the nineteenth century.  The 
method employed here to reveal the fundamental nature of Priestley’s intellectual 
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position is to set it against that of Richard Price (1723-1791). In this way a 
comparison may be made between the monism of Priestley and the dualist frame 
of mind which had been adopted by Price.  This discussion will reveal just how 
fundamentally different these two perceptions of reality actually were.  
             It is hoped that the following analysis will contribute in some ways to an 
assessment of the nature and depth of the changes which took place in Unitarian 
thought over the following six or seven decades.  This identification of the nature 
of the intellectual position which supported the Socinianism of Joseph Priestley 
helps to outline important aspects of the context of Unitarian thought from which 
John Kenrick himself emerged as a critic, thinker and historian.  Kenrick’s 
intellectual development took place during the complex transitional period 
between the late eighteenth-century Enlightenment and the Romanticism of the 
following century.  It is hoped that by focusing upon Priestley’s intellectual 
position it may be possible to gain an insight into the essence of his Socinianism 
and to understand the outlines of the form of thought which helped to shape John 
Kenrick’s attitudes over time. 
        In theological terms these two very different frames of mind, dualism and 
monism, manifested themselves in Arianism and Socinianism and may be clearly 
seen in the religious ideas of Price and Priestley 1  The argument presented in 
this chapter is that these two theological positions were supported by two very 
different intellectual structures and indeed it would appear that the ideas of these 
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two thinkers represented a significant division in the radical thought of the 
eighteenth century. 
           It is true that different aspects of Price and Priestley have been discussed 
and compared many times. 2 Often, however, elements of their thought are 
discussed in isolation or, more rarely, the analysis makes linkages between two 
or three aspects of the thought of one or the other. This chapter contains the first 
attempt to outline their different positions in terms of two contrasting strains of 
radical eighteenth-century intellectual development, and to discuss the 
relationship of this collection of perspectives to their different theological beliefs. 
The objective here is to bring together into one conceptual whole the sum of 
parts in the intellectual frameworks which underpinned Price’s Arianism and 
Priestley’s Socinianism. This theological position which was taken by Joseph 
Priestley caused much controversy amongst those of an orthodox persuasion but 
                                                 
2 There are, surprisingly, very few examples of  comparisons between elements of the thought of Richard 
Price and Joseph Priestley, even in the series of journals devoted almost exclusively to their contribution to 
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publication, rarely are the two thinkers compared directly with one another.  Analyses either deal with 
specific aspects on one of the thinkers, or are made with other writers and thinkers of the time. For the 
ideas of Richard Price, see, for example, John Stephens, ‘The Epistemological Strategy of Price’s ‘Review 
of Morals’’, ED,  No. 5, 1986, pp. 39-50, Martin Fitzpatrick, ‘Reflections on a Footnote: Richard Price and 
Love of Country’  ED, No. 6, 1987, pp. 49-58, and John Stephens, ‘Conscience and the Epistemology of 
Morals: Richard Price’s Debt to Joseph Butler’, ED, No 19, 2000, pp. 133-146. For Priestley, see Margaret 
Canovan ‘ Two Concepts of Liberty – Eighteenth Century Style’, PPN, No. 2, 1978, pp. 27-43, in which 
the ideas on freedom stated by the pioneer liberal Joseph Priestley are set against those of  John Brown, an 
Anglican Vicar of Newcastle whose views were derived from the tradition of classical  republicanism.  
Other comparisons concerning the ideas of Priestley and Price tend to be made between one element of 
their own individual thought and another. For discussions about the thought of Joseph Priestley, see, for 
example, James T. Hoecker, ‘Joseph Priestley and the Reification of Religion’ , PPN, No. 2, 1978, pp. 44-
75, Robert E. Schofield, ‘Joseph Priestley : Theology, Physics and Metaphysics’, ED, No. 2, 1983, pp. 69-
81, Karis Müller, ‘Physics and the Deity: The Ideas of  R. Boscovich and J. Priestley’, ED, No. 12, 1993, 
pp. 49-62.  In a more recent article, Robert E. Schofield links Priestley’s monism to his theology and his 
chemistry in the article, ‘Monism, Unitarianism and Phlogiston in Joseph Priestley’s Natural Philosophy’, 
ED, No. 19, 2000, pp. 78-90.  
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was of great influence within radical circles. Those who followed Priestley’s ideas 
rejected the notion of the pre-existence of Christ and favoured instead a form of 
belief which perceived him essentially as an entirely human figure. 3  
 Initially, the chapter will discuss some general points related to   Arianism 
and Socinianism and will outline some aspects of the views of earlier thinkers 
who held these theological positions. It is hoped from this to identify the sources 
of this subsequent polarisation of two radical theological positions and the frames 
of mind which supported them. It will suggest also that throughout the eighteenth 
century in England there were the outlines of two intellectual currents in radical 
Enlightenment thought, one tending to dualism, the other to monism. 
         The discussion will then consider different aspects of the thought of Richard 
Price and Joseph Priestley.  It will show their contrasting perspectives on liberty 
and necessity, the source of moral knowledge and the nature of matter. It will 
expound their ideas on two different political systems, and it will reveal how 
clearly these views supported their theological positions.  The method here is not 
one which tries to trace developments in their thought from a chronological 
perspective, but rather represents a conceptual analysis of the differences 
between elements of their worldviews. There are two primary objectives in this 
discussion,  firstly, to bring together these themes and to relate them to the 
dualist and monist positions of these two thinkers and secondly, by doing so to 
define that particular frame of mind which lay behind the Socinian thought of 
Joseph Priestley. The final part of the chapter will discuss Priestley’s legacy, 
paying particular attention to the Socinianism which was the defining belief of 
                                                 
3 See chapter 3 below. 
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many of the later Unitarian historical biblical critics, including John Kenrick 
himself. 4   
The theological traditions of Arianism and Socinianism, both of which 
rejected orthodox Trinitarianism, were formed long before they were apparent in 
eighteenth-century radical thought.  The concepts surrounding Arianism were 
complex, and their implications for the doctrine of salvation were argued in the 
lengthy Arian controversy of the fourth century.  The debate which followed Arius’ 
contention that Christ was a created being and subordinate to God in an 
ontological sense ended in the year 381, when Christ was declared to be of the 
‘same substance’ as the Father.5  Socinianism, the belief that Christ was no more 
than a human being, was derived from the works of the Italian-born theologian 
Faustus Socinus (1539-1604), whose ideas were introduced into England in the 
seventeenth century. Socinus taught that Christ was a mortal without sin and that 
Christian faith was the belief in the truth of his teachings.  
What Arianism and Socinianism had in common, of course, was an 
antipathy to orthodox ideas about the Trinity of Father, Son and Holy Spirit.  The 
terms on which the two radical anti-orthodox theological positions founded their 
beliefs, however, were fundamentally different. Arians retained the opinion that 
Christ, although subordinate to God, was a divine, created being who had existed 
                                                 
4 See chapter three, below. 
5 Many critics suggest that Arius’ view of God as the source of all created things including Jesus Christ 
himself, owes more to Hellenistic philosophy than to Christian theology. The fourth century debate was 
centred around the role of Christ as Saviour and redeemer of the sins of mankind. If, argued Athanasius, 
Christ was a mere created creature, then he could not redeem another creature and therefore could not be 
the Saviour of humanity.  In the year 381 the debate was settled when the Nicene Creed declared Christ to 
be homoousios, or ‘of the same substance’ as God himself.  A very comprehensive account of the history 
and development of  Arianism may be found in Maurice Wiles, Archetypal Heresy: Arianism Throughout 
the Centuries (Oxford, 1996). For an analysis from both historical and theological perspectives of this 
crucial doctrinal struggle of the fourth century see Rowan Williams, Arius (London, 2001). 
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before his appearance on earth.  This belief tended to carry with it a weight of 
metaphysical speculation on the relationship between Christ and the Father, but 
in addition had a resonance which extended beyond that. Joseph Priestley 
argued that due to its acceptance of the idea of a pre-existent Jesus Christ belief 
in Arianism could be seen as consistent with the idea of the immateriality of the 
human soul, 6 an idea to which he was strongly opposed. 
 The basis for the Socinians’ rejection of the Trinity and also other 
orthodox doctrines such as atonement and original sin was very different from 
and indeed much more radical than, the rationale for Arianism.  Socinianism 
supposed that far from being either one of three divine beings or a creature who 
had existed as a being prior to his earthly lifetime, Christ was no more than 
human. Thus Socinianism not only opposed Trinitarianism, but also rejected all 
Arian notions about the pre-existence of Christ. Consequently, although both 
these radical perspectives on Christian belief opposed orthodox Trinitarian 
doctrine, they nevertheless disagreed also in fundamental terms with one 
another. When he wrote about the period following the council of Nicaea in the 
fourth century, Joseph Priestley remarked that those who maintained belief in the 
simple humanity of Christ were silenced by both Trinitarians and Arians, and 
indeed, ‘of the two, the latter were full as hostile to them as the former’. 7
                                                 
6 See the discussion on the theological positions of Richard Price and Joseph Priestley below. Note, for 
example, the view expressed by Joseph Priestley in the discussion in, ‘A General View of the Arguments 
for the Unity of God and Against the Divinity and Pre-existence of Christ, from Reason, from the 
Scriptures, and From History’, in Tracts Printed and Published by the Unitarian Society for Promoting 
Christian Knowledge and the Practice of Virtue, vol. 1 (London, 1790), p. 189-190.  Here, Priestley argued 
that ‘The doctrine of Christ’s pre-existence goes upon the idea of the possibility, at least, of the pre-
existence of other men, and supposes an immaterial soul in man, altogether independent of the body’. 
 7 Joseph Priestley, A History of the Corruptions of Christianity (London, 1871), p. 26. 
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These two forms of opposition to orthodoxy are present in the theological 
views of the two giants of the English Enlightenment, Isaac Newton (1642-1727), 
who was an Arian, and John Locke (1632-1707) who very probably held Socinian 
views. Newton was notoriously secretive about his theological ideas due to his 
anxieties that radical beliefs might compromise his position and his work. 8 
Consequently there was, and still is, much debate amongst historians about the 
nature of his faith, 9 and many conflicting opinions both amongst Newton’s own 
contemporaries and modern historians. 10  Maurice Wiles argues, however, that it 
was Newton’s reading of a passage of Philippians 11 which confirmed his 
position, for here Newton understood  two forms of worship, one for God the 
Father and the other for the one Lord, the Son.  It is this interpretation, Wiles 
insists, which proved without doubt Newton’s Arianism and his acceptance of 
Christ’s pre-existence .12   
The true nature of John Locke’s theological beliefs is also uncertain. In an 
age which persecuted heresy he would have been reluctant to reveal any 
unorthodox ideas which he held. Although B.W. Young argues that Locke was a 
radical Protestant rather than a Socinian, 13 there is evidence to show that even if 
Locke was not entirely sympathetic to the more radical belief, then he came very 
close. Like John Tillotson (1630-1694), the liberal churchman who became 
Archbishop of Canterbury in 1691, he was accused of Socinianism, in Locke’s 
                                                 
8 Bernard Cohen and Richard Westfall (eds.), Newton (London, 1995), p. 362. 
9 Maurice Wiles, Archetypal Heresy: Arianism Through the Centuries  (Oxford, 1966), pp. 62-164. 
10 Wiles, Archetypal Heresy, pp. 77-93. 
11 Phillipians 2; 5-11. 
12 Ibid., p. 81. 
13 B.W. Young, Religion and Enlightenment in Eighteenth Century England: Theological Debate from 
Locke to Burke  (Oxford, 1998), p.27. 
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case rather famously by the Anglican Calvinist John Edwards, against whose 
allegations he protested. 14 In his denials, however, Locke never used the most 
obvious defence of all, which would have been to come out in favour of 
Trinitarianism and other orthodox doctrines.  When Locke was accused of 
heterodox opinions, he never affirmed his belief in the doctrine in question, but 
rather denied that he had denied it. 15     
          However, while Locke resorted to such evasions in confrontational 
situations, in his writings he did reveal evidence of his religious tendencies. John 
Marshall points out that as early as 1684 Locke argued that education 
determined a man’s level of virtue and believes that this places him firmly in the 
Socinian camp on the question of man’s sinful inheritance. 16  The evidence for 
Locke’s Socinianism, however, is not purely textual. Locke read many Socinian 
works and associated with many other liberal theologians both in England and 
abroad. Mario Montuori cites a letter in French from Locke to the Dutch Arminian 
theologian Philip van Limborch (1633-1712) as evidence of Locke’s Socinianism, 
for he believes it contains an explicit confession of Locke’s position on the 
question of the nature of the Word in Christ. 17  However, it is not only many 
modern writers who believe in Locke’s Socinianism.  The nineteenth-century 
                                                 
14 John Locke, A Vindication of the Reasonableness of Christianity As Delivered in the Scriptures, in, The 
Works of John Locke, 10 vols [1823], Reprint (Darmstadt, 1963), vol. vii, pp. 159-190. 
15 Gerard Reedy, The Bible and Reason: Anglicans and Scripture in Late Seventeenth Century England 
(Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 1985), p. 135.  Locke’s evasion is evident, for when challenged that he denies 
Christ’s death as satisfaction for the sins of mankind and is therefore a Socinian, Locke makes no 
commitment to an orthodox position and writes instead that, ‘because I have not set down all that this 
author perhaps would have done, therefore I am a Socinian. But what if I should say, I set down as much as 
my argument required, and yet am no Socinian?  Would he, from my silence and omission, give me the lie, 
and say, I am one?’ See Locke, Reasonableness of Christianity, p. 163. 
16 John Marshall, John Locke: Resistance, Religion and Responsibility (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 343-345, pp. 
397-398 and pp. 414-415. 
17 Mario Montuori, John Locke on Toleration and the Unity of God (Amsterdam, 1983), pp. 124-126. See 
esp. pp. 124-125, note 16. 
 49
Unitarian biographer, Alexander Gordon, wrote with some conviction that Locke 
‘may pass for the Socinus of his age’. 18  
There are also distinct contrasts between the opinions of Newton and 
Locke about the nature of matter. Many of Newton’s ideas altered during his 
lifetime, and there was disagreement for a long period amongst historians of 
science about Newton’s exact position on the problem of matter. The crucial 
question was whether Newton thought particles were inactive and impenetrable, 
or whether they shared something in common with an immaterial world. There 
now, however, appears to be a consensus that he in fact consistently maintained 
a belief in the inertial homogeneity of matter, and thought therefore that that 
matter was inactive and impenetrable. 19 Consequently, in Newton’s world, 
matter and the immaterial, whether spirit or soul, were separate from the 
material, and as an Arian in theology, believing in the pre-existence of Christ, he 
may have felt at ease with such a conclusion.  
Contrastingly, it appears that Locke at the very least may have considered 
the idea of the interaction between matter and the immaterial. Although he 
seems to have been firmly of the opinion that thought could not be a property of 
matter, he did believe in the possibility that ‘God can…superadd to matter a 
                                                 
18 Alexander Gordon, Heads of Unitarian History (London, 1895), p. 31.  To quote Gordon in full, he 
writes of Locke that, ‘There was the same lay disengagement from scholasticism, the same purpose of 
toleration tempered by prudence, the same interest in the minimising of essentials, and the same recurrence 
to Scripture, interpreted (that is to say, rationalised) by common sense rather than by profound exegesis.’ 
Gordon asserts that Locke’s simplification of the idea of Jesus as Messiah was accepted eagerly by liberal 
Dissenters as an undisputed axiom. Gordon writes also that the mode of thinking contained in Locke’s 
posthumous Paraphrases of St. Paul (1705-1707) culminated a century later in works such as the Improved 
Version of the New Testament (1808), and The Epistles of Paul the Apostle, Translated with An Exposition 
and Notes (1822) by the Unitarian commentator Thomas Belsham (1750-1829). 
19 Betty Jo Teeter Dobbs, ‘Newton’s Alchemy and his Theory of Matter’, in Cohen and Westfall (eds.), 
Newton, pp. 316-317. 
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faculty of thinking’. 20 Locke’s other contentious suggestion was that immateriality 
was not necessary for immortality. 21  Such ideas, which hinted at a belief in a 
form of materialism, caused much controversy at the time and engendered great 
interest amongst the French philosophes, particularly Diderot and Condillac.  As 
will become evident, however, it was Joseph Priestley who, in his own original 
approach to the problem, found a way through the ‘thinking matter’ controversy in 
the later eighteenth century. 22
There were other aspects of the intellectual positions of Newton and 
Locke which differed. B.W. Young argues that far from there being a fusion of 
their thought, 23 there is in fact a strong suggestion of the existence of a 
disjunction between the two great thinkers. 24  Young cites the example of the 
different approaches of Newton and Locke to the nature of space and time. While 
Newton emphasised their objective, absolute existence beyond the scope of 
human experience, Locke’s view was based on his own empiricist philosophy. 25 
While Newton was concerned with the absolute veracity of space and time, 
Locke’s interests were in the nature of cognition and in the human perceptions of 
the two factors. 26  
  There is a clear distinction also between the ‘absolute’ nature of God in 
Newton’s Principia and the ‘humanised piety’ of the idea of God as defined by 
                                                 
20 John Locke, The Works of John Locke  (London, 1823), 4,3,6, quoted by  John Yolton, Thinking Matter: 
Materialism in Eighteenth Century Britain  (Oxford, 1984), p. 14. 
21 Ibid., p. 17. 
22 See below. 
23  Young, Religion and Enlightenment, pp. 83-86. 
24 Ibid., p. 87. 
25 Ibid., p. 89.  Following Young’s suggestion, see also W. von Leyden, ‘History and the Concept of 
Relative Time’, HT, vol.2 (1962), pp. 263-285.  Note also pp. 264-268 in which the author discusses the 
question of relativity in the question of the moral law in Locke’s thought. 
26 Young, Religion and Enlightenment, p. 92. 
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Locke the empiricist. 27 Thus there are in theology, natural philosophy and 
epistemology indications of some important differences in the thought of Newton 
and Locke. They reveal contrasting ideas about the nature of matter and about 
space and time, which exist alongside their different theological beliefs. 
Consequently, even before those two Rational Dissenters, Price and Priestley, 
formulated their ideas, there is the suggestion that Arianism and Socinianism 
were associated with two rather different perspectives on the nature of existence. 
 Newton’s Arian beliefs were given expression in a work entitled Scripture 
Doctrine of the Trinity, published in 1712 by the theologian Samuel Clarke (1675-
1729). It is often said that Clarke was to theology what Newton was to physics. 
Clarke argued from an Arian perspective against orthodox Trinitarianism, finding 
in the scriptures no proof to support the complex metaphysical relationships 
required by the latter doctrine. 28  Clarke’s basic position on the question was that 
Christ was pre-existent to his time on earth and, although subordinate to God 
himself, had all the same divine powers.  The unity of God was reflected in the 
Father as the one and only source of all authority. 29  For the orthodox, Samuel 
Clarke’s Arianism was unacceptable because he had reduced Christ to a 
subordinate position in relation to God. Likewise, for the Socinians Clarke’s 
Arianism was equally unpalatable, but this time on the basis that he believed in 
the pre-existence of Christ and gave him the divine status which they asserted 
was not proved by scripture. 
                                                 
27 Ibid., p. 98. 
28 J. Hay Colligan, The Arian Movement in England  (Manchester, 1913), pp. 36-38. 
29 Wiles, Archetypal Heresy, p. 112. 
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The radical theological work which gave force to the Socinian view was 
the Letter on the Logos. It was written in 1730 by the Nonconformist divine 
Nathaniel Lardner (1684-1768) but not, however, published until almost thirty 
years later, in 1759. 30 Lardner’s discussion followed the Lockean tradition of 
reliance upon scripture alone as a guide to doctrine. It was directed towards the 
question as to whether the Logos, which Arians understood as a pre-existent 
created spirit and subordinate agent in the creation of the world, actually 
occupied the place of a human soul in the person of Jesus Christ.  Lardner 
argued that the Arian position was wrong, and came up with some very 
persuasive arguments to prove his point. For example, he asked how could it be 
that Christ could be tempted, by the offer of those earthly kingdoms he himself 
was responsible for creating?  
Lardner’s ingenious arguments were hidden from all but a few for almost 
thirty years, but after its publication in 1759, his treatise symbolised ‘a 
memorable epoch in the history and progress of religious truth’. 31  His volume, a 
vindication of Socinianism, and Clarke’s treatise on Arianism, put into so many 
words the essence of these two forms of radical theology which differed so 
fundamentally from one another.  Thus there was a long tradition of controversy 
in radical theological circles about the nature of Christ which coalesced in these 
two eighteenth-century works. 
                                                 
30 Lardner’s opinions carried great weight, for he was already highly acclaimed as the scholar who had 
produced the Credibility of the Gospel History in seventeen volumes ( London, 1727-1757).  See Gordon, 
English Unitarian History, pp. 37-38. Also see W. Turner, Lives of Eminent Unitarians, vol. 1  (London, 
1840), pp. 126-163, for a short but useful biographical essay on Lardner. 
31 W. Turner, Lives of Eminent Unitarians, vol. 1, pp. 155-157. 
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  They influenced greatly Price and Priestley, two thinkers who had had 
rather different experiences of the Calvinism of their youth.  Although little 
detailed evidence remains about life in the pious Price family home in 
Glamorgan, it appears that Richard Price’s father, Rice Price, was a high 
Calvinist. 32 This would indicate that he believed in an absolute Divine will and 
sovereignty which held arbitrary sway, expressing itself in  supralapsarianism, 33 
and unconditional election resulting in limited  atonement.  As Richard Price’s 
lifelong friend, William Morgan, wrote ‘The opinions of the one [Richard Price] 
were candid, liberal and benevolent; those of the other [Rice Price] were narrow, 
selfish and gloomy’. 34  Many years later Richard Price wrote to his sister that the 
religion he supported was not one ‘sour or enthusiastical’, but rather one which 
was ‘free from bigotry, superstition and uncharitableness’. 35 The young Price’s 
aversion to his father’s beliefs guided him towards a liberal theology inspired by 
Clarke’s Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity. The story goes that when the elder 
Price found his son reading this work he became enraged and threw the book on 
the fire.   
As an alternative to Calvinism Richard Price chose Arianism as a middle 
way between the orthodoxy of his youth on the one hand and Socinianism on the 
other. His theology was related closely to the Newton-Clarke tradition, and it was 
                                                 
32 D.O. Thomas, The Honest Mind: The Thought and Work of Richard Price  (Oxford, 1977), p.3.  
According to Andrew Fuller, leading Baptist theologian in the latter part of the eighteenth century, High 
Calvinists were ‘more Calvinistic than Calvin himself’. See D. Bruce Hindmarsh, John Newton and the 
English Evangelical Tradition  (Oxford, 1996), pp. 122, 125. 
33 The belief among some High Calvinists that God chose his ‘elect’ for salvation even before the Fall. 
34 William Morgan, quoted from Memoirs of  the Life of the Rev. Richard Price, D.D., F.R.S (London, 
1815), p. 6, in Thomas, Honest Mind, p. 4. 
35 Richard Price, quoted by Caroline E. Williams A Welsh Family (London, 1893), and in Thomas, Honest 
Mind, p. 34. 
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greatly due to the influence of Clarke in particular that Price became an Arian in 
his beliefs. 36   A radical in theology, Price rejected not only the idea of God’s 
absolute and unconditional sovereignty, but also the Calvinist view of 
punishment, its predestinarian elements37 and the determinism they implied.  
 In Price’s conception of God there is an absence of the complete certainty 
about the moral rectitude and authority of the deity which was so characteristic of 
his father’s orthodox faith. Instead, he links his concept of the deity’s goodness to 
the probability theory he learned from the theologian and mathematician Thomas 
Bayes (1702-1761). 38 Price challenged the unquestioning assumption of God’s 
wisdom and virtue by comparing its assumed certainty to the throwing of an 
infinite number of dice, each having an infinite number of faces and cast all 
together an infinite number of times. Although it is ‘infallibly true’ that it will not 
happen, that they will present the same faces each time, ‘ yet [it] may happen’.  39 
Thus, although the chance that God is not always wise and good is utterly 
infinitesimal, the possibility nevertheless still exists that this could be the case.  If 
man were like God he would have certain knowledge of God’s virtue, but 
because he is human he can have only probable knowledge. Consequently, 
                                                 
36 Thomas, Honest Mind, p. 5. 
37 Ibid., p. 6. 
38 Thomas Bayes was the first to use probability theory inductively.  He established a mathematical method 
of calculating from the frequency of past occurrences of an event what chance there was of it happening 
again in the future. Price and Bayes were friends for some years and after Bayes’ death Price published in 
1763 a portion of his work entitled ‘An Essay Towards Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances’, 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, liii, 1764, pp. 370-418.  See Thomas, Honest Mind, p. 
128.  Bayes is reputed to have studied under the French mathematician Abraham de Moivre (1667-1754), 
who was a pioneer in the theory of probability and whose famous work the Doctrine of Chances was 
published in 1718. A French Huguenot, he was jailed after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685 
and on his release fled to England where he became a close friend of Sir Isaac Newton and where he spent 
the rest of his life.   
39 Richard Price, A Review of the Principal Questions in Morals [1787] Reprint (New York, 1974), p. 426. 
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there are suggestions here, both in an ontological and an epistemological sense, 
that God’s goodness cannot be taken for granted.  
On the question of the harsh Calvinist view of eternal punishment  Price’s 
mathematical inclinations are evident.  Assuming there was a future world, it 
would be one where present inequalities will be adjusted and a proper distinction 
made between good and bad men so that ‘In the future state all men shall 
receive an adequate retribution’. 40  Thus, humankind was not subject to a 
predestined fate, for the practice of virtue was the best hope to secure happiness 
‘through every possible future period of our duration’ 41 and all virtuous men 
would be rewarded with salvation and ‘glorious IMMORTALITY’. 42  
Consequently, men were not condemned to pre-ordained bliss or misery, but 
were themselves responsible through their virtue or wickedness for the state of 
their own happiness in a possible future life. Thus Price’s Arianism was 
underpinned by thoughts of probability rather than certainty and a view which 
understood man as an active being in a balanced, rational relationship with his 
maker and with the power to determine his own fate. 
Although he would certainly have read Nathaniel Lardner’s Letter on the 
Logos when it was published anonymously ten years earlier, Joseph Priestley 
very probably owed his final conversion from Arianism to Socinianism to his re-
reading of the work in the year of Lardner’s death, in 1769. 43  Over the period of 
the next few years he announced his new beliefs in a series of pamphlets 
                                                 
40 Richard Price, Dissertation 3, ‘On the Reasons for Expecting that Virtuous Men shall meet after Death in 
a State of Happiness’, in Four Dissertations (London 1768), p. 322. 
41 Ibid., pp. 321-322. 
42 Ibid., p. 324. 
43 Gordon, Heads of Unitarian History, p. 109. 
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published in Leeds. 44  One of his most concise and powerful denunciations of 
orthodox doctrine was made two years after Lardner’s death, in his Appeal to the 
Serious and Candid Professors of Christianity, which was first published in 1771. 
45  Of the doctrine of election he wrote that it was ‘a doctrine of licentiousness, 
and not a doctrine according to godliness.’ 46 Original sin he believed was a 
‘strange doctrine…injurious both to our maker and ourselves’. 47 The doctrine of 
the atonement ‘ arose from the abuse of the figurative language of scripture’, 48 
and the notion of the divinity of Christ was the ‘great corruption of Christianity’. 49  
However, despite his rejection of these pillars of the orthodox Calvinist 
faith  Priestley did nevertheless hold some reverence for the religion of his youth 
and admitted that he ‘feel[s]…disposed to look upon Calvinism with a kind of 
respect’. 50  Such feelings of warmth may in some respects have been generated 
by a youth spent in the care of his beloved aunt, Sarah Keighley, the devout 
Calvinist who brought him up from the age of nine. To Priestley this ‘truly pious 
and excellent woman’ was a ‘true parent’, 51 and indeed he reflected on the 
gratitude he owed to his aunt who, despite her stern faith, was ‘in all respects as 
                                                 
44 Robert E. Schofield, The Enlightenment of Joseph Priestley: A Study of His Life and Work from 1733 to 
1773 ( University Park, Pennsylvania), p. 173. 
45 Joseph Priestley, ‘An Appeal to the Serious and Candid Professors of Christianity’, in Tracts: Printed 
and Published by the Unitarian Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge and the Practice of Virtue 
(London, 1791), pp. 1-56. 
46 Ibid., p. 13. 
47 Ibid., p. 10. 
48 Ibid., p. 43. 
49 Ibid., p. 21. 
50 Joseph Priestley, Disquisitions Relating to Matter and  Spirit and The Doctrine of Philosophical 
Necessity Illustrated [1777] Reprint (New York, 1976). Hereafter Disquisitions and Philosophical 
Necessity. See Philosophical Necessity, p. 163. 
51 Joseph Priestley, quoted in John Towill Rutt, Life and Correspondence of Joseph Priestley, 2 vols 
(London, 1831), vol. 1, p. 7. 
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perfect a human…as I have ever yet been acquainted with’. 52 It is perhaps this 
good relationship in his early life which explains Priestley’s accommodation with 
certain aspects of the faith of his childhood. In any analysis concerned with the 
history of ideas one should never discount the powerful influences of personal 
experience. 
It may have been some underlying respect for Calvinism which added a 
certain flexibility to Priestley’s approach to the relationship between Calvinist 
ideas about predestination, election, God’s providential designs for the world and 
his doctrine of necessity.  This doctrine did not imply fate, but rather a 
‘mechanism of the mind’ which depended upon motive as determining the 
actions of the will.  By this means, he wrote, from the beginning of the world to 
the ‘consummation of all things’ there is ‘one connected chain of causes and 
effects, originally established by the Deity’. 53  Although he conceded that there 
was a belief of a close connection between necessity and predestination, 
Priestley argued that the two were quite different.  The scheme of necessity had 
been established by infinite wisdom and terminated in the ‘greatest good of the 
whole universe’.  No necessitarian, wrote Priestley, imagined ‘that any of the 
human race will suffer eternally’.54  
  Priestley could not see any resemblance between the two schemes 
‘except that the future happiness or misery of all men are certainly foreknown, 
and appointed by God’. 55  It was in this respect that necessity was almost 
                                                 
52 Priestley, Philosophical Necessity, p. 164. 
53 Ibid., p. xxv. 
54 Ibid., p. 149. 
55 Ibid., pp. 151-153. 
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indistinguishable from the absolute decrees, and he who believed in divine 
providence ‘could not avoid speaking like a necessitarian on the subject’. 56 Thus 
although Priestley condemned the ideas of election and eternal punishment, he 
tended to retain the ‘absoluteness’ of God’s foreknowledge and plans for 
humankind which were  inherent in the Calvinist system.  At no time did he 
question God’s virtue, the Divine will or the absolute sovereignty of God over the 
world. In a sermon given almost a century later, the Unitarian theologian James 
Martineau (1805-1900) commented on this aspect of Priestley’s thought. 
Martineau noted that the ‘exile of Pennsylvania’ had vindicated the Sovereignty 
of the universal Father’, for in Priestley’s mind 
 it is plain, the “eternal decrees” have not yet  
 taken their departure; by the touch of benevolence 
 they have lost indeed their cruelty, but not their 
 absoluteness 57
Thus Priestley’s emergence from Calvinism was different in important respects 
from that of Richard Price.  Price took a radical anti-Calvinist position and 
undermined the absolute sovereignty of God by locating the answer to the 
question of his wisdom and virtue in the realms of probability.  For Priestley, on 
the other hand, God’s wisdom and virtue were certain, as was his plan for the 
world.  This would come about by God’s superintendence over the operation of a 
vast, seamless and unbroken chain of cause and effect, a ‘means’ which would 
                                                 
56 Ibid., p. 130. 
57 James Martineau, The Three Stages of Unitarian Theology: A Sermon, Preached at the Annual Meeting 
of the British and Foreign Unitarian Association in Unity Church, Islington, May 19, 1869 (London, 1869), 
pp. 11-12. 
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finally bring about an ‘end’ which comprised the best possible future in the 
universe. Thus Price and Priestley emerged from the Calvinism of their youth 
with two rather different ideas about God, one tinged with uncertainty, the other 
joyously confident in the omnipotence and virtue of the Deity. 
 These two different visions of God had profound effects on the formation 
of their ideas in other respects. Although both their names are synonymous with 
ideas of liberty, toleration and the spirit of free inquiry,  they had two quite 
different concepts of the nature of freedom itself.  Indeed their contrasting 
opinions about philosophical liberty and philosophical necessity formed the basis 
of one of the most compelling intellectual arguments of the eighteenth century. 58  
        As we know, Price completely rejected Calvinist predestinarian doctrines in 
which man was merely the impotent subject of an all-powerful and arbitrary God. 
He believed that God was honoured more if he was seen as a parent, guide, 
governor and judge of ‘free beings formed after his own image, with powers of 
reason and self-determination’. 59 This was entirely preferable, Price wrote, to a 
perception of the Deity as the operator of a system of conscious machinery or the 
‘mover and controller of a universe of puppets’. 60  Price’s perception of man was 
more normative and for him man as an individual was a free, rational agent in 
whom the mind was active. Rather than will and action being the direct 
mechanistic effects of a motivational cause, Price’s view was that the mind 
determined itself according to the motives which were presented to it. 
                                                 
58 See Richard Price, A Free Discussion of the Doctrines of Materialism and Philosophical Necessity, in 
Correspondence with Joseph Priestley [London, 1788] Reprint (New York, 1976).  
59 Price, Free Discussion,  p. 158. 
60 Ibid. 
 60
        For Priestley, however, whose idea of the system whereby God’s will works 
in the world was much more absolute, the concept of self-determination was 
impossible because the implication was that it was not directly the result of a 
motivational cause.  His conviction was that ‘it must have a certain or necessary 
cause, arising from views of things present to the mind,’ 61 otherwise it 
constituted a break in the all-important causal chain.  Price disagreed.  To assert 
self-determination is to claim liberty and, in any case, he asked, ‘does it follow 
that because I am myself the cause, there is no cause?’ 62 For Price, self-
determination was an active assertion of the mind and not a change of state 
which had been stamped upon it and over which the mind had no power.  Were 
the latter the case, rather than being the agent, the mind was simply a passive 
object of agency. 63  For Price, man was a self-motivating being in whom the 
mind determined its own actions, and in his view Priestley’s necessitarian system 
implied that man was nothing more than a machine. 64
 Price always believed that his friend’s system carried with it the idea that 
man was a passive recipient of natural and physical causes who had no choice 
of action. Priestley, however, had always insisted that he was not a determinist 
and that his necessitarian system did not inhibit the freedom of man to make his 
own decisions and plot his own course.  Priestley’s core doctrine was founded 
upon his belief that man was part of a great interconnected chain of cause and 
effect established and directed by God and subject to God’s plan. The rules of 
                                                 
61 Ibid., p. 129. 
62 Ibid., pp. 135-136. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid., p. 342. 
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the system were that ‘the same consequences should invariably result from the 
same circumstances’. 65  Given that this was the case, a particular cause would 
always produce the same effect and consequently the connection between cause 
and effect ‘is concluded to be invariable, and therefore necessary’. 66  
         It followed, Priestley wrote, that ‘This chain of causes and effects cannot be 
broken’.67  Should it ever be the case that this should take place the very 
argument for the existence of God would be undermined.  God would not be able 
to foresee what would happen to his creation, and therefore could not provide for 
it. If Price’s doctrine, that of philosophical liberty, which breaks the causal chain 
were indeed true, it would undermine ‘ the whole foundation of divine providence  
and moral government’, 68 for then God would not retain the power to guide us to 
the future. 
  Priestley argued, however, that man was not necessarily a passive 
creature deprived by the scheme of necessity of choice with regard to his own 
actions. Men could do and think whatever they pleased ‘both with respect to the 
operations of their minds, and the motions of their bodies’. 69   He wrote that ‘I 
allow to man all the liberty, or power, that is possible in itself’. 70 His point was 
that although man was free to choose his path he was nevertheless subject to 
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the limitations imposed by nature and by God’s design. To illustrate this point, 
Priestley used the river analogy devised by the seventeenth century philosopher 
Thomas Hobbes  (1588-1679) who had described the scheme of necessity as 
being like water descending a channel.  It would be ludicrous, Priestley agreed, 
to imagine that the water was somehow un-free because it could not ascend the 
channel. This it could not do because it was not designed by nature to be 
capable of such a feat. The impediment to the water ascending the channel was 
within the water itself, and consequently the circumstances were not conducive 
to it behaving in any other way than it naturally did. 71  
       It was the same with mankind. Although man has everyday choices, 
whatever direction he takes in life he cannot actually behave in any other way 
than he was intended by God to do. In Priestley’s mind the engine of God’s 
design was represented by the mechanistic causal chain of the scheme of 
necessity.  Within this framework, however, man’s conduct would be as a human 
being who acts upon his ‘view of things’ and his own ‘disposition of mind’. 72
 Priestley, like the American theologian Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758), 
was trying to reconcile the Calvinist idea of God’s will, his sovereignty and his 
plans for mankind with individual freedom. It had long been argued by anti-
Calvinists that if the doctrine of predestination was valid, then man could never 
possess free will, could not be responsible for his actions and therefore could 
commit sin with impunity. In his work Freedom of the Will, published in 1754, in 
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what is now known as the ‘Compatibility Thesis’, 73 Edwards countered this view. 
He proposed that there was no conflict between God’s plan for the world and 
individual moral responsibility, although there were obstructions imposed by 
nature. A simple example would be that of an animal who does not possess the 
qualities which make it possible for the creature to make moral judgements. In 
the same way humans had their own limitations, with regard to ‘such necessity 
as men are under through the force of natural causes’. 74  
         Priestley’s mentor, the philosopher David Hartley (1705-1757), put it rather 
differently, but one may detect the similarity of his analysis of these concepts of 
freedom.  Hartley proposed that in the discussion of human freedom there were 
two different languages.  One was popular and practical and concerned with 
everyday use in which an individual was held responsible for his actions, the 
other was philosophical and related more to complex ideas, processes and 
objectives. 75 While in the popular language, wrote Hartley, man was judged for 
the ‘right and wrong use of his voluntary powers’, at the end of the day ‘the 
actions of man proceed ultimately from God, the one universal cause’.  It was 
absurd, he added, to think that we could mix these two languages. 76 
Accordingly, Priestley’s ideas tried to reconcile individual moral responsibility and 
Divine sovereignty.  Man had the power to choose his own path, but ultimately it 
was granted to God alone the absolute power and will  to bring about perfection 
in the world,  and this was the most vital truth for Priestley. For Price, the 
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essence of philosophical liberty lay in man’s ability to make his own individual 
decisions, and it was this exclusively normative idea of man’s place in the 
scheme of things which was, for Price, the essential truth.  
    Priestley’s scheme of necessity was intrinsic to other aspects of his 
thought.  The idea of a continuous chain of cause and effect in theological terms 
he expanded into two other areas, those of psychology and natural philosophy.  
Consequently, the necessitarian scheme carried profound implications for 
Priestley’s ideas about moral philosophy, and for his important conclusions on 
the nature of matter, both of which differed radically from those of Richard Price. 
  Priestley and Price were as concerned as any other eighteenth century 
thinkers to discover the sources of moral knowledge.  The search for the 
epistemological foundation of ethics was committed to discovering an answer to 
the question as to whether, when one performed a certain action, one was 
impelled by sense experience, feeling, intuition or reason. The first of these 
possible sources was elevated in importance in this period by the fact that an 
important feature of English Enlightenment thought was philosophical empiricism, 
which was the belief that all ideas, including moral ideas, were obtained from the 
impressions of sense which originated in the external world. The various forms of 
empiricism which emerged in eighteenth century thought may be traced to 
Locke’s argument against the concept of innate ideas in his Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding, published in 1690.  
 Common to all empiricist theories was the rejection of substance, which 
was the notion of the existence of a primary reality, a reality which was self-
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sustaining.  Joseph Priestley’s moral theory belonged to the Lockean empiricist 
tradition, while that of Richard Price was founded upon the idea that human 
intuition and reason could access an objective source of moral knowledge.  
Price’s ideas therefore rejected pure empiricism to assert that moral knowledge 
was gained from a rational faculty which existed independently of the senses. It 
is within this area of their thought that may be discerned tendencies towards 
dualism in Price and monism in Priestley. 
Priestley responded naturally to the work of David Hartley, most of whose 
propositions he adopted in full.77  Hartley, following the empiricist system of 
Locke, expounded the theory that all mental phenomena, including moral 
knowledge, could be explained by the association of ideas. Hartley wrote that all 
the pleasures and pains of sensation, imagination, ambition, and sympathy, 
would actually create in man a moral sense which carried with it its own authority 
and ‘all reasoning, as well as affection, is the mere result of association’. 78 It was 
in the work of David Hartley that Priestley found the ideal mechanism to convert 
his own ideas into a theory of moral progress, for Priestley was attracted to the 
unbroken cohesion of the idea of association and the simplicity of the hypothesis. 
79  All this was based upon the empiricist doctrine of the impressions of sense as 
the source of knowledge, the key concepts of which were common to both 
Hartley and Priestley.   
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The reasoning behind the whole system which Priestley adopted from 
David Hartley was that since men were all products of nature they were all 
designed in a similar way and were therefore equally responsive to the action of 
circumstance. Accordingly, wrote Priestley ‘the distinction between things natural 
and moral intirely ceases on the scheme of necessity’. 80 The improvement of 
man’s moral ideas was dependent on a process which was simultaneously 
natural and mechanical and directed by God. The process, which operated in 
tandem with the laws of natural philosophy, in time would facilitate the smoothing 
away of all particular differences of attitude and behaviour.  Accordingly, Leslie 
Stephen’s opinion of Hartley was that ‘He seeks to do for human nature what 
Newton did for the solar system.  Association is for man what gravitation is for 
the planets’. 81   
The knowledge of virtue would come about by means of a process of 
abstraction in which the particulars of sense coalesced into general, universal 
laws. According to Priestley, so ‘exquisite’ is the structure of our minds, ‘that a 
whole group of ideas shall so perfectly coalesce into one, as to appear but a 
simple idea’. 82  These simple ideas became abstract and it was these moral 
abstractions which then guided man’s behaviour. 83  Thus for Hartley and 
Priestley moral knowledge was distilled from man’s sense experience into a 
general law which would be ‘found to govern both the material and intellectual 
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world’. 84 It was the coincidence of all these particular ideas derived from sense 
experience which created the criteria for moral truth and ethical behaviour.  
The other important aspect of Priestley’s moral system was the highly 
optimistic assumption that men would associate virtue with pleasure and also 
with the loftier objectives in life and would eventually reach, with God’s help, that 
state of perfection which was His plan for mankind.  All men’s better thoughts, of 
sympathy, virtue and compassion would be intensified by association, and 
indeed a negative cycle of bad associations could be broken and a fresh start 
made to re-establish the assumed upward trend in moral improvement.  
Mankind’s association between virtue and joy would result in a cumulative 
progress in human morality which would remove the concept of absolute evil, 
because wickedness would be subsumed in the eventual goodness and 
perfection of human society. All evils were smothered and were therefore ‘really 
and truly annihilated, in the idea of the greater good to which they are 
subservient’. 85  
This theory leaves itself open to the criticism that in Priestley’s moral 
system there was too much emphasis upon the action of the mechanism alone 
and too much confidence in a natural propensity in man to choose a virtuous 
path.  Moreover, the establishment of moral knowledge from a source comprised 
of the impressions of sense alone indicates that in the Priestley-Hartley system, 
moral truth lost its absolute, ontological and objective reality. 86  Indeed, there 
may be room for argument that philosophical empiricism and sense impression 
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as the fundamental sources of moral knowledge, inevitably courted the influence 
of circumstance and particular contexts, implying a tendency towards moral 
relativism. This tendency was averted, however, by the emphasis of both thinkers 
on two crucial factors which justified the use of the associationist mechanism to 
form a moral law. The first of these factors was the general assumption that all 
mankind would equate virtue with pleasure and that this would lead inexorably to 
the formation of a general moral law.  The other was the belief that God worked 
directly on the mind of all in furtherance of his Divine plan. 
 The concept of a series of associationist connections within the human 
mind fitted neatly with that aspect of Priestley’s thought which favoured the 
necessitarian idea of an unbroken chain of cause and effect.  Hartley himself 
made the link between the two, writing that several years after he had begun his 
inquiries he realised that necessity ‘followed from that of association’. 87 Priestley 
too brought together the ideas of necessity, virtue and association when he 
spoke of ‘volition …as preceded and directed by motives’ and of ‘any thing moral’ 
and ‘any thing that could be the proper object of praise or blame’. 88 Clearly, 
Priestley believed that the necessitarian system worked well alongside the 
associationist concepts he learned from Hartley’s psychological approach.  The 
direct influence of God upon humankind in the scheme of necessity was 
extended into the idea of the associationist mechanism which brought about 
moral progress due to the influence of the Deity and to man’s propensity to 
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choose good over evil. Thus the association of ideas, moral progress and the 
system of necessity all interlocked together very neatly.  
The idea that there was an inductive process whereby general moral laws 
were abstracted from sense impressions was not one which was shared by 
Richard Price. Neither did he agree with Priestley’s notion that the source of 
moral knowledge lay within a natural context, for he argued that actions 
proceeding from natural instinct had less moral value than those produced by 
rational reflection. 89  In his analysis of eighteenth century moral thought, D.D. 
Raphael classed Price together with the theologian Samuel Clarke and the 
Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid (1710-1796). 90  Raphael’s opinion was that 
these three thinkers were similar because they all rejected pure empiricism in 
favour of the intuitionist view that moral knowledge is gained by a rational faculty 
which existed independently of the senses. For Price sense could not be the 
arbiter of sense itself and consequently there must be some power within man 
that was superior to sense. Sense, Price wrote, was limited because it presented 
only particulars to the mind and could not grasp general ideas.  That was left to 
the intellect, which examined, compared, and rose to the understanding of 
abstract concepts. 91  
 Price’s contention was that the ability to create abstract ideas was innate 
and it was a power of intuition and reflection within us which was capable of 
                                                 
89 Thomas, Honest Mind, p. 105. 
90 D.D. Raphael, The Moral Sense (London, 1947), pp. 1-2. 
91 Ibid., p. 121. 
 70
discerning the moral truth. 92 For Price, then, moral truth was to be discovered in 
a necessary, immutable, objective source which existed independently of sense.  
D.O. Thomas suggests Samuel Clarke and the Cambridge Platonist Ralph 
Cudworth (1617-1688) were powerful influences on the youthful Price and 
contributed much to his idea of moral knowledge. 93 Samuel Clarke defended the 
idea of an absolute, eternal source of moral truth, as did Cudworth, and both of 
them subscribed also to the notion that this objective truth existed independently 
of God’s will. 94 Likewise, Price upheld the view that there must be an objective 
source of moral rectitude which is a universal law, and also argued the anti-
Calvinist position that this law should also apply to God as ‘ the source and guide 
of all the actions of the Deity himself’. 95
Furthermore, like both Clarke and Cudworth, who believed that the will 
was ‘a blind and dark thing’, 96 neither did Price think that morality had its roots in 
voluntarism, for the will and the emotions were too arbitrary to be the basis of 
ethics, and, ‘No will…can render any thing good and obligatory, which was not 
so…from eternity’. 97  Rather, the foundations of moral knowledge were to be 
discovered in a necessary truth accessible to man’s intuition, a truth which was 
an immutable moral substance. Price wrote that  
 morality is fixed on an immoveable basis, and appears 
 not to be, in any sense factitious; or the arbitrary production 
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 or any power human or divine; but equally everlasting and  
 necessary with all truth and reason. 98
Thus for Richard Price, the source of moral knowledge, which was accessible to 
man’s innate rational intuition, was unchangeable, founded upon necessary 
truths about virtue and reason and was a source which had always existed and 
which was everlasting.  His view was that this source was something objective, 
self existent, pre-existent and independent of the influence of sense impressions.  
Contrastingly, the source of moral knowledge in Priestley’s thought was derived 
from the impressions of sense which, by means of the necessitarian and 
associationist mechanisms, coalesced into a general moral law. The moral law in 
Priestley was a created thing which came into being through human sense 
perception. Price’s ideas about the eternal immutable, pre-existent source of 
moral knowledge would have been congruent with his beliefs as an Arian about 
the pre-existence of Christ. His conviction was that Christ was a being who had 
pre-existed his time on earth and as such was divine and separate in ontological 
terms from ordinary humankind. These characteristics of Price’s ideas give a 
clear indication that the fundamental structure of his thought was dualist in 
nature.  
         For Priestley, however, the moral law came into being through sense.  It 
was moulded under God’s direct influence on the mind of man by the unbroken 
chain of mechanisms which comprised the system of necessity and by the 
human psychological operations of association. This favoured a more cohesive 
concept of the homogeneity of God, man and nature, suggesting a monist view of 
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existence. The scheme of necessity, which, as we have seen, underpinned the 
theory of association and was an important factor in Priestley’s moral theory, also 
evolved as a fundamental element in his general frame of mind and one which 
connected to all other key aspects of his thought. Emphasising their 
interdependence on one another, Priestley wrote that  
  it is my firm persuasion, that the three doctrines, 
  of materialism, of that which is commonly called  
  Socinianism, and of philosophical necessity are equally parts  
  of one system, being equally founded on just observations of  
  nature, and fair deductions from the scriptures 99
From this it is clear that Priestley’s system was a fusion of philosophy, theology 
and natural philosophy, and the doctrine of philosophical necessity, which 
complements his theories on the homogeneity of God and man, is closely tied to 
his ideas on the nature of matter.  
          It is when this particular aspect of the intellectual positions of Priestley and 
Price is considered that the tendencies of the two thinkers towards monism and 
dualism come into even sharper definition. The ideas of Priestley the Socinian, 
who did not believe in the immateriality of the soul or the notion of Christ as a 
pre-existent being, and of Price the Arian, who believed in both these things, 
were both closely related to the natural philosophy of the time. Priestley’s 
theories about the homogeneity of man, God and nature, which were 
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complimentary to his doctrine of necessity, were conducive to a more monist 
position which recognised no gulf between the material and the immaterial. 
 Priestley’s concept of matter was new and original and resulted in a 
monist perception of reality. This came into being by means of his clever 
manipulation of the ideas of the Serbo-Croatian Jesuit mathematician Roger 
Joseph Boscovich (1711 – 1787).  Priestley adopted the theory of matter 
presented  by Boscovich in his Theoria Philosophiae Naturalis, published in 
1758. The Jesuit had devised a new idea of matter derived from the concept of 
the Leibnizian unextended monad, which was perceived as the ultimate unit of 
existence in nature. 100 In Boscovich’s theory matter took the form of a puncta, or 
point which served as the focus for the forces of attraction and repulsion. 
Although this was an entirely new arrangement, Boscovich nevertheless retained 
in his theory the distinction between material and immaterial which underpinned 
the matter-spirit dualism which in turn was crucial to his Catholic religious faith. 
           This particular detail, however, Priestley disregarded, for he had discerned 
in the Jesuit’s theory a way to banish the dualist concept of material and 
immaterial from the universe for good.  Priestley removed the puncta, or ‘points’ 
entirely, because he wrote that the chance of them impinging on one another 
was so little that it ‘needs not to be considered at all’. 101 It was instead the forces 
of attraction and repulsion alone that made matter what it was and without them 
‘it would be nothing at all’. 102 These moves on Priestley’s part greatly angered 
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Boscovich.  Although Priestley had given him appropriate credit for his ideas, 103 
Boscovich believed, nevertheless, that his theory had been dangerously 
distorted. According to Priestley, matter was not an inert, impenetrable 
substance, for it was composed entirely of the forces of attraction and repulsion 
and he wrote that ‘no part of it appears to be impenetrable to other parts’. 104  
With this idea, Priestley believed that the problem of interaction between the 
material and the immaterial had been eliminated, and that his way was now clear 
to prove the homogeneity of matter.  
        Because for Priestley matter was neither solid nor impenetrable, there was 
no longer any clear division between that which was perceived as material and 
concepts related to the immaterial, or spiritual. In some ways it is misleading to 
call Priestley a ‘materialist’ and indeed ‘spirito-materialist’ may be a more 
appropriate description, for indeed he himself wrote that, ‘If they chuse to call my 
matter by the name of spirit, I have no sort of objection’. 105  He pointed out that 
his contention was for there to be ‘such a conjunction of powers in the same 
thing, or substance’. 106 Clearly, Priestley’s thought was characterised by a 
monist approach to existence, an intellectual position which eliminated the 
conceptual division between the physical and immaterial and spiritual worlds.  
         Effectively, Priestley had found an answer to the age-old question of how it 
was that if matter was held to be solid and impenetrable, it could nevertheless be 
influenced and guided by immaterial divine powers.  In Priestley’s view matter 
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was an ever-shifting ebb, flow and perpetual interaction of homogeneous forces 
of uniform composition, 107encompassing God man and nature. No one describes 
the idea of the proximity of the divine and the human in Priestley’s thought better 
than James Martineau, who explained it in terms of threads, all of which ‘are 
interwoven in the same texture, and hold a homogeneous relation to the maker’.  
108  For Priestley the quest for homogenisation and for simplification in all areas 
of analysis was fundamentally important.  This method was consistent with a 
desire to streamline the relationship between God, man and natural  philosophy 
and to define the elements of existence as homogeneous and having the same 
basic structure as outlined by his theory of ‘spirito-materialism’.  The similarity in 
all areas of Priestley’s natural philosophy was a trait correctly described by John 
G. McEvoy as ‘synoptic’. 109  
         It was Priestley’s monist belief in the homogeneous nature of all matter 
which undermined his reputation in the field of chemistry. 110  The difficulty was 
that, in accordance with his passion for the idea of the homogeneity and 
penetrability of matter and with his tendency towards inductive reasoning, 
Priestley, believed that his experiments in chemistry would reveal those salient, 
particular facts which would support his own ideas of general laws governing the 
nature of reality.  He wrote that his chemical work was not simply ‘a business of 
air only’, but was of much greater significance in that it would ‘diffuse light upon 
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the most general principles of natural knowledge’. 111  His fundamental conviction 
that his approach to experimentation ought to be in terms of the uniformity of 
substances  and  the forces of  attraction and repulsion 112 led him to disagree 
with the conclusions of the French chemist  Antoine-Laurent Lavoisier (1743-
1794). 113  
          The new chemistry of the Frenchman explained phenomena by 
combinations of many unique substances, and this was a theory which Priestley 
could not accept. 114  Thus the world moved on and while Lavoisier’s theories 
earned him the title of the ‘father of modern chemistry’, Priestley’s objectivity as a 
chemist was seriously undermined by his obsession with the homogeneity of 
existence and the uniformity of matter. 
 While it is true that Priestley’s innovative ideas on the nature of matter 
fundamentally weakened his chemistry, they nevertheless provided a new 
perspective on the age-old problem of the relationship between mind and matter.  
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As we know, Priestley’s conviction was that all matter was composed of the 
same homogeneous particles subject to the forces of attraction and repulsion. 
We have, he argued, no reason to suppose that ‘there are in man two 
substances….that have no common property’. 115   Mind and matter were the 
same substance. 116  Mind, simply, was the very same matter only differently 
organised, for sensation or perception, wrote Priestley, ‘[is] found in conjunction 
with a certain organised system of matter’. 117  Priestley’s theory of mind as no 
more than a different arrangement of homogeneous matter, made it clear that 
both man’s mental and physical activities were equally subject to divine 
intervention.  
      Finally, like other materialists, Priestley was eager to argue in favour of a 
direct causal connection between sense, motivation, will and action.  This causal 
chain was similar to that in older materialist theories such as those of the French 
encyclopaedist D’Holbach (1723-1789) and his countryman, the physician and 
philosopher La Mettrie (1709-1751). However, while in these thinkers the denial 
of a separate spiritual state in man served to reinforce their atheism, Priestley’s 
spirito-materialist, monist theology served to achieve the opposite, and that was 
to bring God and man closer together. 
       For Priestley, matter as a shifting pattern of forces of attraction and repulsion 
organised according to its different functions, provided an appropriate vehicle for 
the causal chain implicit in his ideas of philosophical necessity and association. 
The power of God’s direction flowed effortlessly along a series of unbreakable 
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links in a chain of being, and there were no ontological gulfs between God and 
man or man and nature.  Matter was not simply one element of existence 
separated from the rest by its solidity and impenetrability.  As envisaged by 
Priestley, matter was characterised by its uniformity, whether it took the form of a 
book, an apple, a good idea or the influence of God.  As such, the same 
‘substance’ constituted no less than the whole of existence, and the result of this 
was a truly monist perception of reality which encompassed and integrated God, 
man and the natural world. 
 In stark contrast, Richard Price’s concept of the nature of existence was 
essentially dualist. This was the case for two reasons. Firstly, for Price, matter 
could not be an active source or substance in its own right, for there had to be a 
non – arbitrary force controlling the laws of the universe. Secondly, matter could 
not be penetrable, otherwise there could be no foundation for Newton’s laws of 
motion.  
        Richard Price was no stranger to the mathematical side of Newtonian 
thought.  He had been taught at Tenter Alley, the leading Dissenting Academy for 
instruction in natural philosophy, by the distinguished mathematician John 
Eames, who had been close to Newton and who had inspired Price’s passion for 
applied mathematics. 118 Following Newton, Price believed there had to be a form 
of necessary truth which existed apart from matter and the material world but 
nevertheless acted upon it. This truth was derived from an immaterial source and 
provided order, balance and stability in nature and in the universe.  Were it not to 
exist, so that there was no such thing as ‘the constant agency upon it [matter] of 
                                                 
118 Thomas, Honest Mind,  pp. 10-11. 
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an intelligent and omnipresent spirit,119 then ‘universal confusion would take 
place, and all nature fall to pieces’. 120  The concept of mechanism alone working 
in some form of matter which was imbued with its own powers was an idea which 
supported the blind, the irrational, the random and the arbitrary.  Active matter 
could not be the singular, primary cause of a rational, ordered universe.  There 
had to exist in addition a superior mind, a self- existent immaterial power, to 
superintend the laws of existence.  Thus Price’s vision of existence was one in 
which a higher, rational, immaterial power acts upon matter in the universe to 
maintain order and stability.  
 The matter which was present in this idea of reality had to be solid and 
impenetrable, otherwise Newton’s laws of motion, upon which ‘All our reasonings 
about bodies and the whole of Natural philosophy are founded,’ 121 would have 
had no meaning whatsoever.  Price wrote that ‘Matter [has to be] figured, 
moveable…inactive [if it is to be] capable of communicating impulse to other 
matter’. 122  In other words one body could not impel another unless the matter of 
which both were composed was inactive, solid and impenetrable. Consequently, 
Newton’s laws, which were necessary truths, proved the impenetrability of matter 
and confirmed the impossibility that it could ever be an active force in its own 
right. Consequently, in Price’s thought there were two separate forms of 
existence.  The first was that which constituted necessary truth and a higher, 
rational power, both of which are within the realm of the immaterial, which itself 
                                                 
119 Richard Price, ‘On Providence’, in Four Dissertations (London, 1768), p. 44. 
120 Ibid., p. 53. 
121 Ibid., pp. 29-30. 
122 Ibid. 
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acts upon matter and superintends all existence.  Secondly, there was matter 
itself, without whose properties of solidity and impenetrability the fundamental 
laws of the universe which governed its behaviour could never function.  Price, 
consequently, had a dualist concept of existence. 
 These two very different perceptions of reality, the one monist, the other 
dualist, each related in a complete sense to the two sets of ideas of Priestley and 
Price on such diverse questions as necessity and philosophical liberty, moral 
philosophy, the relationship between God and man and, in the realms of natural 
philosophy, the interaction between the immaterial and material worlds.  The two 
frames of mind represent contrasting conceptual structures, and they have 
important implications for two remaining areas of their thought, their political 
theories and religious beliefs. 
 As advocates of liberty, both thinkers agreed on the requirement for 
intellectual and religious freedom within any polity.  They also both believed that 
the sine qua non of both of these was the establishment of political liberty. For 
Priestley this meant power over one’s own actions, exemption from society’s 
control and the ‘power of providing for [our] own advantage and happiness’. 123 
For Price, political freedom was the basis of human progress, and indeed, 
 Free governments are the only governments which  
 give scope to the execution of the powers of men and are  
 favourable to their improvement.124
                                                 
123 Joseph Priestley, ‘Essay on the First Principles of Government’,1, quoted by Peter Miller (ed.), Joseph 
Priestley: Political Writings (Cambridge, 1993), p. 12. 
124 Richard Price, Additional Observations on the Nature and Value of Civil Liberty and the War With 
America (1777), p.18, quoted by Thomas, Honest Mind, p. 192. 
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 Although the two thinkers were clearly agreed on the requirement for freedom 
within the polity however, their ideas differed radically on the form government 
should take. The characteristics of their conclusions about the structure of 
political systems were consistent with every other aspect of their thought. 
Priestley believed in the ultimate extinction of the hereditary nobility in favour of a 
wider political input from society in general which would coalesce into a political 
will. Like Rousseau, Priestley expressed the view that the idea of having more 
than one will in any state was absurd. The reason for this in Priestley’s view was 
that when any part of government had an absolute negative on the proceedings 
of the rest ‘all public business may be at a stand’. 125 Indeed, he was prepared to 
uphold the unicameral form of the new French constitution because 
 In every state, as in every single person, there ought to be 
one will, and no important business should be prevented from 
proceeding by any opposite will. 126
In this political statement may be detected the same frame of mind which 
supported an unbroken chain of cause and effect, as in the doctrine of necessity.  
Here, in the affairs of the state and the will of the nation, the political structures 
ought to be seamless and without faction or obstruction and the best vehicle for 
such a function was the unicameral system.  This allowed for a political idea 
which concurred with Priestley’s concepts of  homogeneity and uniformity, and 
one which was in agreement with his  unilinear and monist worldview. 
                                                 
125 Joseph Priestley, Lectures on History and General Policy, to which is Prefixed an Essay on a Course of 
Liberal Education for Civil and Active Life (London, 1793), p. 230. 
126 Joseph Priestley, A political dialogue on the general principles of government (London, 1791)Works, 
XXV, p. 104, quoted by Jenny Graham, ‘Revolutionary Philosopher: The Political Ideas of Joseph Priestley 
(1733-1804): Part 2, ED, no. 9, 1990, p. 26. 
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 Contrastingly, Price does not allow such a one-dimensional concept to 
encroach upon his political system.  Price was a federalist. Not only did he wish 
to retain the federal nature of the new American government, 127 he wrote also of 
his hopes for a similar structure in Europe. Each separate state would conduct its 
own internal affairs but there would be appointed a confederacy with 
representatives from all European states taking the form of a senate which would 
solve disputes and manage common concerns. 128  
          Price also supported the balanced British constitution, with the mixture of 
monarchy, aristocracy and democracy so highly praised by Montesquieu. He 
defended it to the extent of calling on the authority of the Royal prerogative to 
block Fox’s East India Bill. Consequently, although Price believed wholeheartedly 
in representative government, he was happy to include over and above that the 
House of Lords, an assembly of a ‘hereditary council, consisting of men in the 
first rank of the state’ 129 to act as a check on the legislature.  Here, in the idea of 
a collective wisdom which was something inherited rather than created it is 
possible to detect a similarity in his thought to the self-existent, and indeed pre-
existent, source of moral knowledge and authority.  
           Both the mixed constitution and federalism are political systems which 
contain the bicameral element which suggests the need for checks and balances 
by a differently constituted, more elevated authority, and they reflect also ideas of 
order and stability. In such systems, the national will is  tempered and balanced 
                                                 
127 Thomas, Honest Mind, p. 266. 
128 Richard Price, ‘Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty, the Principles of Government, and the 
Justice and Policy of the War with America’, (no page given) quoted by D.O. Thomas (ed), Richard Price: 
Political Writings (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 24-25. 
129 Ibid., pp. 26-27. 
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by the calming voice of wisdom and experience. These principles of equilibrium 
are also inherent in Newton’s concept of the order of the universe and in the 
rational mechanics of his laws. In addition, they reflect the mathematical cast of 
Price’s own mind and also, by indicating his wish for a separately constituted 
higher political body, the inherent dualism in his thought. 
          The notion of the need in the polity for a superior, guiding authority which 
had developed its own inherent wisdom over the centuries was very similar to 
that frame of mind which formed the basis of Price’s moral and philosophical 
ideas.  His idea of moral knowledge was that it could be intuited from a self-
existent, and indeed pre-existent, objective source which formed an 
unchallengeable higher authority.  Furthermore, he conceived of God who was 
the divine guiding influence on mankind, as existing on a higher, separate, 
immaterial dimension, the same realm as that of the pre-existent Christ and as 
that of the spiritual and the human soul. Thus all these characteristics of his 
thought marked his perspective as essentially a dualist one which recognised 
another higher authority  separate from the material world. Although the political 
parameters were somewhat different, of course, the concept of an ‘upper 
chamber’ which was formed on different terms and tempered the decisions of its 
‘lower’ house did reflect the outlines of these more fundamental tenets.  Thus 
Price’s dualism was to be found also in his approach to practical political ideas.  
 Most importantly of all, however, these two different frames of mind served 
as strong supports for the theological beliefs of the two thinkers.  Their conflicting 
ideas on the nature of matter, which illustrated Priestley’s monism and the 
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dualism of Price, were directly connected to the Socinianism of the former and 
the Arianism of the latter. Priestley wrote that the doctrine of Christ’s pre-
existence was integral to the idea of an immaterial soul in man which was 
thought by some to be ‘altogether independent from the body.’ 130 He regarded 
such concepts of the soul, which supported the Arian belief in the pre-existence 
of Christ, as the roots of profound distortions of the Christian religion. He insisted 
that it had been the doctrine of a separate and pre-existent soul derived from 
oriental and Greek philosophies which had resulted in that most awful corruption 
of all, a belief in the pre-existence and divinity of Christ, and all the ‘popish 
doctrines and practices’ 131 which went with it. 
        The whole purpose of his work, Disquisitions Relating to Matter and Spirit, 
published in 1777, was to attack such notions by presenting instead the theory of 
the homogeneity of matter which supported his own theological position. 132 His 
concept of matter was crucial to his theological arguments, for the idea that man 
was wholly material was a vital factor in his belief in the ‘doctrine of the proper, or 
mere humanity of Christ’. His contention was that if no man had a separate soul 
then Christ, who in all other respects appeared as a man, ‘could not have had a 
soul which had existed before the body’. 133
 Priestley’s ingenious arguments in defence of his theory of materialism 
were presented in his Disquisitions 134 and also in Price’s volume a Free 
                                                 
130 Priestley, ‘Arguments for the Unity of God, in Tracts, p. 189. 
131 Price, Free Discussion, p. xvii. This quotation comes from the introduction which Priestley wrote for 
this volume. 
132 See above. 
133 Priestley, ‘Origins of the Soul and the Nature of Matter’, in Disquisitions, p. 355. 
134 Cited above. 
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Discussion of the Doctrines of Materialism and Philosophical Necessity, 
published a year later.135  In the latter volume the two thinkers consolidated the 
main outlines of what had become an on-going debate. They discussed not only 
their conflicting ideas on the nature of matter, but also its relationship with other 
controversial subjects, such as the mortality of the soul, death and resurrection.  
Despite all the philosophical points which were made, the heart of the argument 
was theological and reflected two very different sets of ideas about the nature of 
Christ. 
        Priestley’s aim throughout was to prove that Christ was no more than a 
human being who had never pre-existed whereas Price’s defence of his own 
Arianism was based upon his concept of the separate soul and a pre-existent 
Jesus.  The debate was conducted with great skill, wit and wisdom.  Priestley 
asserted that virtually every one of the most absurd doctrines of the Christian 
faith could be traced back to belief in a separate soul and that Christians should 
then, without concern, leave the topic to philosophers.136  Price observed that 
Priestley wished to eliminate the distinction between matter and spirit, in order to 
destroy what he termed the ‘heathenish system of Christianity, by exploding the 
doctrines of Christ’s pre-existence’. 137   
  Priestley’s idea of a future resurrection of the ‘whole man’ depended on 
the belief that none of the matter of which he was composed was lost after death. 
138  This raised many questions, but on one aspect Price made the salient point 
                                                 
135 Cited above. 
136 Price, Free Discussion, pp. xviii-xix. 
137 Ibid, p. 97. 
138 Ibid., p. 83. 
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that if the matter of life was simply matter differently organised from matter after 
death, as Priestley proposed, then it was no less possible for man to have 
existed ‘ before his birth than it is that he should exist after his death’. 139  
       To this powerful point at first it seemed that Priestley’s reply was almost 
tinged with compromise. In his answer  to Price he wrote that, given that man is a 
‘material system’, 140 he, Priestley, must therefore believe that the materials of 
which man was made had a pre-existence ‘and, consequently, those of the man 
Jesus’. However, he added that this was a very different kind of pre-existence 
from that of ‘those who make Christ…to have pre-existed in an active state’. 141  
Priestley asserted that a hypothesis such as this could never have given rise to 
such corruptions of the Christian religion which were derived from the notion that 
Christ had pre-existed in such a form before his appearance on earth. 
 For Price, however, Christ had existed before his appearance in the world 
‘in a state of dignity and glory’. 142 He contended that that the material universe 
was the lowest part of created existence and designed only as  ‘ the seat and 
receptacle of living and spiritual beings’ 143 who rise above one another ‘ in 
endless gradation from the oyster to the one Supreme’. 144  Man is only one link 
in this chain of being, which is filled with an infinite variety of different classes of 
creatures and therefore ‘Who can doubt whether all above us is alike full. – Let 
us here think of the possible dignity of superior, intelligent beings’. 145  
                                                 
139 Ibid., p. 115. 
140 Ibid., p. 119. 
141 Ibid. 
142 Richard Price, Sermons on the Christian Doctrine ( London, 1787), p. 106. 
143 Ibid, p. 121. 
144 Ibid., p. 122. 
145 Ibid., pp. 122-123. 
 87
 According to Price, the Socinian doctrine of Christ’s simple humanity, 
when seen in relation to the gospel accounts of his exaltation, was little short of 
impossible and indeed rendered ‘ Scripture unintelligible [and] Christianity itself 
incredible’. 146 We are told, wrote Price, that after his resurrection Christ became 
Lord of all heaven and earth, with even the angels subject to him. He would raise 
the dead, judge the world and confer eternal happiness on the virtuous, 
punishing the wicked with everlasting destruction. Is it credible or even possible ‘ 
that a mere man could be advanced at once so high as to be above angels, and 
to be qualified to rule and judge this world’? 147  
  Clearly, although Price and Priestley were both considered radical 
religious thinkers of their time, they were at odds on the question of the nature of 
Christ, for although their two points of view both took anti-Trinitarian positions, 
they were also in conflict with one another. Crucially, these two different 
theological positions of Price and Priestley manifested in terms of religious belief  
two fundamentally different frames of mind, one dualist, and the other, that of 
Priestley, monist. 
        In conclusion, Price’s stance on philosophical liberty and Priestley’s position 
on philosophical necessity defined the terms of the two opposing intellectual 
positions which created this clear division in eighteenth century radical thought.  
Granting to man alone the central role of self-determination in relation to his 
actions, Price broke the chain of cause and effect which was so important to 
Priestley’s concept of God working in the world. The seamlessness of Priestley’s 




worldview showed itself once again in his system of moral philosophy. The 
necessitarian scheme married well with the associationist method of David 
Hartley and this mechanism was responsible for the uninterrupted consolidation 
of the particulars of sense into a form of moral awareness ultimately derived from 
empiricism. Contrastingly, Price believed that moral knowledge lay in a source 
which was separately and differently constituted, and which was eternal, 
immutable and had always existed, and consequently owed nothing to the 
impressions of sense.   
 In turn, these two sets of ideas about moral awareness reflected similar 
structures in their thought concerning the nature of matter.  Priestley’s new 
concept of matter encompassed both the spiritual and the material.  Far from 
being one identifiable element in existence, matter, defined as forces of attraction 
and repulsion, encompassed the whole of existence, and it was this theory which 
showed with great clarity the monism of Priestley’s position. Conversely, Price 
remained firm that matter as such was solid, impenetrable and, according to 
Newton’s laws of motion, acted upon by immaterial forces. Consequently, there 
is in Price a dualist theme which may be detected in other aspects of his thought. 
  Price’s dualism was repeated in his writings on political structures. His 
preference was for federal or mixed constitutions in which the final outcome of 
decision-making was balanced between democratic will and the guidance of the 
wisdom and experience of a differently constituted ‘upper house’. By contrast, 
Priestley’s political thought was concerned with a unicameral system which 
tolerated no opposing view and channelled seamlessly the ‘one will’ of the nation. 
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In turn, all these aspects of the thought of Richard Price and Joseph Priestley 
reflected their theological positions. Price’s idea of the immortality of the soul was 
consistent with his Arianism and his view of Christ as a pre-existent being. 
Priestley’s concept of matter as uniform and homogeneous provided a firm basis 
for  arguments in favour of his Socinianism, which supported the idea of Christ as 
only human. Every aspect of the thought of Richard Price was characterised by 
dualism in that it favoured, in his moral philosophy, his concept of matter, his 
politics and his idea of the nature of Christ, a differently constituted higher 
authority and a separate, immaterial dimension. Price’s thought in some senses 
was hierarchical, providing for various grades of existence from that of the 
humblest material form to that of the highest intellectual, spiritual and immaterial. 
By contrast, the thought of Joseph Priestley, was monist, unilinear and seamless, 
characterised by the idea of a great chain of cause and effect.  It conceived of an 
unbroken flow of existence which accommodated God, man and nature, mind 
and body, life and death, within his new monist system of ‘spirito-materialism’. 
Priestley worked tirelessly to use eighteenth century philosophy and 
natural philosophy to prove that Christ was no more than a mere man. He did this 
because he was firmly convinced that to think otherwise was to lend credence to 
the greatest corruption ever perpetrated on the Christian religion, and that was 
the idea of the pre-existence of Christ. Although he was a polymath, Priestley’s 
theology was for him the most important area of investigation during his lifetime. 
In his efforts to underpin the outlines of his Socinian beliefs with natural 
philosophy he was instrumental in the evolution of a particular form of radical 
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thought which differed fundamentally from that of his friend and fellow radical. 
Priestley’s ideas, however mechanical they were, represented a holistic 
viewpoint and a monist understanding of existence which favoured a union of 
spiritual and material.  It was this vision which enabled him to support his 
passionate belief that Christ had been no more than human. In his justification of 
Socinianism by means of eighteenth century natural philosophy Priestley had 
effectively taken a radical form of religious belief and had integrated it with a 
unique frame of mind which was monist in all respects. 
The Priestleyan system dominated Unitarianism in the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries. It was a theological and philosophical approach which 
attempted to draw together the Divine, the human and the natural world into the 
same frame of existence.  It was a rationalisation of theology and a complete 
integration of man, his moral knowledge, his wants and desires, into the natural 
world. The key to the system was the uniformity of the essence of existence and 
the seamlessness of its function, for it was without ontological divisions. 
Priestley’s philosophical and theological system was one major aspect of the 
context of Unitarianism from which the critic and historian John Kenrick emerged 
in the first decade of the nineteenth century. 
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CHAPTER THREE  
 REASON, RELIGION AND THE ORIGINS OF THE HISTORICAL JESUS. 
 
 
 The monist concept of existence developed by Joseph Priestley was one 
important aspect of Unitarian thought related to the context which helped to 
shape the early ideas of John Kenrick. The second element of the intellectual 
tradition in the later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries which contributed 
to the contextual framework from which Kenrick emerged was the evolution of 
the Socinian propensity for historical biblical criticism. 
  Having tried to prove within the framework of the natural philosophy of his 
age that Jesus Christ had been nothing more than a man, and having attempted 
to justify his Socinian ideas within these terms, Priestley turned his attention to 
historical biblical criticism to find additional evidence to support the case in favour 
of his belief in Christ’s simple humanity.  The two evidential sources, one related 
to natural philosophy and the other to a historical approach, were examined 
closely in pursuit of the need to establish the truth about the Christian faith at the 
time of its origins and with that, the belief that Christ had been only human. In 
Priestley’s view Christianity had been a pure and simple faith before it was 
tainted by the ‘corruptions’ of Greek philosophy which in turn helped to form the 
doctrinal distortions of subsequent ages. Priestley wrote that 
  it is only by purging away the whole of this corrupt 
  leaven, that we can recover the pristine simplicity and  
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  purity of our most excellent and truly rational, though much 
  abused, religion. 1
This quotation comes from a section of Priestley’s preface to his Disquisitions, in 
which he justified the inclusion in that work of a Sequel devoted to a historical 
account of heathen views on the pre-existence of the soul. It had been from this 
source, he believed, that the greatest corruption of all, the idea that Christ had 
pre-existed his time on earth, had been derived. 2  
         This sequel, he wrote, had been composed during his research for 
Disquisitions and indeed ‘rose out of it, and is strictly connected with it’.3  In the 
sequel he contended that it was due to man’s ignorance of God in the early ages 
of the world that the doctrine of the pre-existence of the soul gained ground and it  
is ‘ not from theory alone, but from unquestionable facts’ that this was the case. 4 
He analysed the opinions of Eastern religions on the subject of the soul and 
looked at the influence, particularly  of Greek philosophy, on Christian beliefs. 
When his historical – theological work, A History of the Corruptions of Christianity 
was published five years later, in 1782, this particular sequel was mentioned 
once again in the preface to that publication. At this juncture Priestley wrote that 
he considered the whole of it as part of the plan of Corruptions ‘and essential to 
                                                 
1 Joseph Priestley, Disquisitions Relating to Matter and Spirit and the Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity 
Illustrated [1777], Reprint (New York, 1976), p. xxvi-xxvii. 
2 Ibid., p. xxvi. The full title of the sequel is ‘The History of the Philosophical Doctrine concerning the 
Origin of the Soul, and the Nature of Matter with its Influence on Christianity, especially with respect to 
the Doctrine of the Pre-existence of Christ, being a sequel to the Disquisitions Concerning Matter and 
Spirit,’ in Disquisitions, pp. 241-356. 
3 Priestley, Disquisitions, p. xxvi. 
4 Ibid., p. 244. 
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the principal object of it’.5 Thus this particular section, which was essentially 
historical, was, in Priestley’s own mind, equally relevant for inclusion in either his 
philosophical or his historical-theological works. Consequently, regarding the 
nature of the soul and that of Christ himself, Priestley’s thoughts in terms of 
natural philosophy and in history were complementary to one another in the 
sense that both were rational tools in his elimination of the ideas which he 
believed had corrupted what had originally been a pure and primitive Christian 
faith.  
The objective of this chapter is to examine some aspects of the 
emergence of historical-biblical criticism from the radical English Enlightenment.  
The aim is firstly; to sketch briefly, through the work of some earlier writers, the 
development of aspects of radical thought in terms of historical biblical 
scholarship in the decades prior to Priestley; secondly, to look more closely at 
Priestley’s own contribution to the radical tradition of biblical interpretation in a 
historical sense; thirdly, to examine the approach of some post-Priestleyan critics 
who were also Socinians ; and lastly to consider the method in biblical 
scholarship of their successor, the classical historian John Kenrick, and to 
discover to what extent he may be placed within the same tradition. 
  There are several themes and perspectives which are crucial to the 
discussion. Of major importance is the gradual erosion of commitment to  the 
doctrine of plenary, or verbal inspiration of the scriptures, 6 for by its very nature 
                                                 
5 Joseph Priestley, A History of the Corruptions of Christianity (London, 1871), p. xiii.  This edition was 
reprinted in one volume. 
6 William J. Abraham, The Divine Inspiration of Holy Scripture  (Oxford, 1981), pp. 3-4.  According to the 
idea of plenary, or verbal inspiration, the work of the Holy Spirit is so sensitive that it even results in the 
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as a belief in scripture as the actual word of God, this doctrine is usually at odds 
with rational historical investigation. Clearly, from a Unitarian perspective, the 
idea of the inerrancy of scripture as a theological principle, a notion which 
assisted in the defence of orthodox doctrines, came into some conflict with what 
they saw as a rational, historical interpretation of the Bible, for the historian was 
likely to discover evidence about the past which would differ from the biblical 
narrative. Ted Letis goes further, however, and maintains that the doctrine of 
biblical inspiration was the major barrier to historical criticism. 7  
Another important aspect to be considered is the complexity of the 
different perspectives which were employed in the understanding of the  past 
itself and of the historical biblical criticism of the time. Of relevance is the way in 
which the secular history which related to the life of Christ was used to verify the 
truth of the scriptural accounts themselves.  Also, there is the idea of the 
historical development of doctrine which is closely related to the argument 
expressed in Priestley’s Corruptions. This work presented the idea that the 
original Christian message had been corrupted over time by the formation of 
doctrines which had emerged from the contextual intellectual, philosophical and 
cultural circumstances of later ages. These ‘corruptions’ had to be removed and 
the pure, original form of Christian belief recovered. The biblical historian then 
had to shift the angle of his perspective to confirm the truth of this simple 
Christianity against the background of the customs and beliefs of the time in 
                                                                                                                                                 
choice of one word rather than another. Thus, writes Abraham, the guidance extended to the writers’ choice 
of terminology and consequently the words in the Bible are genuinely the very words of God himself. 
7 Ted Letis, ‘From Sacred Text to Religious Text : An Intellectual History of the Impact of Erasmian Lower 
Criticism on Dogma As a Contribution to the English Enlightenment and the Victorian Crisis of Faith’, 
Unpublished PhD. Thesis, Edinburgh, 1995, p. 292. 
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which it came into being. In this way the historical method would establish the 
origins of this simple, uncorrupted faith and prove its validity historically.  
Consequently, there are to be considered several different configurations of the 
relationship between the scriptural narrative, history and doctrine. 
           The Socinian belief in the simple humanity of Christ was a vital element in 
the rise of historical criticism. Given that Jesus was no more than human then he 
was part of human history and his words and actions could be understood more 
clearly in that context. This reflects the tendency in this period of a drift away 
from doctrinal systems, theological presuppositions, and abstract metaphysically-
founded concepts and towards a rational, concrete historical approach to the 
interpretation and understanding of scripture. In the spirit of Rational Dissent 
there was the idea that scripture contained its own truth, which would be 
discovered in the spirit of free and rational inquiry and that this truth could not be 
‘bent’ or accommodated to any particular form of doctrine or belief. 
 The overall contention of this chapter is that all these factors, the 
diminished belief in plenary inspiration, the removal of the ‘corruptions’ of 
Christianity, the desire to seek out and illuminate the historical origins of a pure 
Christian faith, the unshakeable conviction that Christ was a mere man and a drift 
away from abstract doctrinal systems, were to be found in the world view of 
Socinians in the Priestley tradition. This meant that they were in theological and 
intellectual terms in a unique position to carry out a rational historical 
interpretation of the Bible. 
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      A strictly rational approach to the scriptures had been initiated by John 
Locke, who touched upon several of these themes. Locke’s Letter Concerning 
Toleration, published in 1689 was, according to B.W. Young, the founding text of 
the anti-dogmatic tradition which became characteristic of the earlier eighteenth 
century. 8 Indeed Locke’s The Reasonableness of Christianity as Delivered in the 
Scriptures, published six years later, in 1695, presented the idea that all one 
needed to be a Christian was a simple belief that Jesus was the Messiah. 
Defending the integrity of scripture, Locke wrote that the unbiased should read it 
without ‘such learned, artificial and forced senses of them, as are …put upon 
them, in most of the systems of divinity’. 9  
        Christianity could not be improved upon by those who constructed systems 
of doctrine. It was wrong, he added, to ‘cull out, as best suits our system’ either a 
period or verse and to regard them as aphorisms and make them ‘the 
fundamental articles of the Christian faith’.10  Instead, the scriptures should be 
regarded as a ‘collection of writings, designed by God, for the instruction of … 
mankind’, and should be understood in the plain meaning of the words used by 
the speakers according to the ‘language of that time and country wherein they 
lived’.11 Here Locke saw no contradiction between the word of God in the 
scriptures and the language of man in a specific historical context and indeed 
with regard to the question of inspiration he revealed that he knew ‘no other 
                                                 
8 B.W. Young, Religion and Enlightenment in Eighteenth Century England; Theological Debate from 
Locke to Burke  (Oxford, 1999), p. 24. 
9 John Locke, ‘The Reasonableness of Christianity as Delivered in the Scriptures’, in The Works of John 
Locke, 10 vols [1823], Reprint (Darmstadt, 1963), vol. vii, p. 5. 
10 Ibid., p. 152. 
11 Ibid., p. 5. 
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infallible guide, but the Spirit of God in the Scriptures’.12 Thus Locke advised 
against any preconceived ideas regarding the meaning of scripture, and 
recognised the importance of reading it against the background of the context in 
which it was written.  
 On the question of inspiration, neither did the scholar of Old Dissent, Philip 
Doddridge (1702-1752) perceive a tension between the two. Doddridge, who was 
highly influential in the emergence of the Dissenting Academies, studied from 
1719 until 1723 at Kibworth Academy, Leicestershire, under the Independent 
John Jennings. Jennings encouraged free inquiry into all shades of belief, from 
orthodox Calvinism on the one hand to radical Socinianism on the other. In 1729 
Doddridge began an academy of his own in Northampton at which he established 
a radical style of teaching in the Jennings mould and this tradition was carried on 
into the Dissenting academy at Daventry.  At the beginning of his career, in 1724, 
Doddridge described himself as a ‘moderate Calvinist’, and although he admitted 
‘wavering’ towards Arianism on some theological points, this he remained until 
the end of his life. 13  
       Although he did understand inspiration as functioning on various levels, 14 
Doddridge believed in plenary inspiration and he wrote that it should make a 
great impression upon us, ‘to think that we have such a book; a book, written by 
a full divine inspiration…a most authentic and unerring account of 
                                                 
12 Ibid., p. 357. 
13 Alexander Gordon, Addresses Biographical and Historical ( London, 1922 ), pp. 195-196. 
14 Philip Doddridge, A Dissertation on the Inspiration of the New Testament, As Proved by the Facts 
Recorded in the Historical Books of It. To Which is Added a Sketch of the Arguments by Which the 
Inspiration of the Old Testament may be proved in the Easiest Method (London, 1793), pp. 6-10. 
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…important…facts’. 15 This, he insisted, surely contradicted the opinions of some 
who argued that the historical works of the New Testament could have been 
written without any divine assistance at all. Doddridge argued that it was in fact 
because these works of scripture were so accurate in historical terms, not only 
with regard to events and circumstances, but also in relation to Christ’s actual 
works and doctrine, that they had to have been inspired. No ordinary men, 
without the help of divine inspiration, could have done such an expert job. 16 Thus 
for Doddridge, the truth of the historical proved that the doctrine of inspiration 
itself was valid. There was no sense here as yet, as there was emerging in some 
more radical theological circles at the time, that plenary inspiration and the 
historical interpretation of the scriptures did not rest easy with one another.  
         A questioning view on the question of plenary, or verbal, inspiration was 
expressed, albeit in rather subtle terms, by Nathaniel Lardner, whose 
controversial treatise, Letter on the Logos, persuaded Joseph Priestley to 
become a Socinian. 17 In the preface to the first volume of his massive historical 
work, The Credibility of the Gospel History, which was produced in the years 
1727-1757 and was intended to verify the authenticity of the books of the New 
Testament by citing both secular and sacred writers, he wrote that 
  no one may hence surmise, that I give up the inspiration 
  of the books of the New Testament. Nor am I aware, that I 
  have in the lest weakened any argument, that they were  
  written under a special direction and influence of the Spirit 
                                                 
15 Ibid., p. 60. 
16 Ibid., pp. 39-46. 
17 See chapter two, above. 
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  of God. I think, however, that if the Gospel – History be  
  credible, the truth of the Christian Religion cannot be  
  contested. 18
Clearly, Lardner wished to dampen any criticism of his perceived neglect of the 
doctrine of inspiration and this was accompanied by an assurance as to the 
successful outcome of the historical method in defending Christianity. He 
appears aware that there was some tension between belief in the doctrine of 
inspiration and the historical approach, but has, by the rather subtle juxtaposition 
of the two statements, given the last word to history.  
           Almost three decades later, however, in his discussion of the Case of the 
Demoniacs, Mentioned in the New Testament, which was published in 1758, 
Lardner stated some of his opinions more openly. 19 In this particular piece of 
work his opinion was that the idea of possession by evil spirits was a common 
belief at the time, 20 and that the truth was that such afflictions were caused very 
probably by ‘bodily distempers and indispositions’. 21  This ancient belief was like 
others, such as the notion of early Christians that the earth was flat, which had 
been discredited in the light of modern knowledge.  In a similar vein, Lardner 
wrote of the idea of verbal inspiration that he did not consider those enemies 
                                                 
18 Nathaniel Lardner, The Credibility of the Gospel History, or, The Facts Occasionally Mentioned in the 
New Testament Confirmed by Passages of Ancient Authors, Who were Contemporary with our Saviour or 
His Apostles, or Lived Near Their Time, 17 vols (London, 1741), vol. 1, p. x. 
19 Nathaniel Lardner, The Case of the Demoniacs Mentioned in the New Testament: Four Discourses Upon 
Mark v.19, with An Appendix For Further Illustrating the Subject  (London, 1758). See esp. Discourse iii, 
pp. 65 ff. See also William Turner, Lives of Eminent Unitarians (London, 1840), vol. 1, p. 151. 
20 Lardner, Case of the Demoniacs, Discourse iii, p. 70.  
21 Ibid., p. 87. 
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either of mankind or of the scriptures who ‘overthrow the once established 
opinions…that the Scriptures…only use the common way of speaking’. 22  
        This was the kind of inference, wrote the Unitarian biographer William 
Turner, with which Lardner defended in this work ideas which were ‘altogether 
inconsistent with the notions commonly entertained of what is called the plenary 
inspiration of the sacred writers’. 23 Turner believed that Lardner’s response to 
traditional ideas about the inspiration of the Scriptures became more open and 
increasingly sceptical during the thirty years, from 1727 to 1757, in which he 
produced the seventeen volumes of his historical work, Credibility. Although 
Turner’s assertion may have been rather exaggerated, it is clear that there was a 
degree of ambiguity in Lardner’s mind on the question of inspiration.  
 Much more certain was Lardner’s clear enthusiasm for historical 
interpretation as a method of proving the scriptural accounts.  He pointed out that 
the evidence of the truth of any history was both internal and external. In the 
case of the New Testament these two categories related respectively to what he 
calls ‘Principal’ and ‘Occasional’ facts. 24 The former comprised the story of 
Christ’s life and ministry, while the latter were those historical facts mentioned 
briefly within that story which connected it to the contemporary historical context.  
His idea was to verify the truth of the New Testament by scrutinising the work of 
secular and non-Christian scholars.  Their objective observations would support 
its ‘external’ history by mentioning those facts, and the customs, events and 
                                                 
22 Ibid., p. 69.  
23 Turner, Eminent Unitarians, vol.1, p 151. 
24 Lardner, Credibility, vol. 1, pp. v, 3. 
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circumstances which formed the background to the gospel stories. 25 
Consequently, he extended the boundaries of his scholarship outside the New 
Testament narrative to include evidence from the secular historical world. 26  
       Lardner’s Credibility was a work of ‘no ordinary magnitude’, 27 and stood 
head and shoulders above the efforts of contemporary scholars to follow a similar 
line of inquiry. 28 It set out to trace, through scholarly testimonies, the trail of 
historical evidence which proved that the New Testament was genuine, and that 
the books had been written by those whose names they bore. 29 In a general 
sense it widened the whole historical perspective on the Christian story. Right 
from the start, his findings were clear, and in the conclusion to the second 
volume he wrote that the account given by sacred writers had been confirmed by 
other ancient authors and he had found nothing in the books of the New 
                                                 
25 Ibid., pp. 1-7. 
26 Lardner was not the first to produce a work of this nature. Indeed, he was only too eager to give credit to 
his predecessors this form of historical biblical scholarship. In the preface to his work A Large Collection 
of Ancient Jewish and Heathen Testimonies to the Truth of the Christian Religion  (London, 1764), p. vii, 
Lardner singles out a treatise by a French Jesuit called Dominique Colonia, entitled The Christian Religion 
Confirmed by the Testimonies of Ancient Pagan Authors (Lyon, 1718). Lardner writes that this work bears 
a great resemblance to his own and credits Colonia with ‘learning and zeal. ..But some allowances must be 
made for the credulity of his church’. Another work in a similar vein published in France was one by 
Tobias Eckhard, entitled The Testimonies of such who are not Christians collected from Ancient 
Monuments (Paris, 1722). Three years later, in 1725, was published yet another treatise which presented 
external evidence of scriptural authority. In chapter 32 of this work, by J.A. Fabricius and entitled Truth of 
the Christian Religion, there appeared a catalogue of Jewish and heathen writers who had supported the 
truth of Christianity.  In 1727 Le Clerc revised Fabricius’ work in his own Bibliotheque Ancienne et 
Moderne and wrote that there were other pagan writers who gave testimonies and described events which 
could be of great use in confirming the truth of the Christian religion. Two years before the final volume of 
Lardner’s Credibility appeared in print, yet another scholarly effort on the same subject was published, in 
1755. This was by Gregory Sharpe, a Fellow of the Society of Antiquaries, and was entitled An Argument 
in Defence of Christianity Taken from the Concessions of the Most Ancient Adversaries, Jews and Pagans, 
Philosophers and Historians. Lardner was quick to point out, however, that this was a very small volume 
of only 166 pages! 
27 Turner, Eminent Unitarians, vol.1, p. 139. 
28 See note 19, above. 
29 Turner,  Eminent Unitarians, vol. 1, pp. 136, 140. 
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Testament ‘unsuitable to the age, in which they are supposed to have been writ’. 
30
          He had, he added, been aware of the difficulty, even for the most cautious 
scholar, of preventing allusions from his own age to betray his attempts to write 
about an earlier period in history. 31  However, his view from his findings about 
the agreement of New Testament writers with other ancient scholars was that the 
books were genuine and had come down the ages pure and uncorrupted. His 
firm opinion was that ‘If the history of the New Testament be credible, the 
Christian Religion is true’. 32  Lardner’s opinion of history as a tool for verifying 
the truth of the New Testament accounts had grown in strength and confidence. 
 This pattern was similar in the work of Lardner’s close friend the  Arian 
scholar George Benson (1699-1762), 33 with whom he corresponded regularly on 
theological matters. 34 Indeed the two critics, despite their differences on doctrinal 
questions, 35 regularly contributed to the improvement of each other’s 
productions. 36 Benson, who was brought up in a Calvinist family in Cumberland, 
attended Glasgow University before becoming a Presbyterian minister and a 
scholar who was highly regarded by his contemporaries. Like some writers of the 
seventeenth century Benson had modified the doctrine of plenary inspiration to 
                                                 
30 Lardner, Credibility, vol. 2, (Third Edition, London, 1741), p. 954. 
31 Ibid., p. 955. 
32 Ibid., p. 959. 
33 Turner, Eminent Unitarians, p. 213. 
34 Nathaniel Lardner, Eleven Letters to George Benson, 1743/44 – 1753, JRL ,Unitarian Collection, MS. 
Box Ben, Cupboard B1/10, Benson Collection 2, See, for example, fols. 84, 89 & 91, the latter being on the 
subject of infant baptism. 
35 Lardner, of course, was a Socinian, who believed in the simple humanity of Christ. See chapter two, 
above. 
36 Turner, Eminent Unitarians,  p. 213. 
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regard it as a divine intervention which functioned on a much more general basis 
than the dictation of every word of scripture by God.  
            Like Lardner, he appreciated the importance of historical biblical criticism 
and his method bore significant similarities to that of his friend. Clearly, he had 
learned much from Lardner’s ideas and scholarship, for in the index to a volume 
published by Benson in 1735, and entitled The History of the First Planting of the 
Christian Religion, there were more than fifty references to Lardner’s works.  In 
this three volume publication Benson connected the scriptural content of the Acts 
of the Apostles to the Jewish and Roman history of the time. 37  In the preface to 
the work he wrote that he had abridged the epistles and that they were ‘reduced’ 
as far as was possible to their ‘proper times and places’.38  He considered the 
circumstances of the churches, or persons to whom they had been written, as 
well as the immediate occasion of writing them. It was shown therefore ‘how 
exactly they answer the end, for which they were written’. 39 He added that the 
historical method of carrying down from age to age the divine revelation had 
advantages ‘beyond that of systems, institutes or apostolical canons’, for as the 
scriptures are written 
evidence is interwoven with doctrine; promise with  
precept; advice with threatenings; history with noble  
reflections, and weighty observations; parables with descriptions; 
and the best morals illustrated, by the brightest and most  
                                                 
37 George Benson, The History of the First Planting of the Christian Religion: Taken from the Acts of the 
Apostles, Together with the Remarkable Facts of the Jewish and Roman History; which affected the 
Christians within this Period ( London, 1756). 
38 Ibid., p. iv. 
39 Ibid. 
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distinguished examples.  40  
        If anything, Benson’s perception of the role of history in the interpretation 
and validation of scripture was even more acute than Lardner’s. Lardner’s 
method had been to verify the ‘occasional facts’ of the gospel stories with 
evidence from impartial sources, thus adding credibility to the narratives of the 
New Testament. This was important because it had connected scripture with 
historical facts from non-Christian sources and indeed Benson attempted an 
analysis on a similar basis. It does appear from this quotation, however, that 
Benson understood clearly that rather than being an abstract construction of a 
‘system of divinity’, 41 doctrine was closely linked to the historical context within 
which the Epistles were written.     
Some of the most radical thoughts on the subject, however, came some 
three decades later from Joseph Priestley. In general terms, Priestley’s ideas 
were pivotal. They were closely linked to the Lockean tradition of radical 
scholarship which sought to rationalise religion and by doing so to effect an 
accommodation between reason and faith. However, with the development of 
Priestley’s thought came an intensification and further radicalisation of ideas and 
along with those an intertwining of many threads of previous radical opinion on 
the Christian faith. What added weight and significance was the incorporation in 
his theology of the ideas which he had formed within the context of natural 
philosophy. 42 Indeed Priestley’s system of materialism, moral philosophy and 
                                                 
40 Ibid., p. iii. 
41 Ibid. 
42 See chapter two, above. 
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theology constituted no less than a reification of radical thought in a highly 
original way. 
The rational criteria with which he approached historical biblical 
interpretation meant that, along with all the other doctrines of orthodox 
Christianity, for example original sin, the atonement, the virgin birth, the Trinity 
and the concept of the immateriality of the soul, all of which had been branded by 
Priestley as ‘corruptions’, he rejected also the idea of the plenary, or verbal 
inspiration of the scriptures. Priestley wrote that this doctrine was ‘as great a 
cause of infidelity as any other’. 43 He pointed out also that the later Platonists 44 
themselves were not inclined to dismiss the idea of divine communications as 
incredible and indeed after the promulgation of Christianity they ‘pretended to 
frequent impulses and inspirations’. 45  By no means did it follow, he contended, 
that simply because a writer has had some communication with God, that his 
account of that experience was necessarily entirely dependable.  Neither should 
it be the case that he ought to be thought of as any more wise or knowledgeable 
than other men. 46   
The credibility of the writers of scripture, he added, should be assessed 
only with regard to ‘the circumstances in which they wrote… the biases to which 
they might be subject’, 47 and their reasoning evaluated in the same way as one 
would judge that of other men. Indeed the writers of the gospel history are no 
                                                 
43 Joseph Priestley, Letters to a Philosophical Unbeliever (1787), Part 2, p. 33. 
44 It was the ‘overlay’ of the metaphysical precepts of Greek philosophy which had been the main culprit in 
establishing some of the ‘corruptions’ which had distorted the pure, original form of Christianity. 
45 Joseph Priestley, Institutes of Natural and Revealed Religion (1772), p. 245. 
46 Priestley, Philosophical Unbeliever, Part 2, pp. 36-37. 
47 Ibid, p. 36. 
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more than ‘credible witnesses’ to the events of the time, and the rational defence 
of this history should be made on that basis, without any regard ‘to their 
supposed inspiration’. 48 With opinions such as these, Priestley revealed the 
depth of his radicalism in his theological opinions, an element of his thought 
which has not been fully appreciated by modern historians of ideas. 49 His views 
on plenary inspiration were in stark contrast to those at the opposing end of the 
spectrum. The Anglican divine and evangelical Thomas Scott, for example, wrote 
in 1796 that ‘On every account…we have good reason, independently of ancient 
opinion, to receive the whole scripture as the infallible word of God’.  50  For Scott 
the canon of scripture was one undeniable proof of the Christian religion, 51 while 
for Priestley only history could fill the role of a guide to the understanding of 
scripture. 52
Priestley’s lack of belief in the doctrine of plenary inspiration came along 
with his opposition to most of the major tenets of orthodox Christianity. Of the 
entire Christian belief system only revelation, the resurrection of the dead and a 
                                                 
48 Joseph Priestley, An History of Early Opinions Concerning Jesus Christ, 4 vols (Birmingham, 1786), 
vol, 4, p. 15.  
49See Dennis G. Wigmore-Beddoes, Yesterday’s Radicals: A Study of the Affinity between Unitarianism 
and Broad Church Anglicanism in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, 1971), p. 35.  Wigmore–Beddoes 
quotes John Kenrick  from an article published in 1850, when Kenrick wrote ‘we must deal with the 
evangelists as human biographers … possessing no supernatural source of knowledge…and exposed to the 
influences of their age [and] their country’. See John Kenrick ‘The Relation of the Third to the First Two 
Gospels’, PR, vol. 6, 1850, pp. 61-62. Wigmore – Beddoes comments on the originality of Kenrick’s view 
and regards it as advanced for his time. Joseph Priestley, however, wrote virtually the same thing sixty four 
years earlier.  There are many similar passages from Priestley in Early Opinions alone. He wrote, for 
example, that ‘ Setting aside all notions of inspiration, we should judge of the gospel history as we do of 
any other’. Quoted in Early Opinions ,vol. 4, p. 15.  
50 Thomas Scott, A Vindication of the Divine Inspiration of the Holy Scriptures and of the Doctrines 
Contained in them; Being an Answer to the Two Parts of Mr. Paine’s Age of Reason (London, 1796), p. 
129. Scott believed that, ‘These writings contain also internal proof both of being genuine and divine; and 
are confirmed to us by prophecies, which have been fulfilling ever since. Whatever man may now say of 
the sacred writers, they always speak of themselves and each other, as declaring the truth of God to 
mankind, and they demand credit and obedience as the messengers and ambassadors of Christ’.  
51 Ibid., p. 130. 
52 See note 50 above. 
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retributive after-life for man remained.  In addition to that, the fact that he had 
related his Socinian beliefs to aspects of eighteenth-century natural philosophy 
and had emphasised his idea that the truth about the man Christ’s simple 
message was to be found exclusively in a concrete, historical approach to the 
interpretation of scripture had important implications for the parameters of his 
thought. It meant that the form of reasoning he employed in his assessment of 
the scriptures historically was one which functioned in a very narrow sense.53 
This was ultimately due to the fact that his uncompromisingly rational approach 
to the interpretation of the Bible had its roots in empiricism,  natural philosophy, 
and in the mechanisms of human psychology.  54  
With regard to history there were three different perspectives in Priestley’s 
thought. Firstly there was his treatment of secular history, secondly the way in 
which he dealt with the ‘corruptions’ of later ages in his biblical criticism, and 
thirdly, his efforts to link faith to context in his examination of the events of early 
Christianity. His method in secular history, which was clearly outlined in his work 
Lectures on History and General Policy, 55 was very different from aspects of his 
use of history in theological terms. A syllabus of these Lectures, which he gave at 
                                                 
53 The results of this and its implications with regard to aspects of the thought of the historian John Kenrick 
are examined in chapter seven, below. 
54 See Gerard Reedy, The Bible and Reason: Anglicans and Scripture in Late Seventeenth Century England  
(Philadelphia, 1985), pp. 35 – 36.  In his study on the Anglican divines of the late seventeenth century, 
Reedy argues that in their attempts to establish rational grounds for Christianity they used two forms of 
reason.  One was reason in a narrow sense, which compared theological truth with the necessary laws of the 
mind. For them, reason in a wider sense was disposed to an acceptance of the full contents of scripture. 
55 Joseph Priestley, Lectures on History and General Policy, to which is Prefixed, An Essay on a Course of 
Liberal Education for Civil and Active Life, 2 vols (London, 1793). A syllabus of these lectures, which he 
gave at Warrington Academy, was compiled in 1765, but it was not until more than twenty years later, in 
1788, that they were finally published in the two volumes. They contain a wealth of practical historical 
wisdom and represent a valuable guide to the student of history. Of great interest is Priestley’s evaluation 
of historical sources and evidence. For discussion on these lectures, see Thomas Peardon, Transition in 
English Historical Writing, 1760-1830 (New York, 1933) and also Robert E. Schofield, The Enlightened 
Joseph Priestley  ( University Park, Pennsylvania, 2004), pp. 253-257.   
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Warrington Academy, was compiled in 1765, but it was not until more than 
twenty years later, in 1788, that they were finally published in two volumes.  
There is no doubt that Priestley was a historian of great vision, and one with a 
highly developed understanding of the complex nature of his craft in relation to 
the secular world.  In particular, his consideration of diverse historical sources, 
such as oral tradition, letters, coins and medals, monuments and historical 
poems, and his differentiation between direct and indirect evidence, are all highly 
accomplished. 56  
 His perspectives on the wider sweep of history were notable also. With 
formidable insight Priestley wrote that in any period of history ‘so extensive is the 
connexion of things’ that everything written or accomplished is ‘necessarily 
related, in a thousand ways, to many other things that were transacted at the 
same time’. 57 Indeed in order that a proper judgement could be made as to 
whether circumstances may repeat themselves and could therefore perhaps be 
amended, the experience of different ages should be compared and distant 
events brought together so that all schemes, transactions and characters should 
be seen ‘in one unbroken view, with all their connexions and relations’. 58  
Reflected here, of course, in this all-encompassing view of history, was his great 
necessitarian vision of existence. 
There are several characteristics of his thought evident in his approach to 
secular history which confirm him as a historian of the Enlightenment.  The first 
was his tendency, like many writers of his time, to see history as teaching by 
                                                 
56 Priestley, History and General Policy, vol. 1, Part Two, Lectures iv, v, & vi. 
57 Ibid., vol. 1, Part One, Lecture vi, p. 146. 
58 Ibid.,vol. 1, Part One, Lecture i, p. 52. 
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example, and ‘the examples which history presents to us are generally complete’. 
59  History, he wrote, handed down the capacity for good judgement and the 
more complete our knowledge of it the happier we were. 60 The second aspect 
was specifically related to Priestley and his description of the interconnections 
not only within a historical context but also in the wider historical picture. His 
emphasis on such closely bound relationships, consistent with his ideas about 
the linkages of cause and effect in his doctrine of necessity, showed clearly that 
the mechanistic element in his thought was present in his conceptual  
understanding of historical patterns.  
  A third characteristic of his thought which connected his secular history 
to the Enlightenment was his enthusiasm for universal principles, those rules of 
life and conduct which were in accordance with the ‘invariable nature of things’.61  
By understanding this, continued Priestley in his quotations from Bolingbroke, the 
historian would soon form a general system of ethics and politics by the trial of 
these principles and rules ‘ in all ages’, and on the confirmation of them ‘by 
universal experience’. 62 Priestley wrote of moral sentiments that, although one 
would expect them to be invariable and constant, they were perverted and 
intermixed with notions that were foreign ‘ and even contrary to morality, in the 
minds of some whole nations’. 63 Human moral diversity in historical terms was, 
for Priestley, a temporary condition which would eventually be eradicated in 
                                                 
59 Ibid., vol. 1, Part One, Lecture i, p. 49. 
60 Ibid.,vol. 1, Part One, Lecture i, p. 52. Priestley also wrote that history could ‘ free the mind from many 
foolish prejudices’ by giving ‘ a just idea of the advantages and disadvantages of mankind in all ages’. See 
ibid., p. 54. 
61 Ibid., vol. 1, Part One, Lecture I, p. 48.  Here Priestley is quoting Bolingbroke. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Priestley, History and General Policy, vol. 1, p. 76. 
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God’s plan which was ‘seeing that all evils lead to, and terminate in, a greater 
good’. 64 Clearly for him the variety of human ethical standards in history should 
not be seen as the product of historical circumstances and therefore 
understandable within the cultural framework of a particular age, but should be 
considered rather as a divergence from the ultimate perfection of the universal 
moral code.  
Fixated with the idea of universal norms and general principles as he was, 
he nevertheless appeared to be acutely aware of the historical importance of the 
variations in language, laws and customs of different ages and diverse cultures. 
65 Writing, for example, on the relationship between aspects of the society and 
laws of ancient Rome, he cited the example of the Roman law which prohibited 
children from being disinherited without just cause. We may infer from this, wrote 
Priestley, that the state of paternal and filial affection among the Romans must 
have been unfavourable. However, accounts such as these in his secular 
historical thought were merely still frames of the past, for in his understanding of 
historical context there was no real sense of movement or change. It did not 
contain any feeling of the fluidity of organic development which dominated the 
thought of historians of the Romantic Age. For Priestley, the past was polemical 
and anti-historical. 66 Thus in his perspectives on secular history it would seem 
that Priestley was essentially a historian of the Enlightenment. His thoughts were 
concentrated upon a mechanistic concept of the contexts of the past which 
                                                 
64 Ibid., p. 83. 
65 Ibid., vol 1, Part Two, Lecture viii, pp. 150-154 and vol. 1, Part Two, Lecture ix, pp. 155-159. 
66 See James J. Hoecker, ‘Joseph Priestley as a Historian and the Idea of Progress’, PPN, vol. 3, 1979, pp. 
29-40. 
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remained static in time and which provided lessons for the future, and on 
universal laws which were valuable in the same respect. 
            Importantly, however, there was a difference in the method he employed 
to support aspects of his theology, for here there was evidence of a keen 
historical understanding of the development of doctrine in relation to 
circumstances over time. The key text in his analysis was his Corruptions of 
Christianity.  When the two volumes first appeared in 1782 they caused great 
controversy and initiated Priestley’s famous long running dispute with Samuel 
Horsley (1733-1806), the Cambridge educated Anglican prelate who became 
Bishop of St. David’s in 1788.  The exchange of views lasted for six years, from 
1783 to 1789 and cast Priestley’s ideas into sharp focus. 
         His objective in Corruptions had been to show how, what had been 
originally a simple, sound doctrine of Christian faith, had been corrupted by the 
theological and cultural mores of subsequent ages, the Greek metaphysicians 
having been the greatest culprits. In this work, and in another published four 
years later in 1786, and entitled An History of Early Opinions Concerning Jesus 
Christ, he tried to reveal the pristine, untainted origins of the Christian faith and to 
prove that the early Christians believed in the unity of God and the simple 
humanity of Christ, and consequently were fundamentally Unitarian. 67
                                                 
67 See Leslie Stephen, History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century,2 vols (London, 1881), vol. 1, 
pp. 429-441. Stephen’s critique of Priestley’s work in general is scathing, to say the least. He accused him 
of a lack of originality, poor judgement, careless scholarship and a shallowness of thought which results in 
him ‘rapidly glancing at the surface of opinion…[and he] flashes out at times some quick and instructive 
estimate of one side of a disputed argument, only to relapse at the next moment into crude dogmas and 
obsolete superstitions’. Quoted at p. 431.  
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In his treatment of these theological concerns Priestley exposed a more 
innovative side to his historical consciousness.  In order to disentangle the simple 
truth from the corruptions which had accrued over the centuries, he had to 
identify those elements and circumstances within each age which had been 
responsible for the creation of false doctrine. Priestley’s work established by what 
means a primitive form of Christianity had been obscured by the irrational dogma 
and theological systems which had been generated by time-bound ideas. The 
sources of these false doctrines had to be identified and the way in which they 
had been formed clearly explained in order that there would be adequate 
justification for considering them flawed. 
This process took the form of a dismantling of that which had resulted 
from the historical development of doctrines which to the radical scholar 
appeared irrational. Although his motivation resulted in the paring away of 
doctrinal accretions, Priestley’s process inevitably involved an appreciation and 
understanding of the relationship between such theological systems and the 
process over time which caused them to take shape. Consequently he was 
responsible for the evolution of a very sophisticated historical method 68 which 
appears to have been absent in his secular historical ideas.  
One example of how he tackled this may be found in his treatment of the 
development of the doctrine of transubstantiation. 69  The simple direction of 
Christ to his disciples at the Lord’s Supper to eat bread and drink wine in 
remembrance of him was corrupted over the centuries by custom, superstition, 
                                                 
68 Margaret Canovan, ‘ The Irony of History: Priestley’s Rational Theology’, PPN, no. 4, 1980, pp. 16-25.  
69 Priestley, Corruptions, pp.140-164. 
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priestly arrogance and papal whim into a doctrine of supreme irrationality. 70 It 
first became a sacrament, then a mystery, until Justin Martyr’s idea that the 
bread and wine were the true flesh and blood of Christ became accepted. 
Gradually enveloped in more ritual and symbolism, this view was endorsed by 
the Second Council of Nicaea in the fourth century and became an article of faith 
at the Council of Trent in the sixteenth century.  
Due to the fact that the corruption of the original idea of the Lord’s Supper 
took place in the earliest times, Priestley pointed out that its rectification had 
never been complete. Even the reformers were overawed by the mysteries of the 
Eucharist, although by his own time some Dissenting congregations had no 
objection to their ministers preaching all their lives without conducting this 
particular ceremony. 71  Priestley’s consciousness of the circumstances which 
effected the change in the nature of a doctrine such as this over time gave his 
theological concerns about the ‘corruptions’ of Christianity a truly historical 
perspective. Indeed ninety years later that most perceptive of commentators, the 
Unitarian biographer Alexander Gordon, credited Priestley with being a precursor 
of much later theories of theological development. 72  Gordon went so far as to 
suggest that Priestley’s greatest gift to theology was the application of the 
historical method to problems of doctrine. He believed also that Priestley was the 
genuine precursor of the historical treatment of biblical and theological questions. 
                                                 
70 Ibid., p. 161. Priestley cites the comments of Averroes, ‘the great freethinker of his age, [who] said that 
Judaism was the religion of children and Mahometanism that of hogs; but he knew no sect so foolish and 
absurd as that of the Christians, who adored what they ate’. 
71 Ibid. p. 163. 
72 Alexander Gordon, Heads of English Unitarian History (London, 1895), p. 120. 
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73 Consequently, in trying to prove what was false doctrine Priestley employed a 
truly innovative historical method.  
His perspectives in historical biblical criticism were altered, however, when 
it came to a search for the very origin, or ‘springhead’, of Christian faith. 
Alexander Gordon noted correctly also that Priestley’s historical method threw 
into sharp relief the idea that there was some ‘primitive nucleus whence 
developments proceed’. 74 In attempting, however, to validate what he believed 
to be true rather than false, the emphasis of Priestley’s historical approach 
changed.  It became less concerned with the development of doctrine than with 
how close the historian could come to the very beginnings of Christianity, to 
those truths which were related to the events of the life of Christ.  His efforts to 
prove that primitive Christians believed in the simple humanity of Christ were 
derived from the evidence of the opinions of those closest to the events of the 
time.  
For example, if the Ebionites, the Jewish Christians who believed that 
Christ was a mere man and who flourished immediately after the age of the 
apostles, had been instructed by those apostles in the doctrine of the divinity or 
the pre-existence of Christ, would they not have abandoned their new faith? 75  
The Unitarian idea of the nature of Christ, Priestley believed, was probably 
universal amongst the common people in the apostolic age and those who first 
discussed the idea of Christ’s divinity were aware of just how unpopular their 
                                                 
73 Ibid., pp. 120, 122. 
74 Ibid., p. 120. 
75 Joseph Priestley, An History of Early Opinions Concerning Jesus Christ, Compiled from Original 
Writers, Proving that the Christian Church was at first Unitarian, 4 vols. (Birmingham, 1786), pp. 305-
306. 
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opinions were. 76 As to the doctrine of the immaculate conception, apart from the 
allusion to it at the beginnings of the gospels of Matthew and Luke, there is no 
mention of it in the rest of the New Testament.  Had the history contained in the 
introductions to these two gospels been true, surely Jesus would have been 
publicly announced as the Messiah from his birth? And had it been true, why was 
it not recorded by John and Mark also? 77  
Thus Priestley used history to verify the truth of the origins of Christianity, 
staunchly defending his opinion that ‘all that Christianity rests upon is the reality 
of certain historical events’. 78  The writers of scripture, like other men, were 
fallible, and he wrote that we should consider them only as ‘in the character of 
historians, and witnesses of what they heard and saw’.79  Matthew and Luke, for 
example, were simply historians, ‘whose credibility must be determined by the 
circumstances in which they wrote, and the nature of the facts which they relate’. 
80
 Priestley’s conclusions on his historical investigation of early Christianity 
were linked to a set of historical maxims which set out the rules for the credibility 
of evidence. 81 The form of reasoning behind them he compared to the rigorous 
                                                 
76 Ibid., p. 311. 
77 Ibid., pp. 316-318. 
78 Priestley, Philosophical Unbeliever, Part 2, p. 31. 
79 Ibid., p. 36. 
80 Priestley, Early Opinions, vol. 4, p. 58. 
81 See Ibid., pp. 294-302. For example, Priestley wrote that ‘When two persons give different accounts of 
things, that evidence is to be preferred, which is either in itself more probable, or more agreeable to other 
credible testimony’, ibid., p. 296.  He also was clear that, ‘When any particular doctrine is a necessary part 
of a system, and it can be made to appear that within a given period that doctrine was not known, it may be 
concluded that the system had no existence within that period. Or when any doctrine inconsistent with the 
system is held in that period, it equally proves the same thing’.  Quoted at  p. 299. His view on the retention 
of belief in general was that ‘The common or unlearned people, in any country, who do not speculate much, 
retain longest any opinions with which their minds have been much impressed; and therefore, we always 
look for the oldest opinions in any country, or any class of men, among the common people, and not among 
the learned’. Quoted at p. 300. 
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and exacting first principles or axioms of the mathematician, the truth of which 
could never be disputed. 82 He wrote that he wished to apply to the discussions in 
Early Opinions  a form of reasoning which was ‘equally strict’, and had drawn up 
his ‘maxims of historical criticism’, with this in mind so that their rational worth 
would be  incontestable. 83 Thus in Early Opinions the Priestley of the radical 
Enlightenment resurfaced with a historical method founded upon the ultra-
rational criteria of mathematical reason and the narrow boundaries it implied. The 
approach he took in Early Opinions to prove the truth of his rational religion is 
more akin to that in his secular history and consequently this work is at odds with 
Corruptions in that it lacks the fluidity, movement and change which are all 
consistent with the developmental style of the latter work.  
 This contradiction may be explained also by the fact that Priestley’s 
objective in Early Opinions was to prove the truth about the primitive, original 
form of Christianity, and confirm that it was Unitarian, for this simple, Christian 
truth, free from ‘corruptions’, was, for him, universal and applicable in exactly the 
same form to all ages.  Despite the fact that the evidence to support his 
arguments had been derived from the time and cultural circumstances 
surrounding the life of Jesus and his followers, the treatment of the actual truth to 
be found in the context by Priestley is a-historical.  He sought the origins of a 
theological maxim which, by its very nature was not susceptible to the forces of 
development or change.  Priestley’s simple faith, the objective of his rational, 
historical investigations, remained frozen in time and was, accordingly, eternally 
                                                 
82 Ibid., p. 294. 
83 Ibid., p. 294-295. 
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and immutably universal. Consequently, there existed here the distinct paradox 
of the use of a historical method to validate an a-historical belief which 
transcended the ages.  
Thus Priestley’s perspectives on secular history and on historical biblical 
criticism were wreathed in complexity, revealing several different angles of 
engagement. His supreme objective in historical criticism was to ‘test Christianity 
by reason’. 84  However, the mechanistic and mathematical ideas he linked to his 
method not only narrowed and restricted the parameters of his rational approach 
but also made it fundamentally a-historical. Even in his search for the truth about 
the pure ‘primitive nucleus’ 85 of Christianity he was unwilling to give up on the 
laws of mathematics and natural philosophy. His method indicated that for 
Priestley history was governed by these very laws rather than the unpredictable 
outcomes of human activity and experience. 
 Equally unhistorical was his objective, both in his secular and biblical 
histories, to validate universal truths. In contrast to this, however, was the 
essentially historical thrust of Corruptions, which was concerned with the 
historical contexts which had produced false doctrines. These contradictory 
perspectives generated a tension in his historical thought between the universal 
and those particular contexts which were important to his identification and 
removal of the historically generated doctrines which had, in his view, tainted the 
                                                 
84 Gordon, English Unitarian History, p. 108. Gordon wrote of Priestley that ‘His attitude towards the 
religion of Jesus Christ was void of any trace of ambiguity. With him it was a primary conviction that to 
test Christianity by reason could only free it from alloy; its purity regained, its supremacy was assured.’ 
85 Ibid., p. 120. 
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Christian faith. 86 However, despite the varied nature of his historical concerns, 
there was in Priestley, as in other eighteenth century radical theologians, 
incontrovertible evidence of a drift away from systematic doctrine in favour of a 
historical understanding of the untainted, original truth of the scriptures.  
 The appreciation of the complexities of Priestley’s historical and 
theological ideas is important because his influence over the succeeding 
generation of Unitarian critics was profound. In a biographical tribute to 
Priestley’s memory delivered some weeks after his death on 6 February 1804, 
Joshua Toulmin (1740-1815) 87 told his audience that ‘scarcely any author has 
attracted such an universal notice’. 88 He added that when the Abbé Raynal 89 
was in England he had conveyed to a friend the reverence with which Priestley 
was regarded by European philosophers. Toulmin went on to say that Priestley’s 
ardent mind had zealously detected and removed those corruptions which 
‘obscured the lustre of the everlasting gospel’.90 Writing of Priestley’s 
achievements in a letter to his congregation at the New Meeting in Birmingham, 
the minister and biblical critic John Kentish (1768-1853), who was first teacher 
                                                 
86 Such concerns on Priestley’s part, to remove those ‘corruptions’ which distorted Christianity, were not 
entirely new.  Erasmus had taught that Christianity had to be recovered as a simple faith. Consequently, 
from the sixteenth century onwards among radical thinkers, and later, in the eighteenth century amongst 
Dissenters, there had been a powerful motivation to restore a primitive, simple and tolerant form of the 
Christian religion. See Letis, ‘From Sacred Text to Religious Text’, p. 281. 
87 Joshua Toulmin was co-founder, with Robert Aspland (1782-1845), of the Southern Unitarian Society, 
which came into being in 1801. 
88 Joshua Toulmin, A Biographical Tribute to the Memory of the Rev. Joseph Priestley (Birmingham, 
1804), p.11. 
89 The Jesuit-educated Guillaume-Thomas abbé de Raynal (1713-1796) was a radical French writer and 
propagandist whose work helped to create the intellectual climate of the French Revolution. His most 
important work was a six-volume history of the European colonies in India and America which was both 
anti-royalist and anti-clerical in tone and content. 
90 Toulmin, Biographical Tribute, p. 20. 
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and then friend for many years to John Kenrick, 91commented that Priestley had 
‘one of those great and commanding minds…that [-] appear but rarely in the 
course of years’.92    
 Priestley’s innovative contribution to this area of scholarship may have 
been ignored to a great extent by modern historians of ideas, but as regards 
some of his contemporaries and immediate successors in Rational Dissent this 
was not the case.  John Simpson of Bath (1745-1813), also a Socinian and a 
‘worshipper of the One God and Father, in the name of Jesus Christ, his holy and 
beloved servant’, 93 studied under Priestley at Warrington Academy from 1760.  
At that time, Priestley was responsible for the teaching of classics, logic, the 
theory of language and universal grammar, and also history.  The last subject on 
this list was anew addition to the curriculum, for before he lectured at Warrington 
the study of history had been virtually ignored at all the Dissenting academies. 94
        It may well have been Priestley’s enthusiasm for history as a weapon 
against the ‘corruptions’ of his faith that inspired the young Simpson to advocate 
the benefits of a historical reading of the scriptures. Simpson’s volume, An Essay 
to Show that Christianity is Best Conveyed in the Historic Form 95 emphasised 
two important points : firstly that the scriptures could be more easily understood if 
they were studied in the historical form : and secondly that the historical style of 
                                                 
91 See below. 
92 John Kentish, ‘ Letter from the Rev. John Kentish, To the Congregation of Protestant Dissenters, 
assembling at the New Meeting, in Birmingham’, appended to Toulmin, Biographical Tribute, pp. 36-37. 
93 Anon,‘Brief Memoir of the late Rev. John Simpson’, in MR, vol. 9. February, 1814, p. 86. There was a 
story told for many years amongst Unitarians that when Joseph Priestley was on his deathbed he found the 
strength to praise John Simpson’s works. 
94 H. McLachlan, English Education Under the Test Acts, Being the History of the Nonconformist 
Academies, 1662-1820 (Manchester, 1931), p. 212. 
95 John Simpson, An Essay to Show that Christianity is Best Conveyed in the Historic Form (Leeds, 1782). 
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presentation will tend to maintain and support religious truth against the 
‘corruptions’ which threaten it. Simpson’s exposition was not in any sense a 
treatise on historical perspective. His objective was to emphasise the historical 
reading of scripture as a source of understanding rather than the critical 
approach which concentrated on the form of historical truth itself.  
          However, the manner in which he presented his argument contained some 
vivid contrasts between the abstract, the systematic and the metaphysical on the 
one hand and the historical on the other.  He wrote, for example, that ideas of the 
true nature of a practical religion such as that shown in the New Testament 
cannot be communicated in a better way than by memoirs of the perfect life of 
Jesus. This is the best way of displaying Christianity, rather than as ‘an abstract, 
metaphysical system’. 96  He went on to note that although the historical method 
may at first appear to convey the doctrines and duties of religion in a scattered 
and diffuse manner, many circumstances of time, place or person may illustrate 
valuable truths. The importance of this comment was that it linked the 
understanding of the simple, true and uncorrupted Christian doctrine to the 
historical context. 
        We should recognise also, wrote Simpson, that it was the historic style 
which is best suited to prevent a corruption of the true religion, for ‘a designed 
interpolation, in a narrative, is more easily discovered than in a system’. 
Furthermore, when doctrines are delivered in an ‘abstract, systematical way’, and 
precepts are given without any application of them to particular circumstances, 
                                                 
96 Ibid., pp. 56-57. 
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‘they lose their chief force and spirit’. 97 When, however, religious principles are 
interwoven in a genuine [historical] account, ‘We are led to admire and delight in 
the narrative’. 98 Thus although Simpson’s ideas are at first glance more 
superficial than those historical-biblical critiques of some of his colleagues in the 
period, they nevertheless revealed clearly that frame of mind which rejected the 
abstractions of theological systems in favour of a historical illustration which 
bonded together ‘the most important doctrines and precepts, with many 
circumstances of time, place, person, customs and manners, religion and 
government’. 99  
 Simpson’s teaching methods were closely linked to the radical view in 
favour of a historical understanding of the scriptures because they encouraged 
students to judge the truth of the gospel writings on their own terms and without 
external interference from pre-supposed abstract doctrines. The wrong method 
was employed when ‘systematic notions became the standard according to 
which scripture is interpreted’. 100 The correct way was to ‘banish metaphysical 
subtlety and abstruse speculation for the pure, simple, practical truth which Jesus 
preached’. 101
 This persistent theme was not one which was strictly limited to a small 
group of scholars. It was a cast of mind which spread widely into the teaching of 
divinity at some Dissenting academies.  According to John Kenrick, Simpson was 
                                                 
97 Ibid., pp. 80, 82, 83 & 103. 
98 Ibid., p. 104. 
99 Ibid., pp. 38-39. 
100 John Simpson, An Essay on the Impropriety of the Usual Method of Teaching Christian Theology 
(London, 1803), p. 9. 
101 Ibid., p. 16. 
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an influence on Charles Wellbeloved (1769-1858), the Unitarian who was 
principal and teacher of divinity at Manchester College, York, from 1803 until 
1840. 102 Kenrick wrote that it was Simpson’s tract on teaching 103 which was 
partly responsible for persuading Wellbeloved to found his own method of 
instruction in scriptural  interpretation on the basis of independent criticism and 
philology, rather than on a more structured discussion about specific dogmas and 
doctrines. 104
      The Unitarian divine Thomas Belsham (1750-1829), an ardent follower of 
Joseph Priestley had become John Kenrick’s step-uncle in 1794 when Belsham’s 
sister Elizabeth married Kenrick’s father Timothy Kenrick whose first wife, Mary 
had died a year earlier. Belsham was a biblical critic who accepted the historical 
idea and whose great concern was the modification of the doctrine of divine 
inspiration to make way for a rational interpretation of scripture.  Belsham’s 
tortured journey from orthodoxy to Socinianism is described in an account by 
John Williams of Belsham’s life. 105 According to a diary entry dated 1 February 
1789, Belsham, after much soul searching, reading of scripture, and study of the 
                                                 
102 John Kenrick, A Biographical Memoir of the Late Rev .Charles Wellbeloved (London, 1860), p. 101. 
103 See note 102, above. 
104 Kenrick, Biographical Memoir of Wellbeloved, pp. 100-101.  See also note on p. 101. Kenrick described 
Simpson’s tract on teaching as a ‘very valuable pamphlet’ in which the author points out the problems of 
the dogmatic method which ‘makes the theological system the interpreter of Scripture, instead of allowing 
Scripture to be the test of the idea of Christianity’, and recommends the historical method as the only 
proper one. 
105 John Williams, Memoirs of the Late Reverend Thomas Belsham (London, 1833).  This is a long, 
rambling, disconnected account of the life of Belsham, constructed mainly upon long quotations from 
letters and diaries. There are 791 pages in the book, which was published without chapters, an index or 
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convey to the reader the emotional trauma of Belsham’s gradual conversion to a radical Unitarian theology. 
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the inner life of a man of deep religious experience. The redeeming element of the book is to be found in 
the passages from Belsham’s private diary….Here are his prayers, his sighs, his doubts, his hopes, his 
despondences, his frank addresses to God in sunshine and in gloom’. See Gordon, Addresses, pp. 308-309. 
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work of David Hartley, had finally become a ‘Unitarian’, and a week later, in a 
prayer, he told that he had discovered ‘the falsehood of those monstrous, absurd 
and idolatrous doctrines by which the beauty of Christianity has been defaced’, 
and vowed to contribute to the ‘purification of the gospel’.106   
        Furthermore, in an address on his reasons for leaving his teaching post at 
the Dissenting Academy at Daventry, which had an Arian tradition, he confirmed 
that, having been a zealous advocate for the idea of pre-existence, he was now ‘ 
a confirmed believer in the proper humanity, of Jesus Christ’. 107  It followed from 
this that he hoped to endeavour to ‘extricate the pure doctrine of Christ from that 
mass of error with which it is so generally blended’. 108 Consequently, like 
Priestley, Belsham’s objective as a Socinian who believed in the simple humanity 
of Christ, was to identify and remove the false doctrines which undermined the 
simple truth of the gospels.  
Over the following decades Belsham wrote a great deal on scriptural 
interpretation, often in the columns of the Unitarian journal, The Monthly 
Repository. 109 In 1819 he encouraged scholars to interpret the sacred writings in 
the same way as other ancient works, by the use of a correct text and the 
philological approach and to pay attention to the  
  context, to the object and design of the writer, 
  to the habits of thinking, and the peculiar phraseology 
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107 Ibid., p. 390. 
108 Ibid., p. 510. 
109 See MR, First Series, 1806-1826. 
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 of his age and country’. 110
This guidance to scholars of scripture emphasised the importance of both the 
historical and the philological approach to be taken in the understanding of 
scripture.  
  In the preliminary dissertation to his long-awaited work, The Epistles of 
Paul the Apostle, Translated with an Exposition and Notes, finally published in 
1822, he expanded upon his ideas on the subject within the general theme that 
inspiration related only to the basic tenets of Christianity, leaving the apostle 
himself free to present them in his own way. Belsham wrote that the ‘vulgar and 
loose idea’ which regards every sentence of scripture as an inspired aphorism 
must be abandoned by every one who ‘allows himself to reason justly upon the 
subject’. 111  He guided the reader to the work of the German scholar Johann 
David Michaelis (1717-1791), who had decided that it was possible to ‘doubt and 
even deny the inspiration of the New Testament’ and yet be persuaded of the 
truth of Christianity. 112  
                                                 
110 Thomas Belsham, quoted in Francis Mineka, The Dissidence of Dissent: The Monthly Repository, 1806-
1838 (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1944), p. 132.  See MR, vol. xiv, 1819, p. 403. Although this quotation 
comes from an anonymous refutation of objections to a Unitarian ‘ Improved Version’ of the New 
Testament, Mineka is quite certain that the author was Thomas Belsham. 
111 Thomas Belsham, The Epistles of Paul the Apostle, Translated, with an Exposition and Notes (London, 
1822), p. xxv, note 1. 
112 Ibid.  See also John David Michaelis, Introduction to the New Testament (London, 1802), vol. 1, p. 72. 
Michaelis wrote that, ‘The question, whether the books of the New Testament are inspired, is not so 
important, as the question whether they are genuine’. Quoted at ibid.  This work, which also contained a 
dissertation on the origins and composition of the first three gospels, had been translated by Herbert Marsh. 
It was a purely critical and historical work in which the author’s intention was to explain the Greek New 
Testament with the ‘same impartiality, and the same unbiased love of truth with which a critic in profane 
literature would examine the writings of a Homer or a Virgil’. This quotation comes from Marsh’s 
translator’s preface, pp. ii-iii. From even this short passage it is not hard to see why Unitarian scholars such 
as Belsham were attracted to the German’s perspective on the New Testament.  – For an examination of the 
connections between Unitarians and German scholarship, see chapter 4, below. 
 125
Belsham contended that there was no reason to believe that Paul was 
inspired to write anything specific with regard to his epistles. The apostle put in 
‘no claim to inspiration in his reasonings’, 113 and neither did he in any other 
aspect of his writings.  At all times he wrote as any other person of similar 
abilities would in the same circumstances, and  consequently his writings should 
be examined in the same way as any other author, ‘ with the same freedom and 
the same candour’.114 This meant that the critic was released from the ‘bondage’ 
in which it is held that every epistle, every sentence and indeed every word was 
dictated by the Holy Spirit. 115
 If this had been the case the critic would have been compelled to justify 
each doctrine, whereas upon a ‘rational and judicious theory of inspiration’ he 
has scope for liberal and candid criticism’. 116 Thus a rational view of inspiration 
means that the critic does not feel bound to ‘warp and strain a text from its plain 
and obvious meaning’ and feel he must ‘adopt some…farfetched interpretation in 
order to reconcile it to truth’. 117 Thus for Belsham the idea of plenary inspiration 
is a serious drawback to a truthful interpretation of Paul’s epistles. 
Instead, the critic’s approach should be to examine Paul’s writings with 
regard to his style and phraseology, to the fact that he was a Jew and a 
Pharisee, whose education gave a certain cast to his language.  The reader 
should take account also of allusions to customs and manners not now in 
existence and to facts and events which could not be known to the modern 
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116 Ibid., pp. xxvii-xxviii. 
117 Ibid., p. xxviii. 
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scholar.  What was certain, however, was the fact that the Epistles were genuine 
and that their credibility had always been regarded as given,  118 and the critic, 
therefore, could be confident that they were written by Paul, who was a true 
believer in Christian revelation.  
 Equally important was the absolute certainty that they had never been 
intended to burden the ‘simple doctrine of Christ’ with ‘curious speculations’ such 
as predestination and original sin.119  Instead, they were instrumental in providing 
a historical perspective upon not only Paul’s zeal, courage and patience but also 
 the dispositions, characters, and views, the feelings, 
 the prejudices, the imperfect information, the partial 
 reformation, the errors, the faults and irregularities, 
 the frequent wavering and instability, of the first  
 professors of the Christian faith. 120
In other words, Paul’s Epistles provided a perfect historical picture of the 
experiences of those who were the very first to deal with that pristine kernel of 
truth which was the origin of the uncorrupted Christian doctrine.  From all this it is 
clear that Belsham’s frame of mind with regard to inspiration, historical criticism 
and to the removal of ‘corruptions’ to reveal the origins of the pure and primitive 
Christianity was very similar indeed to those ideas expressed by Joseph 
Priestley.  
                                                 
118 Ibid., p. xxxvii and note 3. Here Belsham cites Nathaniel Lardner’s work, Credibility of the Gospel 
History, as an ‘incomparable’ source of external evidence for the genuineness of the Epistles. Belsham 
noted that, ‘This learned and candid writer has completely exhausted the subject, and has brought together 
a mass of evidence in favour of the Sacred Writings, which will in vain be sought after to establish the 
genuineness of any profane author.’ 
119 Ibid., pp. xxxviii-xxxix. 
120 Ibid., p. xxxix. 
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 At Daventry Academy in the 1780’s Belsham taught  John Kenrick’s father 
Timothy Kenrick (1759-1804) and also the scholar and biblical critic John Kentish 
(1768-1853), who in turn tutored the younger Kenrick for the two years before he 
enrolled as a student at Glasgow University in 1807. Consequently Belsham, 
who was influenced in virtually every aspect of both his theological and 
philosophical ideas by Joseph Priestley, was himself in a position of great 
influence over the next two generations of Socinian scholars, including John 
Kenrick himself.  
 Timothy Kenrick’s Socinianism was deeply – felt, for in  
1792 he drew up new rules for the Western Unitarian Society which would 
effectively exclude Arians. According to John Kentish, it was Kenrick’s 
examination of the scriptures which had finally convinced him that Jesus was 
neither equal with God nor a pre-existent being but ‘simply of the human race’. 
121 In the summer of 1799 Kenrick and Joseph Bretland (1742 – 1819), also a 
Socinian, opened their Dissenting academy in Exeter, which was attended by the 
young John.  Bretland’s religious opinions were described on the occasion of his 
death as being ‘strictly Unitarian…the result of candid, free and deliberate 
inquiry’. 122 The latter part of this quotation is in fact an accurate description of 
the teaching methods employed by both Bretland and Timothy Kenrick at the 
new academy.  These techniques did not involve debate or criticism of a 
particular doctrine or dogma, but instead encouraged students to arrive freely at 
their own opinions by the study of scripture alone. Kenrick believed that when 
                                                 
121 John Kentish, ‘Memoir’, in Timothy Kenrick, An Exposition of the Historical Writings of the New 
Testament, 3 vols (Birmingham, 1807), p. viii. 
122 Anon, Obituary of Joseph Bretland, MR, vol. 14, July 1819, p. 445. 
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divinity was taught from ‘human systems’ the mind of the student was concerned 
more with theories than a rational approach to a true understanding of the 
scriptures. 123 Consequently, in order to tackle a fresh analysis and to form a 
properly balanced opinion of such meaning the student had to abandon any 
presuppositions he might hold about doctrines.  
 Also, in order to understand the full truth about Christ’s discourses, it was 
necessary to take some account of the historical context in which the scriptures 
were written and ‘to consider the circumstances and present temper of his 
hearers’. 124 He cited as one example the event of Christ’s teachings on the 
Mount of Olives to a gathering of people whose expectations were for a worldly 
Messiah who would deliver them from the Roman yoke. This explained, wrote 
Timothy Kenrick, the form of the beatitudes, which were expressed as short, 
almost paradoxical statements which were simultaneously highly complex, but 
also sublimely simple, to enlighten the crowd in an unforgettable way about  the 
true nature of the kingdom of God. Timothy Kenrick had linked, therefore, the 
form of Christ’s Sermon on the Mount and the doctrines it produced to a historical 
situation in which the common people had certain expectations about the nature 
of their Messiah, expectations which had to be dispelled.  
His interpretation indicated that he had an appreciation of the relationship 
between Jesus’ presentation of the simple Christian doctrine and the historical 
circumstances of the time.  Timothy Kenrick’s work tried to clarify aspects of the 
gospel stories, in this case the doctrine of God’s kingdom on earth, by putting 
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them in their historical context. The structure of the contents of the three volumes 
took the form of a careful analysis of scripture, verse by verse, and an account of 
the contextual backgrounds to the gospel passages.  
The approach to the scriptures of John Kentish, whose Socinianism was 
confirmed by John Kenrick in his memoir of his lifelong friend, 125 was rather 
similar. Kentish selected short passages of scripture and discussed their 
meaning from historical and philological viewpoints.  Ever present here also, as 
in the work of other radical scholars, was the theme of the rejection of false 
doctrine in favour of a rational, historical analysis of biblical topics.  For example, 
Kentish believed that the idea that the washing of the disciples’ feet was 
somehow symbolic of the purging of the souls of mankind was typical of attempts 
by orthodox scholars to bend and twist the meaning of an incident into what they 
wished it to represent with regard to a specific doctrine. Kentish argued that to 
consider that by this simple act Jesus was consciously intending to reach 
‘enigmatically and mystically’ the doctrine of the atonement was a ‘glaring abuse 
of the scriptures rather than a sober interpretation of them’. 126 Jesus’ washing of 
his followers’ feet was simply a lesson in charity and humility, for at the time the 
Jewish habit was to convey information by ‘natural, rather than artificial signs, by 
deeds rather than words’. 127    It would be wrong, therefore, to approach the 
incident with the idea of the doctrine of the atonement as true as a basis for 
interpretation, then to consider this simple act as being symbolic of that doctrine. 
The critic must make his judgement from an entirely different perspective, that 
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there was a historical explanation which clarifies for the reader the true reason 
for Christ’s actions as no more than an act of humility which was performed in 
accordance with the cultural mores of the time. 
  Kentish’s comments on the Sermon on the Mount concentrated on the 
style of expression adopted by Jesus. Kentish wrote that ‘It abounds with 
imagery….[and] this characterises some of the beatitudes’. 128  This did not 
mean, however, that Christ’s style was necessarily unusual or obscure, for the 
people of the East at this time were quite used to such a method of expressing 
themselves and accordingly ‘this was our Saviour’s accustomed – often his only 
– manner of instruction’. 129 There was, consequently, a clear link established 
here between Christ’s manner of conveying his simple doctrine to the multitude 
and the form of linguistic imagery related to that particular time and place. 
Like John Simpson, Kentish believed that it was the historical presentation 
of the Christian revelation which illuminated its truth and which made it 
compelling.  Kentish wrote that had Christianity been handed down in any form 
rather than the historical, it would have been harder to discriminate between the 
simplicity of Jesus’ doctrines and those ‘human inventions by which they have 
been … so grossly corrupted’. 130 He also believed that the historical narrative of 
the Christian doctrine made it impressive ‘and thus the heart is interested and 
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affected’. 131 It is of great importance to recognise, however, that because he 
viewed the contents of the gospel stories exclusively from a historical 
perspective, Kentish, like Simpson, saw that the gospels recorded not only the 
facts of the events of the life of Christ, but also the doctrines and precepts which 
were ‘intermixed’ with these facts. It was this primitive Christian narrative which 
presented its own truth about articles of faith and duty rather than any ‘system’ or 
‘artificial method’.132   
Kentish wrote also that men were more impressed by doctrines thus 
united with historical facts ‘than by those which are submitted to the 
understanding nakedly, and in the abstract’. 133 Thus his historical ideas had the 
effect of shifting Christ’s own simple doctrines away from the abstract terms in 
which they were previously misunderstood and into the historical realm, 
effectively historicising the doctrines of the primitive Christian faith.  Because 
Kentish and other radical critics emphasised the importance of the historical 
context in the understanding and formation of the text which indicated such 
doctrines, the pure Christianity they sought was in many respects time-bound 
and a contextual truth.  
 However, as we have seen, there was a contradiction in that the truth 
within the text of the scriptures was simultaneously historical due to its contextual 
linkages and a-historical in its universality. Furthermore, there was also an 
uneasy relationship between scripture itself and the context from which it 
emerged. With the advent of historical criticism, the meaning of the text was no 
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longer to be discovered in the text itself, but in its relationship with the context, 
which in a kind of ‘circular fashion’ then helps to explain the text itself. It is as 
though at this point in the evolution of historical criticism the scriptural text, which 
is no longer read as literal or figurative, but is to be understood  historically, has 
somehow lost its foothold on the path to meaningful understanding. Although it 
may have been clear to the radical scholars of Unitarianism that they were 
seeking to reveal by historical means the truth about the early Christian faith, 
there was nevertheless here a conceptual problem, the resolution of which would 
be a complex process. 134
What is clear, however, is that in the work of some radical biblical scholars 
of the eighteenth century and the early years of the nineteenth, there was a drift 
away from the presuppositions of doctrine towards a historical interpretation of 
scripture.  This trend was intensified in the work of Joseph Priestley, whose 
objective was to identify and remove the doctrinal ‘corruptions’ which had 
obscured the truth of the primitive, simple faith of early Christianity.  Some of 
these trends were apparent before Priestley appeared on the eighteenth century 
stage, and in his wake, when the interest among some radical scholars in 
historical interpretation gained momentum, they became even more evident.  
The objective of the remainder of this chapter is to discuss some outlines 
of the thought of John Kenrick himself, to discover if he may be considered as 
within the same Socinian tradition, and to consider his role as a historical biblical 
critic. John Kenrick’s religious beliefs remained fundamentally Socinian 
throughout his life, and it does not appear that his views in this respect altered 
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with time. James Martineau was correct to observe that there was no reason to 
suppose that Kenrick had ever deliberately adopted any other theory than that of 
the ‘older’ English Unitarianism, and indeed ‘rested contentedly on its 
characteristic postulates and propositions’. 135  
Although Kenrick never discussed his religious views in any systematic 
way there were many passages in his work which revealed the nature of his faith. 
He published a number of sermons and many articles in the journals of the day 
which confirmed his beliefs. It should be remembered that, while a host of articles 
appeared over the years, from as early as 1807 until the mid 1860’s, his separate 
works on biblical criticism were not compiled until he reached his retirement 
years in the period after 1850. These two small publications 136 did not contain 
anything which was in any sense new, but merely reflected the tenor of those 
core religious beliefs which had remained virtually unaltered throughout his life.   
The first clue to the nature of Kenrick’s faith comes from a letter he wrote 
as a student at Glasgow College in 1808 to his brother Samuel about a friend’s 
examination experience.  This student, according to Kenrick, was given 
questions on John’s gospel, ‘merely to see what faces we Socinians should 
make at them!’. 137  On the key question of the simple humanity of Christ, Kenrick 
discussed his views forcefully in a discourse delivered at Wolverhampton to the 
Warwickshire Unitarian Tract Society in 1818. He presented a series of 
arguments to prove that the title ‘Son of God’ was merely figurative and that 
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Christ was ‘redeemer and teacher of mankind, and the revealer of immortal life’. 
138  He also pointed out that Nathaniel Lardner’s Letter on the Logos had 
emphasised that there was nothing in the scriptural uses of the title or in the title 
itself to imply Christ’s deity. Some nine years later, in 1827, he referred 
scathingly to the philosophic minds which had busied themselves with 
      subtle speculations respecting the nature of God 
     and the person of Christ, which at last usurped the place  
     of the primitive faith. 139
This passage was contained in a sermon which presented Kenrick’s thoughts on 
the reasons why it had been impossible to establish a popular base for Unitarian 
beliefs. He attacked the orthodox stranglehold on doctrine and emphasised 
forcefully that obstacles to the diffusion of Unitarianism had been generated by 
such factors as human self-interest, fear that a new radical belief might be 
construed as loss of faith, and also the power of national institutions to maintain 
the status quo. 140 There was, for example, the opinion, largely based upon 
misunderstanding of scripture, that salvation depended on certain doctrines and 
that the free exercise of reason on religious subjects was somehow ‘dangerous’. 
141  In a general sense the sermon was a spirited defence of Unitarianism and an 
affirmation of the doctrines it presented.  
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          An equally powerful address, which had been dedicated to John Kentish, 
was given by Kenrick to the Socinians of the Western Unitarian Society at 
Lewin’s Mead Meeting in Bristol in 1836. It outlined the arguments as to why 
Christ should be considered to have been no more than human and a divinely-
inspired teacher and why his ‘inspiration and his miracles are a sufficient 
foundation for faith in Christianity’. 142  This was the simplest way, he added, of 
understanding the relationship between Christ and the Father.  It was also in 
accordance with Jewish expectations about the Messiah, and if we take account 
of Christ’s own language regarding his power and of the nature of the apostolic 
preaching in the book of Acts, we were sometimes tempted to wonder ‘how the 
portentous doctrine of a Trinity in Unity should ever have grown up’.  The source 
of this ‘great corruption’ was the existence of ‘criminal [and] disgraceful’ feelings 
on the part of those who began it and carried it on. 143  From this it is clear that 
during the earlier stages of his scholarly life Kenrick’s vision of the nature of 
Christ was that he was merely human and consequently his thought on this 
crucial point was in accordance with the Socinian tradition. 
 With regard to this nothing changed as time went by.  His arguments in 
the two small theological works which were published later in his life reflected a 
belief in Christ as a holy teacher inspired by God. In Holy Scriptures, for 
example, Kenrick argued that the relationship between Christ and the Father was 
the same as that between Christ and his disciples, and that they were as one in 
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spirit, purpose and affection. The unity of Christ with the Father, he emphasised, 
was not some mysterious union of their natures, but one of counsel and 
subordination of the will of one to the other. 144 Eleven years later, in one of his 
last works, Biblical Essays, which appeared in 1864, Kenrick alluded once again 
to his belief in Christ’s simple humanity when he argued that the history of 
Christian dogma had shown a tendency to elevate Christ’s dignity in proportion to 
the lapse of time and the change in his relationship with his followers, a tendency 
which ‘placed him more beyond the sphere of humanity’.145 Thus it would appear 
that there was no change in his belief with regard to this fundamental aspect of 
Socinianism in his later life. 
 Similarly, the complementary themes of the original purity of the primitive 
Christian faith and the debasement of this by doctrinal ‘systems’ and ‘corruptions’ 
remained, as they did in the mind of Joseph Priestley, key aspects in Kenrick’s 
thought. On the subject of early Christianity, in 1808 there appeared in the 
Monthly Repository a translation by Kenrick, then aged only twenty, of a short 
passage by the German critic, Ludwig Timothy Spittler. 146 This extract reflected 
Spittler’s ideas of the effect of Christianity on the moral and intellectual condition 
of mankind in the period preceding the Council of Nicaea in the fourth century 
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AD.  Spittler wrote that the great fundamental truths about the unity of God had 
been brought into being by Christianity as never before.  
          However, he pointed out that the primitive Christians were a ‘different race’ 
from those of the third century because of the early degeneracy of the church, 
and it was this ‘corrupt system of morals’ which was a major cause of the 
appearance of a ‘Christian religion very different from [that] which its design and 
its earliest appearance promised’. 147  Spittler’s thoughts were influenced  by an 
intellectual background which set great store by the idea that moral and spiritual 
changes in history brought about awakenings which were essentially new, 148 
and by implication uncorrupted. While for the German the important elements 
here were the ebb and flow of moral and spiritual forces in history, for Kenrick, 
however, the passage suggested that it had been later influences which had 
undermined the purity of the early faith. This was why Kenrick had picked this 
particular passage for his own purposes as a Unitarian critic who was anxious to 
establish the purity of early Christianity and its difference from later forms of 
belief.  
A second theme in this extract from Spittler’s work which had attracted 
Kenrick was the idea, strikingly similar to that of Joseph Priestley, 149 that the 
idea of the unity of God was held both by the young and illiterate of early 
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Christianity, whose instruction had been neglected by philosophers. 150 This 
argument Kenrick repeated almost twenty years later, in June, 1827.  He 
advocated that there should be an appeal on behalf of Unitarianism to the 
ordinary classes of England on the grounds that in the early ages of the church it 
had been those plain and illiterate men who ‘held fast to the doctrine of the 
Divine Unity’. In contrast, it was those philosophical and learned minds who were 
persistently absorbed in subtle speculations regarding the nature of God and the 
person of Christ, who had formed doctrines which subsequently had ‘usurped the 
place of the primitive faith’. 151 Pure and unpolluted religious truth, therefore, was 
to be found in the ranks of the unlearned classes rather than with those who 
were intellectually sophisticated, for it had been the latter who had distorted the 
simple tenets of early Christianity. 
 In 1817 Kenrick mounted an angry denunciation of the doctrines of 
Calvinism, which he described as a ‘fearful and revolting system’. 152 In 
particular, the ‘system[s] of theology of human invention’ 153 which had 
constructed the ideas of atonement and predestination had consigned God’s 
creatures ‘to everlasting torments for even the slightest shades of sin’. 154 In the 
same year he gave a lecture on the ‘Love of Truth’ in which he argued against 
benevolence inspired by self interest, and wrote that it would be wrong to use 
such motives as these when ‘we attempt to diffuse his religion, or restore its 
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doctrines to their primitive purity’. 155 In the following year, 1818, he challenged 
the idea that the Jews at the time of Christ had believed their Messiah was 
divine.  He wrote that even when the process whereby this ‘great corruption’ of 
Christianity was engineered it had been clear that the judgement of the primitive 
Jewish church was ‘in favour of the Unitarians’. 156  
 Ten years later, in 1827, Kenrick’s argument on the subject of a pure 
religion which had been corrupted was expounded in a similar way to that  
historical concept of theological development which had been used by Priestley 
in his Corruptions, the idea of a relationship between the emergence of doctrine 
and the context of a particular age. Kenrick wrote that we may attribute the 
existing corruptions of Christianity to the authors who supposed they had the 
warrant of scripture for their various systems. This happened in the ages of 
‘barbarous ignorance’ which followed the gospel era, and it should be 
appreciated how widely different were the language, manners and opinions of the 
Christian church from those of the Eastern people by whom the gospels were 
written. 157  
       With regard to the progressive religion which Kenrick and his fellow 
Unitarians advocated in their own time he argued that ‘nothing is more certain 
than that it must receive modifications from the intellectual state of the world’…no 
[false] doctrines can ultimately prevail among a people allowed to think and 
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examine for themselves’. 158 In both these instances, like Joseph Priestley, he 
has credited the cultural and intellectual mores of particular ages with the 
responsibility for the creation of different doctrinal forms, the one corrupt, the 
other pure and founded upon scriptural truth.  
  As regards the ideas of original purity and later corruption Kenrick’s later 
writings showed the same concerns.  In 1853, in a review in two parts of a work 
by the German critic C.C.J. Bunsen (1791-1860), Kenrick commented upon 
Bunsen’s findings in a manner very similar to the way in which Priestley had 
followed the threads of the development of doctrine. Like Priestley, Kenrick 
believed that behind the tangled web of theological systems and metaphysical 
speculations which had produced all the doctrinal absurdities of orthodoxy shone 
the pure light of original truth. He observed how Bunsen had managed to trace 
the progress by which the mass grew from the simple form which was used in the 
second century. 159 The German had translated the Ethiopic Liturgy from the 
Greek original to discover a ‘relic of Christian antiquity….a very remarkable 
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composition’ and Kenrick agreed with Bunsen’s commendation of its ‘simplicity 
and scriptural character’. 160  
            Kenrick, however, was quick to point out not only that the ancient 
document showed the clear outlines of a simple form of worship, but also that it 
revealed no suggestion either of Christ’s divinity in any orthodox or Arian  sense, 
nor of his atonement for the sins of man. Indeed, he went so far as to suggest 
that, although the phraseology of the rite was not entirely as one might wish, only 
the over-critical Unitarian would refuse to join in were it established in church 
usage. 161 In his conclusion on this point he wrote that ‘we have here a fresh 
proof that the further we go back in Christian antiquity, the nearer we come to a 
purely Unitarian doctrine’. 162
 On the question of corruption, Kenrick cited the example of the distortion 
over time of the simple idea of commemoration at the Lord’s Supper, which had 
contributed not only to the establishment of the false dogma of 
transubstantiation, but also to the elevated role of the priest as special 
functionary at the ritual, a role which destroyed the original concept of 
communion.  He wrote that Bunsen’s opinion that this corruption of the simple 
words of Christ was ‘ the greatest with which the Roman Church is chargeable’ 
was entirely justified. Kenrick’s view was that, had the Christian Fathers kept to 
the ‘simple language of the Gospels and St. Paul, which describes the Lord’s 
Supper as a commemoration, the mischief would have been avoided’. 163 Thus 
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for Kenrick, as for Priestley, truth lay at the origins, the untainted ‘primitive 
nucleus’, of the Christian faith.  Bunsen’s analysis of the work of the third century 
martyr Hippolytus reached back historically towards the traditions and doctrines 
of the apostolic age. Consequently, it proved to be an important text for 
Unitarians such as Kenrick, whose prime objective as radical scholars was to 
prove their point regarding the truth that primitive Christianity was, in all crucial 
respects, essentially Unitarian.   
 Also abundantly present in Kenrick’s writings on biblical criticism were his 
thoughts on the two subjects of plenary inspiration and historical interpretation 
which, of course, from the Unitarian perspective tended to sit uneasily with one 
another.  As we have seen, when the idea began to develop amongst radical 
critics that the events and the doctrines of the Bible were the result of historical 
influences, belief in the notion of verbal inspiration had begun to weaken. 164 This 
pattern of thought was evident also in Kenrick’s work.  In 1821, he wrote a review 
article on the German critic J.S. Semler (1725-1791), who had become professor 
of theology at Halle in 1753. 165  
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         On Semler’s highly controversial view, presented in the early 1770s,166 that 
the Bible was not identical with God’s word, Kenrick observed that in this work on 
the canon of scripture, Semler had tried to ‘correct the inaccurate notions which 
prevailed on this subject’ and had shown that the Jews themselves meant by 
canonical not inspired works but instead a collection of national literature.167  This 
rejection of the idea of verbal inspiration was accompanied in the same year by a 
precise explanation of the historical method with regard to the Bible. To his 
readership, Kenrick explained that, in order to conduct a rational interpretation of 
scripture, ancient languages, manners and customs must be studied, and the 
critic should estimate the influence of education and circumstances on the 
‘modes of thought and turns of expression’ of the writers. 168  
 The general weakening of the idea of inspiration was countered by an 
increasingly confident belief in the historical method as the most effective way to 
a rational evaluation of the biblical texts.  In an analysis which showed that the 
proven length of the Egyptian chronology undermined the truth of the chronology 
of Genesis, Kenrick criticised those who thought that when the accuracy of a 
narrative was questioned, ‘they can quiet doubts by appealing to its inspiration’. 
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169 Such was the practice, he added, of many who would not allow the 
philosopher to read anything in the archives of nature ‘nor the historian in the 
early annals of the world, which is not consistent with what they deem the 
authority of revelation’. 170
       The critic should never, Kenrick argued, ‘fall … into the fallacy of assuming 
the supernatural as the proof of the historical’. 171  To believe that the credibility 
of a history may be established by the assumption of its inspiration is ‘to invert 
the true order of proceeding’. 172 He explained that were it the case that historical 
facts could be proved to be true and yet ‘no human appeared by which such truth 
could be ascertained, there would remain only the supposition of a divine 
communication’. 173 This, however, could never actually occur, because the very 
process of presenting historical truth implies the existence of ‘ independent 
evidence of the facts which it contains’. 174 Thus the supernatural origin of any 
historical document cannot ever be the basis of belief in its historical authority. 175
 The dominant theme of the work by Kenrick published in 1853 was the 
assertion that the idea of verbal inspiration had undergone great modification, 
‘wherever men allow themselves to think freely on religious subjects’. 176  
Freedom of thought, however, was not an option for all critics, for inevitably there 
was always some level of bias generated by the belief of the critic. The Roman 
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Catholic commentator, for example, ‘boasts of an infallible guide, and believes 
his safety to consist in following blindfold’. 177 Likewise Protestants depended 
upon the unchallengeable truth of certain texts to prove their doctrines, and to 
disprove the texts’ authority would mean to deny the doctrine. 178 Undeniably 
then, the doctrine of inspiration was a powerful force for orthodoxy and for the 
defence of false dogma.  
  Kenrick’s counter attack was founded upon the idea of re-casting  the 
doctrine. Rather than being presented as the belief that every word was dictated 
by God, he showed that both Old and New Testaments represented in a wider 
sense ‘parts of a system of divine communication to man’. 179 This was a 
 Revelation of that system of grace and truth, of pardon 
 and eternal life which he preached, because we see no 
human source from which it could have been derived. 180
This amended view of inspiration, which explained divine influence in a much 
more generalised form, did not then conflict with an unbiased, rational, historical 
method of interpretation of the scriptures. In effect it served the Unitarian 
objective, which was to release the questioning mind from any perceived 
necessity to cling to doctrinal presuppositions and consequently opened the door 
to free inquiry regarding the truth and meaning of the scriptures. The religious 
ideas of the authors of scripture were not a repetition of divine dictation, but were 
conceived by men and expressed ‘under the influence of the time and countries 
                                                 
177 Ibid., p. 72. 
178 Ibid., pp. 72-73. 
179 Ibid., p. 22. 
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to which they respectively belong’. 181  There were, according to Kenrick, ‘no 
worse expositors than those who trust to inspiration to qualify them…. [their] 
crude fancies…bring contempt on the sacred volume’. 182 Because the idea of 
inspiration had been modified in this way, for Kenrick and his fellow radical 
scholars the true doctrines revealed in scripture could then be seen to have been 
formed in a relationship with the historical context in which the narratives had 
been written. 
        The Unitarians were not, of course, the only ones to seek historical 
evidences of the authenticity of the scriptures. Orthodox critics of the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries also were intent on proving their truth. 
They, however, approached the exercise from a perspective which sought 
historical evidences to prove what they already assumed to be true on the basis 
of divine revelation. The Bampton Lecturer James Williamson, Prebendary of 
Lincoln said that he did not believe, however, that such assumptions amounted 
to a ‘blind acquiescence’ in the scriptures and added that each man was ‘at full 
liberty to examine with candour the grounds and evidences of Christianity’.  183 
Williamson thought that the evidences of a written revelation was a secure 
method of conveying the doctrines of Christianity, and so strong was the proof 
that we could not refuse our assent to the whole of the divine revelation. 184  The 
orthodox idea was that historical evidences were admissible, but they only 
                                                 
181 Ibid., p. 2. 
182 Ibid., pp. 75-76. 
183 James Williamson, The Truth, Inspiration, Authority and end of the Scriptures, Considered and 
Defended  (Bampton Lecture, 1793), p. 102,quoted by  H.H. McDonald, Ideas of Revelation : An Historical 
Study, A.D. 1700 to A.D. 1860 (London, 1959), p. 130. 
184 McDonald, Revelation, p. 130. 
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served to support that which was already clear, that the Bible was God’s word 
and that the internal evidences and authority of the Holy Scriptures were 
inescapable. 185
            For a later orthodox critic such as Thomas Hartwell Horne 186  the Bible 
could never have been the contrivance even of good men. He wrote that the 
‘wonderful harmony and connection’ of the scriptures could not be ascribed to 
any other cause than ‘their being all dictated by the same spirit of wisdom’,  187 
and that they were ‘actually dictated by inspiration’. 188 Horne’s work contained a 
large section on historical interpretation which formed the whole of the third 
volume. Entitled a ‘Summary of Biblical Geography and Antiquities’, it was 
essentially a descriptive part of the work which dealt with the political, legal and 
cultural mores of the Jews at the time of Christ. There was no real sense that 
Horne was trying to assess the importance of aspects of scripture by relating 
them in any meaningful way to the contextual background .  The historical 
element in Horne’s work was simply that and nothing more – a background, and 
there is no feeling of relationship between it and the simple doctrines of Jesus 
Christ’s ministry.189    
                                                 
185 Ibid., p. 133. 
186 Thomas Hartwell Horne, An Introduction to the Critical Study and Knowledge of the Holy Scriptures 
(London, 1856).  The first edition of this work was published in 1818 and thereafter it ran to ten editions. 
The edition cited here is the tenth. T.H. Horne, of St. John’s College, Cambridge, was Rector of the United 
Parishes of Saint Edmund the King and Martyr and Saint Nicholas Acons, Lombard Street; Prebendary of 
St. Paul’s.  His four-volume work may be seen as an example of some orthodox views of the approach to 
inspiration, history and the significance of these two factors in relation to biblical criticism.  
187 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 404. 
188 Ibid., pp. 200, 201. 
189 See ibid., p. 481. This example, which describes early Christian hospitality to strangers, also quotes 
from Matthew xxv, 41, 45, the passage in which Christ warns that at the day of judgement those who had 
not welcomed strangers were in peril.  The quotation and the context are not eased into any historical 
relationship, the one is simply matched to the other in what is essentially a form of juxtaposition. 
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John Kenrick’s view of a historical analysis of the Bible was quite different. 
He thought that because a historical view arranged events in their chronological 
sequence and their ‘true historical relation’ it clarified our understanding of them. 
Even the political background and the relationship between Israel and other 
lands were important to the significance of scriptural events, and it was indeed 
true that the most impressive passages of the prophets would be unintelligible 
without this kind of knowledge. The life of Christ himself was  
  a narrative of ever growing interest, from the  
  commencement of his ministry to the catastrophe of its 
  close; many of his actions and sayings derive their 
  significance and pertinency from the seasons at which they 
  were delivered… 190
 The truth of Christ’s doctrines were to be discovered within  that relationship 
between him and the context in which he lived and preached. Christ was 
consequently a historical  figure whose teachings had to be seen in relation to 
the culture of the time. Similarly, the genuineness of  Paul’s Epistles was to be 
found in a comparison of them with the history of his life, and to understand them 
‘we must know in what circumstances they were written’. 191  According to 
Kenrick there were no special principles of scriptural interpretation.  The best 
commentary would ‘explain them as … any other book’, aiming only to set forth 
the author’s meaning’. 192 The truth of this lay in the relationship between his 
                                                 
190 Kenrick Holy Scriptures, p. 71. 
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writings and the context in which they were composed, and in the historical 
veracity of his sources and his proximity to them 
 These are criteria which Kenrick explored in his analysis of Mark’s 
gospel, which was one of the most illuminating examples of his historical 
criticism. Not only did he examine the meanings of texts in relation to their 
historical and linguistic contexts, but in his commentary on Mark, Kenrick also 
spelled out some of the rationale behind his own method. Most importantly, 
however, the analysis presented a frame of mind which isolated and defined the 
outlines of biblical narrative in a historical fashion, rather than one which brought 
separate accounts into one harmonious whole for the purposes of defending 
orthodox doctrine.  
The definitive version of the analysis of Mark appeared in Biblical Essays, 
which was published in 1864.  As early as 1827, however, in a review article on a 
work by the German theologian Frederick Schleiermacher (1768-1834),193 
Kenrick had already revealed that frame of mind which sought to define the 
uniqueness of different perceptions of Christ’s ministry. Kenrick agreed with 
Schleirmacher that there was little to recommend the hypothesis of Johann 
Gottfried Eichhorn that the variations in gospel accounts may be explained by the 
existence of an original document outlining the principal facts of Jesus’ life and 
ministry which had been adapted differently by each writer. A more compelling 
perspective, Kenrick believed, was Schleiermacher’s assessment of Luke’s 
                                                 
193 John Kenrick, Review Article on Frederick Schleiermacher, A Critical Essay on the Gospel of St. Luke: 
With an Introduction by the Translator, Containing an Account of the Controversy respecting the Origin of 
the First Three Gospels since Bishop Marsh’s Dissertation  (London, 1825), MR,  New Series,  Vol. 1, 
January, 1827, pp. 33-39. 
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gospel on its own terms and the fact that the German called attention to those 
elements which were inconsistent with Eichhorn’s hypothesis. Eighteen years 
later, in 1845, Kenrick wrote of his belief that Mark’s gospel was not, as was 
widely believed by some, a mere epitomisation of Matthew, but an original source  
‘respecting the life and preaching of their Master, in the earliest period’. 194  
 In a ‘retrospective’ review article published in 1850, 195 Kenrick’s intention 
was to argue against the view of the German New Testament scholar J.J. 
Griesbach, that Mark had epitomized Matthew and Luke and instead wished to 
‘claim for him [Mark] the character of being the earliest of our Lord’s 
biographers…. writing nearest to the time and with the most exact recollection…. 
the colours of memory…yet warm and glowing’. 196  Kenrick noted that there was 
a ‘rough simplicity’ in Mark’s version of events, and a tendency by him to write 
simply to record, rather than to impress and convince as did Matthew and Luke. 
197   
Kenrick defined his method in the inquiry as one which dealt with the 
evangelists as human biographers who neither possessed any supernatural 
sources of knowledge, nor were ‘guarded from error by any divine 
superintendence’. 198 Rather, they were men like ourselves, and ‘exposed to the 
influences of their age, their country and their personal connections’. 199  This 
and this alone had to be the criterion for criticism, for, he wrote, the ‘Deus ex 
                                                 
194 John Kenrick, ‘On the Narratives of the Crucifixion’, CR, New Series, vol. 1, April 1845, pp. 204-206. 
195 John Kenrick, ‘The Relation of the Third to the First Two Gospels’, Review Article of Jo. Jac. 
Griesbachii Commentatio quo Marci Evangelium totum a Matthæi et Lucæ Commentariis decerptum esse 
monstratur (Opuscula Academica, Vol. 11., ed. Gabler (Jenæ, 1825), PR, vol. vi, 1850. 
196 Ibid., pp. 60, 64, 66. 
197 Ibid., pp. 70, 72. 
198 Ibid., pp. 61-62. 
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machina puts an end at once to all human agency, and all reasoning upon 
human probabilities’. 200  Here contained in Kenrick’s reasoning on Mark’s 
gospel, there is the gist of the whole question of divine inspiration in the orthodox 
sense as opposed to historical criticism.  The artificial systems of dogma devised 
by man cannot resolve the contradictions of scripture, only reason and historical 
interpretation are able to unravel such mysteries. 
Mark’s gospel, according to Kenrick, was not derived from any other 
document.  Furthermore, it was not a composite, an epitomisation or an 
abbreviation of any other writer or writers, but simply a completely original 
account written by Mark himself. The idea was not new.  Nathaniel Lardner’s 
analysis of the gospel concluded that Mark was not an ‘epitomiser of another 
author’ and that he was ‘well acquainted with the things, of which he undertook to 
write a history’.201 Mark wrote as an eye witness and as one who had authentic 
information at first hand. His gospel was ‘a very valuable and masterly 
performance’. 202 John Kentish was persuaded also that ‘ Mark is an independent 
memorialist of our Lord’s actions and discourses’. 203 In a similar vein, Herder 
had declared that Mark’s account was the earliest written gospel. According to 
Herder, Mark’s gospel had an oral-like, narrative quality, while Luke’s account 
was more that of a practised historian.204 In a letter written to John Kenrick while 
Kenrick was studying in Göttingen in 1819,Thomas Belsham wrote that ‘Matthew 
                                                 
200 Ibid. 
201 Lardner, ‘St. Mark, Evangelist’, in Supplement to Vol. 1 of Credibility, p. 208. 
202 Ibid. 
203 Kentish, Passages of Scripture, p. 160. 
204 See  Marcia Bunge, ‘Text and Reader in Herder’s Interpretation of the New Testament’, in Wulf Koepke 
(ed.), Johann Gottfried Herder: Language, History and the Enlightenment (Columbia, South Carolina, 
1990), p 144.  See John Kenrick, Biblical Essays (London, 1864), p. 6.  On Luke’s ‘historical’ version, 
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has been more corrupted than any of the rest; and Mark, perhaps, the least, 
because of its brevity’.205
For Kenrick, who was part of that radical scholarly tradition which sought 
to reveal the earliest truths of Christianity, Mark’s gospel was highly significant in 
that it came closer than any other to the historical truth about Jesus’ life and 
ministry. It stood alone as a truthful and uncorrupted version and was unique in 
its proximity to the historical times of Christ. For the reason that it showed no 
traces of second hand authority, 206 it handed down the tradition of Jesus’ life in 
an earlier form than the work of the other evangelists. 207 As one example, 
Kenrick pointed out that Mark began his account with the preaching of John the 
Baptist, without mention of the birth or childhood of Christ contained in Matthew 
and Luke.  He concluded that the absence of this part of Christ’s history in Mark 
was clear evidence that he was not a copier of the other two gospels and showed 
that his account reflected the untainted early origins of Christianity. While the 
texts of Matthew and Luke indicated that they had distorted the story of Christ by 
juxtaposing events and narratives outwith their true contexts, Mark’s gospel, 
according to Kenrick, was ‘perfectly homogeneous’ 208 and stood alone as a 
historically valid account with priority over the others. 209 Kenrick wrote that 
 As a conglomerate implies the previous existence of 
 strata, whence its materials have been derived, so the  
 composite nature of the first and third gospels indicates 
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 a later origin than that of the second, whose structure is 
 simple and uniform. 210
Kenrick uses here a geological analogy to argue that Matthew and Luke 
were in fact rather artificially constructed versions of events which had been 
distorted by the passage of time and the unreliability of human memory. In the 
analysis of these gospels we should be aware, Kenrick wrote, of ‘those variations 
and accretions which gather …around the original nucleus of facts’. 211 By 
contrast  Mark’s gospel was unpolluted historical truth, and because of this 
Kenrick considered it to have great value as a testimony to the facts on which the 
universal Christian religion was founded.  He believed that the nearer the 
historical critic could come to the time of events and facts, the greater the 
possibility of ‘receiving them unmixed with fable’. 212 Religious history, he 
thought, was far more liable to corruption than the secular and with this in mind 
he conceded that it might not be possible for the historian to eliminate entirely 
distortion, corruption and exaggeration from the narrative.  Indeed the only way 
to control the propensity to corrupt a simple tradition and to have a chance of 
attaining pure and simple historical truth was ‘to ascend as near as possible to its 
springhead’. 213
This quotation, in essence, represented the fundamental nature of 
Kenrick’s thought with regard to historical biblical criticism. He was a radical critic 
in the tradition of Rational Dissent whose theologian position was similar to that 
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of Joseph Priestley. As such he was committed to the search for the simple truth 
of early Christianity before it became corrupted by the irrational dogma of 
subsequent ages.  It was this quest for the ‘springhead’ of truth which formed the 
basis of Kenrick’s historical frame of mind and the need to seek the untainted 
origin of Christianity which drew the patterns of his historical thought. 
 John Kenrick was a product of a tradition which, in pursuing a  search for 
the truth about early Christianity, modified the influence of the doctrine of verbal 
inspiration and put its faith instead in the method of  historical biblical criticism. 
Discarding the artificial harmonisation of the gospels, it was a tradition of 
historical criticism which in Kenrick recognised the contradictions in the accounts 
as proof of uniqueness in a historical sense. His objective was to get as close as 
was possible to the earliest origins of the gospels, both in terms of the events 
themselves and in the manuscripts which had recorded them. Kenrick’s analysis 
of Mark’s gospel was symbolic of this form of criticism. It was a rational approach 
to scriptural interpretation which saw the historical method as the most rational of 
all.  Kenrick’s method, and that of his predecessors, was to prise away the 
accretions of time, whether they took the form of harmonisations, composites or 
the corruptions related to false doctrine, and find the unspoiled origin, the 
‘primitive nucleus’ sought by Joseph Priestley which represented a perfect truth.  
John Kenrick, therefore may be placed firmly in the context of Unitarian historical 
criticism and within the theological precepts which gave it impetus. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 





 The historical frame of mind with which the scholars of Rational Dissent 
approached the scriptures in order to reveal the origins and nature of a primitive, 
unspoiled Christian religion, was similar in many respects to that of critics of the 
German Enlightenment, or Aufklärung.  The common objective of English and 
German scholars was to apply reason to scriptural interpretation and to make 
use of the historical method in their analyses.  The study of the engagement of 
Rational Dissent and Unitarianism with German thought in this respect was a 
complex relationship which has brought to light a number of important issues.  
         The main objective of this chapter is to outline some aspects of the 
relationship between radical English and German scholars in the latter half of the 
eighteenth century and the earlier decades of the nineteenth century with regard 
to historical biblical criticism. It will try to determine some reasons why the 
scholars of Rational Dissent were attracted to German ideas in the first place and 
what were some of the results of this encounter. It is important to understand the 
similarities and differences between them, for these help to explain the nature of 
their historical understanding in general. 
John Kenrick’s introduction to Unitarian historical biblical criticism and the 
German approach to scriptural interpretation took place in the earlier period of his 
intellectual life, before 1819. Kenrick was taught German in his early teenage 
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years by the rather eccentric writer and composer Thomas Foster Barham (1766-
1844),1 whose  brother, John Foster Barham (1763-1822) was a distinguished 
German scholar, a member of the Germanophile circle at Cambridge and an 
acquaintance of the German rationalist scholar Heinrich Eberhard Gottlob Paulus 
(1761-1851). 2 Thus the young Kenrick had a good knowledge of the German 
language even before he became a pupil of the Unitarian scholar John Kentish, 
whose knowledge of German and German biblical critics was sound. Many years 
later John Kenrick wrote that Kentish had ‘made himself master of German, that 
he might read the works of Michaelis and Eichhorn’. 3
Kenrick’s interest in German scholarship was intense. During the three 
years before he left England to study in Germany in 1819 he was a regular 
customer of the London – based bookseller and importer of German books, J.H. 
Bohte. 4  Bohte’s catalogue of 1816 listed almost 1,700 titles in German for sale 
in Britain. The selection of authors included the writers and dramatists A.F.F. von 
Kotzebue (1761-1819) and J.W. Goethe (1749-1832), and also the poets C.M. 
Wieland (1733-1813) and F.G. Klopstock (1724-1803).  Also listed were the 
dramatist, poet and historian J.C.F. Schiller (1759-1805), the Schlegel brothers, 
August Wilhelm (1767-1845) and Karl Wilhelm (1772-1829), and the philologist 
and folk lore writer Jacob Grimm (1785-1863). Works of J.G. Herder, G.E. 
                                                 
1 James Martineau, In Memorian : John Kenrick (London, 1877), p. 5. 
2 Frida Knight,University Rebel : The Life of William Frend, 1757-1841 (London, 1971), p. 67.  In his 
theological works Paulus denied the possibility of the supernatural and explained away the miracles as 
either stories told in error or mistaken opinions. 
3 John Kenrick, Memoir of the Rev. John Kentish (Birmingham, 1854), p. 34. 
4 See J.H. Bohte, A Catalogue of Books in Various Languages (London, 1816).  This catalogue gives some 
idea of the very wide range of German literature which was available to scholars at the time. Clearly, by the 
middle of the second decade of the nineteenth century, for those who could read them, there was a very 
wide selection of German works on the market, and many of them in the field in which Unitarian scholars 
were interested. 
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Lessing (1729-1781) and J.G. Fichte (1762-1814) were also available in German. 
In addition, there were listed many publications by the German mythologists,  
C.G. Heyne ( 1729-1812) and  G.F. Creuzer (1771-1858), the biblical critics 
Eichhorn,  Mosheim, Semler and J.A. Ernesti (1707-1781), and the historians 
A.H.L. Heeren 1760-1842) and B.G. Niebuhr (1776-1831).  The catalogue listed 
also almost a hundred different volumes on German language and grammar. 
Consequently, for those who could afford these books and who could read 
German, there was a wide and varied selection available. 
In this short period there were several letters from Kenrick to the 
Manchester College trustee George William Wood (1781-1843) on the subject of 
German books and payment for them. Wood, who was to become an MP whose 
bill in favour of the admission of Dissenters into the English universities was 
defeated in the House of Lords in the early 1830’s, was for many years the 
treasurer of Manchester College in York. In 1815 Kenrick wrote, ‘As to Bohte, I 
presume he would give you a receipt to your house in London for the Reiske’s 
Oratores Graeci’. 5  In another letter to Wood in December of the same year 
Kenrick referred to ‘my German bookseller, J.H. Bohte’. 6  Just over two years 
later, in February 1818, Kenrick wrote again  that he would be grateful for Wood 
to ‘send Mr. J.H. Bohte, York Street, Covent Garden, on my account, a bill for 
£17.19.6d and to let me have the difference of that and £50’. 7 It would seem 
                                                 
5 John  Kenrick to G.W. Wood, 25 February 1815, HMCL,  MS. Wood 3, fol. 29.  Johann Jacob Reiske 
(1716-1774), born in Prussia, was a highly esteemed scholar of Greek, Byzantine and Arabic literature 
whose commentaries on works in Arabic laid the foundations of Arab historical scholarship. 
6 John Kenrick  to G.W. Wood, 14 December 1815, HMCL, MS. Wood 3, fol. 37. 
7 John Kenrick  to G.W. Wood, 4 February 1818, HMCL, MS. Wood, fol. 69. 
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then that this young scholar absorbed the work of some German writers at a 
comparatively young age.  
 After his visit to Germany in 1819-1820 for a year of study in Göttingen 
and Berlin, the emphasis of Kenrick’s intellectual concerns shifted to history,  
philology and to a greater understanding of the role of myth both in relation to the 
Bible and to the history of the ancient world. The ideas he inherited from the 
Unitarian tradition of biblical interpretation, however, remained with him for the 
rest of his life. It is important to set out the context of German scholarship in 
which those ideas developed, and to try to outline similarities and differences 
between Germans and Unitarians in the period. Only in this way will it be 
possible to discover which ideas, whether home-grown or German, were 
projected on to later aspects of Kenrick’s historical thought. 8 As an aid to this, 
the final part of the chapter will be devoted to an assessment of the weight of 
importance of radical English and German ideas on biblical criticism on the 
intellectual development of John Kenrick. 
 In England, in general terms, it was not until 1790 that there was any 
adequate appreciation in intellectual circles of much that was German. 9 
Previously there had been a tendency to favour French literature and opinions 
and to a significant extent the consequence of this was a widespread ignorance 
                                                 
8 See chapters five, six, seven and eight below. 
9 V. Stockley, German Literature as Known in England, 1759-1830 (Madison, Wisconsin, 1949), pp. 1-2. 
For a more scientific and quantitative assessment of the extent to which German works appeared in English 
literary journals in this period, see B.Q. Morgan and A.R. Hohlfeld, German Literature in British 
Magazines, 1759-1860 (Madison, Wisconsin, 1949). This study came up with some interesting conclusions 
indicating that German works which were associated with the ‘universally human characteristics of the pre-
classical and classical writings of the eighteenth century in Germany’ were more prevalent in British 
literary journals in the period. These, according to the study, were consistently more popular than volumes 
which reflected the subjectivity and imagination of German literary Romanticism which became available 
in Britain in the early decades of the nineteenth century. See p. 113. 
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of the German language, a scarcity of books and a lack of good translations. 
Although the last decade of the eighteenth century in England did see some 
interest in popular German plays and novels, the first fifteen years of the 
nineteenth century, during which intellectual exchange with Europe was curtailed 
by the Napoleonic Wars, witnessed a general apathy towards German literature. 
The fortunes of the work of Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) with English 
readers followed this general pattern. Herder’s famous work, Outlines of the 
Philosophy of the History of Man, appeared in English translation in 1800, 10 and 
a year later the English literary elite saw the publication of an anonymous 
translation of Herder’s Oriental Dialogues. There followed, however, a gap of 
more than quarter of a century until the next translation of Herder. This was 
another anonymous work, rendering into English the German’s work on 
language, Über den Ursprung der Sprache, 11 which appeared in 1827. It was not 
really until around 1830 that a true familiarity with aspects of German language, 
literature and philosophy, including that of Herder, was to be found in cultured 
circles.   
 It was the poet Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772-1834), himself a Unitarian 
of the ‘old school’ during the 1790’s, who was largely responsible, of course, for 
the fact that German literature came to be more widely appreciated in England in 
the earlier nineteenth century.  During his trip to Göttingen in 1799 Coleridge 
encountered the most eminent scholars, among them Mosheim, Michaelis, 
Heyne, Eichhorn, the philosopher F.H. Jacobi (1743-1819) and the 
                                                 
10 J.G. Herder, Outlines of the Philosophy of the History of Man, translated by T. Churchill (London, 1800). 
11 Stockley, German Literature, p. 111. 
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anthropologist Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (1752-1840). This period at 
Göttingen coloured the rest of his productive life and his ideas on criticism, 
religion and metaphysics all reflected the Romantic notions which he 
experienced during his visit. 12
  It has usually been supposed that it was by the 1790’s that there existed 
some awareness amongst radical scholars and liberal Christians of German 
historical biblical criticism. This knowledge was most evident in Unitarian circles 
of the time and it was here that the work of the Germans was most keenly 
sought.13   However, well before this date there had already been established a 
tradition of intellectual cross communication between the scholars of Rational 
Dissent and some German biblical critics in relation to both Old and New 
Testaments.  Nathaniel Lardner’s vast work, Credibility of the Gospel Story, 14 
was translated volume by volume as it was produced in English. The Dutch 
translation of the first volume by Cornelius Westerbaen of Utrecht was  published 
in 1730 and a Latin version appeared in Bremen in 1733.  A German translation 
by David Bruhn, of Memel in Prussia was published in Berlin and Leipzig in 1750, 
and later German editions followed, up to the fourth volume, which was published 
in 1751. 15 The translation of the first part of Lardner’s work into German 
contained a lengthy preface written by Sigmund Jacob Baumgarten (1706-1757), 
                                                 
12 Richard Holmes, Coleridge : Early Visions (London, 1989), p. 221. 
13 John Rogerson, Old Testament Criticism in the Nineteenth Century: England and Germany (London, 
1984), pp. 158-159. See also p. 159, notes 4-7. 
14 See chapter two, above. 
15 Memoirs of the Life and Writings of the Late Reverend Nathaniel Lardner  (London, 1769), pp. 124-126. 
See also The Works of Nathaniel Lardner, with a Life by Dr. Kippis, 10 vols (London, 1835), pp. 194-195. 
See, in addition, Booklets with Notes, Notes on Nathaniel Lardner, DWL, MS. 12.54.  
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who taught both J.D. Michaelis  and J.S. Semler 16 and who is credited with 
being, in philosophical terms, a transitional figure between Wolffian rationalism 
and the new concerns with a historical approach to the Bible. 17
 Another work of Lardner’s, entitled Vindication of the Three Miracles,  was 
translated into German by a minister called Meyerburg and was published in Zell 
in 1750.  Lardner’s Discourses on the Circumstances of the Jewish People  
appeared at Halle in 1754 and a translation into German of the Treatise on the 
Demoniacs  was published in Bremen in  1760.  Clearly, the scholarly fame of the 
English Socinian Lardner, who had studied at Leyden from 1699 until 1702 or 
1703, had spread widely and his works ‘ rose higher in esteem and reputation 
among the most eminent divines at home and abroad’. 18  Indeed fully a century 
later Lardner’s proud reputation in Germany still remained firmly in place, for in 
1855 one German theologian remarked in a journal article that Lardner’s defence 
of the credibility of the gospels against the Deists had been so powerful that they 
had been used in his own time in the controversy with Strauss. 19
                                                 
16 Johann David Michaelis (1717-1791), was professor of philosophy from 1746 and oriental languages 
from 1750 at Göttingen.  Johann Salomo Semler (1725-1791) became professor of Theology at Halle in 
1753. It would be difficult to exaggerate the contribution made by them to the historical method in biblical 
criticism. 
17 Baumgarten’s most famous pupil, J.S. Semler, who became head of the theological faculty at Halle after 
Baumgarten’s death, himself confirmed his mentor’s transitional position on the question of historical 
investigation of biblical texts. See Peter Hanns Reill, The German Enlightenment and the Rise of 
Historicism  (Los Angeles, 1975), pp. 43 and 232, n. 51. It is not surprising then that Baumgarten took 
great interest in Lardner’s ideas about using external secular sources to confirm the truth about the events 
described in gospel texts. 
18 William Turner, Lives of Eminent Unitarians (London, 1840), p 141. 
19 Dr Schwarz, in Protestantisch Kirchenzeitung, 27 January 1855. See Booklets with Notes, DWL, MS 
12.54, note 26.  Here, presumably, the writer is referring to D. F. Strauss (1808-1874), the controversial 
German theologian whose Leben Jesu was first published in 1835. The English version, translated by 
George Eliot, appeared in 1846. In the work, Strauss sets out to prove that the gospel accounts were a 
collection of myths within which traces of historical truth were to be found. See chapter 5, below. 
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 Lardner’s friend and contemporary George Benson, 20 was credited 
seventy or so years later by John Kenrick himself with being one of those English 
Presbyterian Dissenters who gave to the Germans ideas about the rational 
interpretation of those parts of scripture which were ‘most wrested to the support 
of orthodoxy’. Kenrick wrote that ‘Michaelis and Semler were the disciples of 
Benson, Peirce and Hallett’.  In their defence of revelation against the Deists of 
the time, men such as Benson developed a better system of interpretation and 
one which conformed with ‘that freedom of thought and investigation which is the 
heritage of Dissenters’. 21 However, the relationship of critics such as Benson to 
the better known German thinkers was not simply one of a degree of influence, it 
was often one of friendship too. A brief letter written in Latin to Benson in 1755 by 
J.D. Michaelis, the content of which suggests that the German has sent his 
English friend a book which he recommends highly, is not only polite and 
gracious, but reveals also a warmth and familiarity. 22
 While Lardner and Benson were credited with exerting an influence on 
German critics, not many years later the intellectual currents were flowing in the 
other direction. The Unitarian social reformer and critic John Jebb (1736-1786), 
for example, was acquainted with the work of Johann Albrecht Bengel (1687-
1752), the Swabian New Testament critic and philologist. In his own notes written 
in 1769 for a proposed New Testament commentary Jebb indicates that the 
introduction to the Greek text will give reasons for it ‘in the manner of Bengelius’. 
                                                 
20 See chapter 2, above. 
21 John Kenrick, ‘Biographical Sketch of J.S. Semler’, MR, vol. 16, February, 1921, p. 66. 
22 J.D. Michaelis to George Benson, May 1755, JRUL, Unitarian Collection, MS. Box B1-16 / B-23.  
 163
23 Bengel was one of a group of theologians who rejected typological or figural 
interpretations in relating Old and New Testament events in favour of a more 
historical view of the scriptures. In addition, Bengel believed that inspired 
passages of scripture were meaningful, not only because they were the word of 
God, but also because they referred to events in a historical sequence. 24  
In the 1760s and 1770s Jebb was also familiar with the work of the Swiss 
critic Johann Jacob Wetstein (1693-1754), whose preparation of a critical edition 
of the Greek New Testament caused him to be charged with Socinianism and 
heresy in 1729.  It was precisely this work, along with its controversial 
prolegomena which, in 1772, in a course of theological lectures, Jebb 
recommended to students for general use as they were ‘not unworthy of 
…notice’. 25 At the same time, Jebb pointed out the value of the introductory 
lecture to the study of the Greek Testament by J.D. Michaelis. 26  Michaelis was 
the orientalist famous for his incisive historical method in biblical criticism and for 
his commentaries on the Mosaic law. He argued that the ancient Hebrew laws 
could only apply to the context in which they were formed and therefore could not 
be considered by Christians as universally applicable moral guides of timeless 
relevance. 27 Michaelis wrote that that the Mosaic laws, though good for the 
ancient Israelites, were not ‘absolutely and universally the best, not yet to be 
                                                 
23 John Jebb, Notes of a Plan of a Commentary on the New Testament, dated 22 May 1769. DWL, MS. 
171-172.   
24 Hans W. Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative: A Study in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century 
Hermeneutics (New Haven, Conn., 1974), pp. 175-176.   
25 John Disney, The Works, Theological, Medical, Political and Miscellaneous, of John Jebb, MD, FRS, 
with Memoir of his Life by the Author, 3 vols. (London, 1788), vol. 1, p. 58. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Michaelis’s famous work Mosaisches Recht was first published in 1770-1771.  The English version 
translated by Alexander Smith appeared much later. See J.D. Michaelis  Commentaries on the Laws of 
Moses, 4 vols  (London, 1814). 
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imitated by every people’, and indeed they should be worthy of our attention ‘only 
as the laws of a very remote country, and as relics of the most ancient legislative 
system’. 28 Of all German historical biblical critics MIchaelis was one of the most 
familiar to both early and later radical English scholars. 
Not only were critics such as Lardner, Benson and Jebb part of this 
intellectual ebb and flow.  Joseph Priestley, the most important radical theological 
innovator of the period, also contributed to the cross current of ideas between 
England and Germany.  Ted Letis argues that Unitarians including Priestley, who 
were known to German thinkers, made an important contribution as pioneers of 
historical biblical criticism and in many respects were precursors of the Germans.   
Accordingly, radical thinkers in England were more responsive to the ideas of 
German critics when the flow of influence changed direction in the nineteenth 
century. 29 Letis is correct in his analysis, but provides no evidence to support it.  
 However, it is clear that not only were the critical works of early radicals 
such as Lardner available to German scholars, but there is also evidence to 
show that the same applied to some works by Joseph Priestley. Priestley’s 
contribution to the ideas of his European counterparts was a reflection of his 
achievements as a polymath. The subject matter of those works which appeared 
in several languages ranged from dissertations on grammar, oratory 30 and 
natural philosophy to history, politics, government and religion. 
                                                 
28  Michaelis, Laws of Moses, vol 1, Art 6, pp. 17, 19. See Rogerson, Old Testament Criticism, pp. 162-163. 
29 Ted Letis, ‘From Sacred Text to Religious Text: An Intellectual History of the Impact of Erasmian 
Lower Criticism on Dogma as a Contribution to the English Enlightenment and the Victorian Crisis of 
Faith’, Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1995, p. 276.  
30 Joseph Priestley’s A Course of Lectures on Oratory and Criticism, which appeared in 1777, was 
translated into German and published in Leipzig in 1779 and in Berlin in 1793 and 1797. For this and the 
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 During the course of the latter decades of the eighteenth century 
approximately thirty five works by Priestley appeared in foreign languages. Due 
to the fact that Priestley’s reputation as a chemist reached far beyond the 
boundaries of his native England a number of works on natural philosophy 
appeared in both French and German. These works included The History and 
Present State of Electricity, first published in 1767. 31  Although the French were 
also greatly interested in Priestley’s works on history, politics and government, 32  
it would appear that only one small work on a religious topic was published in 
France.  Entitled Exposé de l’évidence de la religion révélée, and published in 
Paris in 1822, this was an extract from a collection of Sermons Extracted from 
Dr. Priestley’s Discourses, which first appeared in 1794. 
 The most significant feature of the list of Priestley’s foreign publications is 
that the great majority of those works on Unitarian theology and historical 
criticism which were translated into foreign languages were published in Dutch 
and German. The first part of the exposition, Letters to a Philosophical 
                                                                                                                                                 
following information on foreign translations of Priestley’s works I am indebted to the late John Stephens 
who was director of Waterfields, the antiquarian booksellers in Oxford. 
31 The French translation Histoire de l’Électricité traduite de l’anglois de Joseph Priestley, 3 vols. (Paris, 
1771) appeared with critical notes by M.J. Brisson.  The German version, Geschichte und gegenwärtiger 
Zustand der Elektricität nebst eigenthumlichen Versuchen…Aus dem Englischen übersetset…von D. 
Johann Georg Krünitz was published in Berlin in 1772.  There was also a Dutch translation, Geschiedenis 
en Tegenwoordige Staat der Electriciteit, which appeared in Amsterdam in 1772-3. Another work by 
Priestley on natural philosophy which was translated into both French and German was Experiments and 
Observations on Different Kinds of Air, published in 1774, also appeared in Italian. There were both French 
and German translations of Priestley’s work of 1779, Experiments and Observations Relating to Various 
Branches of Natural Philosophy and as late as 1799 there was published in Philadelphia a French version of 
a Priestley work on phlogiston. 
32 Priestley’s Description of a Chart of History, published in 1769, appeared in Dutch in 1782 and in 
French in 1784. His Lectures on History and General Policy (1788) were translated into both these 
languages in 1793 and in 1796-7 respectively. Both Dutch and French scholars also received versions of 
Priestley’s 1793 work Letters Addressed to the Philosophers and Politicians of France. The French alone, 
however, were interested in a work of 1791, Letters to the Right Honourable Edmund Burke, which 
appeared  in France later the same year. 
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Unbeliever, which was Priestley’s challenge to David Hume’s doctrines of natural 
religion, appeared in German in 1782. 33 Four years later, in 1786, a minor work 
entitled Forms of Prayer for the Use of Unitarian Societies was translated and 
published in Berlin. 34 In 1787, Priestley’s appeal to the Jews to discuss with him 
the Unitarian form of Christianity, which was characterised by the concept of the 
unity of God, appeared in both Dutch and German. 35 A later work, his 
Comparison of the Institutions of Moses with those of the Hindoos and other 
Ancient Nations, could be read in German by 1801, after it was published by 
Braunschweig. 36 Most interesting of all, however, was the publication in Berlin 
and Hamburg in 1785, three years after it first appeared in England, of Priestley’s 
key text on historical criticism, History of the Corruptions of Christianity, under the 
German title of Geschichte der Verfälschungen des Christenthums. 
Consequently, important works by Priestley which dealt with controversial 
religious opinions, comparative religion and, in Priestley’s Corruptions, a form of 
historical criticism which linked dogma to historical context were read by German 
scholars. 
                                                 
33 Joseph Priestley’s Letters to a Philosophical Unbeliever, Part 1, first published in London in 1780, 
appeared in Leipzig in 1782. The work was sold to German scholars under the title Briefe an einen 
philosophische Zweifler in Beziehung auf Humes Gespräch über das System der Natur u. ähnliche 
Schriften. Aus dem Englischen. 
34 The German title was, Liturgie und Gebetsformein zum öffentlichen für Christen von Allen 
Confession…Aus dem Englischen übersetzt. Mit einer Vorrede: Ueber die Möglichkeit und den Werth eines 
allgemeinchristlichen Gottesdienstes von H.A. Oistorius. 
35 Joseph Priestley, Letters to the Jews; inviting them to an amicable discussion of the Evidences of 
Christianity (Birmingham, 1786), was published in Frankfurt a year after it first appeared in England. The 
German version was entitled Briefe an die Juden, um sie zu einerfreudschaftlichen Untersuchung der 
Beweise für das Christenthum einzuladen. Aus dem Englischen des Joseph Priestley nach der zweyten 
vermehrten Ausgabe. 
36 The original English version was published in Northumberland, Pennsylvania in 1799. The title of  the 
German translation of 1801, with an introduction in German, was, Priestley’s Vergleichung der Gesetze des 
Moses mit denen der Hinduer und andrer alten Nationen…verdeutscht und mit einem erläuternden 
Anhange begleitet von Johann Wilhelm Heinrich Ziegenbein.  
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 Conversely, Priestley depended on German scholarship to a large extent 
in some of his works. In his key text, Corruptions of Christianity, 37 for example, 
there are more than eighty references to the work of the theologian Johann 
Lorenz von Mosheim (1694-1755). Mosheim, professor of divinity at Göttingen 
from 1747, was the Lutheran ecclesiastical historian who emphasised the 
importance of the objective, critical treatment of original sources, and who 
widened the contexts of church history to encompass secular historical themes. It 
was natural that Mosheim’s rational, critical observations on scripture would 
appeal to Priestley in his attempts to argue the Unitarian case on many important 
theological topics. 38
 In general terms the Unitarians were the intellectual group who were most 
aware of German ideas on scriptural interpretation in this earlier period, and the 
extent of their engagement with German works was very wide. As E.S. Shaffer 
correctly points out, the assumption that George Eliot’s translation of D.F. 
Strauss’s Life of Jesus  in 1846 was the beginning of the reception of the biblical 
higher criticism in England is entirely wrong, for the principles on which Strauss 
had based his ideas were already in place by the 1790s. 39 As  works by German 
scholars found their way to England in the late decades of the eighteenth and 
early years of the nineteenth centuries, Unitarian contemporaries of Priestley and 
those who followed him became acquainted with ideas from a foreign land which 
in many respects mirrored their own views on the interpretation of scripture. 
                                                 
37 Joseph Priestley, A History of the Corruptions of Christianity (London, 1871).  
38 See below. 
39 E.S. Shaffer, ‘Kubla Khan and the Fall of Jerusalem : The Mythological School in Biblical Criticism and 
Secular Literature 1770-1880 (Cambridge, 1972), p. 22. 
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        There were several groups of Unitarians who seized upon German ideas in 
the latter decades of the eighteenth century and some were better known than 
others. 40  Those close to John Kenrick, of the generation of his father, Timothy 
Kenrick (1759-1804), who had been schooled in the Socinian theology of Joseph 
Priestley, formed one of the groups who have been virtually ignored by historians 
of ideas. These writers were involved with German thought in relation to historical 
biblical interpretation and were most receptive to certain German ideas.    
 Thomas Belsham was a loyal intellectual follower of Joseph Priestley. 41 
Born in Bedford in 1759, Belsham was the most highly regarded of this post-
Priestleyan group, and had a key role in maintaining the Unitarianism of the late-
eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries within the boundaries of 
associationism and necessitarianism which had been drawn by Priestley.  By this 
time, largely due to Belsham, Unitarianism’s arguments had become very one 
sided in favour of the Socinian, monist, Priestleyan world view and the frame of 
mind which had favoured the dualism and philosophical liberty of Richard Price 
had begun to fade in the intellectual mists. 42  
       Belsham engaged in many public arguments and debates in defence of both 
the Unitarian position and his own published critical works until his death in 1829. 
                                                 
40 Rogerson, Old Testament Criticism, p. 159.  One such group existed in Cambridge in the late 1780s. It 
consisted of radical thinkers such as William Frend (1757-1841) and other Cambridge Unitarians, some of 
whom met Heinrich Eberhard Gottlob Paulus (1761-1851) in 1788. See Frida Knight, University Rebel: 
The Life of William Frend, 1757 – 1841 (London, 1971), p. 67. Paulus was the rationalist Tübingen scholar 
who became professor at Jena and produced works which asserted the impossibility of the supernatural and 
explained miracles as being nothing more than mistaken impressions. 
41 For example, the intellectual position of Belsham’s philosophical work, Elements of the Philosophy of 
the Mind and of Moral Philosophy: To Which is Prefixed a Compendium of Logic (London, 1801) was 
virtually identical to that of Joseph Priestley.  
42 Martin Fitzpatrick, ‘This Candid and Liberal Method :The Teaching of Philosophy in the Liberal 
Dissenting Academies of the Late Eighteenth Century in England’, in Colin Richmond and Isobel Harvey 
(eds.) Recognitions: Essays Presented to Edmund Fryde (University of Wales, 1996) pp. 502-503.  
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43  A powerful defence was often needed, for his views were as radical as those 
of Priestley, and Belsham sought evidence for their validity in the new historical 
approach to the interpretation of the Old and New Testaments.  Despite his 
tireless efforts in this area, however, Belsham is usually mentioned only in 
passing in accounts of the development of historical criticism in England. 44  He 
was completely ignored by the nineteenth century writer Leslie Stephen, who 
confined his own analysis of the Unitarians to Gilbert Wakefield (1756-1801), the 
biblical critic Edward Evanson (1731-1805) and to Joseph Priestley himself. 45  
 It is surprising that more attention has not been given by historians of 
ideas to Belsham, for by the early decades of the nineteenth century this radical 
critic 46 was in some respects at the epicentre of interest in the new historical 
biblical criticism which had arisen in both England and Germany. Belsham’s 
engagement with German ideas on biblical criticism was quite extensive despite 
the fact that it appears he could read little or no German. In a letter written to 
                                                 
43 For example, two works, both published in London in 1815, defended Unitarianism against orthodox 
attack. See Thomas Belsham, Letters Addressed to the Right Reverend the Lord Bishop of London, In 
Vindication of the Unitarians, and Tracts in Controversy with Bishop Horsley, With Notes by the Editor, To 
Which is Annexed an Appendix, Containing a Review of the Controversy, in Four Letters to the Bishops, By 
the Same Author. In addition, Belsham’s works reflected his appreciation of the spread of Socinianism. In 
the same year, 1815, there was published in London an extract from an American journal, the Panoplist of 
Boston, which had contained Belsham’s analysis of American Unitarianism, entitled ‘Socinianism 
Unmasked: A Review of American Unitarianism, or, a Brief History of the progress and present State of 
the Unitarian Churches in America, Compiled by the Rev. Thomas Belsham of London’. See also works 
written in defence of his own publications, for example, A Vindication of Mr. Belsham’s New Translation 
and Exposition of the Epistles of Paul  (London, 1825) and an appendix to this published separately and 
entitled, Extracts from the Writings of Eminent Divines of the Church of England, On the History of the 
Creation and Fall, on Justification, And on the Inspiration of the Apostles: Being An Appendix to A 
Vindication of Mr. Belsham’s Translation and Exposition of the Epistles of Paul  (London, 1824).  
44 See Rogerson, Old Testament Criticism, p. 159.  The perceptive Unitarian biographer, Alexander 
Gordon, however, is more expansive and gives Belsham his due credit in a whole chapter of his Addresses 
Biographical and Historical (London, 1922), pp. 304-307. Francis Mineka’s work The Dissidence of 
Dissent: The Monthly Repository, 1806-1838 (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1944) also gives Belsham a 
little credit for his work on biblical criticism. See p. 132. 
45 Leslie Stephen, History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century, 2 vols. (London, 1881), vol. 1, pp. 
427-446. 
46 For an outline of Belsham’s ideas, see below. 
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John Kenrick in Germany in 1819, Belsham confided that he would ‘give a great 
deal’ to be able to read or to hear Eichhorn’s lectures upon the Old and New 
Testaments. 47  
       Belsham’s inability to understand the language meant that he and many 
others turned to any German works in English which were available at the time. 
This meant that non-German speaking radical scholars were most closely 
acquainted with the ideas of Johann David Michaelis. 48 Professor of philosophy 
(1746) and oriental languages (1750) at Göttingen until his death in 1791, 
Michaelis was a pioneer of historical criticism who integrated Old Testament 
scripture with ancient life. The translation by the Germanophile Herbert Marsh 
(1757-1839) of Michaelis’s Einleitung in das Neue Testament, the Introduction to 
the New Testament, was published in Cambridge between 1793 and 1801. 49 
This was essentially a historical evaluation of New Testament scripture which 
denied the doctrine of inspiration. Michaelis wrote that the question whether the 
books of the New Testament were inspired was not as important as the question 
of ‘whether or not they are genuine’. The truth of our religion depends upon the 
latter, ‘not absolutely on the former’. 50  Michaelis’s most famous pupil, Johann 
Gottfried Eichhorn, who succeeded him as professor of oriental languages and 
                                                 
49 Herbert Marsh (1757-1839), the Anglican scholar who became Bishop of Peterborough, studied in 
Leipzig under Michaelis between 1785 and 1792, during which time he corresponded with Griesbach 
regarding  his New Testament studies.  The edition of the work he translated which is cited in this thesis is 
John David Michaelis, Introduction to the New Testament  (London, 1802). 
50 Michaelis, Introduction to the New Testament,  p. 72. 
47 Williams, Memoirs of Belsham, p. 704. Although the biography does not specifically state that this letter 
was to John Kenrick, who was Belsham’s step-nephew, the recipient of the letter is confirmed as Kenrick 
by Alexander Gordon in his Addresses, p. 304. Johann Gottfried Eichhorn (1752-1827) is regarded by 
many as the founder of modern Old Testament criticism, and his influence on biblical scholars in this 
period cannot be underestimated. See T.K. Cheyne, Founders of Old Testament Criticism  (London, 1893), 
pp. 13-26. 
48 Thomas Belsham, The Epistles of Paul the Apostle, Translated, With an Exposition and Notes (London, 
1822), p. xxv.  Belsham quotes extensively from the English translation of Michaelis.  
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biblical exegesis at Göttingen, wrote that this work was ‘indispensable to every 
theologian – a genuine magazine of critical learning’. 51  
        Thirteen years later, Michaelis’s commentaries on the Mosaic laws as 
unrelated to the idea of universal Christian morality revealed his rejection of the 
Old Testament as infallible and an acceptance of its historicity. The Jews were 
an ancient people who should be seen as having their own place in the stream of 
history, and their laws appropriate for their own time and circumstance. As these 
laws were unique to their particular historical context, so were their other writings, 
which were a form of early poetry and mythic expression. 52  Eichhorn wrote that 
under Michaelis’s guidance others had been inspired to investigate the scriptures 
historically, from the spirit of ancient times and the ‘antiquities, customs, opinions 
and modes of thinking’. 53
            Michaelis developed some of these ideas after he had read  Robert 
Lowth’s 54 Lectures on the Sacred Poetry of the Hebrews, which were first 
delivered in 1749-1750 in Latin, and these Michaelis translated into German.  
Lowth was the very first scholar to realise that the Old Testament contained 
poetry and literature and indeed J.G. Herder, whose attention had been drawn to 
Lowth’s work by Michaelis, was compelled then to write his own contribution to 
this train of thought in Vom Geist der ebräischen Poesie, The Spirit of Hebrew 
Poetry, in 1782. Thus the ideas of Lowth in relation to the literary content of the 
Old Testament had been absorbed and refined by these German writers and 
                                                 
51 J.G. Eichhorn, An Account of the Life and Writings of John David Michaelis (Edinburgh, 1835), p. 31. 
52 Reill, German Enlightenment, pp. 194-195. 
53 Eichhorn, John David Michaelis, p. 35. 
54 Robert Lowth (1710-1787) became professor of poetry at Oxford in 1741, Bishop of St. David’s in 1766 
and Bishop of London in 1777. His work, entitled De Sacra Poesi Hebræorum, was published in 1753. 
 172
subsequently re-entered English historical-critical circles in a form which gave 
force to historical ideas of the cultural development of the ancient Jewish nation.  
In the works of Michaelis which were translated into English, there 
appeared three important radical ideas. Firstly, Michaelis rejected the infallibility 
of ancient scripture and its application to Christian morality of the Mosaic laws, 
which were relevant only to the ancient Jewish people at a particular time in their 
history. This implied a sense of moral relativism with regard to past ages. 
Secondly, he regarded the origins of the history of the ancient Hebrew nation as 
built around the primitive mythic creations of a poetic age. This tended towards 
the concept of uniqueness in the idea of historical beginnings and, by implication, 
later cultural development. Thirdly, his analysis of the New Testament was not 
one based upon any doctrine of inspiration, but rather one formed around a 
consciousness of the historical importance of the biblical texts and the 
relationship between religion and the culture of the age.  All this conformed with 
the radical forms of interpretation characteristic of the latter part of the eighteenth 
century, both in Michaelis’s homeland and in England.  
Michaelis was an influential intermediary between radical scholars in 
England and Germany at this time, 55 and the translation of his work was a 
godsend to those English critics who could not read German. In a review of an 
article by Belsham published in 1807, the author recorded Belsham’s praise of 
Marsh’s translation of Michaelis and his hope that  someone equally qualified 
would ‘perform the same office for Eichhorn, which Mr. Marsh has performed for 
                                                 
55 Shaffer, ‘Kubla Khan’, p. 20. 
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Michaelis’. 56  In Michaelis there is a clear example of German scholarship which 
proved a magnet for inquiring scholars such as those of the Unitarian creed. 
Thus the ideas of one of the most controversial German biblical critics of the time 
were diffused amongst those radical English biblical critics whose minds were 
open to new thoughts on the historical content and meaning of both Old and New 
Testaments. 
  Belsham’s studies, which were enhanced by the reading of critics such as 
Michaelis, led him into a wide correspondence with others of like mind. He was 
well acquainted with the youthful Boston clergyman and biblical critic Joseph 
Buckminster (1784-1812), who was responsible for the introduction to American 
scholars of many German works, including the critical edition of the New 
Testament produced by the German scholar Johann Jacob Griesbach (1745-
1812).57 The German’s work was published in America in 1809 and in the 
following year Buckminster wrote to Thomas Belsham regarding another edition 
of the New Testament, this time by the rationalist H.E.G. Paulus. Buckminster 
told Belsham that the work had ‘greatly excited his curiosity’ and wondered if it 
were possible to find someone in England who ‘will give the English an 
                                                 
56 Review of Thomas Belsham, A Summary View of the Evidence and Practical  Importance of the 
Christian Revelation, in a Series of Discourses Addressed by Young Persons, by Thomas Belsham, Minister 
of the Unitarian Chapel in Essex Street (London, 1807), in MR, Vol. 2, May 1807, p. 271. 
57 Griesbach followed Bengel and Johann Salomo Semler in that he divided the NT manuscripts into three 
main groups, the Western, the Alexandrian and the Byzantine and analysed the probability of the truth of 
aspects of the NT by comparing them with the three texts. Those readings, for example, which were 
supported by all three texts – or by two, particularly if they were the Western and the Alexandrian – were 
then considered by Griesbach to be genuine. Griesbach, who was one of J.S. Semler’s most enthusiastic 
disciples, first published his three – volume critical edition of the New Testament at Halle in 1774-1775. 
Two years later, all the historical books were reprinted in one volume, the original synoptical arrangement 
of the gospels having been abandoned. Griesbach’s work represented a rational, analytical approach to the 
history of the production of the gospels and an evaluation of the truth, or otherwise, which they contained.  
It was not surprising, therefore, that Unitarians were attracted to his method. See below. 
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opportunity of knowing what Eichhorn or Paulus or some other German 
[theologians] have done for biblical literature’ ? 58
       Almost a decade later, in 1819, Edward Everett (1794-1865), the Boston 
Unitarian divine who had received a doctorate from the University of Göttingen 
two years earlier, wrote to Belsham from Rome on the subject of a letter he, 
Everett, had received from Eichhorn himself.  The German had told Everett of an 
essay he had published which explained away miracles relating to the departure 
of the Jews from Egypt as natural phenomena.  Eichhorn had also written on Old 
Testament material and had divided the translations of the prophets 
chronologically. The book of Isaiah Eichhorn had related to different periods of 
two hundred years apart, ‘which’, wrote Everett to Belsham, ‘changes the whole 
disposition of these books.’ 59
 Eichhorn’s general conclusions about the writings of the Old Testament 
exposed radical English critics to the most controversial critical ideas of the late-
eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries. Writers such as Belsham would have 
been made aware of the core tenets of a critic such as Eichhorn, by scholars who 
had mastered the language.  The Scottish Roman Catholic critic Alexander 
Geddes (1737-1802), for example, was one of these intermediaries. Geddes’ 
own work, which included a new translation of the Bible produced in the 1780s 
and 1790s, denied the doctrine of inspiration and interpreted early Hebrew 
writings as mythology. 60  Geddes’ interpretations of the Old Testament were 
approved by Germans and Unitarians alike.  Both Michaelis and Eichhorn 
                                                 
58 Joseph Buckminster to Thomas Belsham, 14 July, 1810, DWL, Kenrick Papers, 24.107, 14.  
59 Edward Everett to Thomas Belsham, 1819, DWL, Kenrick Papers, 24. 107, 20.  
60 Shaffer, ‘Kubla Khan’, pp 26-27. 
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praised his enlightened approach to the Hebrew cosmogony and, as he grew 
more and more radical in his ideas, his scholarly relationships with Unitarians, 
including Joseph Priestley himself, blossomed. 61        
 Eichhorn, who has been described as the ‘founder of modern Old 
Testament criticism’, 62 had been a pupil of Michaelis and also of the classical 
philologist C.G. Heyne.  From Michaelis he had learned the importance of 
historical context as a defining factor in the understanding of ancient 
manuscripts. From this had developed Eichhorn’s fascination for the vital 
question of the authorship of Old Testament texts and accordingly, he followed 
the general thrust of the radical German scholarship of the time. Rather than 
regarding ancient texts purely as the infallible fruits of divine inspiration, critics 
were tending to see them more in the light of historical documents whose 
characteristics were determined by the time and circumstance in which they had 
been produced.  Although he did not go as far as denying the Mosaic authorship 
of the Pentateuch, Eichhorn challenged its unitary nature by dividing the ancient 
texts into two distinct sources with regard to the different names of God in each, 
Elohim and Jehova. 63 This introduced the idea of a historical element in the 
authorship of the first five books of the Bible, and undermined the orthodox view 
that these ancient texts were the inspired work of one author.   
                                                 
61 Ibid., p.27. See also Jonathan Sheehan, The Enlightenment Bible: Translation, Scholarship, Culture 
(Princeton, 2005), p. 245. At the turn of the century Geddes was attacked along with German biblical 
scholars by publications such as the Anti-Jacobin Review of 1798-1800. There was, the journal claimed, a 
disdain for religion which had been epitomised by ‘the principles of Eichhorn’. Quoted from the  Anti-
Jacobin Review 6 (1800), pp. 563, 571, by Sheehan, Enlightenment Bible p. 245. 
62 Cheyne,  Founders, p.13. 
63 Rogerson, Old Testament Criticism, pp. 19-21. See esp. p. 21. 
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  Belsham and his contemporaries in England became aware of ideas such 
as these from this new German source.  This is not to say that every Rational 
Dissenter-Unitarian of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries read all 
of Michaelis and everything penned by Eichhorn, whose works were never 
translated into English. 64 Despite this, however, the nature of the English-
German intellectual exchange, blurred as it was by the language problem, was 
that the core ideas of these German thinkers were nevertheless available to all 
who were interested.  
         Those whose intellectual achievements included a  knowledge of German 
were able to draw directly on their writings. John Kenrick’s father, the Unitarian 
commentator Timothy Kenrick (1759-1804), wrote a New Testament analysis in 
which he placed New Testament events and persons in contexts which reflected 
the customs and attitudes of the age. 65  Many of the elder Kenrick’s ideas were 
derived from his own intellectual tradition, with references to such writers as 
Lardner, Lowth, Priestley, Philip Doddridge and Gilbert Wakefield. Wakefield 
himself drew upon the works of German thinkers in the classical mould and was 
interested in the ideas of Heyne. 66 Added to these sources in Kenrick’s work 
                                                 
64 There had been a project, initiated by Herbert Marsh, then Professor of Divinity at Cambridge and A.H. 
Loyd, Professor of Hebrew, in the last two years of the eighteenth century, to translate Eichhorn.  However, 
due to lack of support and money, it came to nothing. See Shaffer, ‘Kubla Khan’, p. 22. 
65 Timothy Kenrick, An Exposition of the Historical Writings of the New Testament, 3 vols (Birmingham, 
1807). The work was published posthumously.  A memoir by the scholar and Unitarian divine, John 
Kentish (1768-1853) noted that Kenrick’s objective was ‘to discover and communicate the pure doctrines 
of the gospel’. See John Kentish, ‘Memoirs of the Late Rev. Timothy Kenrick’ MR, vol. 3, February 1808, 
p. 65. 
66 See A Catalogue of the Very Elegant Classical and Critical Library of the Late Rev. Gilbert Wakefield, 
editor of Lucretius, Pope’s Homer etc., and Author of Various Publications, Sold at auction by Leigh, 
Sotheby and Son, Booksellers, York Street, Covent Garden, On Thursday, March 25, 1802, and Six 
Following Day. (London, 1802).  There are almost 1,500 works on the list. For Heyne’s works, see items 
35, 427, 954 and 956.  There were also in the library works by the German classical and Arabic scholar 
Johann Jacob Reiske (1716-1774). See items 244, 251, 315, 765, 925 and 995. A controversial writer, 
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were the critics  E.F.K. Rosenmüller (1768-1835), Schleusner, Griesbach, 
Michaelis and Wetstein (1693-1754). The latter was a Swiss scholar who 
contributed to biblical criticism a methodical account of biblical manuscripts and 
readings, but who was accused of heresy after his critical edition of the New 
Testament was believed to have favoured Arian and Socinian views. Thus 
Timothy Kenrick’s text showed clearly the mixture of English and German ideas 
which were regularly consulted by radical critics such as himself. 
 The scholar and Unitarian divine John Kentish was also closely engaged 
with the ideas of German critics in the period.  In his work, Notes and Comments 
on Passages of Scripture, a collection of commentaries produced over the years 
and published in 1844, there were almost 270 sources listed, of which around 35 
were German. The best known of the German sources are Bengel, Eichhorn, 
Griesbach, Johann Jahn (1750-1816), 67 Michaelis, Mosheim, the historian  
Niebuhr , the earlier critics Rosenmüller and Schleusner, the theologian F.E.D. 
Schleiermacher , Semler and Wetstein.  John Kentish was not only an expert in 
German, but also read Hebrew, Chaldee and Syriac.   
 Information about these and other German critics was available in 
Unitarian journals. In the Monthly Magazine of 1800, for example, there appeared 
a twenty-four page summary of German language publications. 68  The list 
                                                                                                                                                 
scholar and social reformer, Gilbert Wakefield (1756-1801) rejected his Anglican upbringing and adopted 
Unitarian doctrines. He was classical tutor at the Dissenting Academy at Warrington from 177 to 1783, and 
Joseph Priestley was among his fellow tutors.  Although he never became affiliated to any specific creed 
Wakefield was well-acquainted with well known Unitarians such as John Disney (1746-1816) and 
Theophilus Lindsey (1723-1808), who had also rejected Anglicanism. 
67 Jahn was a Roman Catholic biblical critic and professor of oriental languages at Vienna from 1789.  He 
was a controversial figure and a scholar who produced some radical interpretations of the chronology of 
Old Testament texts. See the analysis of John Kenrick’s assimilation of German scholarship, below. 
68 See ‘German Literature’, in the Monthly Magazine, vol. 10, 1800, pp. 662-686. 
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included works on history, including a volume on ancient history by Eichhorn, and 
also on geography, natural philosophy, moral philosophy and metaphysics, citing 
works by Kant.  Also included were books on philology, literature, education, law, 
medicine and divinity, along with a summary of publications in the catalogue of 
the Leipzig Easter Fair of 1800. 69 Among these was listed a commentary on the 
first three evangelists by Paulus, a work which was described by the reviewer as 
‘a very agreeable present’. 70 This journal therefore provided a comprehensive 
list of the leading German scholars in the field in various disciplines, including 
theology. 
   Another Unitarian publication given over to liberal theological views was 
the Monthly Repository. The early first series of this journal, which ran from 1806 
to 1826, also featured a number of articles, many of them anonymous, which had 
been generated by the work and ideas of the Germans, 71 among them Herder, 
Michaelis and Eichhorn. Herder also, whose ideas on the past had a powerful 
influence on German Romanticism with regard to the formation of its historical 
consciousness, made some appearances in the journal during that period in 
which he was rarely mentioned in more orthodox publications. 
      The first of these was on a literary theme and consisted of three short 
translations from Herder and Goethe by the Unitarian lawyer and diarist Henry 
                                                 
69 Ibid., pp. 679-686. 
70 Ibid., p. 684. 
71 For a comprehensive history of the journal see  Mineka, Dissidence of Dissent. Mineka points out that the 
great majority of contributors used only a pseudonym. This made the identification of authorship in many 
cases very difficult and in some, virtually impossible. Even the editor Robert Aspland himself did not know 
the identity of some of those whose articles, letters and translation appeared in the journal. Mineka has 
compiled a list of contributors who appeared in the Dictionary of National Biography.  The list includes 
writers with whom we are concerned here, for example Thomas Belsham, Thomas Foster Barham, Joseph 
Bretland, John Kentish, Henry Crabb Robinson, and John Kenrick. See Mineka Dissidence of Dissent, pp. 
394-400. 
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Crabb Robinson (1775-1867). 72 Two years later, in 1808, Crabb Robinson wrote 
of Herder’s historical genius with regard to his ‘great connecting views of 
mankind….in which…a few favourite spots are elaborately wrought’. 73 In addition 
he noted the German’s antipathy towards the metaphysics of scholasticism, and 
his apparent consideration of ‘the trammels of logic as a bondage to a liberal 
mind’. 74 On a biblical theme, Herder’s story about the death of Adam was the 
subject of a letter to the Repository’s editor Robert Aspland, 75  and some months 
later, when Crabb Robinson’s translation of Herder’s Paramythia was published 
in the Repository, 76 the subject matter had turned to myth. Thus within a short 
three-year period, important aspects of Herder’s thought had been given space in 
the journal.   
 As in all these publications, the content reflected the interests of its 
readers, and accordingly the Repository published from time to time work which 
made available German ideas to English readers and also accounts of the latest 
research by eminent German critics on biblical topics. In the early decades of the 
nineteenth century it published several reviews of lectures by Michaelis’s 
translator Herbert Marsh, which were a guide to the discipline of biblical criticism 
and to the best critics in the field, citing the Germans Bengel, Wetstein, 
                                                 
72 Henry Crabb Robinson, ‘Translations from the German of Herder and Goethe’, MR, vol. 1, February 
1806, pp. 55-56.  Like many contributors to the Repository, Crabb Robinson wrote under a pseudonym. His 
was ‘Viator’. 
73 Henry Crabb Robinson, ‘Remarks on the Genius and Writings of Herder’, MR, vol. 3, April 1808, p. 177. 
74 Ibid., p. 175. 
75 Asplan was only twenty four years old when he took over the editorship of the journal in 1806. 
76 Henry Crabb Robinson, translation, ‘Paramythia: from the German of Herder’, MR, vol. 4, March 1809, 
pp. 142-145. 
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Griesbach and others.  77  Marsh’s lectures  advised aspiring critics that ‘the Bible 
must be examined by the same laws of criticism which are applied to other 
writings of antiquity’, 78 and were greatly praised by the reviewer. There was, 
however, little doubt as to the most important part of Marsh’s reputation, and that 
was the ‘character under which he is known to the public most honourably and 
most usefully – as THE ANNOTATOR ON MICHAELIS’. 79 Three years later, in 
1816, the reviewer wrote of the hope that Marsh would complete his plan of 
putting Michaelis’s works within the reach of English scholars, thus adding ‘new 
lustre to the name of Dr. Marsh!’. 80
 In addition to the regular publication of commentaries on its favourite 
critics, the Repository also kept track of the latest developments in German 
thought on the subject of biblical interpretation itself. In 1812, for example, there 
appeared a six-page article copied from the Classical Journal  concerning some 
of the latest German publications 81 which carried the ideas of critics such as 
Michaelis and Eichhorn a stage further. W.M.L. de Wette ( 1780-1849) and his 
contemporary J.S. Vater, the orientalist who was professor at Halle from 1799 
to1809, argued that rather than the most ancient books of the Bible being, as 
Eichhorn believed, from two different sources, they were in fact fragments 
                                                 
77 Review of A Course of Lectures containing a Description and Systematic Arrangement of the Several 
Branches of Divinity; accompanied with an Account both the Principal Authors, and of the Progress which 
has been made at different Periods in Theological Learning, by Herbert Marsh, D.D., F.R.S., Margaret 
Professor of Divinity (London, 1810). The twelfth lecture, writes the reviewer ‘is employed in an 
enumeration of the authors who have best explained the several departments of Hebrew criticism. Here we 
cannot fail to perceive that Dr. Marsh’s acquaintance with the theological literature of the continent, 
enables him to execute this part of his undertaking with more than common advantage’.  See MR, vol. 6, 
April, 1811, pp. 295-298, quoted at p. 297. 
78 Review, Marsh’s Course of Lectures, MR, vol. 8, October 1813, pp. 673-677, quoted at p. 675. 
79 Ibid., p. 677. The capital letters are those of the reviewer. 
80 Review, Marsh’s Course of Lectures, MR, vol. 11, October 1816, pp. 596-602, quoted at p. 602. 
81 ‘Some Account of the Researches of the German Literati on the Subject of Ancient Literature and 
History’, MR , vol. 7, May 1812, pp. 352-357. 
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entirely unrelated to one another. This, according to de Wette and Vater, proved 
that the Mosaic laws had in fact been imposed at a much later date, and that the 
Pentateuch was, like the work of Homer, merely a mythological account without 
any historical validity. 82 As  T.A. Howard points out, 83 de Wette, who was more 
radical than Vater, laid the foundations for a shift away from an emphasis upon 
the historical validity of events and people involved in ancient narratives, and 
towards the history of the texts themselves and their authors, a tendency which 
had already developed in the work of some Unitarian critics. 84  
          The article, which mentioned other German writers, some more famous, 
others lesser-known, 85 was accompanied by a translation of an extract from 
Eichhorn’s commentaries on the book of Genesis. 86 Eichhorn argued that it had 
been the unadorned simplicity of the account of the humble life of a few 
shepherds in the infancy of the world which made us ‘fully sensible of the pure 
sources from which [it] was derived’. 87   Consequently, non-German speaking 
readers of the Repository were made aware of two major themes of Eichhorn’s 
work, the oral traditions and diversity of sources of which the book of Genesis 
was composed. 
                                                 
82 See Rogerson, Old Testament Criticism, pp. 28-36 and  Thomas Albert Howard, Religion and the Rise of 
Historicism: W.M.L. de. Wette, Jacob Burckhardt, and the Theological Origins of Nineteenth Century 
Historical Consciousness (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 40-43. 
83 Howard, Theological Origins, p. 42. 
84 See chapter three, note 112, above in relation to Thomas Belsham’s view of the historical perspective 
which should apply to the author of the text. 
85 Mention is made of Griesbach, Rosenmuller, Johann  Jahn of Vienna, and Paulus.  The theologian and 
philosopher Friedrich Ernst Daniel Schleiermacher (1768-1834) is listed too, in relation to a letter printed 
in Berlin in which he called into question the authenticity of the first epistle of St Paul to Timothy. 
86 Anon, ‘Eichhorn on the Authenticity of the Book of Genesis’, MR, vol. 7, May 1812, pp. 357-362. 
87 Ibid., p. 362. The underline here is my own. Eichhorn’s view was that the manuscripts of the Pentateuch 
were not unitary, but that the early Hebrew narratives had been derived from two different sources. 
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 These two themes, which took the historical view that that Genesis was 
compiled from different manuscripts written at different times and in response to 
various sets of circumstances, were examined more closely by Unitarians almost 
a decade later in the years 1821 and 1822. At this time, along with summaries of 
the contents of his historical work on the New Testament, 88  five considerations 
of Eichhorn’s older work on the Old Testament appeared in the Repository. 89 
The first two were summaries of   contents covering the canonical authority and 
history of the ancient Hebrew texts. 90 The remaining three, however, were 
translations of parts of Eichhorn’s texts which included the views that Genesis 
was not verbally inspired, 91 but may have ‘originated in human sources’ and 
been ‘handed down … by means of oral traditions or scriptural records’. 92  
Moreover, several chapters in Genesis appeared ‘distinct, isolated records’, 93 
indicating a different authorship from the remainder.   Because there are 
repetitions in the text, it would appear that Genesis may be a work compiled of 
‘two historical records, fragments of which are variously introduced’. 94  
            Following this conclusion, Eichhorn wrote that, ‘The record under the 
name of Jehovah inserts, as often as possible, fragments of poetry, those earliest 
                                                 
88 These summaries were of the contents of Eichhorn’s Introduction to the Study of the New Testament 
(1804-1812). They gave a good indication to the Repository  reader of Eichhorn’s  historical approach to 
‘higher criticism’, the study of the origins, nature and authenticity of New Testament texts. See MR, vol. 
16, March 1821, pp. 200-203, MR, vol. 16, May 1821, pp. 281-283 and  MR vol. 16, June 1821, p. 335. 
89 These were taken from Eichhorn’s older work, Introduction to the Study of the Old Testament, first 
published in German in 1780-1783. 
90 See MR, vol. 16, September 1821, pp. 511-513, and also MR, vol. 16, October 1821, pp. 582-584.  
91 See MR, vol. 17, August 1822, pp. 488-491, esp. p. 488. 
92 Ibid., p. 489. 
93 Ibid., p. 490. 
94 See MR, vol. 17, September 1822, pp. 533-540, quoted at p. 533. This extract includes several pages of 
the Hebrew text which Eichhorn shows to sustain his argument. 
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historical documents of all nations’. 95  Thus both Michaelis and Eichhorn, who 
represented the first and second generation of the German historical biblical 
critics, 96 had presented to the Unitarian scholars, virtually all of whom subscribed 
to the Repository, a method which looked at the origins of ancient texts and the 
modes of ancient life with a sophisticated historical eye. 97 Not only that, but it 
was a perspective which understood that the development of the Hebrew nation, 
its customs and its laws, took shape in the same way as that of other ancient 
peoples.  
Such ideas were not lost upon even the lesser known contributors to the 
journal. For example, in 1823 an extract was published posthumously of a work 
by one Henry Turner, a Unitarian minister, which emphasised the historical value 
of the Mosaic laws.  His opinion was that it should not be forgotten that these 
laws were created for a ‘temporary and peculiar dispensation’ and gained their 
‘chief beauty and expediency’ from being viewed in this way.  These laws were, 
he added, misleading if regarded as ‘permanent principles of true and acceptable 
religion’. 98 Thus some key ideas of German critics were seen as valid by 
Unitarian contributors who did not necessarily belong to the elite of biblical 
criticism.   
Although  much column space was given over to a host of diverse topics 
such as criminal law, funeral sermons, the Icelandic Bible, political analyses, 
                                                 
95 MR, vol. 17, October 1822, pp. 615-621, quoted at p. 616. 
96 Rogerson, Old Testament Criticism, pp. 16-17.  
97 See also MR, vol. 20, April 1825, pp. 194-204.  This was a ten-page extract from a work of the German 
poet, dramatist and historian, J.F.C. Schiller ( 1759-1805), describing  the historical circumstances behind 
some of the events which occurred during and after the foundation of the Jewish nation.  
98 Henry Turner, ‘An Essay on the Nature and Design of Sacrifices under the Mosaic Law, and the 
Influence which Jewish Ideas and Language Concerning them had Upon the Language of the New 
Testament’, MR, vol. 18, May 1823, pp. 270-275, quoted at  p. 271. 
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biographies, obituaries, Unitarian Association reports, the nature of the brain, 
inns of Switzerland, Indian superstitions and animal rights, the Repository was 
essentially a treasure trove of radical theological opinion. It was by no means 
packed with articles about the work of German critics, but during the years of the 
first series, from 1806 to 1826, it rarely missed an opportunity to publish at least 
something related to the ideas of the German critics. In volume eight, published 
for the year 1813, out of a total of seven hundred and ninety eight pages, fifty 
one of them were given over to contributions related to German critics and 
criticism. 
There were many good examples. There appeared discussions of 
Griesbach’s texts, and of work by Michaelis on textual criticism. In a series of 
letters to the Repository, Thomas Belsham was closely involved in Mosheim’s 
account of the beliefs of the learned early church father Origen (185-254) on 
whether or not the Jewish Christians were Ebionites who had rejected the virgin 
birth. 99  Another example was a biographical article by John Kentish on the 
German philosopher and scholar Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786), 100 who was 
a staunch defender of monotheism. There was clearly a regular and persistent 
appearance in the first series of the journal of German related critical articles 
over the period. 101  
                                                 
99 Thomas Belsham, ‘Mr. Belsham on the Controversy between Dr. Priestley and Bishop Horsley; in Reply 
to the Strictures of the Rev. H. Horsley on the Calm Inquiry’, MR, vol. 8, April 1813, pp. 240-244, MR, vol. 
8 , May 1813, pp. 294-297, MR, vol. 8, June 1813, pp. 383-388,  MR, vol. 8, July 1813, pp. 450-453, MR, 
vol. 8, September 1813, pp. 583-588, and MR vol. 8, November 1813, pp.723-731. 
100 Ibid., pp. 221-226.   
101 This is an approximate assessment of the numbers of pages given over to German critics and related 
topics in each of the twenty one volumes. Volume 1 (1806) – 36 pages, vol. 2 (1807) – 19 pages, vol. 3 
(1808) – 22 pages, vol. 4 (1809) – 42 pages, vol. 5 (1810) – none or very few, vol. 6 (1811) – 15 pages, vol. 
7 (1812) – 10 pages, vol. 8 (1813) – 51 pages, vol. 9 (1814) – 12 pages, vol. 10 (1815) –  none or very few, 
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Why was it that radical Unitarian biblical scholars were so attracted to the 
work of their German counterparts? The philosophical background and the 
theological objectives of the two sets of scholars in the English and German 
Enlightenments were very different. The radical scholars of Unitarianism had 
been schooled in the philosophy of Locke and the associationism of David 
Hartley, and perceived reality through the medium of empiricism. This meant that 
everything was discoverable if one looked hard enough. Many of them, like 
Joseph Priestley, had reacted against the Calvinism of their youth. They used the 
historical analysis of scripture and the examination of the validity of texts to try to 
prove the truth of their radical beliefs about the nature of Christ and to undermine 
the authority of orthodox doctrines such as the Trinity and the atonement. This 
kind of ‘root and branch’ historical examination and reconstruction of the 
scriptures was also a way to discover evidence to prove that the early Christians 
were Unitarians. 102
In contrast, the critics of the German Enlightenment such as Semler and 
Michaelis, and later Eichhorn , had an intellectual background which had been 
dominated by  the legacy of Leibniz, whose philosophy was founded upon the 
idea of contextual harmony. 103 The theological frame of mind of the writers of the 
Aufklärung, which was essentially a Protestant intellectual movement, had been 
                                                                                                                                                 
vol. 11 (1816) – 11 pages, vol. 12 (1817) – 15 pages, vol. 13 (1818) – very few or none, vol. 14 (1819) – 8 
pages, vol. 15 (1820) – one page, vol. 16 (1821) – 24 pages, vol. 17 (1822) – 26 pages, vol. 18 (1823) – 13 
pages, vol. 19 (1824) – none or very few, vol. 20 (1825) – 17 pages and vol. 21 (1826) – 25 pages. 
102 See, for example, Joseph Priestley, ‘Appendix to the General Conclusion, containing a Summary View 
of the Evidence for the Primitive Christians Holding the Doctrine of the Simple Humanity of Christ’, in A 
History of the Corruptions of Christianity  (London, 1871), pp. 317-318.  The appendix which follows in 
this edition is entitled ‘Considerations in Evidence that the Apostolic and Primitive Church was Unitarian’ 
and deals with the same subject in greater detail. Ibid., pp 319-336. See also Joseph Priestley, An History of 
Early Opinions Concerning Jesus Christ, 4 vols (Birmingham, 1786 ).  
103 Reill, German Enlightenment, pp. 6-7. 
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moulded by that deep emotional and spiritual form of religious expression known 
as Pietism, 104 which had challenged Lutheran and Calvinist orthodoxy and had 
identified scripture as the only guide to spiritual life. 
 The main objective of the critics of the German Enlightenment was the 
same as that of the English Unitarians, and that was to rescue religion rather 
than see it destroyed by deism and rationalism.  The Unitarians sought to 
achieve this, however, by attacking orthodoxy and recovering and establishing a 
contrastingly pure form of Christianity uncorrupted by irrational dogma. In 
contrast the German writers used historical criticism as a tool for harmonisation, 
one that might resolve the conflicts between Pietism, orthodoxy and rationalism. 
105 In accordance with Enlightenment values, both of these objectives were 
grounded to varying degrees in reason, and, as Quentin Skinner observes, the 
complex question of what constitutes a rational approach depends very much on 
the nature of other beliefs in a specific context. 106
 Despite the underlying differences in the form of Christianity in which they 
believed, radical Unitarian scholars of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries were clearly anxious to absorb the work of the German critics.  In a 
letter to John Kenrick in 1819, the year in which Kenrick travelled to Germany to 
study at Göttingen and Berlin, Thomas Belsham wrote, ‘I love the critical, and I 
abhor the theological works of the German writers. 107 This short quotation 
                                                 
104 See Peter Erb (ed.), Pietists, Selected Writings New York, 1983) for a description of the movement and 
a selection of writings from its most famous followers. 
105 Reill, German Enlightenment, p. 6. 
106 Quentin Skinner, Visions of Politics: Volume 1, Regarding Method  (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 4-5. 
107 Thomas Belsham to John Kenrick, 1819, in John Williams, Memoirs of  the Late Reverend Thomas 
Belsham, including a Brief Notice of his Published Works, and Copious Extracts from his Diary, Together 
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epitomised the extent and nature of the gulf between a historical method which 
united the two sets of scholars and the many theological points on which they 
were divided. In this letter Belsham’s primary concern about the new German 
rationalist theology was the fact that many of its exponents were ‘anti-
supernaturalists’ who denied the existence of miracles. Belsham wrote angrily 
that to deny the miracles of Christ was to ‘deny his divine mission, which is itself 
a miracle’. 108  
The reasons for the interest of Belsham and many other Unitarians in the 
German approach to biblical interpretation are clear. There had already been 
established links between German and Unitarian writers earlier in the eighteenth 
century in relation to the historical methodology which had appeared in the work 
of Nathaniel Lardner. In general terms the two sets of scholars had common 
method and similar objectives. The idea was to dissect the ancient Hebrew and 
New Testament texts, the latter which, by the time of Griesbach, was perceived 
as a historical document. 109 The scriptures were no longer exclusively the word 
of God, but manuscripts which should be treated as any other ancient texts. The 
objective was to discover more about the origins of the Hebrew nation and the 
real truth about the beginnings of the Christian faith. 
 It was also the case that in the wake of Joseph Priestley those radical 
Unitarian critics who, like him, had rejected orthodox doctrines, found that in 
                                                                                                                                                 
With Letters to and from his Correspondents  (London, 1833), p. 703.  See also Alexander Gordon, 
Addresses Biographical and Historical (London 1922), p. 340.   
108 Ibid. 
109 See Sheehan, Enlightenment Bible, p. 116. It was Griesbach, Sheehan argues, who brought the New 
Testament into the frame of historical investigation and by doing so became the most important textual 
scholar in Enlightenment Germany.  
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many rationalist German thinkers there was, as in themselves, an antipathy 
towards the blind acceptance of dogma and instead, a preference for the 
freedom of historical inquiry in scriptural interpretation. 110 These German critics 
in whom the Unitarians were interested were called ‘Neologists’ because of their 
radical and non-traditional approach to the Bible. They used history to penetrate 
biblical texts and developed both internal and external forms of criticism to 
evaluate historically the meaning of dogma, discarding that which was to then 
irrational or morally indefensible. 111 Thus in the historical method and its 
objectives, Unitarians and Germans had much in common. 
 In general terms Unitarians were fairly pragmatic about their use of the 
work of German biblical critics. The radical English scholars unashamedly ‘cherry 
picked’ certain aspects of German thought and belief to gather evidence which 
would support their own controversial theological ideas, a practice which 
sometimes produced unintended results. Following the German historical 
practice, in his work Corruptions of Christianity Joseph Priestley drew on the 
work of Mosheim, 112 the German ecclesiastical historian who regarded the 
church as a creation of man which reflected, depending on time and 
circumstances, the different forms of his religious expression. 113
        Although this essentially was very similar to the theme of Priestley’s 
Corruptions, the perspective was quite different.  Priestley did not dwell upon the 
idea of religious forms developing within historical contexts as such and neither 
                                                 
110 A. O. Dyson, ‘ Theological Legacies of the Enlightenment: England and Germany’, in S. W. Sykes 
(ed.), England and Germany. Studies in Theological Diplomacy (Frankfurt am Main, 1982), p. 55. 
111 Howard, Theological Origins, p. 35. 
112 See above. 
113 A. O. Dyson, ‘Theological Legacies’ p. 57. 
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did he relate context to doctrine in any sympathetic or understanding way.  
Rather, he made use of Mosheim’s concept to help him illustrate his own 
contention that at various points in time and in certain circumstances in the 
history of the church there had been the development of false, evil and irrational 
doctrines which had corrupted and obscured the origins of the true, simple 
Christian faith. 114  
          In his zeal, however, to outline the development of the corruptions of 
Christianity over the centuries Priestley in fact had adopted some of Mosheim’s 
historical frame of mind. Mosheim was a German ecclesiastical historian who 
belonged to an Aufklärung in which a particular approach to the interpretation of 
the Bible was a factor in the development of a new historical consciousness. 115  
Mosheim wrote, for example, that it was necessary to ‘connect events with 
circumstances, views, principles and instruments which have contributed to their 
existence’. 116 Arguably, it was the use of aspects of Mosheim’s method by 
                                                 
114 See, for example, Priestley, Corruptions, pp. 200-201. Priestley cites the case of an early sixteenth 
century Dominican friar named Tetzel, the famous target of Luther’s anger, who sold the infamous 
indulgences in exchange for absolution. Priestley quotes Mosheim, who wrote that Tetzel’s boast was that 
‘if a man had even lain with the mother of God, he was able, with the Pope’s power, to pardon the crime’.  
Mosheim had recorded that Tetzel had even said that ‘he had saved more souls from hell by these 
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that forgiveness of sin became a marketable commodity. In order to establish the justification for their 
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such practices had accrued around doctrines, and consequently employed Mosheim’s method of examining 
how doctrine arose from time and circumstance. See Corruptions, pp. 195-200. 
115 See Reill, German Enlightenment. 
116 Johann Lorenz von Mosheim, An Ecclesiastical History Ancient and Modern: From the Birth of Christ 
to the Beginning of the Eighteenth Century in which the Rise, Progress and Variations of Church Power 
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Europe during that Period, trans. Archibald MacLaine, 6 vols (London, 1819), vol. 1, pp. 7-8, quoted by  
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1776.  It was the English version, however, which attained the greatest success, and between 1765 and 
1825 MacLaine’s translation went through seven editions. In addition, two American editions were 
published before 1800. See Reill, German Enlightenment,, p. 204, note 4. 
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Priestley which in some ways made Priestley’s theological history far more 
historical in nature than his guidelines to secular history. 117  
        With regard, however, to the influence of German ideas on English scholars 
it ought to be remembered that simply because forms of thought happen to be 
received in one country from another it does not necessarily follow that these 
ideas are certain to be understood or diffused in the same way in the recipient 
country as they were in the country from which they emerged. 118 In the case of 
Priestley the historical nature of Corruptions was never appreciated as such 
either by contemporaries or later thinkers.119 The entire purpose of the work was 
to identify false doctrines and elevate the idea of a pristine, primitive, Unitarian 
Christianity and everything else which characterised the work was subsumed to 
that end. 
 This relentless search for the origins of an untainted form of Christianity 
meant that Unitarians were drawn easily into that branch of German historical 
criticism which determined the authorship, validity and sources of New 
Testament texts. This was why the work of J.J. Griesbach, 120 for example, 
proved so attractive to radical English critics. According to James Martineau 121 it 
was John  Kenrick, then aged nineteen, who reviewed Griesbach’s  work on the 
New Testament in an article in three parts in the Monthly Repository during 1807. 
                                                 
117 See chapter three, above. 
118 Rogerson, Old Testament Criticism, p. 7. 
119 That was until 1980, when Margaret Canovan pursued the argument in favour of Priestley’s historical 
sense in Corruptions. See Margaret Canovan, ‘The Irony of History: Priestley’s Rational Theology, PPN, 
no. 4, 1980, pp. 16-25. 
120 See note 49, above. 
121 James Martineau, In Memoriam, John Kenrick (1877), p. 39. 
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122  The youthful scholar carefully outlined Griesbach’s method in his analysis of 
the variations in texts,123 and his conclusion commended the German’s 
scholarship and insight in producing a useful work which would assist those who 
‘investigate the legitimate interpretation of the genuine text of scripture’. 124  
      In describing a textual problem related to a verse of Colossians, which was 
cited as having fourteen variations, Kenrick summed up in one short phrase the 
significance of the German’s work to himself when he wrote that, ‘as Griesbach 
has arranged them [the variations], they exhibit a complete genealogy of the 
corruption’. 125  As Mosheim’s ideas appealed to Priestley, so Griesbach’s ability 
to trace the development of textual corruption had a similar attraction for Kenrick 
whose frame of mind, like his predecessor’s, was concerned with the removal of 
false accretions to expose a primitive nucleus of untainted Christian truth. 
 Kenrick reiterates Unitarian themes in another four major contributions in 
the Repository which were each related to German thinkers.  The first of these, 
published in 1808, featured a short translation of work of Ludwig Timothy Spittler. 
126 Clearly it had been selected by Kenrick because it agreed with the Unitarian 
idea of a primitive golden age of Christianity in which the ‘great fundamental 
truths of the unity … of God’ appeared before the degeneration process began. 
                                                 
122 John Kenrick, Review of Novum Testamentum Græce. Textum, ad Fidem Codicum, Verionum & Patrum 
recensuit, & lectionis varietatem adjecit, D. Jo. Jac. Griesbach, Vol ii, Ed. 2 da. Halæ, 1806. Londini apud 
Payne et Mackinlay. 1807. See Part 1: MR, vol. 2, March 1807, pp. 151-156, Part 2: vol. 2, April 1807, pp. 
209-213 and Part 3: vol. 2, May 1807, pp. 266-270. 
123 Ibid., pp 152-156 and 209-213. 
124 Ibid., p. 270. 
125 Ibid., p. 211. 
126 See chapter three, above, note 146. 
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127 The second, featured prominently in the previous month, was a biographical 
article by Kenrick on the life and work of Griesbach. 128 Francis Mineka recorded 
that it had been John Kentish who had written this piece. 129 He was wrong, 
however, for it was most certainly the work of the young Kenrick, written and 
published before his twentieth birthday. 
          There are two good reasons to believe this, the first being that James 
Martineau also lists this as attributable to Kenrick. 130  The second reason is that 
this article is signed with the initial ‘K’, which Kenrick used to identify all his other 
subsequent articles, while John Kentish’s contributions are invariably signed with 
the letter ‘N’. There is, furthermore, no reason why the young Kenrick was not 
very capable of writing at such a high level of scholarship.  According to 
Professor John Young, whose private Greek classes Kenrick attended at 
Glasgow College from 1807 to 1810, the young student was ‘in thinking already a 
man and in language as far advanced as those who write for the world’. 131
       In the 1808 article, Kenrick wrote that Griesbach’s discovery of three 
different sets of Greek manuscripts 132 showed the critic that his own way forward 
was not to strike a balance between the manuscripts, ‘ proclaiming that genuine 
                                                 
127 John Kenrick, ‘Extract from Professor Spiltner’s “Elements of Ecclesiastical History”’, MR, vol. 3, 
February 1808, pp. 72-74, esp. p. 73. For ‘Spiltner’ substitute ‘Spittler’. The journal appears to have mis-
spelled the German professor’s name. 
128 John Kenrick, ‘Sketch of the Life, and Notices of the Writings, of Dr. John James Griesbach’, MR, vol. 
3, January 1808, pp. 1-9. 
129 Mineka, Dissidence of Dissent, p. 133. 
130 Martineau, In Memoriam, John Kenrick  (1877),p. 39.  
131 Letter of testimonial from Professor John Young at Glasgow College to Lant Carpenter, in May 1810, 
UCL, Sharpe Papers 198. Professor Young, an eminent classics scholar, was Professor of Greek at Glasgow 
from 1774 to 1821. See chapter five, below. 
132 According to Kenrick, Griesbach found that as early as the third century there existed two editions of the 
New Testament text, one which he called the Alexandrine, which may be found in the quotations of Origen 
and another the Western edition, in those of Tertullian and Cyprian.  From a combination of these two, and, 
wrote Kenrick, ‘the errors and variations which necessarily arise in a long series of transcriptions’, there 
came a third version, the Byzantine. Quoted from ‘Life and Writings of Griesbach’, p. 5. 
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which has the majority’. 133 Instead, it was to read closely the various 
manuscripts to ascertain how far they were genuine, for if two or three turned out 
to be independent  testimonies, then they ‘outweigh a hundred, who repeat the 
reading from each other or from some common authority’. 134 This is the same 
approach which Kenrick took later to the appreciation of Mark’s gospel as nearer 
to the ‘springhead’ of truth than the others, because it was truly historical in its 
telling. 
       The third article was a two part biographical sketch of J.D. Michaelis, 
published early in 1811. 135  The second part of this was largely given over to 
long quotations from a memoir written by Eichhorn about Michaelis. 136  In the 
first part, however, Kenrick noted that Michaelis’ work on the Mosaic laws, 
published in 1770, was the volume regarded by his countrymen as his most 
original and valuable.  Michaelis’ knowledge was extensive about eastern 
manners and  ideas ‘ as necessary to explain the views of the Jewish lawgiver, 
and enable us to calculate the effect of his institutions’. 137 The final article written 
by Kenrick was a study of J.S. Semler, 138 giving  another insight into why 
German criticism was so attractive to Unitarians. In this biographical contribution 
Kenrick described the German’s work as ‘A rich profusion of new and ingenious 
                                                 
133 Kenrick, ‘Life and Writings of Griesbach’, p. 5. 
134 Ibid. 
135 John Kenrick, ‘Sketch of the Life, Writings and Character of John David Michaelis, Professor of 
Philosophy at Göttingen,’ Part One: MR, vol. 6, January 1811, pp. 1-8 and Part Two, MR, vol. 6, February 
1811, pp. 65-71. 
136 See MR, vol. 6, February 1811, pp. 65-69.  For the memoir in full, see Eichhorn, John David Michaelis.  
137 Kenrick,’Sketch of Michaelis’, Part One, p. 6. 
138 John Kenrick, ‘Biographical Sketch of J.S. Semler’, Part One: MR, vol. 16, February 1821, pp. 65-72, 
Part Two: MR, vol. 16, March 1921, pp. 135-141. 
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thoughts’, 139 in which Semler had shown ‘those texts to be spurious which are 
commonly deemed pillars of orthodoxy’. 140   
       Thus, from some key points which were made by Kenrick in these four 
articles published in the period 1807-1821, 141 it is apparent that he had a close 
affinity very early in his life with important German ideas which concurred with his 
own Unitarian opinions. He seized, for example, upon Spittler’s idea of a golden 
age which degenerated into a later period of corruption and false dogma, a 
notion which conformed with the Unitarian belief in the existence of a pure and 
primitive faith which had subsequently degenerated. He recognised in Griesbach 
the importance of a scholarly historical search for genuine texts to prove the truth 
about early Christianity. The true reading had to be the one which was 
independent and closest of all to the events, rather than a composite of majority 
opinions about the validity of texts. In Michaelis he saw the historical value of his 
perspective on the Mosaic laws and in Semler, he praised the German’s findings, 
which flew in the face of orthodox opinion.  
            As to why Kenrick should write such favourable accounts of these key 
tenets of German criticism, the answer is simple. He and other Unitarians were 
enthusiastic about German ideas in this field fundamentally because they agreed 
with not only the historical method the Germans used to prove their rational case, 
but also with the historical tone of their conclusions. It was not the case that the 
                                                 
139 Ibid., p. 135. 
140 Ibid., p. 139 
141 At the time of the publication of these four articles, in 1807, 1808, 1811 and 1821, John Kenrick was 
aged respectively nineteen, twenty, twenty three and thirty three and consequently they may be regarded as 
productions of the earlier period of his life during which the emphasis of his work was the understanding of 
biblical criticism. 
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Unitarian scholarly elite was suddenly flooded with original ideas about historical 
criticism from the German speaking world by which the English radicals were 
strongly influenced and changed in their opinions. A great deal about the method 
and many of the conclusions about fundamental issues of the two sets of 
scholars were similar. They both followed the historical approach to biblical 
events and to the validity and meaning of texts, both rejected false dogma, the 
rigidity of orthodox opinion and belief in verbal inspiration. It was the fact there 
had been a mutual recognition of similar views, already entrenched in a tradition 
of exchange earlier in the eighteenth century, which drew later radical Unitarians 
to a closer study of German criticism. 
           In addition, both sets of thinkers were in a transitional situation as self-
appointed champions of a more rational form of religious faith. This was a set of 
beliefs which in general terms reacted against the doctrines of Calvinism or 
Lutheranism 142 and one which was discoverable by a historical approach to 
scripture. This meant that the intellectual frames of mind of Germans and 
Unitarians may be compared in two other important respects which reveal some 
differences. In both there was a need to find a theological compromise which 
accommodated simultaneously the results of the new historical and contextual 
nature of their researches and the universality and timelessness of their religion. 
Secondly, because in both cases their rational inquiries had undermined much 
                                                 
142 See Reill, German Enlightenment, p. 43. Reill’s view is that it was the  Pietism which formed the 
religious background of most of the German Enlightenment thinkers, including the Neologists, who 
challenged the accepted assumptions of Lutheranism and Calvinism. See page 6 of Reill’s work. As we are 
already aware, it was the irrational tenets of Calvinism against which the Unitarians rebelled. However, for 
an account of Priestley’s reinterpretation of religious belief, see James T. Hoecker, ‘Joseph Priestley and 
the Reification of Religion’, PPN, No. 2, 1978, pp. 44-75. 
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about the foundations of Christian belief, it  was very difficult for them to reconcile 
fully the results of those inquiries with their own fundamental beliefs.  
       On the first issue here there was little that could be reconciled in the thought 
of Joseph Priestley. He had outlined with great clarity the idea of a ‘primitive 
nucleus’ 143 which had been corrupted by the accretions of false doctrine over 
time.  However relevant and important was this core idea of a pure, untainted 
form of Christianity applicable to all ages, it collided in conceptual terms with the 
notion that in order to prove its  timeless validity, the scholar should make use of 
the  historical method, which, of course, emphasised the value of the contextual 
rather than the universal. The truths of the pure Christian religion were, for 
Priestley, immutable and applicable to all ages.  It had been that false dogma 
which had arisen over time which obscured the pristine origins and nature of this 
form of belief. Priestley had used history to justify the removal of the doctrines in 
order to validate the true religion which in turn was universal and trans-historical, 
and consequently there arose within the Unitarian intellectual position a rather 
stubborn conceptual problem.  
 The Unitarians were not aware of this contradiction which arose from their 
historical approach to religious thought. The Germans, however, were acutely 
conscious of the problem.  For Semler, as for the other Neologists such as 
Mosheim and Michaelis, dogma was historical and had no universal validity. It 
was a contextual formation of temporal religious belief which satisfied man’s 
need at any specific time.  Albeit from a different perspective, the German 
Neologists had done exactly what Joseph Priestley had achieved in his key text 
                                                 
143 Alexander Gordon, Heads of Unitarian History (London, 1895), p. 120.  
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Corruptions. Like Priestley, they had historicised dogma, defining it as a 
transitory human creation which was far removed from a timeless faith applicable 
to all ages. There was a great difference between this kind of temporary ‘local’ 
doctrinal formation and man’s feeling for a timeless moral religion. 144  
      Semler, however, found a solution to this. His idea was to differentiate 
between religion, which was the personal spiritual understanding in each 
individual, and theology, which represented the organisation, ritual and dogma of 
each age.  For Semler, there was no immutable, perfect religion applicable to 
every time and place. Religion was progressive and had to expand with man’s 
own consciousness and should respond to the spiritual needs of the particular 
circumstances and culture of each age. 145 The Christian religion could be fully 
understood only within the historical context, in which could be discovered the 
ideas of those who were contemporaries of Jesus and His Apostles. 146  
        The Unitarians, whose investigations of scripture came as close as was 
possible to the events which surrounded the life of Christ, believed this also. 
Joseph Priestley was sure that the perfect form of Christianity which would be 
revealed by such investigations would become apparent to mankind in a 
universal sense, as man himself progressed along a unilinear and uniform route 
towards moral perfection. For Semler, however, the development of religion, 
which was of the eternal, towards a goal of perfection became in his eyes based 
upon an interaction between the spiritual, in other words man’s religious 
consciousness, and form, the dogmatic, in any given historical context. This 
                                                 
144 Reill, German Enlightenment, pp. 43-44. 
145 See Reill, German Enlightenment , p. 166. 
146 Ibid., p. 169. 
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interplay of the eternal and the contextual would result in the triumph of that 
which was spiritual, and consequently there would come about the creation of a 
wider religious consciousness age by age. 147 There were, therefore, two 
different configurations here. That of the Unitarians perceived the historical and 
contextual as no more than a tool employed to reveal a perfect, timeless and 
universal Christianity. The other, the German idea, saw the historical as an 
intrinsic part of the process whereby the attainment of such a perfect faith would 
be finally achieved.  
 This persistent problem of how to reconcile the historical and contextual 
with the general and universal was also a fundamental concern in the thought of 
Lessing, who did not believe that historical evidence could ever be proof of 
necessary truths, which were of a higher order and founded upon reason. 148 His 
conviction was that all truth about God, because it was eternal and universal 
could never depend upon history alone for its justification. 149 Lessing’s solution 
to the problem of  how the philosopher or theologian brought together elements 
of these two worlds, the empirical of the historical and the necessary of the 
rational, or in the case of the theological, the biblical-historical and revelation 
itself, was the idea of an interactive process which resulted in a progressive 
momentum in history and in religion. 150 Lessing’s concept of an interactive 
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148 Henry Chadwick (ed.), Lessing’s Theological Writings  (London, 1956), p. 30. 
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process involved an absorption into the eternal of elements of the temporal. Like 
Semler, Lessing favoured the concept of a gradually expanding theological 
consciousness and the idea of a progressive religion.  Thus although there were 
many areas in which Unitarians and Germans agreed upon both method and 
objectives, this was one in which there were two fundamentally contrasting 
concepts of the relationship between the temporal and the universal.  
          John Kenrick was familiar with Semler’s works. They were to him, 
however, disorganised and little read, and his style ‘uncouth’. Kenrick wrote that 
‘we look in vain for even a single work so elaborate and perfect as the reputation 
of the author might lead us to expect’. 151  Nevertheless, he clearly believed in 
Semler’s merit as an original thinker and noted that he was ‘the first among the 
Germans who perceived …the importance of interpreting [Scripture] historically’. 
152  On this theme, Kenrick selected Semler’s work on ecclesiastical history, for 
which Semler had studied original manuscripts, for further comment. He noted 
that instead of using his researches as polemical weapons to defend Lutheran 
doctrines, as was the usual practice of his predecessors, Semler ‘ investigated in 
them the origin of those doctrines which had since been stamped with the 
character of orthodoxy’. 153  In other words, Semler had followed the same 
method as Joseph Priestley, and that was to define the origin and development 
of the doctrines.  
       While for Priestley such doctrines were corruptions, for Semler, whose 
exegesis had explained the phraseology from which ‘popular doctrines are 
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152 Ibid., p. 136. 
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deduced’, 154 they represented the dogma which was the form, or outward 
manifestation, of the religious consciousness of each age. From the comment 
which followed, it is easy to see why Kenrick showed such a keen interest in 
Semler’s conclusions. Kenrick made the point that Semler had showed that in 
one age doctrines which had been received as ‘unsuspicious truth’ had, in 
another, been ‘anathematized as heresy’. 155 Consequently, wrote Kenrick, 
Semler had drawn upon an argument for the revival of ‘that freedom of 
judgement on doctrinal matters which had been enjoyed in earlier ages’. 156 In 
order to illustrate his point, Semler had exposed the ‘miserable criticism’ used by 
Augustine to extract the doctrine of original sin from the Latin text. 157
           This was a compelling argument about the transitory, historical and 
contextual nature of dogma, or as they were to Semler, religious ‘forms’ and it 
was one which Kenrick would find attractive.  He, like most Unitarians, had been 
convinced that the radical theological arguments of his creed, unlike the precepts 
of irrational and outdated doctrines, were in perfect harmony with a more rational 
age in history which was differentiated in terms of intellectual progress from the 
past. These sentiments appeared in their most clearly defined form in Kenrick’s 
early discourses and sermons. In 1821, the year that saw the publication of his 
article on Semler, Kenrick wrote that the crucial characteristics of this rational 
age were the principles of free inquiry and open-mindedness, the culmination of 
the ascent from barbarism and superstition to civilisation, knowledge ‘sublime 






philosophy and pure religion’. 158  The hope was that the radical beliefs and 
rational inquiries of Unitarianism would usher in a new religious sentiment which 
would concur with the intellectually more sophisticated period in which they lived.  
 Before, however, opinion may be called truly rational, the rules of 
evidence and probability ought to be assessed, testimonies had to be compared 
and ancient languages, manners and customs should be  studied. The influence 
of education and circumstances upon the writers of scripture, on their modes of 
thought and turns of expression should be taken into account. In order to attain a 
complete view of the progress of religion, ‘spiritual things must be compared with 
spiritual’, and the whole series of divine dispensations, from the earliest to the 
latest page of Revelation ‘ be viewed in the connexion of all their parts’. 159 This 
wide historical picture of religious flux and change, which in its use of language is 
startlingly reminiscent of Priestley’s doctrine of necessity, would, he believed, 
prove to the world the errors of the past. 
 Six years later, preaching to the supporters of the British and Foreign 
Unitarian Association in 1827, 160 he said that Unitarians should fix their attention 
upon ‘those gradual and therefore sure revolutions in sentiment, which remove 
ancient prejudices, or prepare the way for their removal’. 161 Religious opinion in 
England was closely integrated with the selfish interests inherent in the political 
and religious institutions of the country. The best hope was the idea of a 
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‘progressive religion’ [which] must receive modifications from the intellectual state 
of the world’. 162  The intellectual activity of the present day, by which he meant 
the removal of irrational doctrine from the Christian faith, could not continue 
without producing an effect upon religion.  Thus his theme was change and the 
hope that with increased attention to historical criticism which ‘from the example 
of neighbouring nations, 163 appears to be communicating itself to our own’ would 
advance the Unitarian cause. 164  
 A later sermon in 1835, given on the Sunday after a meeting of the British 
Association for the Advancement of Science, continued this theme of the 
expansion of religious consciousness in tandem with the state of man’s rational 
intellectual improvement.  We should, he said, thank God for our intellectual 
faculties and should unite religious sentiments with their cultivation. 165 He builds 
on this to present a clear statement of belief in the compatibility of reason and 
faith with a rejection of the notion that ‘ignorance is the mother of devotion’.  We 
should, he wrote, allow the culture of our religious feelings and beliefs to ‘go 
hand in hand with the culture of the understanding, the memory and the taste’. 166 
How hard this would have been to achieve had we lived in an age and country 
where the attempt to improve our minds ‘would have drawn on us the hostility of 
those who prospered by the monopoly of knowledge’. 167  
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There are clear linkages here between the state of religious 
consciousness and variable cultural and intellectual circumstances.   The idea of 
a religion which progressed age by age was undoubtedly present in his thought. 
However, this advancement in religion was bound together with intellectual 
development, and the state of religion in each age was dependent on the degree 
of rationality which had been achieved.  For Germans such as Semler it was the 
spiritual which was the moving force in history.  The triumph of the spiritual 
consciousness over the dogma of each historical age impelled the establishment 
of a purer, more rational faith. Although the elements of reason, spirit and 
doctrine were differently configured in their actions in history, the idea of a 
progressive religion was common to both Kenrick and the Germans.  However, at 
this point in his intellectual life Kenrick, who had been schooled in the empiricism 
of the English Enlightenment  was certain that reason was the dominant factor.  
The Germans, whose background was Pietism, put their confidence in the 
spiritual as the force of religious change, and it was this which directed them 
more readily towards the Romantic Age.  Despite his reliance upon the power of 
reason, however, there was nevertheless a tendency in Kenrick’s thought to view 
religion, as opposed to dogma, as time-bound to some extent, for in his mind it 
seemed to be a progressive force age to age. It would, therefore, be reasonable 
to argue that Kenrick was in a transitional position between English and German 
thought with regard to the contextual nature of religion.  
      Common to Germans and Unitarians was that they were situated, in terms of 
the nature of their own beliefs, between orthodoxy and the new, rational faith 
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underpinned by their historical criticism. In the approach to textual analysis both 
sets of scholars, acting on the principles of free and objective inquiry, had 
challenged key tenets of Lutheran and Calvinist orthodoxy. Because, however, 
these scholars found themselves in new, uncharted and challenging intellectual 
and theological circumstances, it was inevitable therefore that they would find it 
hard to discard old certainties and this in turn produced contradictions in their 
own religious faith.  
          John Kenrick pointed out that it was certainly true that despite ‘expunging 
from the New Testament every passage on which the shadow of an argument for 
the Trinity could be maintained’, Griesbach nevertheless remained a Trinitarian, 
and ‘so may it have been with Semler’. 168  Although Kenrick may have been 
correct in his opinion that Semler’s personal beliefs were fundamentally orthodox, 
there is little doubt that the German’s rejection of the doctrine of inspiration in the 
1770s had been of great importance.  It had weakened the idea that the Bible in 
its entirety was the word of God, and had replaced it with the claim that each 
book had to be considered within its own historical context. Thus there was no 
such thing as divine verbal inspiration, and consequently the whole source of 
religious meaning lay in human, rather than divine hands. 169
          It was by necessity, however, that Semler’s theological position remained 
somewhat ambiguous in the public arena,170 and consequently it was difficult to 
work out the exact nature of his beliefs.  However, Kenrick did make the point 
that although Semler had shown that the canon of scripture was a collection of 
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 205
Jewish national literature rather than one of inspired books, the German 
nevertheless appeared ambiguous about the nature of inspiration itself. Semler 
had argued that the proof of inspiration must, in all cases, be subjective, meaning 
that the individual felt that a particular portion of scripture produced spiritual 
perfection. Kenrick believed, however, that the very same portion of scripture 
might be the word of God to one and not another, or even might have been 
proved to be a forgery.  His conclusion was that this had been an attempt on 
Semler’s part to retain a term in the theological system ‘which could not 
conveniently be banished from it, without connecting any intelligible idea with 
it’.171  
 This rather ambiguous position in which Semler and others found 
themselves was mirrored in more general terms by the theological perspectives 
of Unitarians. The latter had embraced a rational faith founded upon a rigorous 
analysis of scripture, believed in the simple humanity of Christ and had rejected 
many tenets of orthodoxy which they found irrational. Nevertheless, they retained 
their faith in miracles and regarded as contrary to their beliefs any trace of the 
anti-supernaturalism which had been advocated by many German scholars. A 
belief in Christ’s miracles, however, appeared to contradict their uncompromising 
reliance upon biblical interpretation founded upon reason, which in turn detracted 
from their argument in favour of a belief in revelation. Mineka is entirely correct to 
see their beliefs as a rather confused ‘half way house’ between Deism and 
orthodoxy. 172 Thus Germans and Unitarians had in common a transitional 
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theological position which gave rise to contradictions in their own religious 
opinions. 
         Unitarian scholars were loyal to their German counterparts. The Unitarians’ 
radical, controversial, rather curious and inconsistent beliefs, along with their 
propensity for carefully selecting those texts which would support them, all 
contributed to the fact that in the early decades of the nineteenth century they 
were ‘a sect everywhere spoken against’. 173  In order to counter this, a spirited 
defence of Unitarianism was a regular feature of the content in the Monthly 
Repository. One theme of these controversies in the columns of the journal was 
the Anglican accusation that the Unitarians used the method and evidence 
produced by German scholars, who were often Trinitarians themselves, to 
support their own radical beliefs.  Conversely, the Unitarians argued that such 
historical evidence must be strong indeed if it undermined the very doctrines 
believed in by many of the German critics.  Both Unitarians and Germans, both of 
whom were at the forefront of biblical criticism, regularly came under attack from 
leading Anglicans such as Richard Laurence and Hugh James Rose (1795-
1838). 174 The Germans were often reviled for their rationalism, and the 
Unitarians for virtually everything else apart from that. The Germans also 
suffered the wrath of English orthodoxy simply because of their popularity with 
radical Dissent, for from the Anglican perspective the view of Unitarians, 
Germans and the commonality of their opinions in many, if not all respects, was 
one of guilt by association. 
                                                 
173 Ibid., pp. 1-25, quoted at p. 5. 
174 See below.  
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       The Unitarians, however, were quick to respond to all this. One example of 
the their staunch defence of German scholarship was an article in 1817 in which 
the reviewer berates the author, the Anglican critic Richard Laurence, 175 whose 
judgement of the work of Griesbach, he claimed, had been distorted by the fact 
that the German had been highly rated by Unitarians. The reviewer wrote that 
‘even Griesbach must be slightly and coldly praised, in order that Dr. Laurence 
may hasten to calumniate and insult “the Unitarians”’.176  There were times when 
the tone of such reviews could become aggressive and surprisingly sarcastic. 
The reviewer rounded off his last article with a stinging comment which read, ‘Dr. 
Laurence may have succeeded in winnowing some chaff from the wheat: let him 
take the chaff for his pains’. 177
 By these early-nineteenth-century decades John Kenrick  had become the 
leading classical and German scholar of his denomination. He was a powerful 
intellect and no stranger to the defence of radical theology against Anglican 
attacks. These attacks, often launched within the framework of the scholarly 
relationship between Unitarians and Germans with regard to historical criticism, 
were countered in the same vein. In 1821, Richard Laurence, who by now had 
become Professor of Hebrew at Oxford, translated into English the manuscript of 
the mysterious Book of Enoch, which had been discovered in an Abyssinian 
church, and a copy of which was subsequently deposited in the Bodleian 
                                                 
175 Review article of Richard Laurence, Remarks Upon the Systematical Classification of Manuscripts 
Adopted by Griesbach in his Edition of the Greek Testament  (Oxford, 1814), MR,  vol. 12, March 1817, 
pp. 167-172, April 1817, pp. 236-241 and May 1817, 359-364.  At the time, Laurence was Rector of 
Marsham and of Stone in the county of Kent. He later became Regius Professor of Hebrew at Oxford. 
176 Ibid., pp. 167.  
177 Ibid., 
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Library.178 Laurence’s  commentary granted the manuscript and its prophetic 
contents a degree of truth. He then took the opportunity to point out that in the 
Book of Enoch  clear allusions had been made to a being highly exalted in 
heaven who was called ‘the Son of Man, the Elect One, the Messiah, and the 
Son of God’. 179 Laurence asserted that this added weight to the argument in 
favour of the pre-existence of Christ and therefore contradicted Unitarian belief 
that no Jew in any age ‘ever held the opinion of his pre-existence’. Jewish 
doctrine on this point, wrote Laurence, was ‘totally different from that which the 
Unitarians assert it to have been’. 180  
            Kenrick replied with a series of arguments against the idea of pre-
existence, then finished his review with some well-aimed comments which most 
certainly would have wounded his opponent. ‘We rejoice to perceive’, wrote 
Kenrick, ‘that the celebrated oriental scholar, Gesenius of Halle, (not Gessenius, 
as Dr L. calls him) is about to published a Latin translation of this book.’ 181  From 
Gesenius, wrote Kenrick, we shall receive the Book of Enoch ‘in a more 
satisfactory form’. Kenrick added that although Laurence had taken great pains, 
something more accurate was required, for it had been observed that he 
[Laurence] wrote his mother tongue ‘with great carelessness’. 182  
                                                 
178 Review article by John Kenrick of Richard Laurence, The Book of Enoch the Prophet, now first 
Translated from an Ethiopic MS. In the Bodeleian Library (Oxford, 1821), MR, vol. 16, July 1821, pp. 411-
415. 
179 Ibid., p. 413. 
180 Ibid., pp. 413-414. 
181 Ibid., p. 415.  The critic mentioned here by Kenrick was the rationalist Heinrich Friedrich Wilhelm 
Gesenius (1786-1842). A highly acclaimed Hebrew scholar, Gesenius became Professor of Theology at 
Halle in 1811. He challenged both the historical integrity of the books of Chronicles and the Mosaic 
authorship of the Pentateuch. 
182 Ibid., p. 415. 
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         Only seven months later, Kenrick was involved in a battle of words with 
another Anglican cleric, Thomas Burgess (1756-1837), the Hebrew scholar who 
was made Bishop of St David’s in 1803.  This was the bishopric which had been 
occupied previously by Samuel Horsley (1733-1806), the Anglican theologian 
whose assaults on Joseph Priestley’s History of the Corruptions of Christianity 
ignited a controversy with Priestley which last for six years during the 1780’s.  
Kenrick reviewed a work by Burgess 183 which had disagreed with both 
Griesbach and the Unitarians about the validity of 1 John verse 7, a text which 
suggested the witness of Christ’s pre-existence. Burgess argued that the 
Unitarians had absorbed unquestioningly the ideas of the Trinitarian Griesbach 
whose ‘single authority is sufficient for [them] mutilating the received text of the 
New Testament’ 184 Kenrick’s reply to all this was characteristically biting. He 
charged Burgess with employing ‘feeble sophistry’ in his ‘forlorn hope in defence 
of orthodoxy’ and of being prone to the ‘prejudices of the orthodox which make 
them attach more weight to a name than an argument’. 185
 Some years later, in 1827, the object of Kenrick’s wrath was the Anglican 
theologian Hugh James Rose. In 1825 Rose had published a series of sermons 
he had preached at Cambridge on the ‘state of the Protestant religion in 
Germany’. 186 His contention was that in Germany there were a number of critics 
whose treatment of biblical interpretation could be compared with that of ‘the 
                                                 
183 John Kenrick, ‘ Bishop of  St. David’s on Three Witnesses’ Text’, review article of A Vindication of 1 
John v.7, from the Objections of M. Griesbach, in which is given a New View of the External Evidence, 
with Greek Authorities for the Authenticity of the Verse not hitherto adduced in its Defence. By the Bishop 
of  St. David’s, MR, vol. 17, January 1822, pp. 39-47. 
184 Ibid., p. 47. 
185 Ibid., pp. 39, 47. 
186 Hugh James Rose, The State of the Protestant Religion in Germany  (Cambridge, 1825). 
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most violent English Unitarians’. 187 Rose singled out Semler for special criticism 
due to the German’s rejection of inspiration and his historical interpretation of 
scripture, which included an assessment of the cast of mind of the New 
Testament writers before interpreting their writings. These key points of the 
rational, historical approach, of course, had been in some respects characteristic 
of Unitarian criticism for several decades before Rose’s outbursts. 188
 Kenrick’s review article 189 accused Rose of unscholarly bias by searching 
through German authors and picking out anything he thought rash or odious 
which would give him ammunition to attack their theology. Kenrick wrote that 
Rose’s actions resembled those of 
  an attorney-general [who] reads the works of an  
  obnoxious political writer, looking only for passages 
  on which to ground his indictment. 190
He censured Rose’s distorted emphasis on the ‘awful consequences in Germany’ 
191 of believing that theological truth is to be found by a blind confidence in the 
powers of human understanding. Next, he criticised the Anglican for misleading 
readers by classifying under the name of Rationalism ‘all shades and degrees of 
departure from the orthodox standard’. This meant that the imputation that such 
opinions were only Deism in another form ‘is artfully thrown on the whole body of 
                                                 
187 Rose, ibid., p. 82, quoted by Rogerson, Old Testament Criticism, p. 166. 
188 See chapter three above. 
189 John Kenrick, Review Article of The State of the Protestant Religion in Germany, in a Series of 
Discourses, preached before the University of Cambridge, by the Rev. Hugh James Rose, M.A.  Cambridge 
and London. 1825, MR, New Series, vol. 1, January 1827, pp. 48-53. 
190 Kenrick, Review of Protestant Religion in Germany, p. 49. 
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the interpreters of scripture’.192 Finally, he attacked Rose for his rejection of the 
idea of theology as a ‘progressive science’ and for believing instead that the 
Church of England ‘has established a creed for all future ages, in which no one 
should dream of making an improvement’. 193 It was extraordinary, wrote Kenrick, 
that Rose’s reasoning accepted the idea that the sixteenth century preferred its 
own judgement to that of the fifteenth, but thought it was arrogant and 
presumptuous that the nineteenth century should ‘claim the same advantage 
over the age of Luther and Cranmer’.194   
       The controversy between Anglicans on the one hand and the Unitarian-
German alliance on the other was an exchange which often outlined more clearly 
the differences and similarities between the parties involved. For example, 
Rose’s belief that the Anglican creed was immutable as one for all future ages 
was rejected firmly by German scholars such as Semler, who believed that 
dogma can have no universal validity. In this, they agreed with Unitarians, whose 
solution as regards dogma was to eliminate it. Kenrick’s own notion of a 
progressive religion, however, conformed in some ways to the German concept 
of religious change over time. 
        Anglicans, whose Trinitarian beliefs were shared by many German scholars 
such as Griesbach, rejected that aspect of German scholarship known as 
rationalism which undermined belief in miracles and revelation, a belief which 
Anglicans shared with the Unitarians. There was much, obviously, that was not 
shared between the two English religious camps and  Anglicans hated German 
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scholarship because it confirmed much about doctrine which concurred with the 
radical Unitarian beliefs they considered dangerous to the future of the English 
church.  
In addition, Unitarians such as Kenrick criticised Anglican statements 
repeated by Rose that the English Church also laid claim to a set of beliefs based 
upon early, primitive Christianity. Anglican arguments on this point centred on the 
belief that ‘Our church receives only what was received in those ages in which 
truth must have been known’. 195 Kenrick pointed out, of course, that it was 
incredible that Anglicans could possibly make this claim and nevertheless remain 
Trinitarians.   
As to the Trinitarianism of some German scholars, Unitarians regarded it 
with less resentment. They believed that despite the fact that Germans held 
these views, they were still honest scholars and champions of free inquiry who 
investigated the Bible in a historical manner. They never held back the results of 
any research which happened to undermine their own beliefs, but presented it to 
the world in an unbiased way.  With regard to English Trinitarian dogma, 
however, it only served as a barrier to Unitarian hopes for freedom of thought in 
religious matters. Anglicans supported false doctrines and tried to suppress any 
inquiry into the nature of their beliefs. 
As to the Germans themselves, many of them were stung by English 
orthodox criticism of their work. In a much later, two-part review of a work by 
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C.G.J. Bunsen (1791-1860) in 1853, 196 Kenrick lamented that Bunsen had been 
deeply hurt by the ‘prejudiced and ignorant outcry which has been raised in 
England against German theology’. 197 The Anglican – Unitarian – German 
controversy was a two-way debate which took place over a period of many years 
in the nineteenth century.  It emphasised the deep chasms with regard to 
theological opinion which divided Anglicans from radical scholars and it made 
clearer the common factors which brought together Unitarian and German 
scholarship in the period. 
John Kenrick wrote many articles related to German criticism. Out of a 
total of just over eighty contributions, the bulk of which appeared in the Monthly 
Repository, Christian Reformer and Prospective Review, roughly forty one per 
cent were German – related. Of that forty one per cent, nineteen per cent were 
on the subject of biblical criticism while the remaining twenty two per cent 
covered subject matter related to history, philology and myth. Articles on the 
subject of biblical criticism were scattered throughout his productive life, while the 
latter three topics were more characteristic of his later intellectual career after his 
visit to Germany in 1819-1820. 198  
                                                 
196 John Kenrick, ‘Christianity in the Third Century’, Review Article on Hippolytus and his Age, or the 
Doctrine and Practice of the Church of Rome under Commodus and Alexander Severus; and Ancient and 
Modern Christianity and Divinity compared. By Christian Charles Josias Bunsen.  Part One, CR, vol. 9, 
January 1853, pp.1-11. The second part of the article, entitled ‘Bunsen’s Hippolytus – Ancient and Modern 
Christianity’, may be found in CR, vol. 9, February 1853, pp. 73-84. 
 Bunsen was a diplomat with close links to England as well as a biblical scholar and, as Rogerson points 
out, was an important critic in many respects. Bunsen emphasized the consciousness of God within 
mankind and his development, and in doing so took from Genesis the idea of an original human race before 
the Flood. Bunsen was also a keen scholar of ancient Egypt and its chronology and a close friend of the 
German Egyptologist Karl Richard Lepsius ( 1810-1884). See Rogerson Old Testament Criticism, pp. 121-
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Kenrick was one of a group of radical English scholars who had found in 
German biblical scholarship a historical method which was very like their own 
approach to scripture. They rejected the abstractions of dogmatic ideas in favour 
of history to discover the secrets of the Old and New Testaments. The opinions, 
objectives and methods of these Unitarian scholars were similar in many 
respects to some German critics who are correctly seen by Reill as the 
harbingers of the German Romantic movement and its historicist consciousness. 
199 Both sets of scholars rejected Augustinian and Calvinist doctrines such as the 
atonement, predestination and eternal punishment. 200 In this respect they arrived 
at such conclusions independently of one another, the Unitarians reacting 
against Calvinist dogma and the Germans in favour of a spiritual faith rather than 
a fearful one based upon scholasticism and irrational doctrines.  
The idea of verbal inspiration was modified by Unitarians because it 
perpetuated dogma and hindered the way towards the elimination of false 
doctrine by means of historical criticism. The rejection of dogma as applicable to 
all ages was a common belief to Unitarians and Germans, but for very different 
reasons. Dogma, for those scholars such as John Kenrick who inherited 
Priestley’s legacy had to be eradicated as a corruption of true religion. For 
Semler and his colleagues, dogma interacted with spirit in history to expand 
religious consciousness. 
 It is true that the two sets of scholars had much in common and that there 
had been some cross fertilisation of ideas during the eighteenth century. It was, 
                                                 
199 Reill, German Enlightenment, pp. 1-8. 
200 Dyson, ‘Theological Legacies’, p 57. 
 215
however, the case that Unitarians, who were unique not only in their religious 
beliefs but in their tradition of empiricism and philosophical monism, had evolved 
their own patterns of belief. The German scholars too, had arrived at historical 
criticism from an entirely different context, one which had been concerned with 
the philosophy of Leibniz and the Pietism from which many of them had 
emerged. 
        In terms of method, however, Unitarians and Germans functioned 
identically, and learned much from one another. Both favoured free inquiry into 
the origins and meaning of texts which clarified the historical circumstances in 
which the Old and New Testaments had been written. This method, both 
believed, would shed light upon the origins of faith and on the truths of early 
Christianity.  Commentaries such as that of Michaelis on the Mosaic Laws also 
gave rise in the two camps to a deeper understanding of relativism and how it 
could be employed in assessing religious truth. Michaelis’ ideas fell like seed on 
fertile ground, however, for Unitarians had already agreed upon the importance 
of time and circumstance in biblical interpretation, and it had become easier 
therefore for them to accept ideas of relativism in biblical history. 
        The idea of the development of religious forms had been outlined in a 
negative way in Priestley’s Corruptions. In Semler it had been expressed within 
an entirely different configuration of religion, theology and historical context.  It is 
very likely that from these contrasting understandings of religious change Kenrick 
reached the concept of a progressive religion based upon the desire of a rational 
scholar to find a place in history for the beliefs of his creed. Kenrick’s vision of 
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theological change, however, was little more than a faint shadow of Semler’s 
more ‘Romantic’ idea of historical development in relation to religion, but it was 
nevertheless a subtle alteration of perspective which was of some significance.. 
 Unitarians and Germans agreed on many points. There were, however, 
two issues on which they could not be reconciled. One was belief in miracles. 
Many of the Germans, such as Paulus and Eichhorn for example, dismissed 
them as natural occurrences, while for the Unitarians they formed a basis for 
belief in revelation.  The other important difference between them was the 
manner whereby they dealt with the relationship between the contingent and the 
universal with regard to religion. For the Germans, who recognised the problem 
this presented, the spiritual did not exist outside history. It interacted with the 
dogma of the age to create tensions which brought about change in the form of 
an ever expanding religious consciousness. For Unitarians in the post-
Priestleyan decades, who did not perceive any difficulty in this area of their 
thought, early Christianity could be discovered only by eliminating the dogma 
which had accrued over the ages. The primitive faith uncovered by this historical 
method was, paradoxically, a-historical, immutable, timeless and universal. It was 
a ‘primitive nucleus’ which, simultaneously, had existed in the past, was relevant 
to all times and circumstances and yet was also, because Kenrick himself 
believed in a progressive religion, impelled ever forward by the expansion of 
reason, and therefore also something to be found in a perfect future.  
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           Kenrick’s emphasis on the improvement of religious consciousness and 
understanding as the age became more rational was one step in the right 
direction towards the idea of religious development. He recognised in Semler, 
and Spittler also, the idea of variation and change in belief from age to age, 
brought about by contingent circumstances, and there is evidence here of 
German influence over Kenrick’s view of how a better religious faith might be 
achieved. This aspect of Kenrick’s thought, however, may also be closely linked 
with Unitarian confidence in moral and rational progress. Unitarians also believed 
that, unlike the religion of past ages which had been distorted by false doctrine, a 
rational age required a rational faith.  
       However, for Unitarians in general, the concept of the German idea of a 
spiritual element interacting with the external trappings of dogma in each and 
every age was an alien one. In this particular respect Unitarians and Germans in 
the period were like travel companions with much in common who had decided it 
would be convenient to pair up for a journey. Heading towards roughly similar 
destinations on the same kind of transport, they recognised each other’s good 
points, but failed to get to know one another at a truly fundamental level.  
 In general terms the Unitarian historical method was in very many 
respects very akin to that of the Germans.  However, the Unitarian empiricist-
based historical–biblical scholarship was locked in to a search for a universal 
belief applicable to all ages. Contrastingly, the German scholars were indeed, as 
Reill argues, the precursors of the historical consciousness of the nineteenth 
century. Their understanding of the interaction of the spiritual and the external 
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forms of religious belief was an early appreciation of the workings of history. 
Such ideas of historical development formed the early outlines of the German 
historicism of the nineteenth century. In an analysis of the historical work of 
David Hume, Friedrich Meinecke quoted a saying of Hegel which he believed 
was relevant to Hume’s history.  Hegel had said that empiricism could only 
fragment the material of history, but was powerless to put it together. 201 In many 
respects the same quotation could be applied to the Unitarians as they pursued 
their theological and historical-biblical concerns. 
                                                 




CHAPTER FIVE  
 ROADS TO HISTORY 1 : THE BIBLE, MYTH, AND HISTORY 
 
 
 At the conclusion to his essay on Hume, Meinecke qualified Hegel’s 
comments and, characteristically, used an organic metaphor to point out that 
empiricist fragmentation had the effect, nevertheless, of ‘loosening the soil’ to 
make it receptive to new seed. 1  These comments could be applied to aspects of 
the intellectual development of John Kenrick, for in his case  ‘new seed’ did fall 
upon fertile ground.  
The historical biblical method employed by Kenrick and his fellow 
Unitarian critics to reveal Christianity’s primitive, timeless truths had opened up 
some promising cracks in the earth of the religious writings of the past.  However, 
the Unitarian frame of mind had not given any life to those cohesive historical 
forms which had been suggested by German critics. There was, however, one 
important aspect of the engagement of John Kenrick with German critics which 
contributed to the formation of a new historical consciousness in the mind of 
John Kenrick, and that was the understanding of the nature of myth and its role in 
ancient history. 
   There are two important themes running through this chapter. The first is 
concerned with the relationship between history and myth in Kenrick’s thought, 
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chapter four, above, note 201. 
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both in the Bible and in classical antiquity.  The second reflects the importance of 
historical context in biblical analysis as projected into ideas about the origins of 
classical myth.  The first consolidated and contributed to important concepts of 
English Romanticism in Kenrick’s mind. The second culminated in an 
appreciation of uniqueness, in a form of cultural relativism and in a recognition of 
historical development towards nationhood which reflected ideas of the German 
age of Romanticism. These two themes were carried from Kenrick’s approach to 
history and myth in the Bible into his understanding of the nature and origins of 
classical myth and were therefore crucial to John Kenrick’s intellectual 
development and to his perspectives as a classical historian. 
 The first part of this chapter will consider Kenrick’s engagement with myth 
in the Bible and in particular with his opinions of D.F. Strauss.  The second 
section will discuss his thoughts on the interpretation of classical myth. The final 
section will deal with the implications for his thought which were derived from 
these sources. The general thrust of this chapter is that Kenrick’s approach to 
biblical and classical myth in this period created some important threads of 
connection between his radical Enlightenment foundations and the historical and 
Romantic consciousness of the nineteenth century. 
The importance of historical context in biblical interpretation had been 
recognised by Unitarian scholars in England who wished to reveal the origins and 
nature of a primitive Christian faith untainted by the ‘corruptions’ and 
embellishments of man and his creation of false doctrines. This historical frame 
of mind and the methodology it had employed had been refined by the 
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investigations of German scholars whose work had become familiar to 
Unitarians. However, another way to explain biblical narratives became prevalent 
amongst German speaking scholars in the last two decades of the eighteenth 
century.  This involved the application to the mysteries of the Bible of those 
criteria which had been used to interpret classical mythology. Unitarians had 
been attracted by the German historical method in the identification and 
interpretation of texts, and in this they had shared some common objectives. 2  
However, the exchange of ideas with German scholars also meant that these 
radical English thinkers began to engage with German ideas on the Bible and 
myth.  
  In this late eighteenth-century period there was an overlapping of ideas 
about the interpretation of classical myth and the problems faced by orientalists 
and biblical scholars in Germany.  Since the ‘discovery’ of ancient Greece by 
Johann Joachim Winckelmann (1717-1768), 3 and the appreciation of its literary 
and artistic treasures by Lessing and Herder, 4 German intellectuals had been 
steeped in its history and mythology. The methods of the German classicist and 
philologist  C.J. Heyne, who had taught Eichhorn, was the most important 
influence on biblical scholars at this time. Heyne was the scholar whose 
investigation of the politics and mythology of antiquity inspired  Thomas Carlyle 
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4 Ibid., pp. 51-81. 
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to write that Heyne ‘carried the torch of philosophy towards, if not into, the 
mysteries of old time’.5  
      One of Heyne’s notable achievements was to divide myths into two different 
types, historical ones which related to actual events or experiences, and 
philosophical ones which were formed to explain ideas and concepts. Heyne 
wrote that  
                          The types of the ancient mythical sayings can 
     be only two, the one historical, the other physical and  
     ethical (which have come to be called philosophemes). 6
         His ideas were applied by Eichhorn and Eichhorn’s pupil, Johann Philipp 
Gabler, first to the Old and then to the New Testament.  For them the book of 
Genesis was oriental literature and myth, just like any other ancient manuscript, 
for according to Gabler, the primitive world was everywhere the same. 7  These 
conclusions initiated the development of a form of biblical interpretation which 
finally culminated in the controversial opinions, first published in 1835, of the 
German theologian David Friedrich Strauss (1808-1874) 8  Strauss believed that 
the gospel narratives of the New Testament were mythical projections of the 
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auhor’s hopes as manifested in the life of Christ.  In classical studies these 
opinions about myth resulted in the ideas of the scholar Karl Otfried Müller 
 (1795-1840), whose short - lived  career contributed much to the study of 
ancient Greek and Etruscan myth, art, literature and history.        
          Eichhorn’s application of the ideas of Heyne to the interpretation of the Old 
Testament was first outlined in an anonymous article on Genesis published in 
1779, but in fact was written four years earlier. 9 Shaffer points out that for the 
biblical critics the most important aspect of Heyne’s method was that myth was 
no longer simply fable or poetic fiction, but rather a veiled version of ancient 
history and philosophy. 10 Initially  Eichhorn, following Heyne, had regarded the 
second and third chapters of Genesis as historical myths because he believed 
that the events they represented had actually happened. By 1790, however, he 
had modified his opinion to understand them as philosophical myths which tried 
to convey the idea of the loss of a golden age. 11 The application of Heyne’s 
ideas to biblical criticism meant that on the question of myth the classical and the 
biblical had overlapped and the biblical narratives were interpreted as the early 
form of expression of an ancient people. In their ‘mythical’ explanations of 
narratives in both the Old and New Testaments, German scholars from the late-
eighteenth century into the early decades of the nineteenth were both 
courageous and, in relation to the Old Testament at least, often credible. 
 In his own perception of the role of myth John Kenrick was influenced by 
that key tenet of Unitarian theology, which was the idea that due to man’s own 
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 224
creations of false doctrine and dogma, there had been a ‘corruption’ over time of 
a primitive religious truth, one which could be revealed by the historical method. 
This fundamental idea directed the general pattern of Kenrick’s thought towards 
a persistent search for original historical truth in all areas of his investigations, 
whether biblical or classical. Consequently, the idea of the distortion of the 
‘primitive nucleus’ of Christian truth over time by mankind’s own creations was in 
some respects analogous to the idea that myth itself, in both biblical and classical 
terms, may be considered a form of human embellishment which disguised the 
original core of historical truth.  The general outlines of his thought reveal a 
sustained conflict between the ‘primitive nucleus’ of original truth on the one hand 
and on the other the degree to which that truth had been corrupted over time. 
 John Kenrick published nothing notable about myth in the Bible until 
1827, when he presented to readers of the Monthly Repository  a contribution to 
the topic by the critic Johann Jahn (1750-1816). 12Jahn was a German Roman 
Catholic biblical scholar who had been professor of oriental studies in Vienna 
from 1789-1806.  Despite the fact that Jahn’s theology was anathema to Kenrick 
and his fellow Unitarians, Kenrick had much to say in favour of the manner in 
which biblical criticism by Catholics was conducted in Germany. There scholars 
were not, as they were in England, intellectually isolated for their beliefs, and he 
noted with more than just a hint of sarcasm that in Germany ‘a university is a 
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English in 1840. 
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school for all’. 13 Because Catholic scholars in Germany had been ‘placed in the 
centre of knowledge and investigation’, 14 several Roman Catholic theologians 
had attained a high rank amongst biblical critics. Indeed, Kenrick wrote that it 
was very likely that Catholic theologians such as Jahn would be seen by future 
scholars as to have been on some points ‘nearer the truth than their Protestant 
adversaries’.15
Jahn had pinpointed some glaring weaknesses in the idea of the mythical 
interpretation of the Old Testament by contemporary scholars. He argued, for 
example, that the learned men of early Christianity, who themselves were 
acquainted with the mythologies of Greece, Egypt and Rome, recognised no 
myth in the Bible, only historical truth. 16 Furthermore, while other mythologies 
are born in pre-mythic chaos, then develop in polytheism and the deification of 
sun, moon, stars, demigods, a monstrous chronology and bizarre geography, the 
Bible history is quite different. It begins with ONE God, the creator, and cites a 
rational chronology and knowledge of the heavens in simple language. While 
other mythologies were allowed their freest scope in the earliest ages, the 
ancient Hebrew documents are ‘most meagre in the remotest times, and 
gradually become more copious’. They were written in such a way that they 
rejected all but that which could be related with certainty, in other words all that 
was historical. 17 For Jahn, therefore, the structure and content of the Old 
                                                 
13 Ibid., p. 634. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., p. 638. 
17 Ibid., pp. 638-639. 
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Testament proved that it had been founded to a much greater extent upon the 
historical than upon the mythical.   
It is clear why John Kenrick had sought to present Jahn’s views. 
For Unitarians that which appeared to confirm the unity of God, was of great 
importance. Also, however, they were quite naturally cautious about theories 
which attributed biblical narratives entirely to the imagination and mythology of an 
ancient people. This was because they had absolute confidence in the historical 
method to prove the existence of that pure, untainted faith of the early Christians, 
which had been diminished by a haze of theological systems, abstractions and 
presuppositions.  History had replaced abstraction and had undermined those 
composite and systematised forms of belief which had for centuries clouded the 
truth about Christianity’s true origins.  If there now existed the recognition by 
contemporary German scholars that the myths of the peoples of the Old or New 
Testaments had been responsible for the biblical narratives, then these myths 
had to contain a historical ‘core’.  If they did not and were perceived to have been 
produced entirely by the imaginative speculations and abstractions of the mind of 
man, then, for the Unitarians, the crucial concept of the provable historical truth 
about primitive Christianity would be seriously undermined. This is why Kenrick 
insisted later that there could never be a boundary between the mythical and the 
historical, because the former was founded upon the truth of the latter. 18
 A second reason for caution on Kenrick’s part with regard to the German 
mythologists was the fact that myth was almost always understood as including 
‘all supernatural embellishments of a fact, whether symbolically significant or not’.  
                                                 
18 See below. 
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Kenrick continued, ‘To the anti-supernaturalist every miracle is a mythus’. 19  The 
truth of miracles, as we know, was an intrinsic part of the Unitarian belief in 
revelation, and consequently any attempts to see them relegated completely to 
the realms of mythology were bound to be opposed.  
There were nevertheless some ‘miracles’ which had no place in Unitarian 
theology. Twenty one years earlier Thomas Belsham had declared  that the 
accounts of the miraculous conception contained in Matthew and Luke could be 
considered no more credible than ‘the fables of the Koran, or the reveries of 
Swedenborg’. 20 In this case, of course, Belsham  was intent on refuting a 
narrative which implied the divinity of Christ, and one certain way of doing this 
was to dismiss it as a myth. As we have seen, always present in the Unitarian 
frame of mind was an element of expediency which encouraged them to select 
suitable ideas and to angle them to the perspective which would support their 
own beliefs. 21 The story of the virgin birth did not happen to be one in which the 
Unitarians had any belief and therefore it could, without great difficulty, be 
labelled as ‘mythical’. The problems of doctrine were not so acute, of course, with 
regard to the Old Testament, and in 1825, when Belsham was an old man, he 
openly questioned the inspiration and truth of the early chapters of Genesis and 
agreed with the view that this was not a literal description of fact but ‘an 
allegorical story, like the Pilgrim’s Progress’. 22 For John Kenrick, however, 
                                                 
19 John Kenrick, ‘Mythical Interpretation’, p. 636. 
20 Thomas Belsham, ‘ Mr. Belsham’s Remarks on Mr. Proud’s Pamphlet’, MR, vol. 1, October 1806, p. 
587. Belsham was replying to a pamphlet which had asserted the truth of the doctrine of the virgin birth and 
had attacked Unitarianism’s rejection of the doctrine. 
21 See chapter four, above. 
22 Thomas Belsham, MR, vol. 20, July 1825, p. 416, quoted by Francis Mineka, The Dissidence of Dissent, 
the Monthly Repository, 1806-1838  (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1944), p. 133. 
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whose engagement with the idea of myth was on a much deeper level than that 
of Belsham, the historical component of any myth was vital to its interpretation. 
Rational historical interpretation of the Bible was the raison d’être of the Unitarian 
scholar, and bearing this in mind it is therefore to be expected that Kenrick would 
have given some support to a view such as Jahn’s which argued that in the Old 
Testament the historical element outweighed the mythical. 
 There were other chances for Kenrick to express his confidence in the 
historical method. In the years after 1827, when his concerns on the subject were 
mainly directed towards myth in relation to ancient history, there were 
nevertheless several articles in which he discusses the subject of myth in the 
Bible.  These are particularly interesting for two reasons. Firstly, they all 
comment, albeit briefly, upon the work of D.F. Strauss and secondly they provide 
an additional insight into Kenrick’s ideas on the Bible, myth and history. 23  It 
would have been impossible for Kenrick to have ignored Strauss’ Life of Jesus.  
There had been a strong reaction to the work, 24 for Strauss claimed to have 
destroyed the entire historical basis for belief in Christianity 25 and along with that 
                                                 
23 John Kenrick, ‘On the Narratives of the Crucifixion’, CR, vol. 1, April 1845, pp. 197-206. ‘The Relation 
of the Third to the First Two Gospels’, Review Article of Jo. Jac.Griesbachii Commentatio quo Marci 
Evangelium totum a Matthæi et LucæCommentariis decerptum esse monstratum. Opuscula Academica, 
Vol. 11, ed. Gabler. Jenæ, (1825), PR, vol. 6 (1850), pp. 60-76. ‘The Gift of Tongues’, Review Article of 
Die Glossolalie in der alten Kirche, in dem Zusammenhang der Geistesgaben und des Geisteslebens des 
alten Christenthums; von Adolph Hilgenfeld : The Gift of Tongues in the Ancient Church, in connection 
with the spiritual Gifts and Spiritual Life of Ancient Christendom. By Adolph Hilgenfeld. Leipzig. 1850, 
PR, vol 8 (1852), pp. 303-317. ‘The Gospel of Mark the Protevangelium’, in Biblical Essays (London, 
1864), pp. 1-68, and lastly, ‘Jewish Conceptions of the Messiah’, Review Article of Jésus-Christ, ou Les 
Croyances Messianiques de son Temps. Par T. Colani. Deuxième edition, revue et augmentée. Strasburg 
and Paris. 1864, TR, no. 8, May 1865, pp. 241-254. 
24 Horton Harris, David Friedrich Strauss and his Theology (Cambridge, 1973), p. 41. For Strauss’ impact 
see also Peter Hodgson (ed.), Introduction in David Friedrich Strauss, The Life of Jesus Critically 
Examined  (Philadelphia, 1972), p.xvii. 
 25 Harris, Strauss and His Theology , p. 41. 
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had denied the existence of the miraculous and the supernatural. Strauss’ 
primary objective in his sensational Life of Jesus was to provide an alternative 
explanation to the often ambiguous and contradictory rational-historical 
interpretation of the Bible. His contention was that mythical narratives about the 
life of Christ which had been prophesied in the Old Testament arose in the minds 
of individuals who related them to others and within a short time they were 
accepted as fact. The whole gospel narrative, which  had been built around the 
expectations of men at the time of Christ, existed only as a mythical expression 
of the human consciousness.  
          Strauss explained how the ‘pure mythus’ in the gospels had come about.  
He wrote that two sources had contributed simultaneously, though ‘in different 
proportions to form the mythus’. 26  The first was the collection of ‘Messianic 
ideas and expectations’ in the Jewish mind before Jesus which had formed 
independently of him. The second was that body of impressions left by the 
character, actions and fate of Jesus, which ‘served to modify the Messianic idea 
in the minds of his people’. 27 Strauss had devised a mythical explanation for the 
whole story of Christ which at a stroke had swept away the foundations of 
historical criticism. However, he had also conceded that there were individual 
events and facts which, clouded and obscured as they were in the mists of the 
mythus, nevertheless undoubtedly had taken place. The birth of Christ, of course, 
was included as one of these core historical events. This had been a historical 
mythus, which had been founded upon a ‘definite individual fact which has been 
                                                 
26 Strauss, Life of Jesus, Section 15, p. 86. 
27 Ibid. 
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seized upon by religious enthusiasm, and twined around with mythical 
conceptions culled from the idea of the Christ’. 28   
 From John Kenrick’s different reactions to Strauss in the various 
arguments contained in these five articles, 29 three aspects of Kenrick’s thought 
in relation to biblical criticism and history become clear, and it is apparent which 
of them are most important. In these publications Kenrick revealed his opinion of 
the German’s controversial mythical approach, his lasting acceptance of tenets of 
the Unitarian tradition, and reminded the readers of the nature of his 
understanding of the true relationship between history and myth in the Bible. His 
comments also showed that his approach to historical criticism and his concerns 
on the topic of myth and history did not change during his productive intellectual 
lifetime. 
 Kenrick made his opinion of Strauss clear in the 1845 article, in which he 
assessed different accounts of the crucifixion of Christ.  With regard to neglect of 
the importance of history in interpretation he compared Strauss to the 
harmonists, who tried to make ‘one consistent narrative out of the contradictory 
accounts of the evangelists’. 30  He made the point that Strauss  
  with equal neglect of the principles of historical 
  criticism, raises a suspicion from their discrepancy, 
  that the whole has no foundation of fact, but is a  
  mythic web, spun out of supposed prophecies of the 
                                                 
28 Ibid. 
29 See note 23, above. 
30 Kenrick, ‘Narratives of the Crucifixion’, p 205, note *. 
 231
  Messiah. 31
Seven years later, in a review article concerned with the ‘gift of tongues’ 
supposedly granted to the apostles at the time of the descent of the Holy Spirit, 
Kenrick turned the tables on Strauss on the question of discrepancies in the 
narrative.  Kenrick believed that the incident, during which the apostles were 
supposed to have spoken in foreign languages, may be explained by the fact that 
they had become inarticulate in their speech through excitement and religious 
fervour. Although such an explanation may be ‘repulsive to our refinement’….’we 
must not judge the East by the standard of the West’….for ‘such a state, when 
evidently produced by religious emotion, was regarded by the Jews with awe and 
reverence’. 32  Neither, he wrote, should we regard such an incident as 
miraculous, for we should be in great danger of error ‘if we transfer modern ideas 
to the mind of St. Paul, and suppose that spiritual  in  his sense was equivalent to 
miraculous in ours’. 33
            From his historical analysis Kenrick concluded that explanations for the 
phenomenon were most probably commonplace. It may have been simply that 
idea of the ‘tongues’ could be attributed to the inarticulate voices of excited 
people, or the fact that there had been many different languages in Corinth, 
which had been a cosmopolitan port in the period.  Whatever the explanation, the 
idea of speaking in tongues at Pentecost, which was to be found nowhere in the 
gospels, was very different from Jesus’ promise to his disciples that the Holy 
                                                 
31 Ibid., p. 205. 
32 Kenrick, ‘The Gift of Tongues’, pp. 310, 311.  
33 Ibid., p. 315. 
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Spirit would enlighten their minds, remind them of his teachings and ‘guide them 
into all truth’. 34  
       In the final paragraph Kenrick delivered his opinion on Strauss’ Life of Jesus, 
remarking that the German believed only that a certain conception of Christ had 
formed itself in the minds of the early Christians. Strauss had asserted that the 
gospels did not contain a narrative of what Christ really said and did, but what 
might be supposed to have been his words and actions. Consequently, the 
German’s hypothesis had the idea that ‘the gospels do not exhibit Christ to us in 
the truth of history’. 35 Clearly Kenrick’s primary objection to Strauss’ ideas was 
that they were not historical. By his late seventies, Kenrick’s opinion of Strauss’ 
hypothesis had not changed. He described the German’s theory as a ‘set of 
fictitious adventures’, which had been devised with the objective of realising the 
Jewish conception of the Messiah. Kenrick’s final opinion of Strauss was that 
  the ingenuity of the author is much more strikingly 
  displayed than his candour or the soundness of his 
  criticism….[For] in this way the historical Christ disappears 
  entirely. 36
 Once again, it seems, Kenrick’s poor opinion of Strauss is largely based upon 
the fact that the German has attempted to demolish the entire edifice of the 
historical criticism which was so close to the heart of Kenrick and other Unitarian 
scholars. 
                                                 
34 Ibid., p. 308. 
35 Ibid., p. 316. 
36 Kenrick, ‘Jewish Conceptions of the Messiah’, p. 242. 
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 However, there were two other short works published in 1850 and 1864 in 
which Kenrick’s references to Strauss were more conciliatory. They were both 
related to the Unitarian’s greatest concern, the gospel of Mark and its 
contribution to the history of the life of Jesus.  To prove that Mark was the earliest 
and therefore the most reliable of the synoptic gospels was of great importance 
not only to Kenrick but to all Unitarians. If it could be shown that Mark’s gospel 
was credible and had been written nearer to the time of Christ than the other two 
it could then be argued convincingly that historically, it was the most accurate.  
For Unitarians, the crucial factor was, that unlike Matthew, nowhere does Mark 
make any mention of the virgin birth or any of the events surrounding it. Proof of 
the historical truth of Mark, therefore, would have weakened all other assertions 
concerning the birth of Christ, and the assumptions it carried with regard to his 
divinity would have been seriously undermined.  
         According to Kenrick the ‘primitive and genuine tradition…began, as Mark’s 
gospel begins, with the preaching of the Baptist and the ministry of Jesus – 
Jesus from Nazareth’. 37 Here, Kenrick made an explicit point about Jesus having 
been a Nazarene rather than one born in Bethlehem a point with which Strauss 
readily agreed because it had been Matthew’s ‘prophetic requisition that, as 
Messiah, he should be born at Bethlehem’. 38  Kenrick wrote that historical 
criticism had never been able to explain the ‘misapplication of prophecy in the 
narrative of Matthew’, along with the improbable stores of the ‘Magi and the 
travelling star, of the massacre of Bethlehem and the flight into Egypt’ and also 
                                                 
37 Kenrick, Biblical Essays, p. 41. 
38 Strauss, Life of Jesus, Section 32, p. 190. 
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the chronology of Luke with regard to the mention of Herod’s jealousy. 39 The 
events as related by Matthew ‘have an air of romance and of adaptation to 
subsequent conceptions of our Lord’s character’. 40  Consequently, wrote 
Kenrick, 
  Strauss appears to me to be completely successful,  
  when he refers the origin of this history to the desire 
  to realise the Jewish idea of the manner, in which the 
  appearance of the Messiah should be ushered in. 41  
Considering Kenrick’s previous opinions on Strauss this appears rather a 
surprising statement. It may be explained, however, by the sheer strength of 
Kenrick’s Unitarian convictions. Despite his rejection of Strauss’ hypothesis in 
general he made use of the German’s idea in this particular case in order to 
undermine Matthew’s narrative. The use of Strauss’ theory in this way enabled 
Kenrick to differentiate more clearly between Matthew, a gospel which had been 
hostage to prophecies and mythic fantasies, and Mark, a solidly credible, simple, 
unadorned, earlier version of the life of Christ which cast some light upon the 
origins of the true, primitive, historical Christian faith.  
In 1850, Kenrick had made use of Strauss’ mythical theory once again. 
Describing Strauss’ attack on the evidences of revelation like that of ‘Red 
Republicans and Socialists on the institutions of society’, 42 Kenrick conceded 
that there was nevertheless something to be learned from his theories. The 
                                                 
39 Kenrick, Biblical Essays, p. 41. 
40 Ibid., p. 40. For Strauss’ version of the birth of Christ, see Life of Jesus, Section 32, pp. 152-190. 
41 Kenrick, Biblical Essays, p. 40.  
42 Kenrick, ‘The Relation of the Third to the First Two Gospels’, p. 75. 
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distinction between myth and history cannot be drawn chronologically.  The so-
called apostolic age, within which miracles are credible and beyond which all is 
fabulous, cannot be defined as a period. It was not by the complete denial of the 
possibility that mythic narratives should have gained belief among Christians that 
Strauss should be encountered, but by discrimination between the mythic and 
historical elements within them.  
 Kenrick’s view was that the mythic ingredients increased in direct 
proportion with ‘the time that intervenes between the supposed occurrence of a 
fact and its record in writing’. 43 Consequently, if the earliest history of Christ’s 
ministry had been compiled no earlier than the middle or end of the second 
century after his birth then ‘it would not have been easy to dissipate the haze in 
which Strauss has invested it’. 44 It was for this reason, he wrote, that he tried to 
show that Mark’s gospel contained ‘a very early if not a contemporaneous 
record’. 45 Because the Bible was historically valid, there was no such thing as a 
biblical narrative derived purely from myth alone and consequently, his view of 
history and myth in the Bible was that 
 The tares and the wheat, the true and the false 
 narrative, sprang up together, the occurrence of the 
 true wonder being indeed the excitement to the production 
 of the false. 46
                                                 





Thus, history and myth developed alongside one another, the former 
engendering the latter. 
          History for the rational Unitarian scholars was the best possible way to 
eliminate false doctrine, and a powerful weapon of defence against the assaults 
of orthodoxy. It was a core factor in the Unitarian understanding and 
interpretation of the scriptures and in the particular case of the truth of Mark’s 
gospel. Myth was not a replacement for historical truth, but, like the ‘corruptions’ 
of dogma, was rather a human embellishment which grew around the ‘primitive 
nucleus whence developments proceed’. 47 Although Kenrick rejected Strauss’ 
hypothesis as a general concept he was willing, nevertheless, to concede the 
German’s insight when it came to proving a point concerning Mark’s gospel. This 
treatment of Strauss in these two articles reveals the strength of Kenrick’s 
Unitarian beliefs about the simple humanity of Christ and the influence of the 
Unitarian historical-biblical tradition on his thought.  Kenrick’s approach to the 
idea of myth in the Bible was in accordance with the Unitarian pattern of religious 
thought, which believed that a primitive, original truth had been distorted by later 
‘corruptions’ which had in turn led to false doctrines. This applied to myth as well 
as the fabrications of orthodox dogma. 
 The points raised by Kenrick on Strauss were all made after 1845, 
indicating initially that his thoughts on Mark’s gospel were formed later in his life. 
However, the belief that the gospel was an early, independent account of Christ’s 
ministry had been a feature of the Unitarian tradition which had been inherited by 
Kenrick. The idea that Mark’s was an original and historically accurate narrative 
                                                 
47 Alexander Gordon, Heads of English Unitarian History (London, 1895), p. 120. 
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of Christ’s life rather than simply a version which epitomised Matthew and Luke 
had been already proposed, both by Nathaniel Lardner and John Kentish. 48 In 
addition, as early as 1808, in an article on Griesbach 49 and the German’s 
assessment of ancient documents, Kenrick had already revealed a frame of mind 
which was very similar. 
      Kenrick’s advice to the biblical critic was not to strike a balance between 
manuscripts, citations and versions which favoured one reading or another of a 
‘doubtful passage’. Rejecting any form of harmonisation, his plan should be to 
examine each one on its own merits, in this case the Alexandrian and Western 
manuscripts, and determine which were the genuine versions. He wrote that if 
even ‘two or three are independent testimonies, they outweigh a hundred, who 
repeat the reading from each other or from some common authority’. 50  Kenrick’s 
was a frame of mind concerned with the origins of historical sources in the Bible 
which were nearest to the actual events and which represented the ‘springhead’ 
of truth. If biblical accounts were obscured by the corruptions of false dogma, the 
fantasies of myth, or had been merged with other versions, then these should be 
removed and the historically truthful origins revealed. 
 Such ideas were reflected in aspects of Kenrick’s thought on classical 
scholarship, particularly that relating to the understanding of myth.  In Kenrick, as 
was the case with the German mythologists, concepts relating to both the biblical 
and the classical developed alongside one another and this he recognised early 
                                                 
48 See chapter three, above.  
49 John Kenrick, ‘Sketch of the Life, and Notices of the Writings, of Dr. John James Griesbach’, MR, vol. 3, 
January 1808, pp. 1-9. 
50 Ibid., p. 5. 
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in his intellectual lifetime. The most important figure in this early period was 
Heyne , with whose work he first became familiar during his studies at Glasgow 
College in the years 1807 to 1810. It was only a few years later that he began to 
develop ideas on the nature of myth and its interaction with history.  
           There were two very distinctive features of Heyne’s thought. The first 
concerned the relationship of myth and history, the second the origins of myth.  
For Heyne myths represented the early attempts of the primitive peoples of 
ancient nations to explain their experiences and express their ideas. Myth was 
not divorced from true experience; rather it was the oldest history and the oldest 
philosophy. 51 In the historical type the myth contained a core of concrete truth 
and thus myth and history were interactive, and there could therefore never be 
any clearly defined boundary between them. Myth was perceived as the 
embellishment or distortion of historical truth, and in such a way were religions 
‘mixed and coalesced’ … or in other ways ‘twisted out of their proper shape’. 52   
          The most important task of the interpreter of the classical myth, which was 
so intertwined with ancient history, was to distinguish times and ages. He had to 
separate those past times in which poets and philosophers had altered myths by 
‘fitting their imaginations merely to their own opinions’, by embellishing, or by 
setting out ‘to stitch different ages together’. 53 Only if true and false are 
separated will the interpreter understand the history of the human race, and only 
then would it be the case that ‘we are brought back to primitive simplicity and 
                                                 
51 Shaffer, ‘Kubla Khan’, p. 125. 
52 Heyne, ‘Interpretation of  Myths’, (no page given) in Feldman and Richardson,  Rise of Modern 
Mythology, p. 221. 
53 Ibid. 
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speaking’. 54 Complementary to this was Heyne’s second point, which was that 
myths had strictly local origins, and he wrote that the ‘myths of single 
peoples…have manifested themselves each in a separate way’. 55 These, he 
emphasised, had to be ‘interpreted and understood in terms of the popular 
tradition’ and studied according to the thinking of the times and the authors, and 
from the viewpoint of ‘faith, truth, authority and judgement of those who handed 
these things down’.56  The origins of myths were strictly localised, and to be 
found only in the early history of each separate people.  
        Heyne’s place in the history of ideas is an important one. Shaffer believes 
that he represented the early stages of a transition from Enlightenment ideas of 
an abstract, rational religion to Romantic views of mythic symbolism. 57 However, 
Heyne’s transition may also be linked to subtle changes in the concepts 
surrounding the nature of historical development. He believed that all myths had 
local origins, and this being the case the mythology of a particular people had to 
be intrinsic to its own distinctive history and philosophy. Heyne and other 
German writers of the period, notably Herder, gave strength to the idea of 
uniqueness in mythic origins and the sense of the creation of a cultural ethos 
which belonged to that people and no other. 
  By the time John Kenrick encountered such ideas in his classical studies 
he had been well schooled in the skills of Unitarian biblical criticism by his tutor 
John Kentish and was highly competent in the German language, having been 
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tutored by Thomas Foster Barham in his teenage years. 58 When he left Glasgow 
College in 1810, Kenrick had already written two articles on the work of 
Griesbach 59 and had translated the passage by the German critic Ludwig 
Timothy Spittler. 60  Just a year after he graduated in 1810 his article on J.D. 
Michaelis appeared in the Monthly Repository. 61
 At Glasgow College from 1807 to 1810, he was introduced to the ideas of 
Heyne. Professor John Young, whose private Greek classes Kenrick attended, 
was familiar with the work of the German scholar. As early as 1793, Young had 
written to his friend Samuel Rose in London, asking him to send on to him in 
Glasgow a work by Heyne. 62 Six years later, in 1799, Young mentions Heyne 
once again, this time in a letter to another friend, the critic Charles Burney, 63  
and in 1803, in a further letter to Burney, 64 Young writes of Heyne, Ernesti, 65 
and the controversial Homeric scholar Friedrich August Wolf (1759-1824). 66  
         It is very likely that the ideas Young gained from Heyne and others were 
passed on to the young Kenrick to have what would turn out to be a lasting 
influence on his star pupil. By the end of his studies at Glasgow there had built 
up a strong mutual respect between Young and his student, John Kenrick. Young 
                                                 
58 See chapter three, above. 
59 John Kenrick, Review Article on Novum Testamentum Græce. Textum, ad fidem Codicum, Versionum 
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64 John Young to Charles Burney, 7 January 1803, GUL, Special Collections, MSS. Gen. 503/2, 
65 Johann August Ernesti (1707-1781) was a classical and biblical scholar and professor at Leipzig from 
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66 See note 90, below and related text. 
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wrote in a testimonial that he had seldom met with a finer young man than 
Kenrick, whose ‘parts are uncommon and have already received uncommon 
cultivation’. 67 It was his opinion, and that of others also, that on the question of 
intellectual prowess  Kenrick was ‘already a man and in language is as far 
advanced as those who write for the world’. 68
 It was also the case that Kenrick held Young in high esteem. He wrote to 
his great uncle, Samuel Kenrick, himself a former student at Glasgow, 69 that 
Young, who had a philosophical approach to the study of the Greek language, 
was ‘a man of very elegant taste’…whose translations were beautiful and who 
delivered his lectures in such an animated way ‘as sets them off when they are 
dull and bears them out where they are extravagent’.70 Thus it is clear that John 
Young would have regarded Kenrick’s mind as fertile ground for the reception of 
new ideas from Germany about classical myth and in turn Kenrick would have 
most certainly taken Young’s enthusiasm for writers such as Heyne very 
seriously indeed. Young was an innovative scholar and teacher and presented to 
his pupils some very original thoughts on classical philology and the development 
of language. 71  
 Together, the legacy of Unitarian biblical criticism, Young’s influence and 
with it that of Heyne, were to have a profound effect on Kenrick’s intellectual 
development towards an appreciation of the culturally unique in history. In 1816, 
                                                 
67 John Young to Lant Carpenter, May 1810, UCL, Sharpe Papers, 198. 
68 Ibid. 
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71 See chapter six, below. 
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six years after he had left Glasgow to take up his post as tutor at Manchester 
College in York and three years before he left for a study year in Göttingen and 
Berlin, Kenrick wrote on history, myth and the local origins of myth in an essay 
entitled ‘A Specimen of the application of Historical Principles to the Explanation 
of the Greek Mythology’. 72  
           The essay, which as far as may be determined was never published, is 
not dated, but there is abundant evidence to prove that it was written in 1816. 
Firstly, in a letter from York to the Manchester College trustee George William 
Wood in February 1816, Kenrick referred to a parcel containing a paper which he 
had sent to Thomas Robinson, who was Chairman of the Manchester Literary 
and Philosophical Society at the time. Kenrick wrote that he hoped that if 
Robinson did not think the paper was too long and tedious he [Robinson] would 
agree to read it to the society.73  Kenrick added that the paper was concerned 
with the interpretation of Greek mythology and wrote that ‘as some of the 
principles are, as I believe at least, new’, he wished to have the ‘judgement of 
any persons who may take an interest in such investigations’. 74 Secondly, the 
paper may be dated conclusively from a comment made by Kenrick on the title 
page 75 concerning a contemporary work due for publication at the time.  
Discussing his own proposals to clarify the sources of Greek myth, he wrote with 
                                                 
72 John Kenrick, ‘ A Specimen of the Application of Historical Principles to the Explanation of the Greek 
Mythology’, DWL, Kenrick Papers, 24.107.50 (n). 
73 The fate of this paper after it was sent to Thomas Robinson I was unable to determine.  It appears that a 
large amount of material relating to the Manchester Literary and Philosophical Society was stored in the 
Manchester Central Library, but much was lost during the bombing of the city during World War 2. 
74 John Kenrick to George William Wood, York, 1 February, 1816, HMCL, MSS. Wood 3, fol. 38. 
75 The pages are not numbered, but amount in total, including the left hand pages which sometimes contain 
references, to forty four.  I have referred to the pages here by numbering them as in the form of a pamphlet, 
from left to right, page by page, unless the left hand page happens to be empty. 
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a light touch of sarcasm that ‘at this moment the press groans with ‘three 4to’ 
volumes of Mr. Faber, which are to demonstrate its origins in a source never 
suspected before’. 76 Kenrick was referring to George Stanley Faber’s three-
volume work entitled The Origin of Pagan Idolatry Ascertained from Historical 
Testimony and Circumstantial Evidence, which was in fact published in 1816. 77  
Consequently, there is no doubt that this essay was written in 1816 in the hope 
that it might be read to the Manchester society. 
 This early essay of Kenrick’s myth revealed an integration of ideas 
between Unitarian biblical criticism and the interpretation of classical myth. As we 
have seen, the Unitarian frame of mind was of great importance in defining the 
terms of Kenrick’s engagement with D.F. Strauss with regard to myth and the 
Bible. Similarly, that same historical-biblical mindset was crucial in encouraging 
Kenrick’s reception of the ideas of Heyne on classical myth, which in turn helped 
to shape Kenrick’s own ideas on that subject and also its relationship with 
history.  
 In the essay, Kenrick made clear his familiarity with the work of Heyne, 
and his own general agreement with his propositions. The Unitarian scholar 
agreed with Heyne that the narratives about those mythical creatures which had 
preceded Jupiter constituted ‘the symbolical language in which a rude people 
clothed their speculations on the phænomena of nature’. 78  Kenrick’s only 
adverse comment was that in certain cases perhaps Heyne limited his 
                                                 
76 Kenrick, ‘Historical Principles’. This quotation is taken from the title page, or page 1. 
77 George Stanley Faber (1773-1854) was an Anglican divine and tutor at Lincoln College, Oxford, whose 
approach to mythology was founded upon a belief that all the world’s myths were corrupted versions of the 
original stories of the Bible. 
78 Kenrick, ‘Historical Principles’, p. 3. 
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explanation too exclusively to the ‘symbolical expression of the irregular and 
violent action of the powers of Nature’. 79 Concerning those stories of the gods 
who had preceded the birth of Jupiter, Kenrick had followed the account of 
Apollodorus.  He wrote that he had done this for two reasons, firstly because he 
had to choose the work of someone as a basis for the inquiry and secondly 
‘because Heyne has conveyed his own views in the form of a commentary on 
this author’. 80 Furthermore, in his notes to Apollodorus and in various papers in 
the Transactions of the Royal Society of Göttingen, Heyne had been the first to 
point out ‘the true interpretation of this part of the Grecian fables’. 81   
 Kenrick made one brief mention of Nicholas Freret 82 with regard to the 
Frenchman’s argument against Newton’s chronology 83 and his belief that this 
part of Greek mythology was a history of the systems of worship which prevailed 
in Greece. Apart from Freret, however, Heyne was the only other critic to whom 
Kenrick referred in his essay, and he did so at least six times. These references 
were made on points related to the general theme. They were comments by 
Kenrick on questions of degree or perspective rather than any fundamental 
disagreement on the major precepts of Heyne’s argument. 
                                                 
79 Ibid., p. 10. 
80 Ibid., p. 6. 
81 Ibid. p. 8. Kenrick agreed with Heyne that the mythological speculations surrounding the powers of 
nature, battles between good and evil and narratives such as those surrounding  Saturn, Cronos and their 
offspring were symbolic and had no historical foundations.  The period of interaction between history and 
myth began with the birth of Jupiter and the god’s connections with the island of Crete, where he was 
initially worshipped. See ibid., p. 26. 
82 Nicholas Freret (1688-1749) was a classical  historian interested in myth, chronology and history. He 
investigated the comparative value of documents to distinguish between their historical and mythical 
content. 
83 Ibid., p. 17.  See Nicholas Freret, Défence de la chronologie, fondée sur les monumens de l’histoire 
ancienne (Paris, 1758). 
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 There are several aspects of the essay which are striking.  Kenrick made 
the point that the principles contained in it were new. 84 This was certainly true, 
for the whole essay was constructed around the two original and crucial ideas of 
Heyne, the first that history and myth were interactive and could not be 
separated, the second that the origins of myths were localised and they were 
unique to each separate people who created them. Accordingly, the critic’s 
method, Kenrick wrote, should be to ascertain the oldest fables of the Greeks 
respecting their gods, and 
  to trace them upwards, as far as historical evidence 
  will enable him to do it to their local origin. 85
The initial point about this quotation is that it shows that Kenrick agreed with 
Heyne on those two important elements of mythic interpretation, firstly Heyne’s  
conviction, apart from in the case of the most ancient Greek deities, that myth 
and history were complementary to one another and secondly the idea which 
naturally sprang from this, that the origins of myth were localised. Also, however, 
the quotation refers to Kenrick’s intended method, which he regards as entirely 
original, for, he wrote that he proposed a  course of proceeding  
  which as far as he has observed has not been  
 adopted by any of those who have written on this subject. 86
He saw the essay as original clearly not only because It contained these 
important new ideas of Heyne’s regarding history, myth and its origins, but also 
                                                 
84 See note 76, above. 
85 Kenrick, ‘Historical Principles’, p. 5.  
86 Ibid., p. 4. 
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on the grounds that his [Kenrick’s] own methodology, the way in which he himself 
intended to develop Heyne’s ideas, was indeed also new.  
Crucially Kenrick’s method of interpreting myth was formed along the 
same conceptual lines and was analogous to the approach he had used in 
biblical criticism. He incorporated into the interpretation of classical myth 
concepts from the Unitarian tradition of historical analysis. Early in the essay  
Kenrick wrote that he was convinced that more might be done towards 
establishing the outlines of a method of interpretation of Greek mythology which 
would establish its ‘source and primary meaning….if we would be guided by 
history and  not by the love of a pre-established system’. 87 By the latter he 
meant that form of analysis, in which not only is there no distinction between the 
myths of different ages, but the  marriages and births, the genealogies and 
adventures of deities are taught ‘in the same affirmative historical time, as if they 
were the truths of our own religion’. 88  Little care, he added, had been taken in 
the discrimination of the evidence for the existence of those opinions related to 
the ‘age, the country, the character, or the prejudices of the writer who furnishes 
it’. 89 The descriptions of terms related to the importance of true historical origins, 
as opposed to the falsity of later, composite, a-historical versions, were in many 
respects analogous to the Unitarian historical biblical method of interpretation. 
        Even Homer was guilty of the distortion of myth.  Twenty one years earlier, 
in 1795, the small volume which shook the world of classical studies to the core, 
the Prolegomena ad Homerum of F.A. Wolf (1759-1824), had been published. 
                                                 
87 Ibid., pp. 1,4.  
88 Ibid., p. 1. 
89 Ibid., p. 4. 
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Sensationally, it had contended that there had been no single author of the great 
classical poetic works, Iliad and Odyssey, but that later editors had compiled 
them from a series of ballads of much earlier origin. 90  Wolf’s work was eagerly 
read by contemporary critics who had already grasped the notion of original, 
natural, primitive poetry, and Homer was the poet most under discussion from 
that time onwards. 91  
           Kenrick’s own view of Homer’s compilation was that it was unhistorical. 
Homer was like other writers, Kenrick wrote, and indeed may be even compared 
to a Neoplatonist ‘seeking to spiritualise the grossness of the ancient mythology’, 
or even a Christian apologist ‘not averse from exaggerating its defects’.  The 
combination of all these testimonies produced a ‘system’ which ‘certainly was 
never received at any one period as the general belief’. 92  The interpreters of 
myth had ‘applied their systems’ 93 to a mass of heterogeneously composed 
primitive fables, poetical embellishments and philosophical refinements, with the 
result that the historical truth about the origins of myth had been distorted. 
        His frame of mind in the essay on these points was strikingly similar to that 
which already had been revealed in his biblical criticism. It ought to be 
remembered that in his critique of Griesbach, published as early as 1808, 
Kenrick had advocated the pursuit of the single, independent source of truth 
rather than being content with a composite or harmonisation of different accounts 
                                                 
90For a concise account of the content and influence of Wolf’s Prolegomena, see Rudolph Pfeiffer, History 
of Classical Scholarship from 1300 to 1850 (Oxford, 1976), pp. 173-177. 
91 Ibid., p. 175. 
92 Kenrick, ‘Historical Principles’, p. 4. 
93 Ibid. 
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from several manuscripts. 94 In Unitarian biblical criticism the general theme was 
a rejection of the systematic, the presupposed and the artificially constructed way 
of understanding the past in favour of a direct, concrete historical approach. It 
seems that he applied an analogous set of ideas to the interpretation of ancient 
myth. In the essay  Kenrick expressed himself in the language of the Unitarian 
biblical critic, and in his analysis reflected some of those concepts with which he 
was familiar in this respect. Although the context was clearly different, his 
proposed method repeated the importance of findings the origins and the truth 
about the source and the beginnings of things.   
 There was almost in some respects, if not a confluence of ideas, at least a 
projection of a similar frame of mind, from Unitarian biblical criticism into the 
problem of the interpretation of classical myth. Kenrick’s method, derived from 
what he had learned about the objectives of Unitarian biblical scholarship to seek 
for the primary origins, was applied to the pre-Romantic precepts of Heyne. 
While clearly these were aspects of two sets of divergent ideas, in this particular 
instance they locked together with the ease of two parts of a well-worn jigsaw. 
Kenrick’s development of Heyne’s ideas was guided by that fundamental element 
of Unitarian biblical criticism which sought the ‘springhead’ or ‘primitive nucleus’ 
of truth about a simple Christian faith. 
       In the case of myth the ‘springhead’ towards which the historian should 
ascend was represented by the source of primitive mythic origins. The historian’s 
task was to understand the relationship between the factual and the fabulous in 
order to trace the myth back to its origins, which were local rather than part of 
                                                 
94 See notes 49 and 50 above. 
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some composite system which in itself represented a ‘corruption’ or the original 
myth. This curious intersection of two similar  patterns of ideas provides a link 
between radical English thought and that form of German scholarship which 
represented the birth of a nineteenth century historical consciousness concerned 
with the uniqueness of historical periods and of the cultures produced within 
them. The ideas of Heyne on the interpretation of myth had fallen on fertile 
ground which had been carefully prepared by the Unitarian historical biblical 
method. The result was that John Kenrick had recognised the historical potential 
of developing Heyne’s ideas further fully thirty years before the classicist and 
archaeologist Karl Otfried Müller (1797-1871), had aired them in English in 
1846.95
          The effect of this intellectual merger was to have significant implications for 
the thought of John Kenrick. Firstly, the idea that history and myth together ought 
to be perceived as one single form of development coincided with a more 
‘Romantic’ frame of mind. 96 Secondly, the idea that the myth of a people was 
unique to them alone, guided him towards an historical consciousness which was 
to be more sensitive to the relativistic and the unique in cultural development.    
                                                 
95 Karl Otfried Müller’s work Introduction to a Scientific System of Mythology (London, 1844), first 
appeared in German in 1825.  It was translated by a Scottish scholar John Leitch and published in English 
almost twenty years later. For my own appreciation of the work and its significance in the context of John 
Kenrick and myth, see Alison Kennedy, ‘John Leitch, John Kenrick, History and Myth: The Textbook as a 
Sign of Intellectual change’, Paradigm, Journal of the Textbook Colloquium, vol. 2, issue 4, December 
2001, pp. 13-22. For a compact but comprehensive study of Müller, who was a pupil of the philologist 
August Boeckh (1785-1867), and who became Professor of Ancient Literature at Göttingen in 1819 at the 
tender age of twenty two, see John William Donaldson’s introduction to Müller’s History of the Literature 
of Ancient Greece, 3 vols (London, 1858). See also G.P. Gooch, History and Historians in the Nineteenth 
Century (London, 1967), pp. 33-38, and also J.E. Sandys, A History of Classical Scholarship (Cambridge, 
1958), vol. 3, pp. 213-216. 
96 See below. 
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       Heyne’s first important proposition, that history and myth were inseparable, 
was assimilated into Kenrick’s thought. It linked myth and the imaginative 
process which produced it with the historical and cultural development of ancient 
peoples. However, in the 1816 essay, Kenrick cited  two forms of mythic 
expression which could not be considered as having any historical foundation. 
The first was that collection of minor deities, nymphs and muses who were 
products of the Greek imagination and poetic fancy and who often represented 
abstract qualities. 97 The greater, ancient gods, such as Cronos, who preceded 
the birth of Jupiter, who formed the symbolical expression of the world’s 
beginnings, were the second group. Such stories, of cataclysmic conflicts 
between heaven and earth, between good and evil, were similar in many ways to 
the mythologies of other ancient nations. 98   
            The first concrete evidence of the interaction of myth and history was to 
be found when Rhea, pregnant with Jupiter, came to the island of Crete, for it 
was Crete which was generally believed to have been the birthplace of the god. 
Kenrick presented some specific arguments to back up his theory that the 
worship of Jupiter was not, however, indigenous to Crete. His view was that 
Jupiter’s early appearance on the island was due to the arrival of Phoenician 
colonists who brought with them bull worship in the form of the Minotaur. This 
may have engendered the well-known fable of Jupiter transforming himself into a 
bull to carry off Europa to Crete. For Kenrick, myth was closely linked to other 
cultural effects and he believed that the theological system of a people not 
                                                 
97  Kenrick, ‘Historical Principles’, p. 5. 
98 Ibid., pp. 6-17. 
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favoured by divine revelation ‘must be very much influenced by the same causes, 
which bring to perfection their other ideas’. 99 In this way the myth reflected the 
cultural and historical circumstances which produced it, and consequently much 
could be learned from the understanding of the myth within its proper context.  
 A methodology which embarked upon an analysis of the ancient past on 
the basis of a correlative relationship between myth and history could also show 
how the former had often corrupted the truth of the latter. A year later, in 1817, 
he established that Assyrian deities had been perceived as real historical figures 
because the legends of mythology had been simply converted into history. He 
added wryly that the deeds of Ninus and Semiramis had no better claim to be 
received as history ‘ than the conquest of India by Bacchus’.100  Kenrick’s 
conclusion was that ‘The earliest annals of every ancient nation, except the 
Jewish, have been corrupted in the same way as the Assyrian’. 101  
 A dozen years later, in a review of Römische Geschichte [The Roman 
History], by B.G. Niebuhr (1776-1831) and some related works, Kenrick criticised 
English historians who had, he believed, ‘never seized the true spirit of antiquity’. 
Instead of reproducing a ‘living picture of ancient times’, he accused them of 
having been content to compose their histories by ‘combining or…contrasting the 
narratives of the Greek and Latin writers themselves’. 102 Such a procedure 
                                                 
99 Ibid., p. 31. 
100 John Kenrick, On the Possibility of Reconciling the Scriptural and Profane Accounts of the Assyrian 
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101 Ibid., p. 32. 
102 John Kenrick, Review Article on : 1. Römische Geschichte von B.G. Niebuhr, 2 Theile, Berlin, 1811. 2. 
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meant that the writing of ancient history was unsatisfactory even when dealing 
with those periods which most closely resembled modern times. Such methods 
were even less acceptable when the writer came to interpret those ‘obscure and 
mythic ages’ whose true history can never be elicited ‘by those processes which 
we apply to modern times’. 103  
 There was, he insisted, not a single work in the English language which 
understood the real relationship between mythology and history. Writers who 
wished to be ‘popular and practical’ left out those poetical and supernatural 
elements from ancient fable and presented the ‘vapid residuum as history’.  
Others incorporated everything into ‘religious mystery and dogma’, and many 
had become convinced that attempting to glean fact from fable was useless and 
the only recourse was to abandon myth to the poets who had created it. 104 With 
great eloquence, Kenrick expressed his own view on the question of myth and 
history. The gloom  which hung over mythic times, he wrote, was not an 
                                                                                                                                                 
und verbesserte, Ausgabe. Berlin, 1828. 5. A Vindication of Niebuhr’s History of Rome from the Charges of 
the Quarterly Review. By Julius Hare, M.A. London. 1829, WR, vol 11, 1829, p. 353. The review article 
runs from p. 353 to p. 388. 
   In 1846 another article by Kenrick on Niebuhr was published, in which Kenrick challenged Niebuhr’s 
and T.B. Macaulay’s assumptions about the poetical origins of the early history of Rome and claims that 
they produced no evidence to show that there existed any ballad poetry among the Romans. See John 
Kenrick ‘The Poetical Element of Roman History’, Review Article on 1. The History of Rome, from the 
first Punic War to the Death of Constantine. By B.G. Niebuhr. In a series of Lectures, including an 
Introductory course on the Sources and Study of Roman History. Edited by Leonhard Schmitz, Ph.D. Vol 
1, forming the fourth volume of the entire History. London. 1844. Vol. 11. ibid. 2. Lays of Ancient Rome. 
By T.B. Macaulay, Esq. 8th Edition, 1846, PR, vol 2, 1846, pp.322-337. See esp., p. 327.  See also notes 
taken by G.W. Wood at Manchester College in 1842 of lectures on early Roman history by John Kenrick. 
They may be found in the Unitarian Collection held by John Rylands University Library of Manchester. 
From p. 28 the notes outline Niebuhr’s and Macaulay’s arguments defending the existence of early Roman 
ballad poetry. Kenrick’s view is that if there had been such a tradition it would have been recorded by 
Roman writers. He told his students that no Roman author ‘ever saw any thing of the lays out of which their 
history was formed’. Quoted on page 37 of these notes. For a view of Niebuhr’s theory and the criticism it 
drew, see Renate Bridenthal, ‘Was there a Roman Homer? Niebuhr’s Thesis and its Critics’, HT, vol. 11, 
1972, pp. 193-213. 
103John Kenrick, ‘Niebuhr’s History of Rome’, p. 354. 
104 Ibid. 
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‘Egyptian darkness’ but a twilight such as the one to which the observer is 
suddenly transported from the brightness of day. Gradually, he learns to 
distinguish  
the forms and larger outlines of things, even if their  
colour be undefined and their minuter parts be 
undiscernible 105
The historian must peer through the haze to make out the outlines of the truth 
behind the veil of mythic embellishment. 
His task was to identify from the myth what had been the historical 
circumstances which produced it. Regarding the travels of the Greek hero 
Hercules, to the Western Mediterranean, for example, the older writers gave his 
journey a ‘purely mythic air’. For them, Hercules’ objective was to carry off the 
oxen of Geryones, and to achieve his goal he crossed the sea in the golden cup 
of the sun. He returned by way of the Pyrenees and the Graian Alps and en route 
gave origin to the Celtic nation. Another version, copied by Sallust into his 
Jugurthine War, saw Hercules at the head of an army of various nations which 
finally dispersed and took possession of Africa. This narrative, however, Kenrick 
believed, was constructed in a later age when Hercules was identified with 
divinities of Upper Asia. The most historical version came from the Greek writer 
Diodorus, who recorded that Hercules sailed from Crete with a large fleet, 
destroyed cities in Egypt and Libya, established his Pillars at Abyle and Calpe, 
then sailed to Iberia where he defeated Chrysaor of the golden sword. 106 This 
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was, according to Kenrick, an application to the Greek mythic hero of the 
historical fact of the establishment of the worship of the Phœnician Hercules on 
the southern coast of Spain. 107 Thus an analysis which eliminated those 
versions which were improbable for one reason or another and which 
incorporated both myth and history was rewarded with at least some idea of what 
truly lay behind the story of the mythical Hercules’ western travels. 
Kenrick’s ideas about the relationship between the mythical and the 
historical were refined and consolidated in 1845 and 1846. It was during those 
two years that he published reviews of works by K.O. Müller, 108  and George 
Grote (1794-1871), the acclaimed historian of ancient  Greece. 109 The year 1846 
also marked the publication of Kenrick’s own work Primæval History, 110 in which 
he developed further the theme of history and myth. Kenrick’s reviews of Müller 
and Grote served to outline clearly his own mature approach to an opinion about 
the contribution of myth to history from which he had never wavered since 1816. 
They also reveal the similarities and differences between Kenrick, Müller and 
Grote in the approach to the subject.  
With regard to Müller, Kenrick pointed out that he had drawn together 
many of the ideas of his predecessors, including Heyne, on the nature of myth 
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and its significance to historical development. 111 It was therefore not surprising 
that Kenrick approved in many respects of Müller’s perspectives on history and 
myth, which also saw them as complementary to one another. Müller had pointed 
out that historians knew the language, the land and the history of Greece, its 
religion and civil institutions, and had observed that ‘mythology often speaks of 
their origin and constitution’. 112  Accordingly, mythic materials were not isolated 
from other memorials of antiquity, but ‘pass into each other at the boundary, and 
stand in relation of constant transition’. Documents, he added, which had been 
purely historical also spoke of the same circumstances mentioned in myth, and  
‘ideas expressed by mythology, as, in like manner, reproduced by the ancient 
philosophers’. 113 In the introductory section to the review article, Kenrick 
emphasised in similar vein that dark as the mythical period was it was 
nevertheless certain that ‘it contains the elements of the historical’.114  He wrote 
that although scholars had the earliest literary productions of ancient Greece, the 
Homeric poems, even by this time the Greek national character had been 
distinctly formed. The historian had to go far back beyond Homer to discover the 
traditions of an earlier time which myth might serve to illustrate.  
          Although Müller perceived myth and history in close interaction, he did, 
however, indicate a measure of separation between the historical and the mythic 
period during which ‘the great mass of the mythi must have had their origin…and 
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sprang up at the time of which in general they treat’. 115   Müller  believed that 
there was a unique, poetic age in the Greek past during which  myth was formed. 
Mythic expression was a combination of the Ideal, which was a mixture of 
thought, feeling and poetic fancy, and the Real, consisting of historical fact. To 
separate the two was impossible, for there was no criteria to identify the Ideal, 
either than to define it as invention, or idea. As to that which was possible, or 
factual, it could not always be termed the Real, for 
  even the drapery which clothes the imaginary,  
  might, from accident or internal necessity, keep  
  within the bounds of the possible 116
We may only see the facts and circumstances contained in the myth 
 as in a concave mirror, from whose configuration we  
must discover, by calculation, the original form of  
the distorted image it presents 117
Such a form of mythic expression, which bound together in complex ways the 
real and the poetic, could only have been cultivated during a ‘particular epoch in 
the civilisation of a people’. 118 This mode, Müller wrote, of blending together fact 
and idea could not take place at a time when men were accustomed to 
separating speculation and the results of experience. Rather, the Greek mythic 
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age was one of poetry and expression and its intellectual treasures were handed 
down in a ‘certain degree of completeness’. 119
This idea of a separate, unique poetic age which had been characterised 
by the emergence of myth was, according to Kenrick, misleading. His view was 
that we should not speak of a ‘mythic age…as if it had a definite chronology, a 
beginning and an end in time’. 120 It was only when the historical causes have 
become obscured by length of time ‘that the mind seeks and devises mythic 
explanations’. 121 The ‘age of myth’, he wrote, had merely ‘subjective limits’, and 
began ‘where historic certainty ceases for the individual or the community.’ 122 
There could not be a definite boundary where history ends and myth begins 
which was the same in all cases, for the implication was that the length of the 
individual or collective memory, being subjective, varied according to specific 
circumstances. Each community was therefore historically unique with regard to 
the creation and understanding of its own mythology. Consequently, in relation to 
the question of a clearly defined mythic age, Kenrick rejected Müller’s contention 
with a typically Unitarian historical explanation. It also emerged as a solution, 
however, which turned out to be at ease conceptually with ideas of change, 
community and uniqueness, themes which were consistent with Romantic 
thought.  
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George Grote’s idea of a boundary between the ages of myth and history 
was much more definite than Müller’s. 123 Grote identified the mythic age with a 
specific period, the ‘childhood’ of the race, during which the Greek myths 
represented a complete form of consciousness and belief for a people living in 
the age of ‘historical faith’, which he distinguished from the later age of ‘historical 
reason’.124 Grote wrote that it was in this early state of the Greek mind, 
‘stimulating so forcibly the imagination and the feelings, and acting through them 
upon the belief’, that the great body of mythology was formed. 125  These myths 
constituted the ‘entire intellectual stock’ of that age’ and could not be understood 
‘except with reference to the system of conceptions and belief of the ages in 
which they arose’.126 We must, therefore, he wrote, try to identify with the state of 
mind of the mythopœic age. This would not be easy, for we would have to regard 
poetic fancies not simply as realities, but as the governing realities of the Greek 
mental system of the time.  We would have to imagine ‘something analogous to 
our own childhood’. 127  
 Because Grote had specified the age of Greek myth as the nation’s 
childhood in which a particular imaginative, fanciful and creative state of mind 
had manifested itself, he could not, therefore, see any possible linkages between 
                                                 
123 George Grote’s work, History of Greece , 12 vols (London 1846-1856), was the single most important 
contribution to the study of ancient Greece to be published in the nineteenth century. The extent of its 
influence is difficult to underestimate and after the 1840s every aspiring classicist had to consider Grote’s 
work in relation to his own. Grote was a contradictory character in intellectual terms. On the one hand he 
was an empiricist, a rationalist in religion and a political radical of the Benthamite Utilitarian cast whose 
roots lay within the Enlightenment. On the other he was a keen scholar of German Romanticism and 
Idealism. See Frank Turner The Greek Heritage in Victorian Britain (New Haven, Conn., 1981), pp. 86-96. 
See also Arnaldo Momigliano, George Grote and the Study of Greek History, An Inaugural Lecture 
Delivered at University College, London  (London, 1952).  
124 Grote, History of Greece, vol. 1, p. xiii. 
125 Ibid., p. 468. 
126 Ibid., pp. 461, 460. 
127 Ibid., pp. 474-475. 
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the myth of that era and factual history. Grote had set apart the heroic and mythic 
age of Greece from the historical because, he wrote, ‘To confound together these 
disparate matters is, in my judgement, essentially unphilosophical’. 128  Müller’s 
boundary between myth and history had been rather hazy and indefinite. Grote’s 
was much more clearly defined for in his view the mythic age, permeated by an 
imaginative process which had created an entire system of belief in the 
personages and relationships of the gods both to themselves and to humans, 
contained nothing which could be deemed historical. Grote contended that he 
could not draw back the curtain to reveal the historical picture simply because the 
curtain was the picture.  He was convinced that ‘the curtain conceals nothing 
behind, and cannot by any ingenuity be withdrawn’.129 Thus for Grote the age of 
myth was an age of childlike imagination, the creations of which had helped the 
Greeks define the terms of their own  existence and therefore it had no bearing 
on any analysis of the historical ages which followed. 
George Grote’s creation of an impassable gulf between myth and history 
in his famous History of Greece, which was published between 1846 and 1856, 
did not impress Kenrick, the reviewer of the first volume containing the section on 
legendary Greece. In accordance with his very definite views on the interaction of 
history and myth, Kenrick rejected Grote’s method. In Kenrick’s opinion the other 
historian’s approach was contradictory because, while on the one hand Grote 
related in this first section of the work the legends as illustrative of the faith, 
                                                 
128 Ibid., p. xii.  The whole of the first part of the history was devoted exclusively to ‘Legendary Greece’ 
and nothing else. It was, as Turner commented, ‘a learned polemic against the derivation of alleged 
historical fact from the evidence provided by the Greek myths’. See Turner, Greek Heritage, p. 87. 
129 Grote, History of Greece vol. 1, p. xiii.  
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manners and institutions of the people who believed them, he nevertheless 
‘makes no attempt to extract any history, general or particular, from these 
legends’. 130    
Kenrick noted that Grote, having rejected also the possibility of any 
attempts to separate the fictitious from the historical, was then left with a mass of 
tales and legends which, true or otherwise, nevertheless represent the Greeks’ 
faith in them.  Grote could not ignore these myths, so he therefore dealt with 
them according to his estimate of their worth to history and consequently isolated 
them.  Kenrick’s comment was that ‘He most carefully abstains from drawing the 
smallest inferences as to historical facts’. 131 Apart from anything else, wrote 
Kenrick, from a practical perspective the volumes Grote has published will not be 
popular, for by declaring the irrelevance of the mythical age to history he has 
ensured that 
 Few persons will be inclined to read some hundred 
 pages, of which they are impressively warned not to 
 believe a word. In his desire to avoid the common error 
 of deducing special history from mythic legend, he  
 resolutely ignores every thing respecting the ante- 
 Hellenic inhabitants of Hellas 132
Despite his criticism of this particular aspect of Grote’s work, however, 
Kenrick and Grote had in common one crucial element in their thought.  They 
both located the creative origins of myth in the human imagination. Frank Turner 
                                                 
130 Kenrick, ‘Grote’s History of Greece’, p. 451. 
131 Ibid., p. 452. 
132 Ibid., p. 461. 
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has correctly identified two features of Grote’s thought which run contrary to his 
rationalist Utilitarian sensibilities for Grote, it ought to be remembered, was a 
philosophic radical and a rationalist in religion. These two aspects of Grote’s 
thought were firstly, his contention that the creation of myth was characteristic of 
the imaginative nature of the Greek race in its childhood state and secondly, his 
identification of the origin of myth in the imagination. Both of them place Grote in 
the Romantic mould rather than in that of the Utilitarian. The Romantics, 
according to Duncan Forbes, saw a great gulf between the notional age of 
‘childhood’ and imagination and the age of ‘manhood’ and reason. 133 The two 
were perceived not as different in terms of degree, of more or less reason or 
imagination, but almost as different states of being. This is how Grote saw them, 
for in his history there was no place whatsoever for the creative, childhood age of 
myth.  
 With regard to the second point, Grote’s appreciation of the role of 
imagination in the creation of myth, Turner cites that strain of associationist and 
rationalist psychology which accepted a theory of imagination derived from 
emotion and feeling, a theme eloquently expressed by John Stuart Mill. 134 It was 
a theory which managed to adapt the outlines of empiricist philosophy to 
accommodate imagination and fanciful creation. 135 Turner contends that the 
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theory formed the background for Grote’s ideas about the nature of the 
imaginative process which brought about the mythopoeic age in ancient Greece. 
136  Turner is correct in this, for the associative imagination is fundamentally 
synthetic in its process and presents its objective in a complete whole, in this 
case a whole system of belief.  
 This essentially Romantic notion about the ability of imagination to create 
from disparate feelings, ideas and sensations what was finally a complete ‘whole’ 
or a ‘single, unified particular’ was described as ‘mental chemistry’ by Mill. 137 It 
was derived from the doctrine of coalescence, the idea that there could be a 
synthesis of emotions and the perceptions of sense to forge ‘an entirely new and 
irreducible whole’. 138 This doctrine  had been presented in the later eighteenth 
century by associationist thinkers such as David Hartley and Joseph Priestley, 
not only in relation to language 139 but also with regard to the formation of a 
complete and unalterable set of moral criteria. 140
Associationist concepts, their interaction with imagination and the results 
of this were evident in the work of both Grote and Kenrick. 
Grote emphasised that the ancient Greeks required ‘some connecting theory to 
interpret and regularise the phænomena before them’. Such a theory was 
supplied by the ‘spontaneous inspirations of an early fancy’ and the result was 
that most important characteristic of the Homeric Greeks, their ability to ‘construe 
                                                 
136 Ibid. 
137 Walter Jackson Bate, From Classic to Romantic: Premises of Taste in Eighteenth Century England 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1949), p.118.  I am indebted to Bate for his descriptions of this form of thought, for 
they were invaluable in identifying John Kenrick’s concept of the creation and understanding of the role of 
myth in history. 
138 Ibid. 
139 Ibid., p. 119. 
140 See chapter two, above. 
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the phænomena which interested them into manifestations of design’. 141  He 
added that ‘which to us is…the mere creation of an exuberant fancy, was to the 
Greek genuine and venerated reality’. 142 Instead of a sun which we now know as 
subject to astronomical laws, the ancient Greek saw the great God Heliôs 
mounting his chariot in the east by morning, reaching the height of heaven at 
midday and by evening arriving in the west, in need of rest .143  
        John Kenrick’s idea of the formation of imaginative concepts through the 
process of associationism was very similar and appears to have been initiated 
during an early period in his life. In an essay written in 1808 at Glasgow, he wrote 
that 
  a connection has been traced between thoughts 
  apparently most dissimilar, and the wild flights of  
  imagination have been shown to be as much regulated 
  by fixed laws, as the most sober processes of judgement 
  and reasoning 144
This early statement of the imagination as an end product of the workings of the 
associative processes on disparate ideas was most likely derived from the 
influence of the Scottish school of philosophy, whose precepts Kenrick would 
have most certainly encountered during his studies at Glasgow in the years 
1807-1810.  Due to a greater stress upon the importance of the innate in the 
formation of ideas, the Scottish philosophers, particularly Thomas Reid (1710-
                                                 
141 Grote, History of Greece, vol. 1, p. 462. 
142 Ibid., p 465. 
143 Ibid., p. 466. 
144 John Kenrick ‘Illustrations of the Origin of the Passions from the Doctrine of the Association of Ideas’, 
29 December, 1808, DWL, Kenrick Papers, 24.107.50 (d), p. 2. 
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1796) and Dugald Stewart (1753-1828) avoided the extremes of some English 
associationists. For the Scottish philosophers the contents of the mind were not 
formed entirely from the repetitions and associations of sense experience, rather 
they believed that the mind had an innate capacity to guide what experience 
brought to it.145
          In Primæval History, published in 1846, however, Kenrick’s mode of 
expression on this subject was more sophisticated. He applied his own 
interpretation of the creative idea to the relationship between history and myth, 
writing of the process which had resulted in the creation of myths that   
  Imagination itself…has its laws; it requires a motive  
  for its exertion, and the definite form which its productions 
  assume, implies a cause which has given them this shape, 
  rather than any other….What gives definite form to the legend 
  thus created is something present to the senses, or permanent 
  in the feelings of those who produce or receive it.  146
It was the power of emotions such as curiosity, national pride and religious 
feeling which awakened the ‘activity of this faculty’, and however much the   
legend which resulted from it appeared real due to its definite form and vividness, 
it was still essentially imaginative. 147 In this much later passage were present all 
the elements which suggest that Kenrick was close to the same philosophical 
‘school’ as Grote and Mill.  
                                                 
145  Bate, Classic to Romantic, pp. 101 – 102. Other implications for John Kenrick’s thought of this position 
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146 Kenrick, Primæval History, p. 65. 
147 Ibid. 
 265
 The idea that the definite shape of the myth, an end product of human 
imagination, was derived from emotion, sense or feeling and created by the laws 
of a specific process is consistent with the associationist answer to the mystery 
of the creative process.   Clearly,  Kenrick’s description of the creation of myth 
was derived from one of the various perspectives on empiricism which had found 
their own solutions to the problem of feeling and imagination and which had 
established their own home grown forms of ‘Romanticism’. 148 For him the 
process which formed the imaginative from the empirical represented a 
philosophical frame of mind which complemented the idea of the interactive 
relationship between myth and history.  
          Grote’s reason for the rejection of any historical element in this period was 
related to his opinion of the Greeks as being, just like an individual, at a particular 
stage in their intellectual development, that being childhood.  This idea, 
according to Forbes’ definition, was a theme characteristic of Romanticism. 
Notably, the concept of the mental development of a people over time was one 
which also appeared in John Kenrick’s thought. In his review of K.O. Müller, 
Kenrick wrote of myth that the age of its production usually preceded that of 
recorded history. It was an ancient language, the memorial of the times in which 
it originated and the only means whereby we could conceive the character of the 
Greeks or the relation in which this age stood to the historical. It opened up to us 
                                                 
148 Bate, Classic to Romantic, p. 118. Bate notes that this doctrine, or form of expression, was distinctively 
British and  it was not until after the first quarter of the nineteenth century that there was any evidence that 
it had made an appearance in European Romantic criticism. 
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a glimpse of an early world ‘when religion and philosophy lay yet undiscriminated 
in the mind, and fancy was not controlled by reason’. 149
         With regard to this essentially Romantic notion, in which the ages of myth 
and reason were separate, there was not much difference between Kenrick and 
Grote. Both saw the mythic age as one not yet governed by man’s rational 
capacities.  In John Kenrick, however the importance of the role of the historical 
and the search for the primary source which had been instilled in him by 
Unitarian biblical criticism had also strengthened the idea of the interaction 
between history and myth.  The result was that while Müller and Grote were 
primarily concerned with the historical significance of the mental state of the 
Greeks during that particular period in which they created their myths, John 
Kenrick historicised the myths themselves. His approach had been formed and 
refined by a complex interaction between the importance of the primary historical 
source to Unitarian biblical criticism, the ideas of Heyne, and influences from 
both the Scottish philosophers and English Romanticism. 
 All these ideas in Kenrick’s mind concurred with the second important 
proposition of Heyne, that myths had local origins and ought to be interpreted in 
relation to the time and circumstances in which they appeared. 150 It was this 
contention around which other key elements of Kenrick’s 1816 essay had been 
constructed. The idea also appeared later, in K.O. Müller, who wrote that myths 
                                                 
149 John Kenrick, ‘System of Mythology’ p. 336. See also John Kenrick, The Egypt of Herodotus (London, 
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the extract from Heyne’s Interpretation of the Language of Myths, in Feldman and Richardson, Rise of 
Modern Mythology, p. 220. On the later views of Müller, on the subject of the origins of myth, see 
Introduction to a  Scientific System of Mythology, pp. 46, 166, 68-71. 
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sprang from oral tradition and from local regions and from this may be 
determined their age and relationship to history. Kenrick, however, had been 
familiar with the idea of the localised origins of myth through his reading of Heyne 
and had begun to develop such thoughts a decade before Müller’s work 
appeared.  
             As we know, during the earliest period of his intellectual life, when 
Kenrick became familiar with Heyne’s ideas, he had already been schooled in the 
Unitarian approach to biblical criticism which was firmly anchored to a strictly 
historical interpretation. A concern with the original context applied not only to 
events themselves, but also to those who wrote the accounts. Consequently it 
would be natural for Kenrick to conceive of the origins of myth, being conjoined 
with history in terms of its interpretation, in a similar way.  His mind was intent on 
the discovery of original, uncorrupted sources, whether biblical or classical, which 
would reveal not a later version of the narrative or one which was a composite of 
several, but the real historical truth, or at least the closest the historian could 
approach it.  
In his essay of 1816 Kenrick set out a list of five principles by which the 
critic should be guided in his investigations into the origins of the gods who came 
after Jupiter. Firstly, the place to which Greek tradition referred the birth of any of 
the gods, must be considered as that in which his or her worship was first 
formed, or from which it spread itself over Greece. Secondly, the domestic 
traditions of such a place were the decisive evidence as to whether the myth had 
originated there or was foreign to it. Thirdly, the critic should be very cautious in 
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admitting that the worship of a divinity had been imported into Greece, unless 
from countries which had had considerable intercourse with it, by conquest, 
colonisation, commerce or geographical proximity.  It ought to be remembered 
too, that the original character of a god was often changed by the people by 
whom he or she was worshipped or altered with regard to other local 
peculiarities. Lastly, the critic should be mindful that the Greek gods were never 
incorporated  originally in the system they now exhibited, but had been formed 
into these various connections in a period after the first rise of their worship.  151
These  early ideas that the origins of myth were localised, and that the 
method of discovering them was to ascend upwards to the source remained a 
persistent theme. His faith in the local origins of myth emerged clearly in an 
article by Kenrick published in 1833 in the Philological Museum, 152 the short-
lived journal edited by the two Germanophiles Julius Charles Hare (1795-1855) 
and Connop Thirlwall (1797-1875). 153 The content of this intensive and learned 
study of the origins and development of ancient language 154 also contained 
ideas he had already consolidated on the origins of myth. The complex pattern of 
the formation of myth was unravelled by his understanding of the movements, 
separations, isolations, connections and diffusions of various ancient peoples 
                                                 
151 Kenrick, ‘Historical Principles’, p. 26. 
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and tribes, their gods and their forms of worship. The analysis depended upon a 
grasp of the earliest, and therefore the most uncorrupted, sources of evidence 
about the mythic characters and the circumstances surrounding their creation 
and worship.  
One good example of this method was the narrative of Niobe, the 
supposed daughter of Tantalus and wife of King Amphion of Thebes, whose six 
children were slaughtered by the twin deities Apollo and Artemis. Kenrick wrote 
that traces of the early diffusion of the Asiatic religion, of which Sipylus was the 
centre, and where the legends of Tantalus and Niobe had been connected with 
the worship of the gods, had been found in other parts of Greece.  Indeed, Niobe 
appeared in the oldest legends of Sicyon and Ægialeia. In this connection, 
however, the historian should not be misled into thinking that Niobe was the 
daughter of Phoroneus, for there are other things to be taken into account in the 
Asiatic origin of the fable.  Apis, Niobe’s brother, is said to have been murdered 
by Telchin.  The Telchines, however, belonged to the worship of the mother of 
the Gods, and they were the same [people] as the Idæi Dactyli of Crete and 
Phrygia. 155  This illustrates Kenrick’s method of juxtaposing historical, 
ethnological and local mythical elements in order to clarify the truth about the 
story of Niobe and her tragedy. 
Similarly, the idea of locality as a crucial factor appears in an article 
published in the previous year in the same journal, in which Kenrick wrote of his 
researches into the names of the ante-Hellenic peoples of Greece. 156 Here, he 
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reached back to the linguistic and ethnological sources which provided evidence 
to the identities of those very early Greek peoples whose mythology blossomed 
in the distant past.  His view was that although their myths were locally originated 
to a very great degree, these ancient narratives had been subsequently 
incorporated into the later system of mythology and consequently could no longer 
be clearly defined. Latterly then, the myths of the ante-hellenic tribes could only 
form part of the ‘mythological substratum’ of this distant age.  
 A dozen years later when he reviewed Müller’s work, which had 
also been influenced by Heyne and others, 157 it was clear that Kenrick shared 
with the German his thoughts on the ‘locality and separateness of origin’ 158 of 
ancient myths. His conclusion on Müller’s work was that it would gradually infuse 
more correct opinions on a subject which had hitherto been given over to 
‘sciolism, fancy, and theological prejuduce’.159 Kenrick agreed with Müller that 
myths were created by single tribes and families, by special customs and 
religious rites in confined areas.  The gods were eventually brought together by 
selection and combination from a number of different worships. All this was 
harmonised by poets, giving an ‘artificial unity’ to the legends, and ‘bringing into 
mutual relation and combined action a number of personages, who had no 
original connection with one another’.160 It was the scholar’s duty to discover the 
true myth from its local origins, for 
 The local mythus is not…a fragment of the more 
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 comprehensive, but the nucleus around which  it has 
 gradually gathered. 161
Müller’s ideas about the local origins of myth reflected similar themes which had 
appeared in Kenrick’s early essay of 1816. The historian ought not only to seek 
out the origins, these ‘nuclei’ of the myths, but should also trace the development 
which takes place around them 
  downwards, through their successive enlargements. 
  and intermixtures, by the aid of historical  facts, respecting 
  the progress of civilisation, literature and the arts, among the 
  people by whom these fables were believed. 162  
This was the second part of Kenrick’s stated method, which he had claimed as 
original in 1816. The first part encouraged the search ‘upwards’ for the original 
source. 163 Here, however, there was a change of dynamic towards the idea of 
development related to the myth, which originated in a specific, local area which 
was, by implication, unique. Consequently, the form and nature of development 
which involved the relationship between a people’s mythology and their 
civilisation, literature and the arts, were also unique. . 
 The same idea appeared in an expanded form thirty years later in 
Kenrick’s Primæval History, in which he wrote that mythology was of great use to 
the historian, for it was a product of the national rather than the individual mind 
which gave 
  a vivid image of national character. Religious and 
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  moral feeling, knowledge, taste, the predominance of 
  plastic or reflective power among the intellectual  
  faculties, in ages from which no literary works have  
  descended to us, may all be traced in the creations 
 of mythology 164
Mythology, then, was much more than a collection of fantastic tales. It interacted 
with many other aspects of the life of a culture which was unique in relation to 
others because the original source of its legendary past lay in the locality of a 
specific people or nation. It functioned as a binding factor in the collective 
consciousness of a people and, in the case of Greece, was interwoven with all its 
finest poetry and was ‘essential to the interpretation of its art’. 165  
        All these themes conformed with the idea of the organic development of a 
people or nation on its own terms in an internal sense. In this view the centre of 
gravity of development is within the culture itself and owes nothing to any 
universal precepts or systematic principles which are external to the boundaries 
of its own existence.  Kenrick’s idea of myth as having a unique form of input in 
cultural terms was similar to that of J.G. Herder, whose emphasis on the national 
character of myth reversed the preference of Enlightenment scholars to regard 
myth as having universal significance. Like Herder, Kenrick believed that the 
mythology of a people, which was linked to its own domestic locality, was an 
element of cultural growth which should be understood alongside others. It was 
also an important contributory factor in the formation and development of a 
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national consciousness, for these were the times during which ‘states received 
their form, and nations their character’.166
 This historicist theme of national identity was repeated many times in 
Kenrick’s articles and histories and was linked to other Romantic concepts. One 
most potent example was the number of comments in this vein on the subject of 
the Jewish people. Kenrick noted their own strengths and weaknesses and the 
development of their nation along the lines of any other ancient culture, and the 
ideas of national character, cohesion and belief formed an integral part of the 
discussion.  In an article entitled ‘The Destruction of the Jewish State’, published 
in 1845, 167 he wrote that the supernatural origin of the religion of the Jews by no 
means implied that their history was unlike that of any other nation or that 
‘national character was formed by any other than natural influences’. 168 Also, in 
the ancient nation even crimes of fanaticism and bigotry, which were less 
profitable than those which spring from selfishness ‘indicate elements of national 
character capable of high results’. 169  
           Time also had its role to play in the creation of a people’s unique identity, 
for in the case of the Jews an old, hereditary national character had formed 
under the influence of the centuries without which ‘ the national existence must 
have terminated centuries before’. 170 Having been slowly matured in this way, ‘A 
national character…cannot be instantly changed’. 171   
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 Although difficult to define with respect to art, for there are no works to 
indicate the nature of the Jewish ‘national character’, there is a great literature 
from which we learn about ‘the formation of the character’ and the influence of 
their religion in ‘penetrating and modifying the whole national mind’. 172 This mind 
was also interesting in relation to its conceptions of the Messiah, for there was a 
‘national belief respecting the person and office of the Messiah’. 173  In a later 
article, Kenrick pointed out the strength of the Jewish ‘national feeling’ and the 
resort of the Jews to ‘national sanctuary, by laws making them in every respect a 
peculiar people’, whose ‘national depravity was also without parallel’. 174 The 
Jewish nation was, consequently, like a unique individual with character, life, 
beliefs, feelings, faults and a mind of its own.  
 The same ideas featured frequently in different contexts in Kenrick’s many 
other reviews and articles. Of nations in general, he commented upon a ‘most 
important element’, which was ‘the influence of the national religion on the 
national mind’, 175 which, like an individual, could come to its own ‘verdict’. 176 He 
criticised historians who omitted to record ‘many things which are essential to a 
complete view of the national character’, for it was the finer influences of 
literature ‘of which national character is the result’. 177 The themes of 
development and corruption also made their re-appearance outwith his studies 
                                                 
172 Kenrick, Primæval History, p. 161. 
173 Kenrick, ‘Jewish Conceptions of the Messiah’, p. 245. 
174 John Kenrick, ‘Jewish Coins and Hebrew Palæography’, Review Article of History of Jewish Coinage 
and of Money in the Old and New Testament, by Frederic W. Madden, London. 1864, TR, vol. 5, April 
1868, p. 257. 
175 Kenrick, ‘Grote’s History of Greece’, p. 453. 
176 John Kenrick, ‘Froude’s History of England’, Review Article of History of England from the Fall of 
Wolsey to the Death of Elizabeth, by James Anthony Froude, Late Fellow of Exeter College, Oxford, 2 
vols,. London - John W. Parker and Son, 1856, CR, vol. 12, July 1856, p. 386. 
177 Kenrick, ‘Grote’s History of Greece’, pp. 449, 450. 
 275
on the Jewish state. With regard to the history of Rome, Kenrick questioned the 
chronology which made certain early Roman figures ‘representative of certain 
periods and phases of national development’. 178 Later, at the beginning of the 
empire, Kenrick noted that under the reign of Augustus the ‘national character’ 
had been ‘corrupted’, and it was impossible that the new ruler should not fear a 
resurgence of republican feeling. 179
 There are other passages in Kenrick’s work which reflect the idea of 
national cohesion emanating from language, 180 historical traditions and forms of 
religion founded upon the myths which had local origins. His ideas on what 
brought about the sense of community within a nation were very like that of 
Arnold Hermann Ludwig Heeren (1760-1842), who was Kenrick’s teacher of 
history at Göttingen during his study trip to Germany in 1819-1820.  Heeren 
believed that the key to understanding the development of national character was 
to give precedence to the effect on cohesion of ‘external marks’ of language and 
certain institutions sanctioned by religion’. 181 Subsequently, Kenrick’s idea of 
what formed a national character was an interaction of ‘the reason, imagination 
and affections of man’, 182 which in turn produced a ‘general conformity of mental 
conception and vocal expression, characterising the whole nation’. 183
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          Kenrick’s expression of the uniqueness and cohesion of each national 
character formed from the development of interdependent factors was striking in 
a Romantic sense. The national state of mind, the mental attitude of a people, 
was moulded to historical conditions created by locally generated myth and its 
relationship with art, literature and ethics.  The national character did not develop 
due to an artificially created system or one imported from an external source. 
Myth, religion, language, 184 and other factors which helped to mould these 
specific characteristics had their roots in unique and concrete historical 
circumstances. This was a frame of mind which was closely allied with Romantic 
interpretations of history. It emphasised uniqueness, specific points of origin and 
a form of cultural development in one nation which clearly differentiated it from 
the next.  
 The origins of this element in Kenrick’s thought concerning national 
character, which appeared in the 1840s were the result of not one, but several 
sources of influence. Firstly, biblical criticism clearly played its part, for the idea of 
nationhood was the theme of his analysis of the life of the ancient Jewish people, 
which had to be viewed as any other ancient nation. Secondly, the study of 
classical myth impressed upon his mind its importance in relation to the 
development of a nation’s culture, art and moral feeling, thus ‘national character’ 
was a factor here also.  
      Thirdly, the German classicist Philipp August Boeckh (1785-1867), who was 
Professor of Rhetoric and Ancient Literature at Berlin at the time of Kenrick’s visit 
in 1819 to 1820, had published his work The Public Economy of Athens  just two 
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years earlier. In Boeckh’s work the Greeks were not seen simply as producers of 
philosophy, literature and art, but as a nation like all others in the throes of a 
struggle for economic and military survival. The volume portrayed a people from 
many aspects in a concrete historical reality rather than one usually perceived to 
have existed in a golden age of intellectual perfection. Thus Boeckh had 
illustrated that history itself was now mindful of the strengths and weaknesses of 
the character of nations.       In his memoir of Kenrick, James Martineau wrote 
that ‘No great scholar left upon him [Kenrick] so great an impression as Boeckh’, 
185 who, according to G.P. Gooch, occupied a position with regard to classical 
studies similar to that of the German historian Leopold von Ranke  (1795-1886)in 
the history of modern Europe. 186 Lastly, the work of the philologist Jacob Grimm, 
who emphasised Teutonic origins and the development of a distinctive German 
myth, literature and character, was also very likely to have been a factor in the 
emergence of this particular element in Kenrick’s thought. 187 Grimm’s ideas 
about the German past, its tales and traditions, would have appealed to a 
historian concerned with the influence of myth on the identity of a people. 
These ideas of development, interdependence and cohesion led naturally 
to the concept of a nation as developing organically. In Kenrick’s writings there 
are some striking examples of the organic imagery which was related to the 
Romantic Age. Like Thomas Arnold, 188 Kenrick regarded classical culture as the 
zenith of man’s intellectual and artistic achievement and therefore wished to 
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establish whenever possible connections between the end of the ancient world 
and the beginnings of the modern. When Rome fell, he wrote, it appeared as 
though there had been a total destruction of the previous civilisation and a return 
to such chaos that a new creation would be required to initiate another beginning.  
This, however, was not so for 
 We shall find the germs of feudalism in the 
 tenure of the land, in the decline of the 
 empire; we shall see that the codes of law 
 which had been deemed most exclusively of  
 barbarian growth, have been strongly impregnated 
 with the spirit of Roman Law. 189
Beneath the ruins which had been created by the old and new possessors of the 
West of Europe ‘the seed still lives which in due time is to cover the earth with a 
more abundant harvest’.190 There would be a continuation of the cultural mores 
of ancient times and the ‘seeds’ of those would survive and flourish with the help 
of the new Germanic conquerors. The upheavals of the dismemberment of the 
Roman Empire in the third century AD had created separate states which were 
like ‘slips taken from a blighted and decaying tree’. 191 As such they would have 
no healthy vitality, ‘[but] new life was to be infused by the settlement of the 
Teutonic nations’. 192 Here there is expressed not only the organic concepts of 
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Romanticism, but also the Romantic idea of the primitive strength and vitality of 
the rude and the barbarous as contrasted with the weakness of a decaying and 
corrupt civilisation. 
 There were however, three short passages in Kenrick’s work which 
illustrated more clearly than most his affinity with Romantic perspectives on 
historical understanding and cultural relativism. He wrote that in the case of 
history, and also of languages 193 ‘Strata are formed from the detritus of other 
strata, kingdoms from the fragments of empires’. 194 This expression of a cyclical 
process of historical change, a process of birth, death and decay, was organic. It 
also understood the wider historical process in terms of single nations in 
interaction with the greater shifts and movements of the whole. 
 Kenrick’s thoughts on the outlines of historical forms and their interaction 
may be compared with the ideas of J.C. Hare, whose work Guesses at Truth 
described some perspectives on history which were of a truly Romantic character 
with regard to historical development. Hare believed that the right way towards 
the understanding of a past age was firstly, to gain the fullest idea of its peculiar 
features, and secondly, to ‘contemplate it with reference to the place it holds in 
the history of the world’. 195 The nation is born, has life, dies and decays. The 
progress of universal history is comprised of the successes and failures of the 
shifting organisms of nations and the value of what is passed one to another.   
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 Within a similar context, another two passages present Kenrick’s idea of 
the life of a nation. He wrote that as time advances, ‘a nation, like an individual, 
has the right to endeavour to prolong its existence’. 196 The concept here of a 
nation as an individual entity with a life of its own and the will to preserve that life 
was an organic one. The idea of a people and culture with its own unique, 
individual path of internal development was even more strongly expressed when 
Kenrick wrote that  
  There is no principle in historical philosophy more 
  certain, than that national character, when a people 
  has not been changed by inoculation with a foreign 
  stock, is essentially the same, through all its stages 
  from its germ to its decay. 197
These organic concepts are of the Romantic Age and they emphasise the 
uniqueness of peoples and nations relative to one another. The uniqueness of 
cultures as expressed in this way is a given, because organic thought is 
fundamentally different from the atomism of the radical English Enlightenment 
which tends rather towards concepts of general uniformity.  Kenrick’s 
perspectives may be compared with those of J.G. Herder, who wrote, in a much 
more colourful fashion that 
       Each nation must therefore be considered solely 
  in its place with everything that it is and has …. [in] 
  that great garden in which peoples grew up like plants 198
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Thus Kenrick shared with Herder the idea that a people or a nation developed 
organically and maintained throughout its existence a form of uniqueness which 
differentiated it from others in the most fundamental way. 
 Most crucial to this way of thinking about the Romantic form of 
development of nations was an emphasis on the origins of a people or  elements 
of their culture.  Without a specific, local and separate origin there could be no 
sense of uniqueness about the growth of any historical ‘organism’. One good 
example was Kenrick’s description of the formation of the Egyptian religion. 199 
The warning to the historian here was identical to that previously given to the 
biblical critic, that no external abstractions or ‘systems’ should be permitted to 
distort the unique historical reality of the context within which one sought the 
truth, whether it concerned the origins of the Egyptian religion or the nature of the 
primitive Christian faith. 
 Both, it appeared, had suffered the same fate, of being overlaid with the 
precepts of Greek philosophy.  This attempted harmonisation of Egyptian 
theology and Greek philosophy, according to Kenrick, was, it seemed, a 
tendency very pronounced in the later Platonists. It appeared particularly in the 
work of writers such as Porphyry, Iamblichus, Proclus and Damascius, who 
admitted into their philosophy much of Egyptian and oriental origins and ‘such 
modifications as would adapt them to their purpose of establishing a system’. 200 
The writer Iamblichus tried to show how Greek philosophy and Egyptian theology 
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were integrated and how in fact from the very beginning the whole Egyptian 
system ‘sets out from one and advances to a plurality; the many again being 
guided by one’. 201 Thus according to Iamblichus the Egyptian religion was a 
commonly held general belief which had been adapted subsequently into various 
diverse forms. Kenrick commented that for the cultivated Greek philosophers, it 
would have been quite natural to try and refine away the gross conceptions of 
primitive legends, symbols and rites and ‘engraft upon traditional mythology the 
speculative philosophy of a later age’. 202 Such attempts, however, were fruitless, 
for the evidence clearly showed that the religion of Egypt was not systematically 
conceived. In Egypt’s distant past there existed no such thing as a system from 
which worshippers in different localities selected the gods they wished to 
worship’. 203  
 Kenrick’s concept of the nature of the origins of the Egyptian religion was 
identical to the way he saw the origins of myths, as localised and not part of any 
organised system. Kenrick did not disagree that the Egyptians had their national 
religion, but it had never been systematised in its early stages.  Rather, it had 
been formed by ‘a multitude of religious conceptions’ 204 and by this means each 
local deity was allowed his separate honours. The reason for Kenrick’s 
conclusion was that in their names and visible symbols these gods at first 
appeared to be distinct and there was usually some particular office assigned to 
each one. However, a closer examination revealed that sometimes one deity 
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assumed attributes of another and he concluded that ‘a permanent line of 
demarcation cannot be drawn between them’. 205 Furthermore, gods which 
appeared in most instances as inferior were from time to time given titles of 
supreme divinity. This, Kenrick believed, was the consequence of their local 
origins, for to the people of each locality ‘their own special god would become the 
chief object of worship’. 206 Clearly, as with myth, the principle of localism of 
origins is fundamental to an analysis which concurs with the idea of uniqueness 
in religious belief.  
 Not only religion, however, was included in those elements of the 
Egyptian civilisation which Kenrick considered unique. In an article of 1853 207 
Kenrick outlined the gain to research of the Prussian expedition to Egypt in 1842 
headed by Richard Lepsius, who was generally regarded at the time as the most 
eminent Egyptologist in Europe.  The expedition had resolved many points on 
Egyptian chronology and drawings which were made illustrated the interiors of 
many tombs which had been previously unknown. Also, according to Kenrick, it 
put ‘beyond controversy’ the highly civilised nature of ancient Egypt and proved 
the important point that the arts and ideas of the Egyptians had been the result of 
growth over centuries. He wrote that ‘they are thoroughly indigenous, and bear 
no analogy to those of other nations’. 208 In addition, Kenrick pointed out that this 
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being the case the Egyptian civilisation was an ideal subject for the study of the 
development of an ancient people. It provided a ‘firm standing point’ from which 
the historian was able to look backwards over the preceding centuries during 
which ‘Egypt had been slowly acquiring the characteristics which these remains 
of antiquity so distinctly reveal’.209
 It was also the case that the development of one element of the Egyptian 
culture would have an effect on another.  Religious unity had a bearing on the 
strong political unity of Egypt from earliest times. This unity, however, was not 
derived from common belief in a theological system which had been imposed by 
a superior authority. Rather, it revealed itself in a ‘general conformity of mental 
conception, characterising the whole nation, yet differenced at the same time by 
local or other influences’.210
His idea of the origins of the religion of the ancient nation of Phœnicia was 
identical to his concept of the roots of Egyptian worship. Phœnician worship also 
had a ‘distinctive national character’. 211 The beginnings of the nation’s religious 
practices were, however, virtually lost in the mists of time. The only accounts of it 
were probably written eight or nine centuries after the age to which its origins had 
been attributed. Kenrick pointed out, however, that these works were 
nevertheless of great value due to the fact that that very little else had survived 
concerning the religion of this ancient people. 212 It was probable that, as in the 
case of a treatise of Plutarch on the Egyptian theology, the opinions of different 
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ages may have been brought together although ‘not always in perfect 
consistency with each other’. 213  
There were, however, alternative sources for writers to consider, and they 
comprised the documents and memorials in the different cities of Phœnicia. Also 
available were the records of the temples which had been ‘illustrated by the local 
appellations, and popular histories of the gods, and the mystic rites of their 
several temples’. 214  Religion, wrote Kenrick, was only a product of the ‘reason, 
imagination and affections of man’, 215 and had its roots so far back in societies 
that its origin was lost.  Consequently, all accounts which we have respecting the 
primary beliefs and worship of heathen nations must be gleaned from tradition 
and myth, from the names and forms of deities, temple rites, hymns and prayers, 
the tales of which they were the subject and the etymological significance of their 
names. 
Having discovered something of the religious practices and cultural mores 
of an ancient people such as the Phœnicians, how then should the historian 
judge them? The German historian Leopold Ranke denied that there were 
universal values. All values took on a concrete historical form and were 
consequently unique, arising from a particular historical situation. It was history, 
not philosophy, which provided the true guide to values. The historian should try 
to maintain an impartial position on the forces of history and relate these in 
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context without imposing upon them his own values or those of his own time. 216  
Among Ranke’s primary objectives was to separate the study of the past from the 
ideas of the present .217 He also emphasised the autonomous nature of all 
historical forms and that the value of an epoch was in its own existence and 
should be seen as valid for its own sake’. 218 The belief that every society had to 
be seen as a complex of a set of values different from those of other peoples and 
should be assessed only in terms of their worth within the context from which 
they had evolved 219 was historicist and a reflection of the nineteenth century 
idea of history. 
Ideas such as these appeared to some extent in Kenrick’s work, in his 
biblical criticism and also in his secular history, confirming once again that the 
same patterns of thought often extended to both.  In his analysis of the ‘miracle’ 
of speaking in tongues Kenrick had written of the great danger of error in 
transferring modern ideas to the mind of St. Paul, and in doing so confusing his 
idea of the spiritual with ours of the miraculous. 220 Also, with regard to the 
question whether it was the profligacy and sinfulness of the Jews which brought 
about the nation’s demise, Kenrick’s opinion was that ‘we must compare them, 
not with Christians of the present day, but with Heathens of their own’. 221 Here, 
even in his writings on the Bible,  Kenrick was defining the context as essential to 
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historical understanding and was setting apart the mores of the past from the 
judgemental standards of his own time.  
In his secular histories Kenrick, who believed that myth, which had local 
origins, contributed to the religious and moral feeling of the people who created 
it, had a distinctly non-judgemental view of unethical behaviour. In his 
assessment of the character of Gallienus, an emperor of Rome in the third 
century AD, Kenrick wrote that ‘if he took cruel vengeance on Byzantium, we 
must remember what were the uses of war in those days’. 222  Similarly, his 
reaction to the religious practices of ancient Egypt was typically impartial, for he 
urged that  
 We must not pronounce that the spectacle which 
 would grossly offend our eyes argues a depraved  
 heart in those to whom it bore a sacred character. 223
The criminal practises too, of the Phœnician pirates were distanced from modern 
ethical judgements, for, as Kenrick wrote, they traded where trade was profitable 
and used violence to gain their purpose. Their morality, however, was only on a 
level with their neighbours and indeed ‘it was no offence in this age to ask a 
stranger if he were a pirate’. 224  
The Phœnician religious practices were also explicable as products of 
their own time. Kenrick noted the abhorrence with which the rites of Moloch were 
spoken of in scripture, but avoided the use of any judgemental tone himself. Not 
only did he give an impartial account of child sacrifices to the god Moloch, before 
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whose likeness young children were roasted alive, but Kenrick even tries to 
explain the purpose behind such acts. These regular sacrifices involved only 
children and they were regarded as ‘propitiatory offerings on behalf of their 
parents’. 225  Kenrick asserted that the motivation of the mothers who brought 
their offspring to the altars of the god to be burned ‘believed themselves to be 
securing their childrens’ eternal happiness, by this sacrifice of natural feeling’. 226 
Consequently what would have been considered morally abhorrent in Kenrick’s 
time to the Phœnician mothers was a rational and acceptable practice in terms of 
their own religious and cultural circumstances. Unlike Ranke, Kenrick never 
elaborated in any way on his own approach to the moral relativism which is 
clearly to be found in his thought. Without question, however, he showed an 
appreciation of time and circumstance and also of the ‘otherness’ of the unique 
cultural mores and moral standards of ancient civilisations which were related to 
these factors. 
Clearly, he did not fall into the trap of the historian’s ‘pathetic fallacy’, 
described by Herbert Butterfield as the practice of abstracting things from the 
historical context and evaluating them by a system of direct reference to the 
present. 227 It was historians such as Gibbon and Macaulay whose work revealed 
the most glaring examples of such a mode of thought. Gibbon’s own prejudices, 
largely centred around his loathing of the fanaticism and superstition of the 
Christian churches, were responsible for the great flaws in his historical 
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understanding. 228 Macaulay used history as exemplary and established 
connections in a political sense between past and present for his own purposes. 
229  
Granted, it could be argued that it was perhaps easier to conceptualise the 
‘otherness’ of ancient times than to distance oneself effectively from historical 
periods which, in Macaulay’s mind at  least, encroached upon the present 
context. John Kenrick, however, did not see it that way, and indeed it was this 
judgemental characteristic of Macaulay’s work which engendered his criticism of 
it. Kenrick wrote that ‘His [Macaulay’s] censures are expressed in more 
impassioned language than … is consistent with the tone of history’. 230 Kenrick 
felt that when Macaulay became more familiar with the role of historian and was 
less under the influence of parliamentary habits, he would learn to control his 
temperament and ‘acquire the calmness of an historical critic’.231 He added that 
Macaulay’s lack of impartiality lay largely in the ‘unsparing censure with which he 
loads that to which he is opposed’. 232 Kenrick’s historical consciousness was 
much more sophisticated than that of Macaulay and indeed his historical thought 
represented a very different form of treatment of the values of the past in 
isolating them completely from those of the present. 
Considered as complete works, the method and structure employed in the 
compilation of Ancient Egypt Under the Pharaohs (1850) and Phœnicia (1855), 
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both of which were published after Kenrick’s retirement from his professorship at 
Manchester College in 1850, were examples of a new kind of history.  Instead of 
a one - dimensional narrative which included within it occasional commentaries 
on themes of ancient life, these two works were divided into separate sections 
devoted entirely to different aspects of the two nations. In Ancient Egypt there 
are separate chapters on climate, geography, population, language, agriculture, 
commerce, industrial arts, the military, domestic life, dress, architecture, 
sculpture, painting, writing, music and science. In the case of Phœnicia we may 
add colonies, navigation, mining and metallurgy and government.  The final 
sections of each work are devoted to the general fortunes of each nation in 
political and military history. 
            These works were a fuller extension of the idea of national development, 
for they revealed a much clearer picture, from many different angles, of the lives 
and culture of ancient peoples. In structure and composition the two works were 
very sophisticated, for they chose to account for the origins and development of 
many cultural and social aspects of peoples rather than simply their wars and 
political histories.       They were designed in this way largely due to the influence 
of Boeckh and also of A.H.L. Heeren, on whose lectures Kenrick based his own 
courses in history at York after 1820.  Kenrick wrote that ‘The work of my 
honoured teacher, Heeren, first assigned to commerce its due place in the 
history of ancient nations’. 233 In his own History of Ancient Greece, Heeren wrote 
separate chapters on the Greek constitution, political economy, judicial system, 
the military and the influences of poetry and philosophy on the government. 
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 Thus, from that turning point at which there came about an 
intersection of ideas between John Kenrick’s Unitarian theology and historical 
biblical criticism and Heyne’s perspectives on the interpretation of ancient myth 
several important themes were revealed in Kenrick’s intellectual development. 
History, which was founded upon empirical fact, could interact with imagination. 
The philosophical basis for this was that form of British Romanticism which 
modified and coalesced the sense perceptions of empiricism to produce the 
creations of human imagination. It was this idea which laid the philosophical 
foundation for the integration of myth as part of the historical process of 
development. The importance of Unitarian biblical criticism and its search for the 
‘springhead’, the nucleus of truth drew him naturally to Heyne’s ideas about the 
origins of myth. The implications of this was an appreciation of the diversity of 
peoples in their cultural development and an understanding of cultural relativism, 
the core idea of the historians of the Romantic Age.  Crucial to this way of 
thinking had been that emphasis on the separate, localised origins of a people, 
for without this there could be no sense of uniqueness.  
 Acutely aware of the importance of historical inquiry and the value of the 
primary origins of things, he historicised the myth rather than the minds which 
created it. This, together with Kenrick’s belief in the organic nature of the nation, 
which is the essence of the idea of relativism in a cultural sense, meant that he 
understood the outlines of a new consciousness founded upon the internal 
growth of unique and diverse historical forms.  These changes in John Kenrick’s 
thought were of some significance. The ‘seeds’ of a varied collection of new  
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perspectives on the understanding of the mythic past had fallen on the fertile soil 










 One form of assessment of the depth of historicist understanding in a 
writer’s work in the middle years of the nineteenth century is the way in which he 
dealt with language and literature. The ideas of changes in language over time, 
its interaction with human thought, its cohesive power over societies and nations, 
its organic nature and correlation with historical development all represented a 
departure from English Enlightenment themes. These new thoughts about 
language were consistent with a perception that it was something unique to a 
people and of the mode of speech being a strong influence on a society’s cultural 
development. The Romantic Age witnessed the multiple source theories of the 
origin of languages as opposed to the single origin concepts characteristic of 
Enlightenment thought.  Finally, the understanding of linguistic change was a tool 
for the historian of ancient nations, for alterations in elements of language could 
help to plot the movements and connections of peoples in the distant past. 
      A critic’s approach to literature also serves as an indicator of his frame of 
mind at this period. The rejection of eighteenth century neo-classical standards of 
aesthetics and taste in favour of a form of criticism which considered literary and 
artistic works in terms of their own context also followed a route towards 
Romanticism.  John Kenrick’s ideas about both language and literature clearly 
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encompassed elements of the historicist frame of mind with which he perceived 
historical development and a new approach to literary taste, and together they 
defined a  new philosophical approach very different from that of the English 
Enlightenment.   
      The radical Enlightenment view on language had been typified by Joseph 
Priestley, for whom language was a science. Priestley’s thought was in tune with 
the Enlightenment tendency to believe in a single source of human speech, a 
primitive language ‘spoken by the first family of the human race’. 1 He thought 
that diversity in human tongues was caused by the absence of the practice of 
writing, by the frequent admission of inflections into what was a simple and 
primitive form of speech, and also by differences in climate and ways of living. 2 
Typically, Priestley’s own preference would have been a ‘philosophical and 
universal language, which shall be the most natural and perfect expression of 
human ideas and sentiments’. 3 At the time, however, he contented himself with 
his main objective, of showing the variety of ways in which different languages 
expressed ‘the same mental conceptions’. 4 The tendency in Priestley’s thought 
on language was how to find a way towards uniformity rather than to consider 
any appreciation of diversity. 
 Half a century after Priestley however, the approach to language amongst 
leading philologists, particularly in Germany, had revealed important 
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Reprint (Menston, 1970), p. 288. Priestley’s lectures on the theory of language were given at Warrington 
Academy where he was tutor in languages and belles letters. 
2 Ibid., pp. 289-290. 
3 Ibid., p. 8. 
4 Ibid., p. 7. 
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characteristics of a historical consciousness related to the Romantic thought of 
the nineteenth century. Language was an integral factor in the development of a 
culture or a nation. It was the expression of a people at a particular period in their 
history and it developed organically along with mental, cultural and historical 
changes. Language was a cohesive force in society and with this and all other 
factors in play it was typical of ‘every other form of the historical development of 
humanity’. 5 Language was a tool in the identification of the cultural and historical 
movements in the life of a people and therefore historians could use language 
and the changes over time of patterns of speech as clues towards the 
interpretation of the history of ancient worlds. 
Considered as a general frame of mind, the manner in which  German 
philologists in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries approached their 
studies of languages was historical.  The scholar Jacob Grimm (1785-1863), 
following the ideas of the Danish philologist R.C. Rask (1787-1832), transformed 
the recognition of consonant shifts between several Indo-European languages 
into a law of linguistic development.6 What became known as Grimm’s Law 
traced sound shifts between Greek, Gothic and Old High German. It recognised 
patterns which were systematic and coherent and which established connections 
                                                 
5 Wilhelm Windelband, An Introduction to Philosophy (London, 1921), pp. 284, 285. 
6 R.C. Rask wrote that ‘ If there is found between two languages agreement in the forms of indispensable 
words to such an extent that rules of letter changes can be discovered for passing from one to the other, 
then there is a basic relationship between these two languages’. Rask  is quoted from Undersǿgelse om det 
gamle nordiske eller islandske sprogs oprindelse (Copenhagen, 1818), English translation of parts, 
Lehmann, 1967, pp. 29-37, no exact page given, in  R.H. Robins, A Short History of Linguistics (London, 
1990), p. 198. This statement of Rask’s formed the basis of Grimm’s Law, which was first formulated in 
the second edition of his Deutsche Grammatik,published in 1822. 
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between the Indo European family of languages. 7  Grimm saw in the sound 
shifts which he had identified what he believed to be evidence of an assertion of 
identity in the early German speaking peoples. 8 His linguistic work and his 
writing of German folk tales along with his brother Wilhelm, were all part of the 
German Romantic movement which was in harmony with a strong consciousness 
of national pride, identity and community. This group of Indo-European 
languages was the central focus of the new linguistic sciences and eminent in 
this particular field was Franz Bopp (1791-1867). 9 Bopp went further than Grimm 
and tried to trace the original grammatical  structures of these various languages 
in order to discover the positions they occupied relative to one another. He 
became convinced that Sanskrit was not the mother language, but just one of 
many related tongues. 10
 Language had not been given to man directly from God. The German 
poet, critic and thinker J.G. Herder had concluded that in order to understand 
language man required reason and therefore already possessed language. 11 
This was because language and thought were inseparable, for ‘language 
becomes a natural organ of the understanding, a sense of the human soul’. 12  
The German philologist and educationalist Karl Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-
                                                 
7  See Frans van Coetsem, ‘Grimm’s Law : A Reappraisal of Grimm’s Formulation from a Present Day 
Perspective’, in Elmer H. Antonsen (ed.) with James W. Marchand and Ladislav Zgusta, The Grimm 
Brothers and the Germanic Past : Amsterdam Studies in the Theory and History of Linguistic Science 
(Amsterdam, 1990), pp. 43-59. For a short analysis of the reaction to Grimm’s work in England see 
Raymond A. Wiley, ‘Grimm’s Grammar Gains Ground in England, 1832-1852’, ibid., pp. 33-4. 
8 Anna Morpurgo Davies, Nineteenth Century Linguistics (London, 1998), p. 90. 
9 Bopp’s major work was entitled A Comparative Grammar of Sanskrit, Zend, Greek, Latin, Lithuanian, 
Old Slavonic, Gothic and German (Berlin, 1833-1852).  
10 Davies, Nineteenth Century Linguistics, p. 131. 
11 Michael N. Forster, Herder: Philosophical Writings (Cambridge, 2002), p. 96. 
12 Ibid., p. 97. 
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1835), who was instrumental in founding the Friedrich Wilhelm University in 
Berlin, where Kenrick was to study in 1819-1820, wrote that language was ‘the 
formative organ of thought’ 13 because it allowed for the objectification of mental 
processes. 14   
Herder believed that the affinity between language, thought and 
development accounted for cultural diversity for ‘this difference [between people] 
right next to each other can be explained just as naturally as the unity  of the 
familial language in one nation’. 15 The concept of language as a cohesive agent 
on a people or a nation was complemented by Humboldt’s theory that the inner 
structure, or innere Sprachform, of each language made it unique. It contributed 
to national character, for language and thought exercised a two – way influence 
on one another and consequently, wrote Humboldt, ‘the mere peculiarity of 
language exercises influence on the nature of nations’, 16 and it is certain that 
‘the development of language first conveys national differences into the brighter 
region of the mind’. 17  
Humboldt argued also that since language was the product of an organic 
being it shared in the nature of all that was organic, meaning that every part of it 
                                                 
13 Wilhelm von Humboldt, ‘Nature and Constitution of Language’ in On Language : On the Diversity of 
Human Language Construction and its Influence on Mental Development of the Human Species, §  9, 
quoted by Michael Losonsky (ed.), Wilhelm von Humboldt : On Language (Cambridge, 1999), p. 54. 
Although von Humboldt turned to the study of languages in 1799, this work was not published until after 
his death in 1836. 
14 Roger Langham Brown, Wilhelm von Humboldt’s Conception of Linguistic Relativity (The Hague, 1967), 
p. 68. See also Davies, Nineteenth Century Linguistic, p. 116. 
15 Forster (ed.), Herder, p. 151. 
16 Wilhelm von Humboldt, quoted from ‘Ueber den Nationalcharakter der Sprachan’, Zeitschrift 
fürVöklpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft,xiii, 1882, pp. 211-232, in Langham Brown, Humboldt’s 
Linguistic Relativity, p. 80, 
17 Wilhelm von Humboldt, ‘ Character of Languages’, in On Language, § 20, quoted by Losonsky (ed.), 
Humbold : On Language, p. 153. 
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had life only because of the existence of all the other parts. 18 Languages, like 
peoples, were diverse cultural ‘growths’, each forming its own holistic unity, the 
parts of which were interdependent. This conceptual framework was 
complementary to cyclical ideas of birth, development, decay, death and rebirth 
in relation both to the language and the culture which spoke it. This relativistic 
approach was antithetical to Enlightenment ideas about the uniformity of 
progress for all mankind. It is in fact the German poet and critic August Wilhelm 
von Schlegel who is most often credited with the incorporation of organic forms 
into the discussions about language, although it is also recognised that Herder’s 
work had already provided the impetus for the use of organic metaphors. 19
Humboldt became most famous for his classification of languages into 
three separate groups. Firstly, there was the isolating type, such as Chinese, 
then the agglutinative, like Turkish, and finally the inflectional, with Sanskrit as 
the prime example. At one end of the spectrum was Chinese, which was the 
purest isolating language and at the other was Sanskrit, the purest flexional 
tongue. All the others, including the agglutinative languages, or hybrids, were 
ranged between these two. 20 Bopp too, and the Schlegel brothers 21 also found 
methods of emphasising the differences between language types. 
 In stark contrast to this method was the tendency to highlight the 
similarities between human tongues. This was the Christian and Enlightenment 
                                                 
18 Davies, Nineteenth Century Linguistics, pp. 86-87. 
19 Ibid., p. 86. 
20 R.H. Robins, A Short History of Linguistics (London, 1997), pp. 166-168. For Humboldt’s thoughts on 
the Chinese language, see his essay ‘On the Grammatical Structure of the Chinese Language’, in T. Harden 
and D. Farrelly (eds.)Wilhelm von Humboldt : Essays on Language (Frankfurt am Main, 1997), pp. 95-110. 
21 August Wilhelm Schlegel (1767-1845), the poet and critic, and Karl Wilhelm Friedrich Schlegel (1772-
1829), who was one of the most famous critics of German Romanticism. 
 299
approach which was characteristic of the scholarship of the orientalist and 
philologist Sir William Jones (1746-1794). It was Jones’ intention to show man’s 
unity and common ancestry and to prove the theory that all mankind had been 
descended from a single pair, an idea that bestowed upon the human race a 
unity of kind and purpose. As a result, his method was to emphasise the common 
elements in humanity, rather than to point out the differences. 22 This applied to 
languages, of course, and Jones worked hard to establish the common linguistic 
origins of post-diluvian humanity which had established itself in Mesopotamia 
after the flood. This remnant of humanity, Jones believed, subsequently divided 
into three distinct branches and lost what he was convinced had been a shared 
primary language.  Contrastingly, however, philologists could ignore this kind of 
analysis and choose instead to emphasise the differences between languages in 
order to prove their uniqueness.  It appears that many of the German philologists 
of this early nineteenth century period tended towards this latter approach.  
There are indications of some very early influences on John Kenrick’s 
ideas on language, in particular that of Professor John Young, his Greek tutor at 
Glasgow College and the teacher who most probably was responsible for 
Kenrick’s early encounter with Heyne. 23  Kenrick wrote to his great-uncle, 
Samuel Kenrick, that not only was Young a very interesting lecturer in his 
                                                 
22 William Jones, Discourses Delivered at the Asiatick Society, 1785-1792 [1807], Reprint (London, 1993), 
p. 188. This reprint from volume three of The Works of William Jones (1807) contains an introduction by 
Roy Harris and a bibliography of eighteenth - century linguistics by Karen Thomson. 
23 See chapter five, above. 
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manner, but that his matter   was very original. 24 He treated the Greek language 
in a very different way from that method which was fashionable in England by  
‘investigating its changes in successive eras and elucidating its 
structures by a reference to the principles of Philosophic grammar. I 
find it a very interesting employment to follow his 
track 25
Forty seven years later, in a review article on a work of C.C.J. Bunsen (1791-
1860), the Prussian diplomat and scholar, Kenrick wrote once again of Young 
that he was one of these who had seen that there were important patterns in 
language changes and had extended this principle of grammatical inflection, the 
result being that ‘a light was thrown on the formation of language which has since 
spread itself on all sides’. 26  
  Young’s method must have suggested to him a perspective on language 
which involved the idea of change over time, and his ideas may have prepared 
Kenrick for understanding the Romantic treatment of linguistic topics which he 
encountered during his study year in 1819-1820 in Göttingen and Berlin.  The 
primary objective of Kenrick’s stay in Göttingen had been to attend the lectures of 
Heeren and write his own new modern history course for his students at York. 27 
At Berlin, however, he devoted his time ‘almost entirely to Philology’. 28
                                                 
24 The emphasis here was Kenrick’s. 
25 John Kenrick to Samuel Kenrick of Bewdley, 9 January, 1808, HMCL, MS. Misc. 7, fols. 289-290.  
26 John Kenrick, ‘Bunsen’s Philosophy of History’, Review Article of Outlines of the Philosophy of 
Universal History, Applied to Language and Religion, by Christian Charles Josias Bunsen, 2 vols. (London, 
1854), CR, vol. 11, pp. 525-538, quoted on p. 526. 
27 See also John Kenrick, ‘Notes of the Early Part of the Life of the Rev. John Kenrick written by him for 
his Wife in 1870-1872’. Copied by Elizabeth Reid in 1878. (Hereafter, ‘Notes’), UCL, Sharpe Papers 191, 
p. 54. 
28 Ibid., p. 64. 
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         His decision to take a year’s study leave had been partly the result of a 
desire to resign his post as tutor at Manchester College, York. Kenrick suffered 
from a lack of confidence in his own teaching abilities and a sense of being 
‘deficient in some qualities essentially requisite for such a station’. 29 A trip to the 
German speaking area of Europe was a natural choice for him. He been 
schooled in the German language and in the ideas of their scholars from an early 
age and therefore it was not surprising that there was also a great enthusiasm on 
the part of the young Kenrick for the trip. 30  
 There are several unpublished sources from which we may learn 
something of Kenrick’s direct experience of the ideas of the German intellectual 
elite in the year 1820 and a little about the nature of the impact upon him. The 
first is a letter to his friend, the college trustee G.W. Wood. The second is a 
memoir of his early life which was written much later during the years 1870-1872 
and the third is the bundle of lecture notes Kenrick brought back from his studies 
at the German universities.  Together they give some insight into the general 
intellectual background in which he studied and indicate some of the influences 
he encountered.  
        A letter from Göttingen to G.W. Wood, the college treasurer, in the winter of 
1819 31 contained some news to Wood about German politics and the content of 
                                                 
29 John Kenrick to George William Wood, York, 18 January, 1817, HMCL, MS. Wood 3, fol 45.  See also 
letters from Kenrick to Wood written on 29 January, 1817 and 2 March, 1817, ibid., fols. 46-50, in which 
Kenrick expresses similar sentiments.  
30 John Kenrick to G.W. Wood, 11 June, 1819, HMCL, MS. Wood 3, fol. 72. The first part of the journey, 
which had been intended to provide an opportunity for Kenrick and his companion John Wellbeloved to 
absorb some of the culture of the German speaking world and to perfect the language, was marred by 
tragedy. The young Wellbeloved, son of Charles Wellbeloved (1769-1858), died of a fever during the first 
few weeks of the German trip. 
31 John Kenrick to G.W. Wood, Göttingen, 5 December, 1819, HMCL, MS. Wood 3, fols. 73-74. 
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the German newspapers but nothing about his study experiences. However, 
Kenrick indicated his enthusiasm for his work by his stated desire to bring back 
with him to England a selection of books. With customary financial prudence he 
suggested it would be better to do this than to wait to order them once he was 
back in England, for that would prove to be a much more expensive exercise. 
However well intentioned he was in this respect, however, it became clear that 
his thirst for knowledge from Germany was never to be quenched by the volumes 
which he finally brought home.  
         Almost immediately on his return to York he reported to G.W. Wood that he 
had set up a German language class at Manchester College in which one of his 
pupils was John Relly Beard (1800-1876),32 who in 1854 was to form Unitarian 
Home Mission Board and who retained an interest in German studies all his life. 
33 From then, for the next fifteen years at least, Kenrick continued a regular 
importation of books from Germany. 34  
 In 1823, for example, he asked  Wood to send £25 and a few pence to the 
credit of a company in Hamburg for his purchase of books. 35 Two years later he 
wrote to Wood that he had ‘an account…of £24.6s.8d…for a parcel of books from 
                                                 
32 John Kenrick to G.W. Wood, December 1820, HMCL, MS. Wood 3, fol. 78. 
33 Kenrick and Beard shared their common interest in German scholarship for many years. In 1850 Kenrick 
wrote to Beard, ‘I see [from] the work of Schumann, which you have translated, that the question of the 
priority of Mark’s gospel has been agitated in Germany. I was not aware of any thing having been recently 
written on this subject, my own conclusions having been arrived at entirely by my own inquiries’. John 
Kenrick to John Relly Beard, 6 March, 1850, JRL, Unitarian College Collection, Woodhouse Collection, 
Cupboard A/A2, pp. 1-2. 
34 See chapter eight below for an assessment of the German content of Kenrick’s library, sold after his 
death in 1877 by the auctioneers Sotheby, Wilkinson and Hodge. A copy of the catalogue may be found at 
UCL, Sharpe Papers, 195. 
35 John Kenrick to G.W. Wood, 4 October 1823, HMCL, MS. Wood 3, fol. 94. 
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Germany for me’. 36 In 1832, having sent an order to Leipzig, he asked Wood to 
procure the ‘usual credit’ of £50. 37 By the following year, 1833, it is clear that 
there had been for some time a regular flow of literature from Germany to York. 
In a letter to William Rayner Wood Kenrick wrote that he would like to obtain 
through the ‘usual channels’ of Messrs. Schuster and Co. of Manchester a credit 
of £30 with Gruner and Co. of Leipzig, for the purpose of making ‘my annual 
importation of German books. They will know in the counting house exactly how 
the thing is to be done’. 38  
        Three months later a letter from Kenrick to William Rayner Wood was 
concerned with an edition of the works of Schiller. Kenrick noted that he had a 
pirated edition of the German poet’s works, which could not be obtained in the 
regular way, but wrote that ‘if you can fix on any other I shall be happy to include 
it in my next order’. 39 Kenrick’s regular requests to Germany were both for his 
own scholarship and also for students such as Beard, who often requested 
German books as class prizes. Thus the trip to Germany only intensified 
Kenrick’s interest in German literature, for in the subsequent years his 
enthusiasm never waned. 40 It was also during those years which followed 
                                                 
36 John Kenrick to G.W. Wood, York, 15 September 1825, HMCL, MS. Wood 3, fol. 118. 
37 John Kenrick to G.W. Wood, York, 18 April 1832, HMCL, MS. Wood 3, fol. 166. 
38 John Kenrick to William Rayner Wood, York, 26 February 1833, HMCL, MS. Wood 3, fol. 175. 
The head of the firm was probably Leo Schuster, the German merchant mentioned in Bill Williams, The 
Making o f Manchester Jewry, 1740-1875 (Manchester, 1976), see pp. 43 & 83, and also p. 380, note 62 
and p. 385, note 28.Williams writes that Schuster was one of a group of German-born merchants in 
Manchester, of whom there were at least forty six by 1825, who were all prominent in their support of 
worthy causes in the city. Schuster he mentions as having become an annual subscriber to the Society for 
Promoting Christianity Among the Jews.  
39 John Kenrick to William Rayner Wood, York 25 May 1833, HMCL, MS Wood 3, fol. 182. 
40 See also: John Kenrick to G.W. Wood, York, 24 November 1823, HMCL, MS. Wood 3, fol. 97, John 
Kenrick to G.W. Wood, York, 4 June 1834, HMCL, MS. Wood 3, fol. 104, John Kenrick to G.W. Wood, 8 
June 1824, HMCL, MS. Wood 3, fol. 105, John Kenrick to G.W. Wood, York, April 11 1828, HMCL, MS. 
Wood 21, fol. 54, John Kenrick to G.W. Wood, 10 June 1828, HMCL, MS. Wood 3, fol. 179, Leo Schuster 
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immediately upon his studies in Germany that Kenrick wrote his philological 
works on Latin and Greek grammar and prose composition, leaving the 
completion of his historical books until after his retirement in 1850. The speed 
with which he tackled his philological labours on his return to England was clearly 
an indication of his enthusiasm for the task.  
 During the summer in Berlin Kenrick studied Tacitus with the famed 
Homeric scholar F.A. Wolf (1759-1824). With Carl Gottlob Zumpt (1792-1849) he 
practised Latin composition and conversation, while with August Boeckh (1785-
1867) his subject was Demosthenes. Many years later, as an elderly man in his 
eighties writing an account of his early life for his wife, Kenrick’s memories of that 
period in his life were still clear and surprisingly vivid. 41 He recalled that of all the 
classicists at Berlin at the time, it was F.A. Wolf who had the highest reputation 
due to his Homeric studies which, like many others, Kenrick believed had given a 
real impetus to classical scholarship and the study of ancient nations. 
         According to Kenrick, however, Wolf had been content to ‘repose upon his 
laurels, and did little in university teaching’. 42 Wolf’s lectures on Tacitus were 
short-lived, for ill-health forced him to suspend the course not long after it had 
started. According to Kenrick, at about this time Wolf was involved in a dispute 
with the theologian Schleiermacher and also August Boeckh. The row concerned 
                                                                                                                                                 
to G.W. Wood, Mosley Street, 19 October 1828, HMCL, MS. Wood 3, fol. 126, John Kenrick to G.W. 
Wood, York, 9 January 1829, HMCL, MS. Wood 3, fols. 143-144, John Kenrick to G.W. Wood, 
Scarborough, 8 September 1829, HMCL, MS. Wood 3, fol. 132, John Kenrick to William Rayner Wood, 
York, 28 February 1834, HMCL, MS. Wood 3, fol. 196, John Kenrick to William Rayner Wood, York, 21 
October 1834, HMCL, MS. Wood 3, fol. 218 and John Kenrick to William Rayner Wood, York, 10 May 
1835, HMCL, MS. Wood 3, fol. 229. 
41 John Kenrick, ‘Notes’.  
42 Ibid., p. 65. 
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an unfavourable criticism Wolf had made of a colleague’s edition of Plato. 43 
Wolf, Kenrick wrote, was ‘of a jealous and imperious temper’. He considered 
himself the Richard Bentley of German scholarship and indeed resembled the 
arrogant Bentley ‘at all events in that respect’. 44 Kenrick noted that despite 
Wolf’s high reputation in scholarship, the general opinion of the classical scholars 
of Berlin of his   personality ‘was unfavourable’. 45
 Kenrick, wishing to undertake a more thorough training in Latin 
composition in order to improve his teaching at York, had procured a letter of 
introduction from the biblical critic Eichhorn to F.A. Wolf, who was reputed to be 
‘the most critical Latinist’. 46 Wolf, in turn, recommended Kenrick to study under 
Zumpt, who was then Rector of a Gymnasium in Berlin. Zumpt, from whom 
Kenrick received private lessons in Latin, was, according to his young English 
pupil ‘not only an excellent teacher but a very intelligent man’. 47 The German 
had produced a Latin grammar which appeared to Kenrick to be far superior to 
anything in England and in 1823, Kenrick published a highly – acclaimed 
translation of the work which ran, with enlargements and additions, to several 
more editions. 48 James Martineau remembered a remark made by Zumpt on 
John Kenrick’s German, that it differed from a native speaker’s in one respect 
                                                 
43 Ibid., p. 67. 
44 Ibid., pp. 67-68. Richard Bentley (1662-1742) was the classical scholar appointed in 1700 as Master of 
Trinity College, Cambridge. During his tenure his scholarship was matched by his arrogance and his 
temper. 
45 Ibid., p. 68. 
46 Ibid., p. 64. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid.  See John Kenrick, A Grammar of the Latin Language, By C.G. Zumpt, Professor in the Frederick’s 
Gymnasium, Berlin, Translated, with Additions, by the Rev. John Kenrick (London, 1823). 
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only, that it was ‘too pure’. It was correct literary speech without a trace of local 
colouring. 49
  Philology apart, the young Kenrick also heard lectures by the 
anthropologist Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (1852-1840), 50 Eichhorn, and the 
theologian  Schleiermacher whose great wisdom on the subject of metaphysics 
was imparted to students each morning at six. Kenrick admitted to having been 
attracted to Schleiermacher’s dawn philosophy lectures more by his celebrity 
rather by his subject. He recalled how strange was the terminology of German 
philosophy and how unintelligible it was, particularly to one who was not an 
enthusiastic early riser. Schleiermacher lectured from seven till eight on ‘some 
subject which I forgot’, 51 then went home with a day of study and clerical duties 
before him. The great theologian’s lectures were delivered from brief notes and 
he ‘never seemed at a loss for words, however abstruse the subject on which he 
spoke’. 52
 While his philosophy was perhaps daunting for students, whenever it was 
known that Schleiermacher was to preach the church was crowded.  The 
German’s figure was not imposing. Although his face was refined and showed 
great intellectual power, in physical terms ‘He was below middle size and hump-
backed’. In the pulpit he spoke entirely without notes, in clear tones and simple 
language, but beyond this and the ‘liberality of his theological opinion, his 
                                                 
49 James Martineau, ‘In Memoriam: John Kenrick’, in Essays, Reviews and Addresses: Personal and 
Political (London, 1890), p. 404. 
50 See chapter seven, below. 
51 Kenrick, ‘Notes’, p. 62. 
52 Ibid. 
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preaching was not remarkable’. 53 Kenrick wrote that except when it was his own 
turn to preach, he did not think Schleiermacher was often seen in church. He 
recalls calling on the German theologian after the hour of morning service, which 
was regarded there as a perfectly appropriate time to visit, and finding him ‘in a 
costume which showed that he had spent his morning at home’.54  
 The scholar who made the greatest impression on the young Kenrick was 
August Boeckh, whose insight into the public and private life of ancient Athens 
filled Kenrick with admiration. 55 Kenrick recalled that with regard to his status as 
a philologist Boeckh was ‘the great ornament of the University’, but unlike most 
scholars concerned with the study of language had also a great talent for 
calculation and ‘delighted in statistics’ which gave him a deep understanding of 
the revenues of the ancient Greek state. 56 Like all German professors, Boeckh 
never wore full academic dress, but instead, when summer came around 
appeared in a ‘green stuff gown fastened by a band and tassels around the 
waist’. 57 It was harmless anecdotes such as these, written by Kenrick some fifty 
years after his visit to Germany, which give some fascinating insights into the 
behaviour and demeanour of some of the great intellects of early-nineteenth-
century Germany. Kenrick’s memories of his early life also reveal, however, how 
close he had been for a period to their innovative ideas in the fields of philology, 
ancient history and theology. 
                                                 
53 Ibid., p. 67. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Martineau, ‘In Memoriam : John Kenrick, p. 404. 
56 Kenrick, ‘Notes’, p. 65. 
57 Ibid., p. 70. 
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 August Boeckh gave a weekly lecture on the method of philological study, 
and chaired the weekly meeting of a Philological Seminarium at which there were 
readings from a Latin author followed by a discussion on him in Latin. 58 These 
weekly lectures and others, including Wolf’s ill – fated course on Tacitus, were 
recorded in the notes which Kenrick wrote during his months in Berlin. 59 This is 
the third source of information available on his year in Germany.  Sadly, 
however, except perhaps to a modern-day polymath, the contents of this rather 
chaotic bundle of notes are virtually unintelligible. Granted, they were written in 
Kenrick’s clear and precise hand, but the notes were taken down in a scholarly 
mixture of Greek, Latin, German, a little English and Rich’s shorthand, 60 and 
consequently remain largely beyond the grasp of the modern scholar.  Even if 
one happened to be well versed in the classics and in nineteenth century 
German, one would still have to master the intricacies of the outlines of Rich’s 
shorthand.  
         However, one basic rule of Rich’s shorthand was always to write out proper 
names in full to avoid confusion and consequently from this the modern reader is 
at least able to glean something of the content of the lectures at which were 
written these notes. From the bundle of loose folios which survive it is impossible 
to gain any accurate knowledge of how the ideas of the great philologists were 
presented at this time or indeed how they were received by Kenrick himself. The 
                                                 
58 Ibid., pp. 65-66. 
59 John Kenrick, German Notes, DWL, Kenrick Papers, 24.107.41. 
60 This was a form of shorthand originally devised in the seventeenth century by one Jeremiah Rich. A 
fourth edition of The Pens Dexterity Completed, or, Mr. Riches Short-hand now perfectly Taught, Which in 
his life-time by his Table was never done, was published in London in 1676. The shorthand was updated in 
the early eighteenth century by Philip Doddridge (1702-1751) and later by the Unitarian divine Lant 
Carpenter (1780-1840). It was used extensively in Dissenting Academies by many scholars, including 
Richard Price, Thomas Belsham and John Kenrick himself. See Appendix.  
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notes do, however, give at least some indications of whose work was mentioned 
at the lectures. The first name which is noticeable is that of Grimm and the 
following pages appear to indicate that there had been some notes taken on 
Grimm’s theory. This may well be the case, for only a few months before Kenrick 
arrived in Berlin, Jacob Grimm had published the first volume and edition of his 
Deutsche Grammatik, which traced the historical development of the Germanic 
languages. 61
         Nearby in the notes was recorded the name of the poet F.G. Klopstock 
(1724-1803), who anticipated the Romantics in his free and expressive use of 
language and chose patriotic themes from ancient German mythology for many 
of his poems. Also making an appearance in the random pages was another 
forerunner of the German Romantic movement, the poet Christoph Martin 
Wieland (1733-1813). Wieland, whose allegorical poem Oberon anticipated many 
Romantic themes, also spent much of his time translating Greek and Roman 
texts.  The Schlegel brothers, August Wilhelm and Friedrich, also appear in the 
text of the notes. They were, of course, both Sanskrit scholars, 62 but their work 
was also regarded as an inspiration to the new Romantic movement. August 
Wilhelm Schlegel’s lectures on criticism, for example, illustrate clearly his 
Romantically - inspired aversion to any neo-classical ‘despotism of taste’ and 
instead a wish to appreciate poetry as a ‘universal gift of heaven’ in which even 
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62 See above. 
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‘so-called barbarians and savages have their proportional share’. 63 Neither, he 
wrote, is it possible to be a ‘genuine connoisseur’ without being capable of 
imagining ourselves placed ‘in the peculiar situation of other people and other 
times’, and ‘to be aware of them at their very core’.64
 Kenrick’s notes also contain information on the analysis of Greek texts, for 
there was mention of David Ruhnken (1723-1798), a German-born follower of the 
English classicist Richard Bentley.  Also appearing is the name of August 
Immanuel Bekker (1785-1871), who had studied at Halle and who had been 
appointed professor of philosophy at Berlin in 1810. As a classical philologist, 
however, the main focus of his work was on Greek prose texts, and he produced 
several highly acclaimed editions of classical Greek writers. In one of the folios at 
the bottom of the bundle one can just distinguish the name of Humboldt and a 
little further on Schelling.  Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling (1775-1854), 
was a towering figure in German idealist philosophy who took his inspiration from 
Kant and Fichte. His conviction was that man was driven not only by reason but 
also by natural impulses and the essence of his  contribution to the Romantic 
movement was the unification of the natural and spiritual in man in terms of art.   
 Consequently, although Kenrick’s ‘German Notes’ remain in great part 
virtually unintelligible to the modern scholar, it is nevertheless possible to gain, 
from the notation of names of writers and thinkers who were under discussion at 
these lectures, some idea of the influences under which he studied at this time. 
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He would have absorbed the hypotheses of some of the great names in German 
philology, who recognised the whole historical significance of language as a 
vehicle for uniqueness in cultural development and identity. Also, he would have 
become acquainted with some of the major themes of German Romanticism in 
terms not only of language but also the appreciation of literature in historical 
context rather than by means of universal standards. The impenetrability of the 
‘German Notes’ makes it impossible to relate aspects of Kenrick’s thought to the 
influence of specific thinkers.  However, the modern scholar is able to gain at 
least some idea of the general themes which dominated the lectures at which the 
notes were taken. In Germany, Kenrick was influenced by ideas of a Romantic 
nature, themes concerning changes in language over time, its inseparability from 
human thought, its cohesive power, organic nature and multiple sources of origin. 
Language was a tool for history and a catalyst for the historical literary criticism 
which rejected abstract standards of judgement.   
        Because language developed historically, every tongue had a specific 
structure and vocabulary at any given period and it was with that in mind the 
etymologist should conduct his studies. In the preface to his translation of 
Zumpt’s Latin Grammar, published in 1823, 65 Kenrick was very careful to point 
out that Zumpt’s method was not to understand the whole history of the Latin 
language. His idea was to find a way to form a Latin prose style upon the model 
                                                 
65 John Kenrick, Zumpt’s Grammar of the Latin Language. The other two philological works written in the 
aftermath of his trip to Germany were, John Kenrick, An Introduction to Greek Prose Composition, from 
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of the ‘purest writings of the golden age – the age of Cicero and Caesar’. 66 This 
was not to say, wrote Kenrick, that Zumpt confined his choice of words and 
phrases to one age, for such pedantry has ‘long since been ridiculed and 
exploded’. 67  The reason Zumpt decided to concentrate on the grammar of the 
‘golden age’ was because its rules of construction were well designed to assist in 
composing in an ancient language. There was no reason to use a variety of 
models from several eras, for ‘the attempt to combine the practice of different 
ages would produce an incongruous mixture’. 68  
       In other words, Zumpt was perfectly aware that language altered in different 
ages. His choice of the Latin of the ‘golden age’ of Cicero and Caesar was by no 
means pedantic.  He chose this particular age of Latin for reasons which were 
primarily utilitarian, because it so happened that it provided the best structures 
for the teaching of grammar.  First published in 1818, it was soon recognised, 
wrote Kenrick, that Zumpt’s grammar had ‘a vast superiority over all others’. 69 
Indeed, it had been largely Zumpt’s very recognition of the philosophical 
principles of language development  that had given his grammar precedence 
over previous works which had been less conscious of the different ages of the 
Latin language.   
Years later Kenrick reflected on ideas on the development of languages, 
which by the mid-nineteenth century had disseminated into both German and 
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English intellectual circles. These ideas had been systematised by German 
philology in the work of Friedrich Schlegel, who saw such principles in relation to 
the origins of inflections, and by Jacob Grimm, who had determined the 
intermediate steps between the ‘beginning and the end of a series of changes’. 70 
Grimm’s work had been crucial, wrote Kenrick, because the intermediate steps 
‘often afforded proof of an identity’.71 Grimm, he added, had been enabled to 
classify the changes which language underwent and approximately to lay down 
their laws. This meant that etymology was no longer guesswork but science and 
took ‘its place as an auxiliary and a supplement to history’.72
Language, which altered in its vocabulary and its grammatical structures 
over time, was the key to the mental development of the people who spoke it, for 
language and thought were interdependent. This, of course, had been a 
fundamental contention of both Herder and Humboldt, but it was Herder who first 
saw language as the formative factor in the uniqueness of cultural development. 
On the question of the interaction of language and thought, Kenrick agreed with 
both of them when he wrote that language was not an invention of mankind, by 
which we mean the result of the intellect acting upon ‘the powers and properties 
of things extraneous to himself’. Rather, it was an ‘instinctive function of the 
combined organs of thought and utterance’. 73
The apparent absence of any desire to communicate in those who  had 
been isolated from others did not detract from the idea that language was a 
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72 Ibid. 
73 John Kenrick, An Essay on Primæval History  (London, 1846), p. 109. 
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natural function of man. This need to form language to communicate was a 
desire which comes from within rather than something which has been triggered 
by external factors. He wrote that ‘It is as natural to the human being to speak 
articulately, as to the brutes to communicate by inarticulate sounds’. 74 He 
pointed out that the difficult question about the origin of language had stemmed 
from the fact that it was conceived as a ‘conventional system’. As such, it could 
not have been established in the first place without the use of language itself, 
and consequently ‘it seemed that the existence of the thing to be explained was 
involved in the explanation of its origin’. 75  That the origins and development of 
language did not constitute an arbitrary process but a natural one may be proved 
by the fact that the roots of any language, whether French, German, Greek or 
Chinese, were never found to be more than a few hundreds in number. 76  In 
stark contrast, the possible combinations of vocal sound amount to ‘a number 
hardly to be expressed by figures’.77 Clearly, it was the case that the growth and 
formation of language from these simple roots, relatively few in number, was not 
an arbitrary process, but one which had been 
 carried on with a purpose of making vocal sound 
 a more exact representative of the operations and  
 affections of the mind. 78
             As time went by the process became more sophisticated. Once a 
language had mastered the art of communication by the imitation of sounds of an 
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external nature it began to make use of analogical meanings.  This meant that 
sounds of a particular quality had an affinity with certain mental and emotional 
states. 79 Kenrick reasoned that gradually, as language developed further, we 
were distanced from audible resemblances between words and the things they 
signified. As this happened, we found it more difficult to sense the relationship 
between the word and the thought. Despite this, however, there nevertheless 
remained a natural connection between the two which helped the speaker select 
the word which he made the symbol of his thought and aided the listener to 
appreciate its significance.  It was this symbiosis of language and thought which 
formed the basis for a mutual understanding between people. Furthermore, the 
development of a national language over time was concurrent with the 
development of the mental state of a nation. 
 Some of these ideas about the co-existence of language and thought and 
their relationship to the historical understanding of language Kenrick later 
projected back into his biblical interpretation. In his work, The Value of the Holy 
Scriptures and the Right Mode of Using Them, published in 1853, as a guide to 
scriptural interpretation, he wrote that the discourses of Jesus were the least 
obscure portions of the New Testament because ‘their truths are drawn from a 
perpetual spring of feeling in the human heart’. 80 This emotion lay deep beneath 
the superficial changes in opinions, manners and modes of speech of the time. 
Contrastingly, the writings of  Paul were the most difficult to interpret for, ‘the 
mind and style of the writer had been thoroughly imbued with the peculiar ideas 
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of his school and nation’. 81  This was characteristic, of course, of the traditional 
Unitarian method, which had been to interpret scripture historically, and 
according not only to the circumstances surrounding events but also those which 
influenced the author. In this case the linguistic element was cited by Kenrick as 
a factor in the study of scripture. 
By now, Kenrick had the full force of German philological inquiry behind 
him to bring depth and a clearer understanding to his biblical scholarship. 
Because ‘thought and language have a reciprocal action on one another’, 82 the 
difficulty in the interpretation of Paul is not simply verbal. It extends to the ‘very 
mode of the conception of truth. 83  The modern reader should not, wrote Kenrick, 
take the sense of the scriptures by what comes naturally to him, which was 
generally that which accorded most with modern usage.84 The sole objective 
ought to be to discover by the established rules of language ‘and the special 
genius of the language which he is interpreting’ 85 what the author meant to say. 
Thus, having absorbed over the years the linguistic ideas he gained largely from 
German philology, Kenrick re-defined to some degree his approach to the 
interpretation of the scriptures. 
With regard to the interpretation of the Old Testament the critic had to take 
note of that ‘special genius’, or uniqueness, of the Hebrew tongue which had 
been intensified by the fact that the Jewish people had been long separated from 
the rest of the world. There had been little influence from other tongues to dilute 
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its own singular characteristics which meant that the scholar had to appreciate 
the peculiarities, or uniqueness, of thought and expression which were so 
characteristic of this ancient nation. The symbiosis of language and thought in a 
situation where external influences and connections with other nations were few 
or non-existent  resulted in the development of a people with very distinctive 
characteristics. Humboldt would have agreed, for in 1822 wrote that ‘The 
characteristic qualities of nations and ages are … intimately intertwined with 
those of the relevant languages’. 86 This interaction of language and thought, 
which in turn produced specific national characteristics, also  supported the idea 
of cultural uniqueness. 
The power of language as a cohesive, binding force on society functioned 
in two ways. Firstly, it fuelled a centripetal dynamic which energised and 
strengthened the inner cohesion of a society and its uniqueness. By 
accomplishing that, however, it defined more clearly how different that language 
and people were from those in other societies. It brought to light the notion of the 
variety of cultures and their differences relative to one another. Incorporating 
both these concepts, of inner cohesion and external alienation, Kenrick wrote in 
1832 that there was no stronger tie of community than to speak the same 
language, no difference more readily remarked ‘or one which more effectually 
keeps nations from mingling, than a diversity of speech’. 87 It was true also that a 
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common speech was ‘one of the closest bonds of the social union’, 88 for with a 
community of language, similarity of institutions and religion is naturally 
combined, and ‘the belief of a common origin binds all together, by a tie as strict 
and sacred as that of a family’. 89 Language was the key to understanding a 
people, for it reflected upon their character and traditions. It was natural to 
speculate that if language acted on the national mind and received an impression 
upon it in return then, as Vico has shown, wrote Kenrick, our first insight into the 
peculiarities of a people is to be gained from ‘a knowledge of their speech – the 
necessary condition of their social union’. 90  
 Kenrick’s comments on Giambattista Vico (1668-1744) were well 
founded. In 1832 he had written a learned article on the Italian philosopher for 
Hare and Thirlwall’s Philological Museum, 91 concluding in his analysis that Vico 
was ‘one of the most original thinkers whom his country has produced’. 92 Kenrick 
was not impressed, however, by Vico’s idea of Providence working in the world 
and in history. The Unitarian defended, as always the integrity of historical inquiry 
by emphasising the need to ‘try everything by its own evidence, confident that 
…truth can never be inconsistent with truth’. 93  
Language, he believed, provided the cohesive power to hold together 
societies and accentuate their own uniqueness because it interacted with thought 
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and therefore helped to mould national character. Language was not the product 
of passive imitation.  Rejecting the radical English Enlightenment empiricist 
argument that man was a passive receptor of external sense impressions, 
Kenrick revealed a contrasting view that 
 the child, following some internal impulse of his own 
 is forever showing a disposition to go beyond the barriers 
 which grammar and usage have set up, to coin new 
 words, or follow out new analogies 94
Here appeared the idea of the Romantic idealisation of childhood, of the 
appreciation of creativity in a state of innocence, but in the quotation there was 
also something else, a process within the development of language of which 
Humboldt wrote.  This was the German’s idea of energeia, which described the 
inner creativity of the speaker, which in turn gave the language its innere 
Sprachform, or internal structure. 95 The whole idea of innate linguistic creativity 
and by implication, of course, that of concurrent intellectual development, in turn 
gave strength not only to the concept of cultural uniqueness itself but also to the 
Romantic notion of society as an organism. 
 Speech, like other forms of development in Romantic thought, was 
organic. This idea, revealed as a theme in Kenrick’s historical thought, 96  was a 
historicist concept which also formed an integral part of his perception of the 
nature of language.  In the historicist mind, historical forms were social 
organisms held together by complex relationships between language, tradition, 
                                                 
94 Kenrick, Primæval History, p. 111. 
95 See above, notes 16 & 17. 
96 See chapter five, above. 
 320
mental development and all the social mores which blend together in a 
community or society. Isaiah Berlin wrote that these social organisms were 
‘quasi-biological entities which defied analysis by the exact quantitative methods 
of chemistry or physics’. 97 They were associations of people each of whom had ‘ 
its own individual laws of growth, its own unique ‘organic’ character ‘, and they 
were ‘social wholes which develop like plants’. 98  
 Concepts such as these were easily integrated into the understanding of 
the development of language. Kenrick’s view was that its study required more 
than simply an accumulation of vocabularies and it  ought to be accompanied 
and guided by an ‘insight into the laws of human thought and the organism of 
speech’. 99  To this he added that in both these respects ‘the speculative German 
has been greatly in advance of the practical Englishman’. 100  Jacob Grimm, 
Kenrick wrote, was able to ‘classify the changes which language necessarily 
undergoes’, and to lay down their laws ‘by careful study of the organic laws of 
speech’. 101 These organic ideas of philology were reflected in the imagery which 
Kenrick  also used to describe historical development. He wrote that language, 
like history, exhibits metamorphosis, not creation.  New kingdoms come into 
being from the fragments of empires and ‘languages from the decay of other 
languages’. 102  
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           In similar terms, in the literature of Greece the East had preserved a 
precious seed ‘like the seed enclosed in the swathing of a mummy’. It had neither 
air, light, moisture or earth, but in the West a congenial soil was awaiting it and, 
transmitted to this soil it germinated and grew. 103 The organic concepts in 
Kenrick’s thought related to language applied, as they did for the Germans, just 
as easily to the birth, death and decay of historical forms themselves.  
 His search for the origins of linguistic forms, however, could never be 
straightforward. As we have seen, Kenrick’s thought was dominated by the 
desire to discover the ‘primitive nucleus’ of something pure before it was in any 
way altered by corruption, development or change.  His own description of this, 
the ‘springhead’ of truth was very apt, for his driving need to discover the 
verifiable historical beginnings of religion, myth or language was the intellectual 
equivalent of the search for the source of the Nile. However, he pinpointed no 
single location in his theories about the origins of human speech. He wrote that 
modern inquirers surveying the endless variety of structures and roots in human 
language, from the monosyllabic Chinese to the polysynthetic Mexican, in which 
an oak is called Amanganaschquiminsi, knew that their derivation from a single 
stock was impossible. He did not believe there was one form of speech from 
which all human tongues had been disseminated. Rather, he was sure that there 
had been separate origins and different sources of human languages. 104
            His opinion about the multiple sources of language contrasted starkly with 
that of the Enlightenment thinker Sir William Jones who, in 1786, was the first to 
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argue that Greek, Latin and Sanskrit were related and had come from a common 
source. In his Discourses  to the Asiatick Society, Jones’ primary purpose was to 
establish the ethnic unity of Europeans, Indians and Chinese and the 
identification of Persia as the post-diluvian home of mankind. All this would, of 
course, be reconciled with orthodox Christian and biblical themes which held the 
belief in a single source theory in both ethnology and linguistics. Jones’ discourse 
On the Origin and Families of Nations, as its title suggests, contains a definitive 
conclusion on the unity of humankind. Its ancestors may be traced to three 
‘families’ descended from the sons of Noah, the Arabian, the Indian and the 
Tartar. He accepted, however, the regrettable fact that ‘the language of Noah is 
lost irretrievably’. 105 Undeterred, however, by his own inability to establish any 
common linguistic features between these three branches of mankind, he 
nevertheless insisted that post-diluvian humanity had been one single 
community.  
 Kenrick’s argument was the direct opposite of what Jones had tried to 
prove.  Kenrick believed that different language forms had originated in different 
parts of the world. He wrote that the monosyllabic languages of Eastern Asia, 
those of the nomadic nations in Asia’s Northern and Central regions, of the 
interior of Africa, the Indian Seas, the Pacific and the New World  
are so manifold and various, that it is impossible to assign 
 to them a common origin in a single locality, without  
ascending to an antiquity far exceeding all authentic  
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chronology. 106
Chronology was a crucial factor in the argument, for a period so limited as that 
which was usually supposed was quite inadequate to explain linguistic 
differences, say, between the Coptic and Syro-Arabian languages, or the Hebrew 
and the Syriac.  Consequently, to the historian the ancient nations were 
autochthones, 107 peoples who were of their native soil and had been so from the 
earliest times.  
 The assumption, wrote Kenrick, that languages so different as to be 
virtually unintelligible to one another had developed within a few generations of 
the time when the first members of the human race were thought to have had 
one form of speech had impeded the advance of the new science of comparative 
philology. Despite this, he added, it was hoped that the recent researches would 
add much to the study of the ‘affinities and filiations of mankind’. 108 The 
widespread family of languages, which has been called Indo – European, differed 
in most of its roots, still more in its etymological principles and grammatical 
forms, from the Semitic or Syro-Arabian family. Of the people supposed to be 
descended from Ham, only one, the Egyptian, has handed down to us any 
memorials of its ancient language ‘but these are sufficient to know that it differed 
essentially from both the foregoing’. 109
 Kenrick argued his theory of separate linguistic origins around the 
circumstances of the development of writing in the ancient world. He pointed out 
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that the Phœnician alphabet 110 was probably derived in some part from the 
phonetic alphabet of the Egyptians, and was in turn the ‘parent of the Greek and 
Roman’. 111 This phonetic use of hieroglyphic characters ‘would lead us to regard 
picture-writing as the remote source of the alphabet’. 112 However, he told his 
readers that in the cuneiform character of the Persepolitan inscriptions we had an 
example of an alphabet which had no connection with picture-writing, and had 
evidently ‘been formed by combinations of a single character’. 113
Although the antiquity of the inscriptions at Persepolis was not great, 
some were found on the very ancient ruins of Babylon which were similar but not 
identical. Thus, the Phœnician  and Persepolitan alphabets were completely 
different in their form and structures. Furthermore, the Devanagari, the written 
Sanskrit, was different again, for it bore no resemblance to any of the alphabets 
of Western Asia. As for the Chinese form of writing, it could not even be called 
alphabetical because it denotes objects and ideas by immediate association with 
the visible sign appropriated to them,  and ‘not by analysis of the actual sounds 
of the language’. 114 Kenrick concluded therefore that we had here, in four great 
centres of ancient civilisation, four separate modes of denoting and 
communicating thought ‘so dissimilar to each other, as to lead to the conclusion, 
that they are separate inventions’. 115  
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This was a much more feasible explanation than that of those who make 
the coincidence of a few words in two different languages ‘a ground for 
maintaining the original identity or affinity of nations’. 116 Left to itself and without 
any historical factors in play, such as conquest by another nation, the language 
of a people will remain intact. Consequently, where some similarities do exist 
between it and another tongue, ‘migration and intermixture have been the cause’. 
117  Kenrick’s view on the separate origins of languages concurred with his ideas 
on other cultural factors, such as myth and ancient religions. The implications of 
his ideas of linguistic relativism were even more significant. Languages, which 
Kenrick believed had separate origins and presented quite different structures 
and modes of communicating, were interdependent with thought. These two 
factors together implied that there was in Kenrick’s mind a deep consciousness 
of the differences in peoples and nations and a significant appreciation of their 
relativism in cultural terms. By implication this frame of mind would clearly extend 
through language and thought to values and ethical standards. Although Kenrick 
does not discuss this last point specifically in relation to language, it is clear that 
there was a tendency in his mind to appreciate the relationship between historical 
context and the formation of values. 118
 What factors had been responsible for this intellectual position which had 
developed in his mature thought on language by the mid-nineteenth century? 
How did these factors interact with one another, and which emerged as the most 
important of all? By the 1850’s there had accumulated several sources from 
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which this view of linguistic diversity may have been derived.  Firstly, his support 
for uniqueness and diversity with regard to other cultural factors such as myth 
and pagan religions may have influenced his thought on linguistic sources. There 
were, in his view, different origins for the races of the world too, and this is 
discussed below. 119 Secondly, it was clear that the researches and conclusions 
of German philologists 120 such as Humboldt, whose classification of the world’s 
languages into three groups was a compelling solution to the problems of 
philology, had lasting influence on him.  
Most importantly, however, Kenrick, like all educated men, had become 
aware of the advances in the understanding of philology, ethnology, physiology 
and geology. The learned elite of these new, influential scientific disciplines did 
not, of course, entirely agree with the major points of religious orthodoxy. One 
compelling argument in favour of the truth of the scientific view was the fact that 
the Hebrew calculations that mankind had been on earth for a mere six thousand 
years was far too short a duration to have made possible the development of 
such diversity in tongues and in races. Orthodox theologians and scholars 
believed that mankind had descended from a single pair and that the Hebrew 
chronology which put man on earth for this relatively short period was true 
                                                 
119 See chapter seven, below. 
120 John Kenrick was not the only English scholar, of course, to have had experience of the German 
philological method. In 1838 the Rev. W.B. Winning, a clergyman from Bedford, published A Manual of 
Comparative Philology  (London, 1838). The work recorded the affinity of the Indo-European languages 
and applied this conclusion to the primæval history of Europe, Italy and Rome. In a list of fourteen items 
cited in the compilation of the book, ten are German works. He lists volumes by Bopp, the two Schlegels, 
Carol Ritter and Karl Otfried Müller, and explain’s Grimm’s Law to his readers (see pp. 36 ff). Unlike 
Kenrick, who rejects the traditional biblical-based view of both the languages of the world and the origins 
of mankind (see chapter seven, below) Winning’s objective is to reconcile with the scriptures the science of 
comparative philology and its contentions about the diversity of linguistic sources. 
 327
because the scriptures were infallible. Science had shown that these two crucial 
elements of orthodox belief fundamentally contradicted one another. 
 Kenrick complained that despite the discoveries of science little was 
discussed openly or objectively about the question in England ‘where a brand of 
heresy, if not of atheism, would be affixed to any one who doubted the literal truth 
of the Mosaic narrative’. 121  This, of course, spoke of the unity of mankind and in 
turn supported the notion that there had existed one God - given language, the 
Hebrew, from which all others had developed.  Even supposing he had not been 
instinctively averse to the opinions of orthodoxy on this point, Kenrick would have 
opposed the idea that language had been given to man from God it any case. He 
had learned from German philology that language and thought were 
interdependent and developed concurrently, and so man’s acceptance of the gift 
of language from God was a fallacy. As Herder had put it so succinctly, in order 
to understand language, man had reason, and therefore already possessed the 
gift of speech. In a lecture at Manchester College in 1830, Kenrick told students 
that the best argument for the human origins of language came from the form of 
the Chinese tongue. 122 In this language, which was probably the oldest in the 
world, complex ideas were still represented by the combinations of the simple 
ideas of which they consisted. If languages had been of divine communication, is 
it not likely that divine wisdom would have framed a shorter and simpler form of 
expression? 123
                                                 
121 Kenrick, ‘Bunsen’s Philosophy of History’, p. 530. 
122 Notes taken by William Raynor Wood , ‘Is Divine Interposition Necessary to Account for the Origin of 
Language?’, John Kenrick’s Orations, 1830-1831, HMCL, MS. W.R. Wood 2, p. 30. 
123 Ibid. 
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         The belief in the diversity and uniqueness of peoples and cultures which 
had pervaded his thought for many years slotted in neatly with the scientific 
discoveries which had come to light at this time. The expansion of empire had 
raised the consciousness of many to the many races of humanity on earth.  In 
Britain in the 1850s the term ‘ethnology’ was the general framework for the study 
of the colourful and diverse cultural characteristics of non-European ‘uncivilised’ 
peoples. 124  One may suppose that Kenrick’s study of diversity in myth, religion 
and language amongst ancient peoples had built a strong foundation for his 
reception of the conclusions of the new sciences about the different origins of 
language and also of mankind. 125
        These disciplines took a rational approach to the complex and contradictory 
problems of diversity and chronology and challenged some beliefs of Christian 
orthodoxy. As a Unitarian whose confidence in the power of reason and objective 
inquiry to solve each and every problem, however difficult, it was entirely 
predictable that Kenrick would take the side of science in opposition to the beliefs 
of orthodoxy which he had been fighting to disprove all of his adult life. Kenrick’s 
time had come, for by the middle decades of the nineteenth century, the 
conclusions of science had given this staunch Unitarian scholar an even stouter 
stick with which to beat his orthodox theological opponents. 
 Apart from his inbuilt antipathy to orthodox opinion, what annoyed Kenrick 
even more were those attempts by scholars of the Anglican clergy to justify their 
beliefs by any means possible – even if it meant that they carried their bias and 
                                                 
124 George W. Stocking, Victorian Anthropology (New York, 1987), p. 47. See pp. 47 – 77 for an account 
of the ethnological studies of this period. 
125 See chapter seven, below. 
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prejudice into their scholarship, bending it to suit their own ends. His review of a 
work by the clergyman Charles Forster was  scathing, to say the least. 126  
Forster was an orthodox  writer and biblical critic whose views on the origin of 
language, which he argued had been one single source, concurred with his ideas 
on the infallibility of the Old Testament as an inspired text. Kenrick accused him 
of calling 
theological prejudice to the aid of his argument… 
and declares that to question on any ground whatever… 
the infallible exactness even of the gospel genealogies 
is to “strike at the root of Christianity and Revelation”. 
       Kenrick struck out at the hapless Forster for taking no heed of all the 
advances in  science and of all the new historical thinking in recent years, but of 
writing ‘as he may have done three centuries ago’. 127 The idea of a single 
primæval language from which all others were derived was no longer plausible in 
the light of modern ethnological and linguistic studies. Kenrick’s argument here, 
and the sheer vehemence of it, 128 revealed the strength of his Unitarian views, 
                                                 
126 John Kenrick, ‘Forster’s Primæval Language’, Review Article of The One Primæval Language, traced 
experimentally through Ancient Inscriptions, including the Voice of Israel from the Rocks of Sinai,by the 
Rev. Charles Forster, Part 1 (London, 1851). –Part 2, The Monuments of Egypt, and Their Vestiges of 
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128 Kenrick’s review of the work of Forster, who was clearly an exponent of unswerving religious 
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Forster merely failed in his attempt to solve a difficult historical problem, we should have passed a much 
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want of moral courage among the critics of our country, when they give an account to the public of works 
which are likely to be favourites with those who call themselves the religious world. They are fearful of 
bringing on themselves the imputation of irreligion by freely exposing their faults; the praise they bestow is 
circulated far and wide by the puffing publisher, and a false reputation is created for their authors. It 
becomes a duty, therefore, for writers who are not subject to these influences to speak plainly, and as Mr. 
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particularly in opposition to the orthodox idea that divine inspiration should take 
precedence over all rational historical inquiry, in his mature thought.  
       In order to prove the first language as having generated Hebrew, Forster had 
to identify his primæval tongue with the very ancient Egyptian language. To do 
this, Kenrick alleged, Forster had denied the whole system of hieroglyphical 
interpretation which had been discovered by Jean Francois Champollion (1790-
1832). Great credit had been bestowed upon the French linguist by the scientific 
fraternity when he had found the key to deciphering the Egyptian symbols. 
Kenrick wrote with acid pen that according to Forster, all of Champollion’s work 
had been a delusion and his school were enemies of revealed religion. Against 
the Frenchman and his achievements it appeared it had been necessary  for 
Forster ‘to make an appeal to the English public and the Christian world’. 129  
 There was a similar angry reaction on the part of Kenrick to the general 
drift of Bunsen’s ideas and in his reviews of these Kenrick revealed that side of 
his nature which prioritised the defence of Unitarianism. In  January, 1855,  
Kenrick reviewed a work of Bunsen 130 in which the German had referred to the 
‘dry Unitarianism’ which had been incapable of explaining the history of Christ 
and which was nothing more than Deism with Christ as a moral model, or some 
form of ‘latitudinarian Mohammedanism’. 131 Kenrick’s reaction to this was 
                                                                                                                                                 
Forster’s appears to us to be decidedly one of these false reputations, we have not hesitated to say so, and to 
assign our reasons.’ Ibid., p. 48. 
129 Kenrick, ‘Forster’s Primæval Language’, p. 45. 
130 John Kenrick, ‘Dr. Bunsen and his Critics’, Review Article of Hippolytus and his Age, or the 
Beginnings and Prospects of Christianity, by C.C.J, Bunsen. Second edition, in two vols ( London, 1854 ), 
CR, vol. 11, January 1855, pp. 1-13. 
131 Bunsen, Hippolytus and his Age, vol. 1 p. 81, quoted by Kenrick, ibid., p 12. Defending the nature of 
Christ as identical with that of the Divine nature, Bunsen wrote of Unitarianism as a negation of the 
Christian religion. To quote him in full, Bunsen wrote that ‘The dry Unitarianism of the eighteenth century 
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predictable and Bunsen’s description of Unitarianism as Deism modified by 
Christian morality he described bluntly as ‘trite calumny’. 132 When, eight months 
later, his task was to consider Bunsen’s opinions on the unity of humanity, and 
that the parent language had been invented by an individual. Kenrick wrote that  
  We must confess that we could more readily  
  conceive of a single individual inventing piquet 
  or battledore and shuttlecock than inventing language. 
  It is essentially a social instrument. 133
        There was by mid-century a more aggressive and intolerant tone to 
Kenrick’s arguments and to his reasoning in the face of the continued onslaught 
of orthodox ideas. After a lifetime of defending his faith against what he believed 
to be the unsound scholarship of orthodox clergymen  this was probably not 
surprising. His expositions and reviews were infused also, however, with a new 
confidence, not only that which comes with maturity but also one which had been 
empowered by the rational voice of science. Thus when it came to the criticism of 
the ‘single source’ theory of language, his comments were scathing and his wit 
tinged with sarcasm because he knew his rational opinions on the Christian faith 
were in the process of being validated by the scientific authority of a new age. 
                                                                                                                                                 
is the first real negation, and has proved itself to be as incapable of explaining the history of Christ, as the 
intellectual mystery of man and mankind. As religion, it cannot pretend to more than a latitudinarian 
Mohammedanism, or at most a denationalized Judaism’ in short, to modern Deism, taking Christ as a moral 
model.’  He did give Unitarians some credit, however, adding that ‘Such, however, is not the Unitarianism 
of some of the present leaders of that denomination in England’. Here he would be referring to James 
Martineau, whose style of Unitarianism was more spiritual than that of his predecessors in the late 
eighteenth century. See chapter seven, below. 
132 Kenrick, ‘Bunsen and his Critics’, p. 13. 
133 Kenrick, ‘Bunsen’s Philosophy of History’, pp. 529-530. 
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 However, all these fresh ideas about language, its origins and the nature 
of its development, were not simply weapons in the continuing disputes between 
Unitarians and those of the orthodox persuasion. The whole idea of the separate 
origins of languages amongst ancient and primitive peoples had given voice to 
the Romantics who celebrated the original, creative genius of the volk. There 
developed the primitivist idea that purer forms of unique and diverse literary and 
artistic expression might emerge from simple, uncultured peoples who were 
untainted by civilisation. 134
These new philological ideas also constituted an important tool for the 
historian of ancient cultures. They were used by Kenrick in two ways, firstly as a 
means  to investigate the ancient tribes of Greece on the basis of the principle of 
the binding power of language. This power was instrumental in creating 
boundaries between peoples which could in turn reveal their origins, movements 
and affinities with others. The second way in which he used language in his 
history was to emphasise its importance as an integral part of a nation’s past. He 
did this in his two major historical works, Ancient Egypt Under the Pharaohs 
(1850) and Phœnicia  (1855), by giving over space for discussion in each of them 
to the language of these ancient nations. 
 Kenrick’s approach to historical philology was evident in an article he 
wrote in 1832 for the Philological Museum, 135 the short-lived journal edited by 
the Germanophiles and ‘liberal Anglicans’ 136 J.C. Hare and Connop Thirlwall, 
who had been the translators of Niebuhr’s History of Rome  (1828).  Kenrick’s 
                                                 
134 John B. Halsted, Romanticism (London, 1969), p. 18. 
135 John Kenrick, ‘On the Names of the Antehellenic Inhabitants of Greece’, PM, vol. 1, 1832, pp. 609-627. 
136 See Duncan Forbes, The Liberal Anglican Idea of History (Cambridge, 1952). 
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opinion was that at whatever time the Hellenes became a distinct people and 
extended their name over Greece it is certain that they bore ‘traces and traditions 
of other tribes who had preceded them in it’. 137 Because it was language more 
than anything else which distinguished people from one another, he tried to seek 
out the original names of these tribes for ‘they have for the most part left us 
nothing else’.138  
 It was this sense of linguistic difference , Kenrick argued, which had given 
the ancient tribes their names. It had been the exquisite fineness of the Hellenic 
ear which had led to an ‘early appropriation of a distinguishing epithet to those 
who spoke less harmoniously than themselves’. 139 The names given by the 
Hellenes to the ancient tribes were the names of birds. With this in mind he used 
a combination of etymological and historical evidence to trace the wanderings of 
the Pelasgi to prove that they were a distinctive people who had been identified 
by the name of storks.  This idea had been much debated by classicists, but 
Kenrick went on to speculate that such a name may have denoted their 
‘rudeness of speech’, 140 for the stork was often charged with ‘defective elocution 
…was held to have no tongue at all….and, therefore the stork was especially 
adapted to represent a people of barbarous speech’. 141 True or false, what was 
important was that his analysis carefully dissected the languages and nature of 
the early tribes and clearly defined them as ‘other nations’, and separate peoples 
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139 Ibid., p. 611. 
140 Ibid., p. 615. 
141 Ibid., p. 613. 
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in their own right. 142 If later they were subsumed into the Hellenic world, there 
was no doubt in his mind that originally they had had unique identities, separate 
origins and their own characteristics and traditions. He had used the study of 
language, therefore, to expand the understanding of the history of ancient 
peoples and their origins. 
 His other use of language in his histories was to emphasise its importance 
as one factor alongside all the others which contribute to the formation of a 
nation.  In both Ancient Egypt and Phœnicia  the incorporation of specific 
sections on the subject of the nations’ languages was indicative of his recognition 
of their importance. While in Ancient Egypt, language was discussed in the same 
section as population, in Phœnicia it received an entire chapter to itself. The 
early possession of  cuneiform writing caused many scholars to believe that the 
Phœnicians actually invented the alphabet, which they later passed on to the 
Greeks. 143 Not only Greek, however, but also Hebrew and Egyptian owed a debt 
to the  Phœnician language for elements of their own linguistic constructions and 
vocabularies. The idea behind the structure of Kenrick’s analysis was to 
emphasise that the importance of language to a culture was no less than the 
religious, commercial, political and economic aspects of a nation’s development.  
In a general sense, Kenrick believed that Phœnicia had been treated rather 
shabbily by some historians who held it up from a polemical point of view as an 
example of divine vengeance on the ‘arrogance, the luxury and the selfishness 
which commercial prosperity engenders’.  Yet, he added, no great nation of the 
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143 Kenrick, Phœnicia, p. 157. 
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ancient world conferred such benefits, including a linguistic one, on mankind and 
at the same time ‘inflicted upon it so little injury’.144
         If not as highly esteemed as Egypt or Greece in manufactures and arts 
Phœnicia left a legacy nevertheless, which appears to have been ‘national and 
local’. 145  The Phœnicians worked in wood, gold and ivory and the characteristic 
ornaments were of ‘native origin’. 146 Hiram’s works at Jerusalem offered enough 
examples to allow us to appreciate and to judge the ‘aesthetic character’ of 
Phœnician art.  Here Kenrick revealed his Romantic frame of mind with a critical 
appreciation of the creative abilities of a primitive, localised form of ancient ‘folk 
art’. By doing so he was essentially rejecting neo-classical standards of taste in 
favour of an approach to aesthetics which was historical and Romantic in style.  
       This not only applied to aesthetics, but also to his treatment of literary 
criticism. His scattered comments on this subject are of great importance, for it is 
here that his Romantic spirit is often most clearly revealed. Kenrick rejected neo-
classical standards of taste in favour of an approach to literature which was 
historical and therefore more Romantic in style. In relation to late-eighteenth and 
early-nineteenth century literature and art the idea of neo-classicism was that art 
imitated nature. Consequently, the form of criticism applied was one which 
sought a norm or a universal ideal by which to evaluate the artistic production. It 
judged as near to perfect those classical standards of beauty as they had been 
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represented in the ancient world, for those, it was believed, were enduring 
models which could not be surpassed. 147  
However, as early as 1808, in an essay written at Glasgow, 148 there were 
indications that Kenrick had already begun to reject notions of the ideal in taste in 
favour of a more contextual evaluation of beauty. In his essay he wrote that 
‘There is no eternal immutable standard of things amiable, desirable or hateful 
and disgusting’. 149 These qualities, he believed, shifted from one object to 
another according to their relationship with the individual.  Imagine the European 
ideal of beauty in the complexion and features of the European female as 
contrasted with disgust at those of the Negro. Yet if the natives of Guinea have a 
goddess or a personification of beauty, we may be assured that ‘her 
characteristics are exactly what we consider as the essence of deformity’. 150
This rejection of the universal standards of neo-classical taste appeared 
again three years later in Kenrick’s article on the life and work of the German 
orientalist J.D. Michaelis. 151  Kenrick made an interesting comparison between 
Bishop Robert Lowth and Michaelis. Lowth, he wrote had been ‘a man of refined 
taste’ which had been formed entirely upon classical models, who ‘judged of the 
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sacred writers by a classical standard and European ideas’. By contrast, 
Michaelis’ philological researches were much more historical and rational than 
Lowth’s, for the German ‘could discover in the kindred dialects the meaning of an 
obscure Hebrew word’. Furthermore, he could understand the ‘local allusions of 
the sacred writers’ and estimate their merits more rationally than by comparison 
with Greek and Latin authors. 152  
From notes taken of Kenrick’s lectures on belles letters, read on his behalf 
at Manchester College, York, during his study year in Germany from 1819 
to1820, it would appear that his position on literary criticism was very similar. 153  
These notes, taken by Richard Martineau, are not dated, but the fact that he was 
as a student at the college at that time in effect places them within this two year 
period. 154 Martineau noted Kenrick’s  opinion that although it had been the 
common method of critics to arrange different authors in divisions and to weigh 
their merits and demerits, of late ‘criticism has emancipated itself from the 
arbitrary rule of these tyrants in literature’ and now the author is judged 
‘according to the circumstances in which he wrote’. 155  
This theme was developed over the years at Manchester College and 
appears again in an expanded version in another set of lecture notes taken much 
later, at the close of Kenrick’s teaching career in the years 1849-1853. 156 In 
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these, Kenrick’s exposition was a great deal more precise. The history of 
literature, he told students, ‘belongs to the study of general history not merely as 
an accessory but as an essential part’.  It was a ‘more immediate product of the 
mind than any other form in which it manifests itself’. 157 The common critical 
method had been to establish great classes, such as epic, lyric and dramatic 
poetry, oratory, and real and fictitious history, then to review all the most 
illustrious authors who cultivated them.   
This form of criticism classed together and judged by abstract standards 
the productions of men who had lived in different ages.  The standard was 
usually framed according to the notions of these ages in which the critics who 
cultivated them had lived and consequently they  were far from being those times 
in which genius had been’ most vigorous and taste most pure’. 158 The French, 
Kenrick told his students, were the worst offenders. In the age of Louis XIV critics 
believed that the perfection of literature had been attained both in the earlier 
production of their own nation and in all the Greek and Roman classics, and this 
idea was in vogue ‘until very recently’.159
Contrastingly, the historical method was the only fair way of judging an 
author’s merits. The most original genius was not always the most correct 
because the flight of imagination had a close connection with the knowledge of 
his contemporaries. The spirit of modern criticism ‘attends more to the life which 
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157 Crompton Jones, ‘Greek and Roman Literature’, p. 1. 
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the outer garment covers than to the form and texture of the garment itself’. 160 
The notes read that 
 If beneath the rudest rhythm and the most unpolished 
 diction there lies the expression of strong, natural feeling, 
 of brilliant imagination, of vigorous power, it gives them 
 a higher rank than the most cold correctness. 161
In this Kenrick’s exposition was very similar to that of August Wilhelm Schlegel, 
who wrote that we ought to recognise what ennobles human nature from, 
‘everything beautiful and great beneath the external garnishings’.162 Poetry was 
the ability to devise the beautiful. It was a universal gift from heaven and where 
this internal excellence was present, ‘one should not be concerned with 
superficiality’. 163  Schlegel added that everything ought to be traced back to the 
roots of our existence. If it came into being there then it had value, but if it was 
merely attached from the ‘outside without a vital origin, then it can neither flourish 
nor experience true growth’. 164 His view was that criticism of poetry and the 
other arts could not be founded on ‘the basic laws of the beautiful’, which all of 
them are said to have in common. 165 To follow this kind of criticism ‘scientific 
discussions are necessary,’ which prove unattractive to those who want only to 
enjoy ‘the productions of excellent minds’. 166
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Likewise, Kenrick wrote that ‘the productions of human  intellect cannot be 
brought under these strict plans of classification which are applied in science in 
the case of organised bodies’ 167  Like Schlegel, Kenrick exposed the contrast 
between Enlightenment ideas of the science of man as part of nature and 
Romantic ideas concerning the  essentially human sources of original genius 
These were the emotion and imagination of men, which could not be appreciated 
or evaluated within the bounds of universal rules of  classification. There are here 
also hints of a dualism which emphasises, in terms of literary appreciation, a gulf 
between the world of nature and the world of man. 168
 Similar themes appeared in the introduction to a series of lectures on 
English literature, this time in Kenrick’s own hand. 169 The notes were not dated 
and could have been written at any time in the 1830s or 1840s during Kenrick’s 
years of teaching at Manchester College. With regard to his approach to literary 
criticism, however, the material was consistent with the ideas revealed both in 
the early notes taken around 1819 to 1820 and in the much later ones written in 
the late 1840’s and early 1850’s. These notes were probably the ones from which 
later lectures were delivered and because they are Kenrick’s own they contain a 
deeper and more detailed exposition of his rejection of the neo-classical in favour 
of the Romantic in literary criticism. 
 Kenrick wrote that when, for example, we brought together under the 
general name of epic the Iliad, the Odyssey, the Aeneid, Paradise Lost and 
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others, we did injustice to their authors by trying to apportion their merit by their 
approximation to some abstract definition of epic poetry. This mode of criticism 
tended to cherish a ‘narrow and exclusive spirit in literature’. 170 Standards of 
excellence were formed according to the judgement and taste of the great ages 
of literature. The same disposition created arbitrary definitions and exacted 
conventional standards, and the practice was to treat with contempt what did not 
come up to these standards, ‘whatever the poetical genius or mental power of 
the writer might be’. 171 None were more intolerant in this than the French, and it 
was not until Lessing in Germany raised the standard of revolt against this 
despotism, that ‘more just and comprehensive principles of literary criticism 
began to prevail’. 172
 Kenrick’s objective in this introduction to his lectures was to justify his 
intention to take a historical view of English literature. He believed that what he 
described as the ‘ordinary method’ of comparing author with author was ‘trivial 
and unsatisfactory’. 173 He hoped, he wrote, to raise criticism to a higher rank by 
connecting it to history, ‘to which it is capable of affording the most important 
illustration’. 174 It was through literature that we could find the best way of 
ascertaining what the men of that age and country really were.  The literature of a 
nation is the pure product of the intellect and reflects ‘a more distinct image of the 
mind than it is possible to derive from any other human work’. 175
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 Lastly, he wrote that the productions of the human mind, and especially of 
the imagination, cannot be analysed and classified like ‘material and organic 
bodies, in which, amidst their accidental varieties, certain generic and specific 
forms are invariably found’. 176 These productions of the mind ‘refuse to be bound 
by these rigid laws by which, in the outer world, Nature maintains the uniformity 
of her works’. 177 The mind requires that our classes and definitions should be 
varied and enlarged for it ‘has within itself a spring of action and a formative 
power, displaying itself from time to time in new creations’. 178  In this idea we 
may see reflected the tensions between eighteenth century neo-classicism and 
nineteenth century Romanticism.  The first, which Kenrick rejected, is closely 
related to the uniformity, the abstract rules and the classificatory methods of the 
natural philosophy of the eighteenth century. The second, which he accepted, 
emphasises the varied, individual, creative power of man in history, the forms of 
which are essentially human, concrete, historical and real. The first is governed 
by general laws, the meaning of the second is to be discovered in the ‘multiplicity 
of individual manifestations at different ages and in different cultures’. 179  
       The neo-Kantian philosopher Wilhelm Windelband wrote that in his view the 
decisive factor in nineteenth century philosophy was the question as to the 
degree of importance which the ‘natural-science conception of phenomena may 
claim for our view of the world and life as a whole’. 180 Like the Romantics, John 
Kenrick’s perception of the role of the uniform in nature was that it could not 
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reflect the uniqueness of human forms or imagination and creative genius, all of 
which require different criteria for their evaluation. Although there were other 
factors involved, It was to a certain extent his appreciation of the intensity of 
linguistic uniqueness which drew him towards the idea of the separate origins of 
the world’s languages. 181
 Kenrick’s understanding of the changes in language over time revealed an 
appreciation of linguistic development as a natural, non arbitrary process.  He 
was aware of the cohesive power of language on a society or a nation and its 
influence on the development of cultural uniqueness.  The development of 
language was best conceived as an organic process because it was 
interdependent with thought and consequently it constituted an integral element 
in the growth of a society or a nation. It served as a useful tool for the study of 
history, fundamentally because all features of linguistic life were ‘typical of every 
other form of the historical development  of humanity’.  182 In literature, he 
rejoiced in the individual creative spirit of man and rejected those abstract, 
universal conventions of taste which had governed eighteenth century criticism. 
In rejecting the evaluation of the productions of man within the framework of the 
natural world he revealed the consciousness of a gulf between the natural and 
the human world and a dualism in his thought. 183 Consequently, Kenrick’s whole 
approach to the study of language and literature reflected the historical and 
aesthetic consciousness of the nineteenth century. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 THE ORIGINS OF MAN, SCIENCE AND RELIGION  
 
 
 By the mid-nineteenth century many intellectuals had realised that the 
discoveries of the new sciences of geology, ethnology, physiology and philology 
had cast grave doubts upon the literal truth of the first eleven chapters of the 
book of Genesis. John Kenrick, as a Unitarian and a liberal theologian, was one 
of these who questioned the validity of the Old Testament narrative of mankind’s 
beginnings. The Unitarian frame of mind, which favoured a rational historical 
interpretation of the Bible, was sceptical of any belief in the idea of an 
instantaneous creation of the world and of mankind. In 1821, Thomas Belsham 
(1750-1829) had challenged the idea of the unity and inspiration of the book of 
Genesis. In his usual blunt manner he made the point that if the history of the 
creation in Genesis had been inspired, then all the discoveries of Kepler and 
Galileo, Copernicus and Newton, were false, and ‘all their demonstrations must 
be erroneous, which is impossible’. 1
 By mid century the beliefs of orthodoxy were facing even greater 
challenges.  However, the terms of engagement between Kenrick and his old 
enemy had fundamentally changed. These changes had come about in relation 
to the effectiveness of the role of history. While in one sense it had become 
irrelevant, in another its usefulness was greater than ever. History, which had 
                                                 
1 Thomas Belsham, Reflections Upon the History of the Creation in the Book of Genesis, A Discourse 
delivered at Warrington, August 19, 1821, And Published at the Request of the Ministers of the 
Congregation (London, 1821), p. 26. 
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previously been the chosen weapon of Unitarian biblical critics in their efforts to 
breach the bulwarks of the doctrines of orthodoxy, could not now be a force to be 
reckoned with on the question of the origins of mankind. In 1855 Kenrick wrote 
‘we must suppose a beginning somewhere; but we can never reach it by 
history’.2 The distant origins of man were beyond the scope of the historian and 
consequently the rational biblical critic should be aware instead of the researches 
of ‘sound physiologists’ to prove his case. 3 The role of history was now 
superfluous in relation to the discovery of the truth about the ‘single pair’ theory 
of the origins of humanity. 
Nevertheless, history did prove a crucial factor in the argument against 
any attempts to accommodate Genesis and nineteenth-century science.  For 
John Kenrick, mindful as ever of his role as Unitarian historical biblical critic, the 
narrative of the creation was part of the traditions and beliefs of an ancient 
people. This meant that the Old Testament story was founded upon the 
worldview of a primitive culture and therefore could not be reconciled in any way 
with the precepts of nineteenth century science for ‘the credibility of every 
historical writing must stand on its own ground’. 4 Accordingly, in the debate 
about Genesis, the Unitarian interpretation of the Hebrew writings as the myth of 
this people rose to new heights of importance in the arguments presented by 
Kenrick.  
                                                 
2 John Kenrick,’Bunsen’s Philosophy of History’, Review Article of Outlines of the Philosophy of 
Universal History, Applied to Language and Religion,  by Christian Charles Josias Bunsen, D.D., D.C.S., 
D. Ph, in two volumes, London 1854, CR,vol. 11, 1855, pp. 525-53, quoted at p. 530. Kenrick noted, rather 
sarcastically ‘We recommend this triple doctorate, in which “there are not three Doctors, but one Doctor,” 
to the advocates of the Trinity, as a substitute for some of their worn-out illustrations’, ibid., quoted at p. 
525. 
3 Ibid. 
4 John Kenrick, Primæval History  (London, 1846), p. xviii. 
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 These two factors regarding the role of history in Kenrick’s interpretation of 
Genesis in the mid-nineteenth century had very different implications. The failure 
of the historical approach with regard to the discovery of the origins of mankind 
led John Kenrick to a scientific and biological alternative form of inquiry which in 
turn linked his thought with the racial theories of the later nineteenth century. The 
Unitarian view of the historicity of the Hebrew writings, however, had crucial 
implications for Kenrick’s theological and philosophical ideas, which caused them 
to become detached from the fundamental tenets of the radical English 
Enlightenment.  
The first part of the following discussion will explore Kenrick’s ideas about 
the origins of man, some reasons for his conclusions and the implications of 
these. The second part of the chapter will show how, in a more general sense, 
his Unitarian historical biblical approach to the problem of Genesis in the face of 
the new scientific discoveries of the mid-nineteenth century helped to bring about 
major changes in his own philosophical and religious positions. 
Firstly, however, it is necessary to set out some of the background to one 
of the most potent arguments of the time, one which encompassed different 
views about the origins of the human race and its composition. In the pre-
Darwinian mid-nineteenth century the belief that mankind was made up of 
different races, or indeed even of several species, which had originated in 
various parts of the world represented a polygenetic idea of the nature of 
humanity. 5 This was a biological perspective on the question of human origins.  
                                                 
5 There are some variations on this word, and on its opposite, monogenist. For example, in Christine Bolt, 
Victorian Attitudes to Race (London, 1971) p. 9, monogenesis, polygenesis, and  monogenesist and 
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The polygenetic view contrasted fundamentally with a belief in the unity of 
mankind and that the origins of humanity had been a single pair.  This latter view 
was a monogenetic 6 concept of the origins of man and concurred with the 
orthodox Christian belief in Genesis and the unity of the human race. The 
majority view of the time, it also tended to support the Enlightenment idea that 
the reasons for the diversity of human racial characteristics were fundamentally 
climatic and environmental. 7   
 The intellectual background to the emergence of different attitudes to 
humanity’s beginnings at this time was a melting pot of diverse and contradictory 
theological and scientific ideas. The ramparts of religious orthodoxy were 
assailed on all sides by the conclusions of the new linguistic, geological, 
ethnological and physiological sciences. As we have seen, 8 many philologists 
tended to note the diversity rather than the common factors of language, and 
many, like Kenrick, believed in different origins for the major linguistic groups.  
The Scot Charles Lyell (1797-1875) had shown in 1830 in his Principles of 
Geology that the features of the earth’s surface had been formed by natural 
processes over a very long period of time. Lyell’s conclusions flew in the face of 
Christian orthodoxy, for still in vogue amongst many such theologians in the mid-
century decades was the belief that the world was only a few thousand years old.   
                                                                                                                                                 
polygenesist are used.  In Michael Biddiss (ed), Images of Race (Leicester, 1979), p. 17, the choice is 
monogenesis and polygenesis with monogenist and polygenist. I have decided to use the combination of 
monogenism and polygenism along with monogenist and polygenist. As adjectives I shall use monogenetic 
and polygenetic to save confusion with the nouns. See Hannah Franzisca Augstein (ed.), Race: The Origins 
of an Idea, 1760-1850 (Bristol, 1996), pp. ix-xxxiii. 
6 See note 2, above. 
7 Augstein (ed.), Race,  p. xiii. Biddiss, Images of Race, p.17.  
8 See chapter six, above. 
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 By the mid-nineteenth century, ethnology in Britain had been dominated 
for almost three decades by the work and ideas of the Bristol doctor James 
Cowles Prichard (1786-1848), who firmly believed that there was one single 
human species. 9   An Anglican who had been inspired by the Evangelical 
Revival in England, his objective was to prove that the story of Genesis was true 
and that all races of men had descended from one single pair. Of Quaker 
parentage, Prichard was a monogenist until the end of his life, but unlike most 
who agreed with him, Prichard initially criticised the theory that climate was 
responsible for human diversity. Rather, he thought that the reason for human 
physiological diversity had been sudden variations in the hereditary fabric. 10  
Prichard’s original argument was that all mankind had originally been black and 
that racial difference had been brought about by civilisation. Later, however, he 
modified this to admit that climate may after all have played some part in physical 
diversity. 11 Fundamentally, however, his ideas claimed that all mankind had 
emerged from a single source and he emphasised the common factors between 
races rather than the differences.  
 The opposing view of the polygenists, whose thoughts on different races 
had always been distasteful to orthodox Christianity, had found strength initially 
in the opinions of  the Scottish philosopher Lord Kames 
(1696-1782).  His ideas on the polygenetic origins of North American Indians had 
been discussed at lectures given by the Scottish Enlightenment thinker Dugald 
                                                 
9 Prichard’s Researches into the Physical History of Man (1813) was expanded into a five volume work 
(1836-47), and his Natural History of Man was published in 1843.   
10 Augstein (ed.), Race, p. xxiv. 
11 Ibid. 
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Stewart (1753-1828). Prichard had staunchly fought against such ideas all his 
life, but at the time of his death in 1848, just two years after John Kenrick had 
published his work An Essay on Primaeval History, it was clear that he had lost 
the battle.  The polygenists, although generally in the minority, were putting up a 
fierce polemic for their views. The environmental explanation for human diversity 
had been persistently challenged well before mid-century by thinkers who 
believed in the biological determinism of races and who tended to see humanity’s 
origins in polygenetic terms. 
        In the 1840s the Scottish anatomist Robert Knox (1791-1862), a polygenist, 
lectured in England on ‘The Races of Men’ and these talks were collated in a 
work of the same name published in 1850.  Knox’s view of race was a biological 
one.  According to him the theories of eighteenth-century naturalists were wrong. 
Races could not interbreed successfully and the mixed race was destined to 
weaken and die. 12  Knox wrote that ‘By intermarriage a new product arises which 
cannot stand its ground’ and consequently the descendents will fall back on the 
stronger race and all traces of the weaker race ‘must in time be obliterated’. 13 
Furthermore, Knox was pessimistic about theories of universal human progress 
because he insisted that no race could overcome the limits of its own hereditary 
characteristics. He criticised the historian T.B. Macaulay for his contention that 
the ‘pitiable state of the Irish is owing to their religion’. Religion had nothing to do 
with it, for the same Celtic characteristics embraced those of different religious 
persuasions and therefore, wrote Knox in his blunt style, ‘It is the race, then, and 
                                                 
12 Augstein(ed.), Race, p. xxxi. 
13 Robert Knox, The Races of Men : A Philosophical Enquiry into the Influence of Race over the Destinies 
of Nations (1852) no page given, quoted by Augstein (ed.), Race, p. 253.  
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not the religion’. 14  His theory on racial determinism had brought him to the 
opinion that ‘race is in human affairs everything ….in a word, civilisation – 
depends on it’. 15  
 Although Knox was on the fringes of nineteenth-century ethnological 
thinking, there is no doubt that by the 1840s ideas such as these had begun to 
emerge as an alternative to notions of the unity of mankind as descendents of a 
single pair.  The other branch of the new sciences which had given force to the 
arguments of the polygenists was phrenology. The three decades from 1820 to 
1850 saw intense interest in this study which had been pioneered by the 
Dutchman, Pieter Camper.  Phrenologists believed that there was a direct 
correlation between the contours of the skull and the mental faculties of mankind. 
The most influential, the Scot George Combe (1788-1858), 16 emphasised the 
relevance phrenology had to the study of race. 17
 The decade of the 1840s, during which Prichard revised his work 
Researches into the Physical History of Mankind  and  published a fourth edition 
18 saw the beginnings of a polarisation of views about the origins of mankind and 
the equality, or otherwise, of different races. It was at this time that the 
Ethnological Society, which had maintained for decades its Prichardian views 
                                                 
14 Ibid., pp. 242-243. 
15 Robert Knox, The Races of Men: A Fragment (1850), no page given, quoted by Biddiss (ed.) Images of 
Race, p. 12. 
16 Biddiss, Images of Race, p. 15. 
17 Ibid. Combe’s major works on the subject were Essays on Phrenology (1819) and The Constitution of 
Man (1828). See David de Guistino, Conquest of Mind : Phrenology and Victorian Social Thought 
(London, 1975). This work gives a fascinating and comprehensive account of the study of ‘head reading’ in 
the early decades of the nineteenth century. Phrenology, it was believed, provided important clues to many 
human psychological and racial characteristics. 
18 George W. Stocking, Jr., Victorian Anthropology ( New York, 1987), p. 63. See also Bolt, Victorian 
Attitudes, pp. 4 -7. 
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about the unity of humanity and the ‘single pair’ theory of human origins, started 
to go into decline. The newer conclusions about the nature of man began to build 
foundations for the racial theories of the later nineteenth century.  
 In 1856 a young writer on the subject of human speech named James 
Hunt joined the society and six years later formed the rival Anthropological 
Society of London, which was much more generally inclined to the polygenist and 
racialist ideas of its founder. Hunt’s view was that the older ethnology, which he 
saw as merely ‘the history or science of races’, 19 had been overtaken by 
anthropology, which he described as the ‘science of the whole nature of man’. 20 
This new science would transcend the Prichardian ethnological method which, 
with the Bible in mind, had tried to iron out the differences between the races.  
From the mid-1850s Hunt denied the uniformity of mankind, either in origins or 
development.  His views, which he himself declared had been ‘imbibed from the 
late Dr Knox’, 21 were grounded in the ideas of racial inequalities and differences. 
Indeed some time later, in 1866, Hunt argued that while Britain had an empire 
she had to take account of these differences because of the impossibility of 
applying ‘the civilisation and laws of one race to another race of man essentially 
distinct’. 22 The gradual decline of the older society and the rise of the new 
represented a parting of the ways between a view of mankind’s origins founded 
upon religious belief, and one which had an approach to the questions of the 
                                                 
19 James Hunt, quoted by  Stocking, (no page given) Victorian Anthropology, p. 248. For a brief account of 
the formation of the Anthropological Society of London see Stocking, pp. 246-248. 
20 Hunt quoted in ibid., p. 247. 
21 Ibid.,  
22 James Hunt, Third Annual Address, Journal of the Anthropological Society of London, vol. 4, 1866, p. 
lxxviii, quoted by Bolt, Victorian Attitudes, p. 4. 
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birth and development of humanity which was centred upon the findings of the 
linguistic, anthropological, physiological and geological sciences.   
 The conclusions of these new sciences which more often than not clashed 
with the beliefs of orthodox Christianity, meant that by the mid- nineteenth 
century the ethnological arguments had entered a cul-de-sac. Based upon the 
perceived infallibility of the Hebrew manuscripts, and despite the findings of 
Charles Lyell, most orthodox Christians believed that the world was only about 
six thousand years old.  This short chronological span supported a historical 
argument for monogenism, for the shorter the timescale the easier it would be to 
trace peoples back to their common original source. The longer the estimated 
period of man on earth, the harder that task would be, for the single pair and their 
origins would be lost in the mists of the very ancient past. 
Paradoxically, however, the idea of a short chronology seriously 
undermined any biological or scientific arguments in favour of monogenism itself, 
for the shorter man’s time on earth the more difficult it was to imagine how such 
diversity in the physical and mental characteristics of races had come about. 
Thus the mainstream Enlightenment argument in favour of the unity of man, 
which generally concurred with the beliefs of orthodox Christianity and which held 
that physical differences between peoples had been determined by climate, 
environment and circumstances, was seriously weakened by the biblical 
chronology which shortened the period of man’s existence on earth.  Indeed, in 
the light of the new scientific inquiries, it was clear that two core beliefs of 
orthodox Christianity, the first in the unity of mankind, the second in the infallibility 
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of the ancient scriptures which had suggested that mankind had only existed on 
earth for six thousand years, were in apparent contradiction.  
On thing was certain, however. There was no historical evidence of the 
diffusion of the human species from a single source, and although it was true that 
popular orthodox beliefs about the origins of mankind from a single pair may be 
found in many traditions, this proved nothing.  The idea of a single pair was so 
obvious an answer to the question of origins that this argument carried very little 
real weight. To reverse the process by which people multiplied and to trace them 
back to the ‘simplest combination out of which increase can arise’ was no proof 
of a real reminiscence of a fact. 23 Such legends were so purely local and so 
intimately connected with the manners, production and language of the region in 
which they were found that they led one to the conclusion that they had been 
independently formed. Their resemblance on the one point of supposing a ‘single 
pair the origin of the whole race’ was to be explained by the above cause. 24 The 
historical argument, therefore, was ineffective in proving the ‘single pair’ theory 
either true or false.   
 As there could never be any historical proofs for any aspect of the diverse 
arguments, the biological approach became the more rational way of dealing with 
the problem. It became clear that this was the path chosen by Kenrick. In an 
article in which he discussed the work of the Swiss geologist and naturalist Louis 
Agassiz (1807-1873), Kenrick wrote that this ‘distinguished philosopher’ had 
called into question the common belief of the origin of the human race from a 
                                                 
23 Kenrick, Primæval History, p. 14. 
24 Ibid., pp. 14-15. 
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single pair. Agassiz had maintained the opinion ‘very general we imagine among 
physiologists…that many varieties, and many pairs of each variety, of the human 
species, were placed on different part of the earth by the Creator’. 25 Such an 
opinion, Kenrick observed, struck ‘at the very foundations of orthodox theology’. 
26 The tone of this passage gave more than a hint that Kenrick warmed to this 
idea. Not only would he have been in favour of such a theory because of its 
inevitable impact upon orthodox belief, but also because it appeared to be the 
opinion of many scientists that this was a much more rational and likely  scenario 
than the idea of a single pair as ancestors of the entire human race. 
 It was within this framework of conflicting opinions in the mid-nineteenth 
century that the biological ideas of the polygenists began to gain ground. There 
were several characteristics to be found in a truly polygenetic thinker.  Because 
the major races of mankind displayed so many linguistic and physiological 
differences, the polygenist, far from supporting the ‘single pair’ theory, viewed 
mankind as being composed of different species who could not interbreed with 
sufficient success to ensure long-term fertility. The diversity of humankind caused  
polygenists to reject the Enlightenment-based climate theory and rather to insist 
that men’s physiological differences were caused by the fact they originated as 
diverse species in different places. The polygenist emphasised the differences, 
discrepancies and inequalities between races, an approach to the subject which 
was compatible with the notion of the ‘stability’ of races. This was the idea that a 
                                                 
25 John  Kenrick, ‘Religion and Geology’, Review Article of The Religion of Geology and its Connected 
Sciences, By Edward Hitchcock, President of Amherst College, and Professor of Natural Theology and 
Geology (Boston, 1851), PR,vol. 7, 1851, p. 466. 
26 Ibid. 
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race, once established, changed little over time. This view would also accord with 
the polygenist theory of racial determinism, the belief that a race was restricted 
within the limits of its own hereditary characteristics, and could never overcome 
them. 27
 How close did John Kenrick’s ideas come to polygenism?  
On the question of species it would appear he favoured a compromise between 
polygenetic and monogenetic views.  His ideas on the subject of racial 
differences in general only ever appeared in detail in his work Primæval History, 
published in 1846, and in a few articles which appeared in the early 1850s. 
Before that he mentioned virtually nothing on the topic.  However, in an early 
essay, written in 1808, 28 he wrote in an aesthetic context of the differences 
between the features of the European and Negro females. 29 It was not until 
twenty-eight years later, in 1836, that he mentioned the topic again, this time in a 
sermon preached before the Western Unitarian Society in Bristol. 30 His views on 
the nature of mankind reflected some ideas he presented later on the subject of 
the definition of species. Appropriately for a sermon, his emphasis first and 
foremost was on the ‘great facts which are the everlasting basis of the Gospel, as 
a revealed religion’ and the ‘universal brotherhood of the human race’. 31  
                                                 
27 See Biddiss, Images of Race,  p. 17. 
28 John Kenrick, ‘Illustrations of the Origin of the Passions from the Doctrine of the Association of Ideas’, 
29 December, 1808, DWL, Kenrick Papers, 24.107.50 (d). 
29 Ibid., pp. 4 -5. 
30 John Kenrick, The Authority of Jesus, as a divinely inspired Teacher, sufficient for the Evidence and 
Efficacy of Christianity, A Sermon  Preached Before the Western Unitarian Society at Lewin’s Mead 
Meeting, Bristol, August 18, 1836 (Bristol, 1836). 
31 Ibid., pp. 23-24. 
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          He told his audience that such facts were admitted alike by men who may 
seem ‘wide as the poles asunder’. 32 At first men may not seem to have anything 
in common, but on closer inspection we recognised their characteristics as those 
of the varied ‘tribes of men’, who have different languages, stature and 
complexion. However, the same framework of the body, vital organs, intellectual 
powers and affections were ‘possessed by all’. 33  The first impulse of the 
savage, he wrote, was to treat the man of a different nation or colour ‘as if he 
were of a different species; but as he knows him better, his heart expands 
towards him’. 34 Clearly, Kenrick’s concept of the races of men is that although 
there were great differences between them, they were all basically formed in the 
same way and were consequently of the same species. 
 This is the same general idea as he later suggested in his outline of the  
argument on the meaning of species in  Primæval History, published in 1846, 
when he criticised the orthodox Christian idea of mankind’s descent from a single 
pair. In his summary of the argument of the ‘single pair’ theory, he wrote that the 
‘Variety of form and colour which the human race now exhibit’ begs the question 
as to whether humankind was composed of different races of separate origins or 
was descended from one primary form from which they have deviated ‘under the 
influence of soil, climate, food, and the other circumstances by which the 
condition of men is diversified’. 35 He continued ‘There is one species of man, if 
                                                 
32 Ibid., p. 23. 
33 Ibid., pp. 23-24. 
34 Ibid., p. 24. 
35 Kenrick, Primæval History, p.12. 
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we take the word in its popular sense’. 36 This meant an aggregate of qualities 
transmissible by descent, and so invariably found together, ‘that where we 
perceive the existence of one we infer the rest without disappointment or 
uncertainty’. 37
 In his notes Kenrick cites two other definitions of the term species, one by  
the French zoologist Georges Cuvier (1769-1832) for whom it meant all who 
were descended from a ‘common parentage’ and the other from the monogenist 
Prichard, who envisaged it as distinctness of race ‘evinced by the constant 
transmission of some characteristic peculiarity or organisation’. 38  It was 
perfectly understandable, Kenrick wrote, that the print of human footsteps in the 
sand would lead an observer to conclude that these were beings of the same 
physical, intellectual and moral sympathies as himself. It would also appear that 
all these qualities are found together, differing only in degree. Furthermore, in 
every part of the world, notwithstanding their differences, human beings of 
different colours and types may successfully multiply.  
 It was also argued, Kenrick wrote, that according to the analogy of nature, 
individuals of the same species, however numerous or widely diffused, appear to 
originate from one stock rather than many. From this it was believed that the 
human race had its origin in a single pair, all the varieties having been 
subsequently introduced. 39 This analogy, however, has no foundation in fact, for 
                                                 
36 Ibid., p.13. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., note 1. 
39 Ibid., pp. 13-14. 
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‘we have no historical proof of such a division of species from a single centre’. 40 
In other words, it does seem the case that there is one species of man, and 
different varieties, but there is no way of knowing if all human beings were 
descended from a single pair because we cannot prove it historically. 
 His clearest statement on species as unitary with variations came later, in 
1855. He wrote that    
  Surely, in the view of common sense, creatures of 
  the same form, organs and structure, subject to the same 
  physiological and pathological laws, possessing the same 
  faculties of reason and conscience, freely uniting with each  
  other and becoming parents of a self-perpetuating race, must  
  be reckoned to belong to the same species, even though blue, 
  pink and green should be added to the varieties of colour 
  which already prevail among them. 41
This shows that he believed all men, although varied, to be fundamentally of the 
same species and having the same general physical characteristics, and 
furthermore, they were therefore able to interbreed successfully.    
The fact that there were many different varieties of mankind was not at 
issue, neither was the contention that they all belonged to the one common 
fundamental species. The crucial questions were : had they all come from the 
same single source with variations occurring later, and if so, how did this come 
about ; or had these different races of man begun their existence in separate 
                                                 
40 Ibid., p. 14. 
41 Kenrick, ‘Bunsen’s Philosophy of History’, p. 529. 
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parts of the world? On the question of the climate theory as an overall 
explanation, Kenrick noted that unless there was intermarriage, there was no 
tendency among white races living in climates where the population was black to 
approach the colour of the natives.  The ‘trifling infuscation’ produced by 
exposure to the sun was confined to individuals and the ‘children are born and 
grow up as fair as in temperate climates’. 42 Neither was there any evidence that 
the Negro race living in North America ever approached the colour of whites, 
although other peculiarities are said to wear out in those ‘who are the most 
perfectly domesticated’. 43   
           Although it was impossible to discern from the effects of heat the causes 
of diversity in humankind, there was nevertheless a general conformity between 
colour and climate. Kenrick wrote that the peculiarities of the Negro were not 
always found in complete combination, for it was certainly true that the peoples of 
the deepest black were to be discovered in the equatorial and tropical regions of 
the old world, while ‘tawney and fair-complexioned races appear successively, as 
we ascend to higher latitudes.’ 44 The apparent exceptions to this generalisation, 
he explained were due to the ‘different elevations of tracts which lie beneath the 
                                                 
42 Ibid., p. 18 
43  On this point Kenrick quotes Samuel Stanhope Smith, an American churchman and Princeton academic. 
Stanhope Smith’s work, An Essay on the Causes of Complexion and Figure in the Human Species, was 
originally an oration given to the American Philosophical Society on 27 February 1787. A greatly 
expanded text was published in 1810. The essay followed the arguments of the monogenists, that 
humankind had emerged from one source and that different varieties of race and complexion had been 
caused by climate and other factors such as social conditions. It was written to counter the arguments of the 
polygenist Lord Kames whose idea was that God had created different races of men so that they could 
flourish in different climatic environments. This argument is contained in Henry Home, Lord Kames, 
Sketches of the History of Man, 4 vols (Glasgow, 1802). This early controversy set the scene for the 
arguments which developed between monogenists and polygenists as the century progressed.  Kames’ 
theories were attacked by some because they implicitly denied the possibility of the perfectibility of 
mankind due to the fact that the characteristics of various races would be determined and bound by their 
own climates. 
44 Kenrick, Primæval History, p. 19. 
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same parallels’. 45 He concluded that we might suppose that these races had a 
separate stock, and, as their shades and colours were endless, the number of 
these stocks would be infinite. Alternatively, it was not entirely wrong to suppose 
that climate might have in some way produced these diversities, but 
  we may safely say, that if all the varieties which we see  
  have been superinduced upon a common stock, a very long 
  period must be allowed to accomplish this….It is only, 
  therefore, by a very great enlargement of the common  
  chronology, that we can avoid the conclusion of an  
  original diversity of race. 46
      Thus although Kenrick did not actually deny the possibility of mankind having 
been descended from one pair or that climate could have produced such 
amazing diversity in mankind, nothing could be proved by history. Biology and 
time remained as the only two factors around which any speculation might be 
formed. Consequently if we were to hold to the Hebrew chronology of a few 
thousand years, then the only conclusion was that the different varieties of 
mankind originated separately in different parts of the world.  The idea of 
separate origins for the different varieties of mankind conformed in many 
respects to his general frame of mind.  He believed that myths had separate local 
origins 47 and also that the main groups of human languages had originated in 
separate locations. 48 As a Unitarian biblical critic he had always been directed 
                                                 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid., pp. 19-20. 
47 See chapter five, above. 
48 See chapter six, above. 
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towards the search for the origin of truth. Consequently his was a mind which 
sought the true beginnings and the sources of things, untainted by any abstract 
notions, which in this case were founded upon orthodox belief in the single pair 
theory. 
        His views on the origins of races received some keen attention in a 
contemporary journal. 49 The reviewer saw Kenrick’s comments on the separate 
origins of man as in opposition to writers such as Prichard, Nicholas Wiseman 
(1802-1865), who became Roman Catholic Archbishop of Westminster in 1850, 
and Johann Blumenbach (1752-1840), the German anthropologist whose 
lectures Kenrick had attended during his studies in Göttingen in 1819-1820 and 
with whom he had occasionally socialised. 50 Blumenbach, like the others, 
believed in the descent of man from a single pair and in human unity. He argued 
that all the major races had been descended from a single Caucasian type which 
had subsequently ‘degenerated’ under the influence of climate. 51  
       Nicholas Wiseman was one of a group of clerical writers who included the 
Anglican theologians John Bird Sumner (1780-1862), Richard Whately (1787-
1863) and the geologist Adam Sedgwick (1785-1873), all of whom, apart from 
Sumner, went on record to oppose Darwin’s Origin of Species. These writers all 
assumed the orthodox biblical tradition in their anthropological speculations 
which regarded as fundamental a belief in man’s descent from one pair who had 
                                                 
49 B. Fellowes, ‘An Essay on Primaeval History’, Review Article,PR, vol. 2, 1846, pp. 243-250. 
50 Notes of the Early Part of the Life of the Rev. John Kenrick, written by him for his Wife in 1870-1872, 
copied by his niece Elizabeth Reid in 1878, UCL, Sharpe Papers 191, pp. 57-59.  
51 Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, The Anthropological Treatises of Johann Friedrich Blumenbach  (Boston, 
1978). This edition is a reprint of the 1865 edition and contains also The Inaugural Dissertation of John 
Hunter M.D. on the Varieties of Man. Blumenbach’s work was translated by Thomas Bendyshe. See pp. 
205-276 on the degeneration of the human types. 
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been formed in the act of creation, the unity of man, his recent appearance on 
earth and the ‘degeneration’ of non-Christian peoples. 52 Clearly, Kenrick’s ideas 
were recognised at the time to have been in opposition to the received wisdom 
on the single pair theory. 
 Kenrick’s thoughts on the origins of the races of man as being separate 
were supported by his views on the inherent stability of racial types and the great 
differences between them. In relation to the permanent features of races Kenrick 
presents one of the most common arguments used by supporters of the 
polygenetic view.  Where no intermixture of races had taken place, he wrote, the 
differences between them are ‘no less marked than they were three thousand 
years ago’. 53 He observed that  
  The Negro, with all his peculiarities of form, 
  colour and hair, appears just the same in the  
  paintings of the age of Thothmes iii, fifteen centuries 
  before the Christian era, as he is seen now in the  
  interior of Africa. 54
Clearly then, if we assumed a single origin for humanity, how is it possible that 
such radical changes as are manifested in the Negro race could have taken 
place over time if three thousand years ago his form and colour were exactly the 
same as they are now? It is undeniable, wrote Kenrick, that the idea of 
adaptation to climate is to be taken into account with regard to the Negro races. 
However, how much influence may we assign in respect of racial differences to 
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climate, soil, food and modes of life in general to bring about the differences in 
the physical, intellectual and moral peculiarities of the different races of men? We 
have no means of comparing the same race of people under altered 
circumstances and, even if we did, we have no way of assessing which complex 
causes have brought about such alterations. On the question of racial changes 
over time he adopted an essentially polygenetic argument when he wrote that 
  the survey of those races whose successive  
  conditions we can ascertain, presents to us rather 
  the proofs of the tenacity with which nature adheres 
  to her established forms, than the flexibility with  
  which she varies them 55
In other words, the mental and physical attributes of a particular race are more 
likely to remain static over time than to alter under the influence of environment 
or circumstance.  This view of the stability of races was, for example, in direct 
contrast to the opinion of Robert Chambers, the amateur Scottish geologist who 
published anonymously his Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation in 1844. 56 
Chambers’ view was that in the space of a few generations a tribe or nation could 
be either advanced or degraded very rapidly by the influence of the conditions 
under which it lived. Chambers wrote that ‘the style of living is ascertained to 
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have a powerful effect in modifying the human figure in the course of 
generations, and this even in its osseous structure’. 57  
 For Kenrick, however, races where intermarriage was not a factor 
remained very much the same in their physiological make-up over time, and the 
differences between them were great.  It was the differences rather than any 
common factors which interested him and he wrote that the division of the 
inhabitants of the ancient world into the Caucasian, the Calmuck and the 
Ethiopian varieties ‘has the advantage of being founded on obvious differences’. 
58 These divisions were ‘well adapted to history’ 59 and therefore a great deal 
more convincing than the theory that mankind had been descended from a single 
pair.  
        The differences between races were distinctive. The Caucasian, wrote 
Kenrick, had an oval skull and a perpendicular facial angle, and in addition had a 
stature and frame ‘fitter to give the highest combination of strength and agility’. 60  
To this race belonged all the nations most remarkable in ancient history, from the 
Indians and Persians to the Assyrians, the Greeks, the Romans and the 
inhabitants of modern Europe. The Mongolian, or Calmuck, variety was 
characterised by a broad face, produced by ‘the great lateral extension of the 
bony arch which unites the cheek bone to the skull’, giving to the countenance 
something of a lozenge shape. 61 The Finns in Europe, the nomadic nations of 
Northern and Central Asia, the Japanese and the Chinese belong to this type. He 
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wrote also that those of China and Japan may be regarded as the most perfect 
specimens of this race, while in the Eskimos and the Finns its characteristics are 
the ‘most repulsive, and accompany the lowest state of intellect and manners’. 62 
Mongolian civilisation was generally unknown to ancient writers and only came 
into their view when the Huns effected ‘the most remarkable revolution which the 
world has undergone’, and overthrew the Roman Empire and settled in Western 
Europe. 63
 In his short analysis of the characteristics of the Mongolian races, Kenrick 
suggested that China and Japan, who have the best examples of this type,  
exhibit a social state not inferior to that of ancient Egypt and India.  In this brief 
sentence there is the hint of the idea of the comparative method of historical 
understanding. This was the notion presented by some historians of the Scottish 
Enlightenment, that in the absence of concrete historical evidence, one could 
bring the distant past to life by comparing it with primitive peoples who lived in 
the present.  Consequently the historian could, by conjecture, recreate the times 
of ancient peoples who had left no record of their own lives and cultures. 64
 Clearly, however, despite his comparison between contemporary China 
and Japan and the two ancient nations of Egypt and India, there is little indication 
that Kenrick had much enthusiasm for this particular  historical method. In his 
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assessment of the third of the world’s racial types, the Ethiopic, Kenrick wrote of 
the equatorial African that he had 
  the blackest colour, the most woolly hair, the  
  lowest facial angle, the smallest average quantity 
  of brain and medulla oblongata, and a frame of  
  inferior agility and strength. Where this variety reaches  
  its extreme point of deviation, as in the Negro of the 
  countries south of the Great Desert, it seems to be  
  accompanied with a degeneracy of the intellectual powers, 
  which has condemned this race to be, in all historic times, 
  the slaves of Europeans and Asiatics. 65
This opinion of the sub-Saharan African was in no sense unique, being shared by 
many Victorians. Indeed such comments reflected much of the opinions of Africa 
and the Africans who were in this period thought by many anthropologists to be 
inferior both physically and mentally to the lighter skinned races, particularly 
Europeans. Despite the protestations of the monogenist J.C. Prichard, within the 
broader social context it was more often than not accepted that the European 
idea of civilisation was far superior to that of primitive peoples such as Africans, 
who were somehow ‘separate’ from northern races. 66  
However, Kenrick’s comments reveal a disinclination on his part to accept 
the fundamental requirement of the comparative historian. That was a belief in a 
concept of human development as a predictable, unilinear process whereby it 
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was assumed that all cultures would finally reach the same level of achievement 
and civilisation. This idea of the uniformity of human progress tended to be an 
Enlightenment notion which was also linked to the orthodox Christian belief in the 
unity of humanity and its source in a single pair. John Kenrick, however, having 
decided that in biological terms it was more likely that the races of man had 
separate origins, would find it easier to speculate that not all human varieties 
would then proceed towards the same form and degree of civilisation. 
 From his writings on Africa it is possible to detect in Kenrick’s thought a 
clear indication of the idea of racial determinism, which was an important  trait of 
polygenetic thought. Although the state of Africa south of the Sahara was dealt 
with only briefly in Primæval History, Kenrick enlarged upon the topic in an essay 
entitled ‘Causes Which Have Retarded the Civilisation of Africa’, probably written 
in the 1840s. 67 There are three important factors in the essay which are worth 
consideration. The first is Kenrick’s opinion that the African race was inferior. The 
second is that the reasons for this inferiority were in some respects innate to that 
race rather than entirely due to climate and environment. The third is that due to 
this inferiority the African race would therefore not necessarily develop along the 
same path as that trodden by the European. 
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 Kenrick defined civilisation as ‘the improved state of the arts of life’. 68 
Nearest to this condition were the northern regions of Africa and those 
civilisations in Tunis, Tripoli, Algeria and Morocco which were brought from Asia 
in the seventh century after Christ. These regions, like the southern extremity of 
the continent, had been colonised in some parts by Europeans. Considering 
some areas of the vast continent on a comparative basis Kenrick noted that the 
‘kingdom of Abyssinia, though it would have been reckoned barbarous for 
Europe, is civilised for Africa’. 69 However, from there to the Cape, all down the 
Western side of Africa ‘there is not a single tribe that has made any considerable 
progress in the arts of life.’ 70 The African, wrote Kenrick, had no system of 
agriculture, made no clothing or metals with which to manufacture tools. 
Medicine consisted of only the simplest remedies. Law, legislation and 
jurisprudence had never advanced beyond the earliest forms of the social union. 
Force ruled, everywhere life and property were insecure and the whole of society 
was characterised by instability and violent change. 
 ‘Nowhere’, he wrote, do we find a native tribe that has devised itself an 
alphabet, or even advanced to pictorial writing’, 71 and consequently the past, 
beyond the narrow limits of memory, was lost. Science was unknown, and the 
idea of a law of nature, an invariable sequence of cause and effect, had never 
entered the mind of the native African for whom ‘the wildest superstition takes the 
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place of philosophy’. 72 As to languages, they were imperfect, scant in vocabulary 
and poorly developed in terms of forms and inflections. The productions of the 
arts of sculpture and music were ‘coarse and grotesque’. 73
 Consequently, he wrote, we were justified in asserting that where African 
tribes had not received an infusion of European civilisation they remained in a 
state of barbarism.  This had always been the case, for there were no traces of a 
past civilisation in Africa. In the Egyptian tomb paintings of 4,000 years ago the 
black Africans carry only the simplest offerings of their soil, the log of ebony and 
the elephant’s tusk. They lead animals and carry gold dust, the ostrich’s egg or 
feathers ‘but never  anything which could warrant the supposition that 
manufacturing skills and industry were known among them’. 74  Kenrick pointed 
out that even at this period in history the black races of the interior of Africa were 
the victims of the cruelty of their neighbours who often reduced to slavery people 
whose features and other characteristics of race ‘are precisely those which mark 
them to the present day’. 75
 For an effect so general and enduring there must be lasting causes and it 
was clear, he wrote, that it must be attributed to an inferiority of race in the native 
population of Africa. If one extended this inferiority to the African intellectual 
faculties, it would explain why this race has been prevented in making the same 
advances in art, literature and other aspects of civilisation which have been made 
in different ages by China, India, Egypt and Greece. Kenrick wrote that the fact of 
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inferiority here was not to be denied and that when from motives of humanity we 
maintained the absolute equality of the Negro race with the nations mentioned 
‘we do their cause an injury’. 76  
 The native African, he pointed out, was characterised by all those outward 
peculiarities which the physiognomist and physiologist have identified as marks 
of inferior intellectual capacity.  The proportion of brain was the smallest and the 
indications of the predominance of sensual over intellectual and moral quality the 
most marked. It would be a great error to speak of all the black nations as if they 
stood upon the same ground with regard to their intellectual faculties. Although 
race differs from race among them, there is still a general character and an 
average number of qualities belonging to each one and ‘this average is lower in 
the African than in other races, and lowest in those which deviate from the 
European type’.77 Kenrick noted that Prichard himself, who had quoted the 
Heidelberg physiologist Friedrich Tiedemann as being in favour of the opinion 
that in relation to the size of the brain the European had no advantage over the 
African, nevertheless conceded that others had different views.   Those who 
disagreed were, for example, Cuvier, Samuel von Sömmering, Peter Camper 
and the controversial London surgeon and physiologist William Lawrence (1783-
1867). 78 These men, wrote Kenrick, were ‘names which may make us pause in 
adopting Tiedemann’s decision’. 79  
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 The idea that some entire races were intellectually inferior to the Anglo 
Saxon and would never catch up with the advances of the white races was 
closely related to the ‘science’ of phrenologists like von Sömmering and Camper. 
They studied cranial structures in order to identify and analyse psychological and 
intellectual characteristics. This mode of thought suggested, of course, that there 
were limits on the idea of the uniform progress of mankind, for in the mind of the 
phrenologist and the mid-Victorian racialist some men were more rational than 
others. 80
 The intellectual inferiority of the African was a major factor in the failure of 
the continent to become civilised, but external factors also had played their part. 
Kenrick pointed out that the most striking characteristic of the African continent 
was its isolation from the rest of the world. There were no major gulfs, only a long 
coastal barrier. Unlike Asia, with its networks of gulfs, inlets and navigable rivers, 
Africa showed a ‘singular monotony of outline’. 81 Kenrick cited the opinions of 
the German geographer Carol Ritter (1779-1859), whom he described as ‘the 
first who has treated fully and philosophically of the physical geography in 
connexion with the history of man’, and whom, he added, laid great stress on the 
intermixture of sea and land by deep bays as an important cause of intercourse 
between nations and the promotion of civilisation. 82 In addition to its 
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geographical disadvantages, the climate of equatorial Africa was ‘unfriendly to 
the development of the physical and intellectual qualities of the human species’. 
83 Thus intellectual inferiority, geographical position and climate were all factors 
which had retarded the development of the African race. 
 Kenrick was aware that there were two different sets of causes which 
could have brought about the retardation of the African and these were directly 
linked to one’s view of the origins and development of mankind.  If we believed in 
a single source as the origins of man we would then agree that a ‘long 
succession of outward influences have produced the peculiarities of the African 
race, [and] this is a presumption that they are not necessarily permanent’. 84  
However, he conceded that even if these peculiarities were ‘original’, by which he 
meant innate to that race because it had come into being as a separate variety of 
mankind, they might still be reversed by the ‘endless modifications’ of 
intermixture with other races. 85 Consequently, his prognosis with regard to the 
African condition was not entirely hopeless, for, he wrote ‘I by no means assume 
that the Africans are a race incapable of improvement’. 86 On the contrary, he 
believed that by pointing out the causes which had retarded their civilisation, and 
discriminating between those which were temporary, and those permanent, he 
could encourage hope of the future regeneration of the race. 87
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 The suggestion that there were these two sets of factors related to 
the situation of the African races was a significant point in his argument. It is 
clear that Kenrick believed that there were not only climatic and geographical 
influences affecting Africa’s development, but that there were innate failings in 
the race also which retarded its development. Kenrick believed that Africa would 
develop along different lines from European civilisation. He rejected Thomas 
Arnold’s well known opinion that the Negro race at some point in the future would 
be delivered from degradation and would be raised to the same level as other 
races. Kenrick failed to see how this was possible without some degeneration of 
other races, which was very unlikely. He wrote of Africa 
 I am content to hope that she is destined to arise 
at length and join in the march of improvement, 
though she may have no chance of outstripping 
those who are already so [advanced]. 88
Kenrick’s own view, however, was that European civilisation was not necessarily 
the norm, to the exclusion of all other forms of development. We were, he wrote, 
apt to identify ‘civilisation’ with our own complex system and to condemn people 
as barbarous ‘who have not steam engines and railways, newspapers or electric 
telegraphs’. 89 After all, he wrote, manufactures had attained perfection before 
steam, and literature existed in a perfect form before the invention of printing. 
 Kenrick did not believe that Africa was destined to remain as it was. He 
was confident that it would become more agriculturally productive, that its 
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customs and laws would improve, and that its barbarous superstitions would be 
changed for a purer form of religion. However, he wrote ‘It is … neither to be 
expected nor desired that Africa should in the progress of its improvement be 
strictly confirmed to the European model’.90  Rather It would seem that Africa 
would take a path towards a form of civilisation which would be different from that 
of more advanced nations and consequently there is an element in his thought 
which favours the idea of racial determinism. 
            This notion in Kenrick’s thought regarding the factors, innate and 
external, which influenced human character and development was in some 
respects similar to that of the Scottish philosopher Dugald Stewart (1753-1828), 
whose ideas Kenrick would have encountered at Glasgow College.  Stewart 
believed that in human development the innate and active powers of men and 
the mechanisms of the laws of association complemented one another. He 
thought that both innate principles and external circumstances were responsible 
for the creation of character, attitudes, taste and moral sensibilities. Stewart 
wrote that the human will, for example, exercised its influence over the train of 
thoughts extensively, and the ‘different degrees in which it is possessed by 
different individuals, constitute some of the most striking inequalities among men, 
in point of intellectual capacity’.91
 Consequently, during his time at Glasgow College from 1807 to 1810 
Kenrick came across ideas about the function of the associationist principles very 
different from Priestley’s absolutist interpretation of them. For Priestley 
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associationism suggested the mechanical function of an autonomous train of 
thought leading inexorably from the perceptions of sense to the coalescence of a 
general universal moral law.  In the Scottish philosophy, by contrast, the trains of 
thought were controlled to a great extent by the innate qualities of the individual.  
Similarly, Kenrick’s thought suggests an approach which recognises both innate 
and external causes for the nature and extent of the development of human 
races over time.     
Kenrick’s general perspective on the question of the races of men pointed 
towards the idea of separate origins and the tendency in his analyses was to 
pinpoint differences between races rather than to emphasise any common 
factors. His preference also was for the idea that racial characteristics remained 
stable over time. The fact that he also recognised an innate element in races 
revealed a tendency towards the concept of racial determinism.  In his view, it 
would appear that the nature and degree of development of each racial type 
were determined not only from without, but also from within, and this reflected the 
idea that races had their inherited characteristics. 
 Kenrick was not a polygenist in the fullest sense. He saw all humanity as 
fundamentally belonging to the same species and saw no reason why all could 
not interbreed successfully. This idea of a single species concurred with a belief 
that ‘with all these causes of variety, there is a remarkable amount of 
correspondence arising from the uniformity of human nature’. 92 This would 
suggest that in his thoughts on the diversity of mankind he was a transitional 
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figure. However the biblical chronology precluded any reliance on the climate 
theory to explain the diversities of humankind and consequently it seemed to him 
far more likely that the major races had come into being in separate locations on 
earth. In the absence of interbreeding, races remained stable in their 
characteristics. Indeed he indicates that the only way in which the ‘permanent’ 
failings of Africans may be removed is through intermixtures with other races. 
This emphasises his views that at least in part, the retardation of the African 
races is due to innate factors, which in turn reveals a tendency in Kenrick to 
agree with a form of racial determinism.  
         Consequently, Kenrick’s thought supported a quasi-polygenetic perspective 
on the varieties of humanity which undermined ideas about the uniformity of the 
progress of the human race. His ideas on the subject had much greater affinity 
with racial theories of the later nineteenth century. In this context one particular 
factor is significant, and that is the idea that without any intermixtures with other 
races, the characteristics of a race remain stable.  Kenrick’s treatment of this 
theme was an optimistic one, for he believed that it would be interbreeding with 
other races which would alter favourably the ‘permanent’ factors which held back 
the African race in its advance towards civilisation. Conversely, the view taken by 
Joseph-Arthur, Comte de Gobineau (1816-1882), who wrote of races as ‘clear-
cut varieties of which their main quality is undoubtedly their permanence, a 
permanence that can only be lost by a crossing of blood’, 93 was rather one of 
great pessimism. He believed that the white races were superior and that they 
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would flourish only as long as they remained free of intermixture with the inferior 
black and yellow races, for interbreeding with these would result in corruption 
and immorality. Despite their different perspectives on this question, one 
optimistic, the other not so, Kenrick and Gobineau shared the common belief 
that, left to themselves, the characteristics of races would remain stable and 
unchanged. Thus although Kenrick’s ideas on race hovered between polygenism 
and its opposite there were nevertheless characteristics of his racial thought 
which could be firmly connected to later racial theories. 
 Kenrick’s biological assessment of race came about because he knew that 
history had no part to play in the discovery of the truth about the origins of 
mankind. History, however, in the role given to it by Unitarian biblical criticism, 
had a crucial part to play in Kenrick’s evaluation of the relationship between 
scripture and science.  The second part of this chapter will explore this idea and 
its implications, which led to fundamental changes in Kenrick’s ideas about the 
nature of religious belief and the kind of philosophy which accommodated this 
new position.  
 During the earlier decades of the nineteenth century the study of geology 
had struggled to gain a foothold as a credible branch of scientific discovery. The 
biggest barrier to the establishment and expansion of the geological sciences 
was the orthodox religious idea of the length of past time. The great geologist 
Charles Lyell believed that the present state of man’s world had been brought 
about by uniform, cyclical and natural change over a long period. 94 The crucial 
                                                 
94 Charles Coulston Gillispie, Genesis and Geology, A Study in the Relations of Scientific Thought, Natural 
Theology and Social Opinion in Great Britain, 1790-1850 (Cambridge, Mass., 1951), pp. 126-127. 
 378
question was how that had been accomplished in the very brief six thousand 
years allocated by the Hebrew chronology.  Clearly also, if men of religion 
accepted the truth of the single pair narrative in Genesis, then the validity of Old 
Testament chronology was weakened, and vice versa. Consequently it became 
very difficult for those who believed in the inspired truth of ancient scripture to 
explain away the diversity of mankind on a religious dimension alone. In short, it 
was becoming well-nigh impossible to encompass within one rational dimension 
the scriptural account and the conclusions of science in general, and those of 
geology in particular.  
 There was no doubt about the gravity of the geological challenge, and in 
Kenrick’s opinion it seriously threatened ‘The peace established between 
theology and science’. 95  The first eleven chapters of Genesis, he wrote, posed 
difficult questions which had been forced into the open since the interpretation of 
scripture was freed from the authority of the church and since science and history 
had been independently cultivated as disciplines. Previously, Kenrick pointed out, 
controversies had been confined to conflicting opinions about the interpretation of 
scripture itself, and due to the often ambiguous phraseology of scripture it was 
never difficult for those holding opposite opinions to find authority for them in the 
same volume. 96  A skilful metaphysician, he wrote, might undertake to reconcile 
free will with predestination, but to reconcile the Copernican system of the 
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universe with a ‘phraseology founded on the belief of the revolution of the 
heavenly bodies around the earth was clearly impossible’. 97
 It became evident also that the findings of geology could no longer be 
represented as ‘crude speculation’. Geology had demonstrated that the world 
had not been brought into the state in which man had been placed upon it by a 
single and instantaneous act of creative power; rather it had shown that ‘ages of 
ages had elapsed from the commencement to the close of this process’. 98 The 
difficulties presented by the ancient scriptures with regard to the creation, the 
deluge and its subsequent chronology were not for Kenrick simply a problem for 
geology alone but one for history also. Clearly, on historical grounds there were 
formidable objections to the Hebrew chronology, for it was incredible that ‘a little 
more than four hundred years after the world was dispeopled by the Flood, 
Abraham should have found a Pharaoh reigning over the monarchy of Egypt’. 99
 While the geologists tried to work out a way of vindicating themselves from 
charges of contradicting the authority of the ancient scriptures, problems, of 
course, arose with other branches of knowledge. The physiologist found it hard to 
maintain the unity of the human species and  its origin from a single pair along 
with the chronology of the deluge which ‘ allows only a few centuries for the 
development of the most marked and permanent varieties’. 100 The ethnographer 
too was ‘equally perplexed by the multitude of languages, or different roots, 
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structure and analogies…in all quarters of the globe’. 101 History demanded, for 
the ‘multiplication and diffusion of mankind, the progress of the arts and 
sciences, and the consolidation of empires’ a period far longer than the four or 
five centuries into which these ‘vast and gradual changes have been crowded’. 
102 Kenrick added that such a state of things was embarrassing to science, and 
‘full of danger to the interests of religion’, and it was time that the difficulty was 
fully acknowledged and met. 103
 There were many different ways of confronting the problems arising from 
Genesis, geology, physiology and ethnology in the middle decades of the 
nineteenth century. All of them attempted to harmonise the scriptural narratives 
about creation with the advances in science of the time. The  ideas of orthodoxy 
were expressed in a work entitled Scripture and Science not at Variance, by John 
H. Pratt, Archdeacon of Calcutta. 104 Pratt’s view was that it was ‘impossible that 
Scripture, proceeding as it does from Divine Inspiration…can, when rightly 
interpreted, be at variance with the works of the Divine Hand’. 105 Because this 
record of nature and the Word of God came from the same infallible author they 
could not therefore disagree with one another. Rather, if these two divine records 
were forced into ‘unnatural conflict’ it was man’s fault, because he was the fallible 
interpreter. 106 A closer examination of scripture would most likely restore 
harmony and indeed the discoveries of science might very well throw a new light 
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on scripture, which would then be relieved of its false interpretations. Finally, 
there was always the possibility that science itself would be proved wrong.  
Under the guidance of wiser men this would be corrected and again harmony 
would be possible. 107
 The Nonconformist divine John Pye Smith (1774-1851), who was divinity 
tutor at the Dissenting college at Homerton, based his attempts at the 
harmonisation of scripture and science on the idea that Genesis ought to be 
regarded as revelation given by God to the first creatures in a manner which was 
intelligible to them. Consequently the scriptures should be seen by us as 
analogous to what God’s word really meant in modern terms. Pye Smith asserted 
that we were therefore on safe ground and fully warranted by divine authority to 
‘translate the language of the Old Testament upon physical subjects, into such 
modern expressions as shall be agreeable to the reality of the thing spoken of’. 
108 For Pye Smith the Mosaic narrative was true and the alleged discrepancies 
between the Holy Scriptures and the discoveries of scientific investigation were 
‘not in reality, but in semblance only’. 109 The narrative had been ‘suited to the 
men of primeval times’, yet when it was understood by the conversion of what 
was figurative and idiomatical into plain language, ‘it is a faithful description of the 
facts that did occur, and the method and order of their occurrence’. 110 This 
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meant that ‘the most accurate science confirm[ed] the declarations of scripture, if 
only we take care to understand them rightly’.111   
 Similarly, the objective of the American geologist Edward Hitchcock 
(1793-1864), president of Amherst College and professor of natural theology and 
geology there, was the reconciliation of science and scripture. His method was to 
present evidence to show that the earth was indeed of great antiquity, but argued 
that this in no way challenged the authority of the narrative in Genesis.  The fact 
that according to interpretation of Scripture there had been a long period 
between the creation of matter and the creation of light, allowed time for the earth 
to develop the way it had, and ‘gives the widest scope to the geologist’, with 
every chance to indulge his ‘largest speculations concerning the age of the 
world’. 112 All the changes of mineral constitution and organic life over long ages 
which had been revealed by the strata of rocks had been passed over in silence 
by the sacred writers because such things had been irrelevant to the subject of 
revelation. They were now, however, full of interest to the man of science ‘who 
should afterwards take pleasure in exploring the works of God’. 113
Like Pye Smith, the scholar William Whewell (1794-1866), who became 
professor of moral philosophy at Cambridge, in 1838 and Master of Trinity 
College in 1841, advocated the re-interpretation of parts of scripture in order to 
accommodate the new discoveries. The sacred narrative, he wrote, spoke of 
natural objects and events very different from anything which now took place.  
When applied to an initial state, these words and phrases ‘cannot help being to 
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us obscure and mysterious, perhaps ambiguous and seemingly contradictory’. 114 
It was inevitable, he wrote, that modifications of the current interpretation of the 
words of Scripture would come about as a consequence of the ‘progressive 
character of Natural Science’. Science taught us to describe known facts in new 
language, but the language of scripture was ‘always the same’. It had been 
necessarily adapted to the common state of man’s intellectual development, ‘in 
which he is supposed not to be possessed of science’. 115 However, when the 
language of Scripture, ‘invested with its new meaning’, had become familiar to 
man, it will be found that ‘the ideas which it calls up are quite as reconcilable as 
the former ones were with the most entire acceptance of the providential 
dispensation’. 116
John Kenrick believed that all these attempts by such writers to harmonise 
the Mosaic narrative with the discoveries of modern science were futile and 
misguided. He had never wavered from the perspectives of the Unitarian 
historical criticism he learned in his youth. Now, decades later, it once again 
became a powerful argument, this time against the corruption of scripture by 
attempts to accommodate it with science.  Instead of trying to twist the meaning 
of scripture to support false doctrine, orthodox writers were now attempting to 
make it harmonise with the science of the day. 
Kenrick’s reaction to Whewell’s ideas was one almost of disbelief. 
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He wrote that Whewell had spoken repeatedly of ‘the necessity of bringing 
forward new interpretations  of Scripture, to meet the discoveries of science’. 117 
He, Whewell, talked of the language of Scripture being invested with a new 
meaning.  It is difficult, wrote Kenrick, to understand this otherwise than as 
sanctioning the principle that the commentator is to bend the meaning of 
scripture into conformity with the discoveries of science. This would be utterly 
inconsistent with reverence for Scripture and ‘calculated to bring both it and its 
interpreters into suspicion and contempt; and we must suppose the Author to 
have meant, that our ideas of the authority of certain portions of Scripture ‘are to 
be modified, when we find their obvious meaning to be at variance with scientific 
truths’. 118
 At first geologists had been reproached for presuming to place their own 
crude speculations in opposition to the word of God, but at length the 
discrepancies of time became ‘too certain to be any longer denied’. 119 The best 
course of action, it appeared, was to ‘devise some new rendering or exposition of 
the Bible narrative’, and indeed this method was adopted. 120
‘We impute no dishonesty of purpose to the learned and pious men who have 
engaged in this attempt’, Kenrick wrote, and on the part of Whewell, Kenrick 
decided that he himself ‘would rather suppose some confusion of ideas or of 
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phraseology, than a deliberate design to pervert scripture from its obvious 
meaning’. 121
In a similar vein, despite the fact that Kenrick seemed to have agreed with 
the hypothesis on the origins of man of the Swiss naturalist and geologist Louis 
Agassiz (1807-1873), Kenrick had some harsh words for him.  This ‘distinguished 
philosopher’, Kenrick wrote, had struck at the heart of orthodoxy with an opinion 
shared by many physiologists, that many different varieties of man had been 
placed in separate parts of the world by the Creator. This hypothesis had been 
sure to ‘excite boundless clamour’, but  Agassiz tried to avoid controversy by 
‘alleging that his views were not at variance with the Mosaic history’ 122 and by 
‘attempting to make the author of Genesis bear witness to an original plurality of 
races’. 123 The injury of such attempts, wrote Kenrick, accrued to religion more 
than to science. 124 No philosopher, he wrote, would close his eyes to scientific 
evidence, but the flawed exegesis by which he attempted to make it tally with 
scripture exposed him to the suspicion of having no sound rule of interpretation. 
Furthermore, it made the Bible seem obscure and uncertain instead of ‘simple, 
direct and honest in its historical style’. 125
In this controversy about how to relate Genesis and the new sciences, 
Kenrick had come full circle. His lifelong role as a Socinian historical biblical critic 
demanded that ‘the credibility of every historical writing must stand on its own 
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ground’. 126 For him, nothing had changed and the Bible had to be interpreted like 
any other work, with careful consideration being given to the age and context in 
which the testaments were written and also to the perspectives of those who 
wrote them. There ought to be no attempt to twist or corrupt the scriptures to 
comply with false doctrine, or indeed to harmonise them with ‘modern’ ideas 
which were entirely out of context. 
The history of the Hebrew people was a national history and the various 
portions of it had been founded upon documentary evidence, poetical sources, 
tradition and even to the period before written records began. We could not, he 
insisted, have the same evidence ‘of the events of the reigns of David and 
Solomon, and those of the period comprehended in the first eleven chapters of 
the book of Genesis’. 127 Nor could we be surprised, he added, if, without 
documents respecting primæval times, ‘ a narrative should have formed itself, 
reflecting the opinions, partly true and partly erroneous, of the people among 
whom it had its birth’. 128   
The American Edward Hitchcock, for example, had unfortunately 
‘identified Religion with the cosmogonic and historical opinions of the Jewish 
people in the remote age in which the book of Genesis was compiled or written’. 
129 He then took upon himself the impracticable task of reconciling them with 
modern science. This was erroneous. The solution to the problem could not be 
found, Kenrick claimed, in the oft-repeated maxim that religion and science, 
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being both true, cannot therefore be inconsistent with one another, for those who 
argue this ‘do not use the same words in the same sense’. 130 Kenrick’s 
contention was that 
 The objector, when he charges science with  
 undermining Religion, means that it impairs, by 
 contradicting, the authority of the writings on which 
 revealed religion is founded; while the apologist, if he 
 has any definite meaning, understands by religion, 
 those great and indestructible sentiments of the  
 human mind, which preceded, and may survive, all 
 written records and all historical evidence.131
Thus those who insisted that there was a conflict between religion and science 
made the mistake of assuming that the two were to be judged on the same 
fundamental basis. This was not so, because they could not be compared on 
equal terms.  Science was founded upon the reason applied to nature and the 
physical world, but religion was part of human experience and we should 
therefore take account of the human capacity for imagination and religious 
feeling.  
          Our belief, Kenrick maintained, would be strengthened by the fact that 
there was a ‘middle ground’ between these two ‘firm and wide enough to build an 
ample and enduring structure of religious faith’. 132 Neither ‘our religious feelings 
nor our religious belief’, he held, were necessarily affected by a discriminating 
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criticism of the Jewish records. 133 Creation was still an example of omnipotence, 
and in the limitation of it to six days we ‘trace the influence of the Jewish 
institution of the sabbath’. 134 The narrative of the creation of woman we should 
regard rather as a ‘simple and natural expression of the relation and mutual 
feeling of the sexes’, than as a historical fact. 135 Furthermore ‘conscience and 
observation, no less than Scripture, teach us the weakness and defects of our 
moral nature’. 136 The essence of religious and moral feeling was not then 
something which required the literal reading of scripture or evidence of science to 
prove its worth.   
          Kenrick’s idea that religion and science had to be considered separately 
appeared in the 1840s, the decade during which he wrote Primæval History. In 
the light of the new discoveries of the mid nineteenth century his ideas on the 
parting of the ways of religion and science were becoming more prevalent within 
many areas of intelligent society, including Unitarianism, and Kenrick 
commented, ‘I know that this is the state of many minds’. 137 This view of religion 
and science showed that Kenrick had travelled a long intellectual journey since 
his scholarly beginnings under the towering influence of Joseph Priestley. As 
R.K. Webb points out, the Priestleyan system had been hugely influential and 
had shared in the most advanced thought of the age in psychology, political 
theory, science and theology. 138 Priestley’s radical Enlightenment mind had 
                                                 
133 Ibid., p. xx. 
134 Ibid. 
135 Ibid., p. xxi. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Ibid., p. xxii. 
138 R.K. Webb, ‘John Hamilton Thom, Intellect and Conscience in Liverpool’, in P.T. Phillips (ed.), The 
View From the Pulpit: Victorian Ministers and Society  (Toronto, 1978), p. 214. 
 389
created a vast, rational synthesis of man, nature, natural philosophy and God in 
which reason and faith were fully integrated. This was a concept of reality in 
which man was completely bound within the processes of nature and subject to 
its eternal and universal laws. 
        The term ‘integration’, however, does not really encompass satisfactorily the 
essence of Priestley’s vision, for his ideas went beyond that. Priestley’s concept 
of the nature of existence was centred upon the idea of the small amount of 
matter in the universe as being penetrable and forming ever-shifting patterns of 
force fields. This resulted in a form of ‘spirito-materialism’ which had the effect of 
incorporating together in a theological sense the spiritual and the material, faith 
and reason and the religious and the natural world, the latter being a world in 
which man was an intrinsic part. The result was a monist understanding of reality 
and spirituality as one.  Priestley’s view was that of an unbroken synthesis of 
spirit and matter within which reason, knowledge and faith found their meaning. 
The ‘otherness’ of a separate dimension, which would allow for the idea of the 
pre-existence of Christ, was alien to his thought and in Priestley’s mind there was 
no room for the dualism which would permit the concept of a separate soul. 139   
                By the 1840s John Kenrick, who had been a staunch Socinian, had 
accepted that there could be no harmonisation of science and religion, or, by 
implication, reason and faith.  This implied his return to a dualism which 
represented a complete departure from the ideas of Priestley.  His Priestleyan 
predecessors and early contemporaries in the Unitarian movement had relied on 
reason and its handmaiden, historical criticism, to validate their faith. The result 
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of this was a dry, rational form of belief which lacked the spontaneous and 
‘irrational’ joy of religious faith. By the mid nineteenth century, however, Kenrick 
and many other intellectuals had began to realise that the concrete and verifiable 
discoveries of science now threatened to undermine religious belief. 
       Reason, that  fundamental principle of Enlightenment thought, had turned 
upon religion, the very thing it had been required previously to support. The time 
had come therefore to take the dualist route, to release faith from the bonds of 
reason and re-locate it in an unquantifiable dimension of feeling, emotion, 
spirituality, imagination and joy, where it would be securely isolated from the 
incursions of pure rationality. Thus, on the issue of reason and faith, Kenrick now 
took a contrasting position on the essence of reality, one which differed radically 
from Priestley, his Enlightenment mentor. In Kenrick, philosophical dualism had 
reappeared, this time in a form which separated the realm of science and the 
natural world from that of man, and which broke down Priestley’s eighteenth-
century synthesis.   
The altered relationship between religion and science was a  persistent 
aspect of Kenrick’s thought from the 1840s, when he wrote his Essay on 
Primæval History, and there are several reasons why he began to see them as 
separate. Clearly the immediate catalysts for his statements on the subject had 
been the concerted attempts in that decade by Hitchcock, Whewell and others to 
effect a reconciliation between religion and science by means of the realignment 
and reinterpretation of scripture. Consequently, the frame of mind which Kenrick 
had inherited from Unitarian historical criticism, which defended the integrity of 
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scripture, has to be considered an important factor in his rejection of attempts by 
his contemporaries to ‘bend’ scripture into an accommodation with mid 
nineteenth-century sciences, particularly geology. 
 In a wider sense Kenrick, like many thinking religious men, was aware 
that the discoveries of the ethnological and geological sciences were problems 
which had to be confronted by Christian intellectuals such as himself.  He wrote 
that although those of his time admired the wisdom and humanity of the Mosaic 
institutions and the beauty and purity of the devotional writings of scripture, they 
could neither close their eyes to the discoveries of science and history, nor 
satisfy their understanding with ‘the expedients which have been devised for 
reconciling them with the language of the Hebrew records’. 140  
His understanding of literary criticism in a Romantic sense was another 
factor in the emergence of the idea.  Kenrick expressed the view that religion, 
which pertained to man’s own mental concept of faith and the idea of God, and 
science, which dealt with the processes of the natural world, had to be 
considered separately. He had taken an analogous viewpoint in his Romantic 
approach to literary criticism, in which he argued that the creative productions of 
the human mind could not be classified by the rigid laws and uniform laws of the 
natural world. 141 In the Romantic idea it seemed that the poet could appreciate 
the beauty of the natural world and wax lyrical about it and the emotions which it 
inspired, but he himself was not part of nature. Neither was man bound, as 
Priestley had believed, by its abstract and universal laws. The individual’s new 
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role in the Romantic Age was to rejoice in the beauty and diversity of the natural 
world which brought about an emotional relationship with his own creative self. 142 
Human emotion could never be classified by the abstract laws of natural 
philosophy, and accordingly the feeling which inspired religious faith could never 
be rationalised by the discoveries of science. Kenrick’s approach to literature 
tended to suggest that because there could be no reconciliation between the 
uniformity of nature and the creative genius of man, neither could there be any 
accommodation between the laws of science and religious belief. 
 His appreciation over the decades of a form of historical understanding 
which concentrated upon the realities of human experience rather than 
philosophical systems and abstractions had drawn him closer to an idea of the 
innate qualities of man. His studies of human origins, of language and its 
interaction with thought had given force to a desire to understand the human 
impulse in history and the development of religious faith. Presented then with an 
option to regard religion as something simultaneously essentially human and 
spiritual which was somehow beyond the dry, classificatory systems of 
Enlightenment reason, Kenrick was almost certain to grasp it.  
There was another important aspect of Kenrick’s thought, however, which 
clearly must have had some bearing on his separation of religion and science by 
the middle of the nineteenth century, and that was his Unitarian belief in miracles. 
Owing to the findings of the science of the mid- nineteenth century and to the 
growth of knowledge at this time, many had seriously questioned the possibility 
of the existence of miracles. Unitarians, however, had always consistently 
                                                 
142 John Halsted, Romanticism ( London, 1969), pp. 12-13.  
 393
maintained the truth of miracles as proof of God’s revelation, and had never 
altered their beliefs on this point. Indeed one of their strongest criticisms of 
German critics in the period had been the fact that many of them were ‘anti-
supernaturalists’ who denied the possibility of the miraculous events narrated in 
the Bible. 143  Kenrick’s faith in miracles never wavered. In 1821, in his article on 
the German critic J.S. Semler, he wrote that he did not doubt that German 
theologians would ‘return from this extreme of scepticism’, for he himself believed 
that the miraculous parts of the New Testament history were established by the 
same rules of evidence as the rest, and that ‘no separation can be made of 
them’. 144 Forty three years later, in Biblical Essays, he repeated the same 
sentiments when he declared that he believed there were facts in the gospel 
history ‘which do not admit of explanation without recourse to miracle’. 145  
If then, confronted by the scientific knowledge which seriously challenged 
the existence of miracles, Kenrick as a Unitarian had to deny their very 
existence, he would then have been forced to relinquish what had always been 
regarded in the tradition of his belief as a fundamental support for the argument 
in favour of revealed religion. All other aspects of the ‘corrupted’ Christianity, 
among them the atonement, eternal punishment and the divinity of Christ, had 
been rationalised by Unitarians in their theological and historical arguments.  A 
faith in the existence of miracles, therefore, was one of the last remaining 
foundation stones in the edifice of Unitarian Christian belief and without it the 
entire structure would collapse. This aspect of Unitarian belief was something 
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which had always appeared to their critics to be a glaring inconsistency in their 
otherwise ultra-rational approach to religion.  
In 1838 Baden Powell (1796-1860), who was Savilian Professor of 
Geometry at Oxford from 1827, had made the point that in order to believe that 
an event was a miracle, one had to acknowledge the existence of a being with 
the power of suspending the laws of nature and that for anyone ‘versed in 
physical inquiries, would be the most difficult point of all’. 146 This, then, was very 
possibly another reason why Kenrick pursued the dualist option on the mid-
nineteenth-century question of science and religion. The tension between a belief 
in miracles and a new confidence in the discoveries of science resulted in a 
decision to consign, as Baden Powell eventually did, the unverifiable and 
‘irrational’ elements of religious faith to a separate dimension of human 
experience. 
 Kenrick’s perspectives on science and faith paralleled those of Baden 
Powell who was against ‘explanatory contortions’ which tried to harmonise the 
irrationality of miracles with the stability of the natural order. 147 Just as Kenrick 
had argued that there was a ‘middle ground’ between reason and faith, with 
regard to the question of miracles, Powell suggested a compromise on the 
grounds of a ‘primary distinction in nature and function between reason and faith, 
- intellect and religious sense – and the admission that what is legitimate object 
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of the one, may not even be recognisable by the other’. 148 Pietro Corsi points out 
similarities between Powell’s approach to the problem of miracles and that of the 
German neo-Hegelian theologian Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872) who believed 
that although miracles were absurd in relation to reason they were nevertheless 
both objects of faith and its direct creations. 149  Powell differed, however, from 
Feuerbach in that he did not think that miracles were purely subjective creations 
but rather that the faith of the believer gave them concrete existence. 150  
 In 1862, in Essays and Reviews, Powell made his views on the subject of 
the separation of the natural world from the religious one clear once again when 
he wrote that men must recognise both the claims of science to decide on points 
properly belonging to the world of matter, and the ‘independence of such 
considerations which characterises the disclosure of spiritual truth’.  151 Like 
Kenrick, Powell believed that the more knowledge advanced the more it would be 
recognised that Christianity must be viewed apart from a connection with 
physical things. Reason and science could never provide evidence of God 
working miracles. The assurance that this was true was only to be found in each 
individual inquirer’s own mind. 152 Powell was at the centre of the controversy 
which raged on this subject during the middle decades of the nineteenth century. 
It was a debate which affected thinking Christians, and Kenrick could not have 
                                                 
148 Baden Powell, The Order of Nature Considered in Reference to the Claims of Revelation (London, 
1859), p. 429, quoted in ibid., p. 214. 
149 Corsi, Science and Religion, p. 214. 
150 Ibid. 
151 Baden Powell, ‘On the Study of the Evidences of Christianity’, in Essays and Reviews (London, 1862), 
p. 152. 
152 Ieuan Ellis, Seven Against Christ: a Study of ‘Essays and Reviews’ (Leiden, 1980), pp. 63-64. 
 396
been unaware of the fundamental importance of the issues which confronted his 
Unitarianism. 
The dualism which had developed in Kenrick’s thought with regard to the 
human and natural worlds may also have owed something to the influence of 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Kenrick would most certainly have read Kant, but 
should evidence of this be required it may be found in his shorthand notes on 
German Literature in which he mentions Kant’s Kritik der reinen Vernunft 
[Critique of Pure Reason ] published in 1781. 153 Kant’s critique had distinguished 
between the phenomena of human knowledge of the empirical world and the 
noumena  of the ‘things in themselves’, which were ‘thinkable’, but not 
‘knowable’. This became known as the doctrine of transcendental idealism, which 
opened up a dimension in which reason was no longer the criterion by which all 
human experience was linked.  
The post-Kantian decades in England resulted in the concepts of idealist 
thinkers such as Thomas Hill Green (1836-1882) and Henry Mansel (1820-1871), 
who wrote of religious thought that, ‘in thus believing, we desert the evidence of 
Reason, to rest on that of Faith’. 154 At this time many dualist theories were 
applied to different aspects of philosophy, theology and human experience. In the 
late eighteenth century Priestley’s monist view had been that God, man and 
nature were part of one great chain of being, and that man, being part of nature, 
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was subject to its operations through the mechanisms of empiricism and 
associationism.  At the core of this new dualism, however, was the separation 
between man and nature, and a consciousness of the gulf between the material 
world and that of the spiritual and the human soul. It was in some respects very 
akin to that kind of dualism in defence of which Richard Price had argued so 
forcibly.  
 The focus, then, in the mid-nineteenth century and later was often upon 
the nature of religious belief which many held did not necessarily comply with 
reason, and upon the misguided attempts of those who attempted to rationalise 
faith by scientific means. The neo-Kantian thinker Wilhelm Windelband argued 
that there had to be another dimension, a spiritual one of mystery, without which 
‘there is no religion’, and science was ‘ill-advised’ to attempt to construct a 
religion out of its knowledge. 155  When  religion attempted to convert itself into a 
demonstrable doctrine it became exposed to a clash with rational thought and 
lost ‘the mystery which is of its very essence’.  Christianity without mysteries, he 
added, ‘was an unhappy idea of the eighteenth century’. 156  
Having accepted that religious belief was no longer a hostage to reason, 
by the 1840s Kenrick asserted his belief in a more spiritual faith relating to 
matters of the heart and soul rather than the physical or material world. He now 
wrote of feeling ‘the sublimity and purity of the devotional, moral and prophetic 
writings of Scripture’ 157 and also of ‘a perpetual spring of feeling in the human 
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heart’.158  Although these were only a few scattered phrases, in their emphasis 
on religious feeling they closely resembled elements of the thought of the 
Unitarian theologian James Martineau (1805-1900). 
 When he first published his influential work The Rationale of Religious 
Enquiry in 1836, Martineau hinted at a less rationalistic form of religion, and one 
which recognised a more spiritual and Romantic idea of religious belief.  In the 
Rationale, Martineau, like Kenrick, wrote of ‘that truly sublime state of mind, faith 
– absolute faith – in truth: and the great problem will be solved, how to combine 
the freest intellect with the loftiest devotion; - and while inquiring always, to love 
and worship still’. 159 Martineau emphasised that the inquiries of the critic should 
not change in any way the feelings for his faith, for the Christian faith never goes 
against reason – although it may often appear to go against what reason is able 
to prove. 160
The evolution of Martineau’s religious thought had brought about a 
transformation in the nature of the Unitarian creed. Influenced by Coleridge, 161 
Kant,162 and the American Unitarian Divine William Ellery Channing (1780-1842), 
Martineau, along with others in the Unitarian movement, rejected the 
determinism of Priestley’s doctrine of necessity in favour of a sense of 
individuality, and also undermined the arid rationalism of the creed with an 
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emphasis on a more spiritual faith. He criticised the selfishness of Utilitarianism 
and adopted the Kantian rather than the Benthamite approach to ethics, believing 
that it was the motive rather than the result which reflected the moral 
characteristics of the action. 163  
Martineau, John James Tayler (1797-1869), Charles Wicksteed (1810-
1885) and the Ulster-born minister John Hamilton Thom (1808-1894), were all 
prominent in a movement which led Unitarianism away from Priestleyanism 
towards a new kind of religious belief.  It was one which incorporated the feelings 
of the soul, relied on innate feelings rather than external evidences and emotion 
rather than logic or reason. It was also a form of religious devotion which was 
inspired by faith rather than science. R.K. Webb’s analysis of this spiritual 
movement in Unitarianism was that over a period of thirty years from the last two 
decades of the eighteenth century it moved the creed away from Priestley’s 
rationalism to Martineau’s sense of feeling and emotion. 164 Unitarianism under 
Priestley’s influence had been a movement intent upon theorising and attacking 
Trinitarian beliefs, whereas under the leadership of people like Martineau and 
Thom it became religion for its own sake. Thom’s maxim was ‘not to philosophize 
about Religion – not to determine the theory of Religion, but to make you 
religious’. 165 On the question of external evidences,  J.J. Tayler wrote to Thom in 
1859 that he did not believe evidences ever really proved anything ‘till the inner 
man is previously touched and already won by a deep feeling of spiritual want.’ 
He added that while any Unitarian of the old [Priestleyan] school would regard 
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such a statement as ‘mystical and almost incomprehensible’, it flashed into his 
own mind ‘with all the conclusiveness of the clearest light’. 166  Thom’s own 
feeling was that ‘our path to God lies not through the reasoning powers ….the 
Soul conceiveth Him…through the sentiment of a divine Faith, and  not the 
discovering force of an all-sufficient argument’. 167
 Like Kenrick, Tayler and Thom both emphasised the distinction between 
argumentation and reason on the one hand and sentiment and faith on the other. 
In this particular context, the separation of science and religion was consistent 
with the drift away from the rational approach of Priestley towards the Romantic 
sensibility of Martineau.  Within the Unitarian intellectual milieu in this later period 
the parting of the ways of reason and faith had particular significance due to the 
recent history of the creed. Because Priestley’s system was unique in its 
mechanism and ultra-rationalism and Martineau’s so spiritual, emotional and 
Romantic, the transition between the two over thirty years was perceived as 
being a dramatic one. Due to the fact that Priestley had employed psychology 
and natural philosophy to form his synthesis of man, nature and theology, the 
question of the scientific as opposed to the inner spiritual impulse of man was 
particularly relevant to these later Unitarians and to Kenrick himself. 
        From the 1840s onwards Kenrick never relinquished the new dualist 
position that science and religion should be regarded as separate.  In a letter in 
1870 to Charles Beard, editor of the Theological Review, to which Kenrick had 
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contributed a number of articles, Kenrick made clear his thoughts on the subject. 
He wrote that he wished Beard success in his endeavours to reconcile science 
and theology. 168 He was not, he added, however, hopeful of an immediate result, 
for although there had been a time when science and theology had lived in 
harmony and cooperation, that had changed. Kenrick wrote to Beard that to 
establish the ‘wisdom of God in the creation’ was deemed by Boyle, Newton, 
Locke, Hartley, Priestley and Cuvier the highest result of their scientific enquiries. 
They thought that by pointing out the marks of design, adaptation and provision 
in nature which were ‘all directed to a wise and benevolent end, they were 
powerfully aiding the cause of religion’. 169 We ought to remember, he urged, that 
it was not the men of science but the theologians, under the influence of 
metaphysics, who abandoned the argument from design which had carried 
conviction to so many generations of men. ‘Will men of science’, Kenrick asked, 
‘accept the substitute which is offered them’? 170
 Kenrick was of the opinion that the scientists would object to the vague 
use of consciousness ,171 which had been made the substitute for reason in 
regard to morals and religion. Men of science also might plausibly allege that a 
man cannot dispute his own consciousness of what he thinks, feels and believes, 
but that this cannot extend beyond himself and can be no evidence that his 
subjective belief has a corresponding objective reality. He reflected, ‘Such is my 
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old-fashioned view of the matter’. 172 Finally he asserted that scientific men would 
require scientific evidence before they yielded their assent ‘although the question 
lies beyond the limits of physical  science’. 173 In his letter Kenrick made his 
comments on the fundamental change in the approach to the relationship 
between religion and science in a calm and measured way. By this time he was 
eighty two years old and one may almost detect a sense of nostalgia with regard 
to those older, Priestleyan ideas which had passed into history. Alongside that, 
however, there was the recognition of a still-sharp mind that in a changing world 
there was now an irreconcilable gulf between reason and faith.  
 Although it has not until now been adequately recognised, John Kenrick 
was part of Unitarianism’s transition. Kenrick was a historian, while Martineau 
was a theologian and philosopher, and therefore they came to certain points in 
their development by very different routes.  Kenrick’s appreciation of the 
individual and the unique in the historical sense was a persistent characteristic of 
his intellectual development from an early age. In his literary critique he had 
recognised the value of spontaneous human creativity in poetry and in his 
historical view of the ancient world the imagination of man had moulded the 
myths of individual societies. It would have been natural, therefore, to appreciate 
a creative, spiritual, innate and individual response to religious faith. 
Furthermore, his Unitarian position with regard to the corruption of scripture and 
to the question of miracles had helped to guide him towards a form of religious 
belief similar to that of Martineau.  
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On the question of Kenrick’s acceptance of a more spiritual faith as 
opposed to the rational one into which he had been born, James Martineau 
himself was not blind to the changes in John Kenrick.  In a late piece of work 
entitled ‘Saint Jerome and his Theological Correspondents’, published in 1864, 
174 Kenrick had praised Benjamin Jowett’s application to the scriptures of ‘the 
common sense principles of classical philology’ which helped him to produce 
‘that Essay which is the Novum Organum of biblical interpretation’. 175  Kenrick 
was referring to Jowett’s essay on biblical interpretation which had appeared in 
the famous Essays and Reviews, first published four years earlier, in 1860. 
 It was not surprising that Kenrick handed such praise to Jowett’s efforts, 
176 for there was much in his essay with which Kenrick would have been intensely 
familiar. The Anglican classicist had criticised ‘efforts to pull the authority of the 
Scriptures in different directions’. 177 The interpreter, wrote Jowett, should be 
concerned to preserve the simple word of that book absolutely pure from the 
refinements or distortions of later times. The book itself remained unchanged 
amid the different interpretations of it, and the office of the critic was not to add 
yet another point of interpretation, but to recover the original sense. The greater 
part of his learning came from the reading of the text itself, and the reader of 
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scripture should have no delight in the voluminous literature which had 
overgrown it. His object was to ‘read Scripture like any other book’. 178 Jowett’s 
conclusion to the essay was that although the scholar was worn out with 
intellectual toil and regarded with suspicion by many of his contemporaries’ yet 
he would not be without  ‘a sure hope that the love of truth, which men of saintly 
lives often seem to slight, is, nevertheless, accepted before God.’ 179
In his memoir of Kenrick, Martineau highlighted Kenrick’s mention and 
obvious appreciation of Jowett’s famous essay. 180 Kenrick must, wrote 
Martineau, have felt the power of a more spiritual school of thought if he had 
heaped such praise upon Jowett.  The Anglican’s essay had the effect of clearing 
the spiritual aspects of scripture from all dependence on disputable ‘evidences’ 
and had seen the life of Christ as the centre of Christian teaching. Martineau 
added that 
 Without attributing to Mr. Kenrick any conscious 
 removal from his early theological position, we yet believe 
 that his judgement had led him to conclusions, and the 
 currents of life floated him into a climate of feeling,  
 congenial only with a philosophy other than he had imbibed; 
 and that, whether or not it found a place in his  
 understanding, it had some secret harmony with the  
 largeness of his later sympathy and serenity of his faith. 181
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 Thus in two ways John Kenrick’s treatment of history had brought him to 
evolve sets of ideas which had more affinity with the later nineteenth century than 
the century in which he was born.  His realisation that history could never 
discover the truth about the origins of man guided him towards a biological 
assessment on the varieties of humankind, their beginnings and their limitations, 
which was akin to the racial theories which emerged in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century.  Kenrick’s second conclusion about history, based upon the 
Unitarian historical biblical criticism with which he had been concerned all his life, 
was that because it had shown that Genesis formed the traditions and beliefs of 
an ancient people, the ancient scriptures could therefore never be bent into an 
accommodation with the discoveries of modern science.  
        This in turn resulted in his realisation of a growing gulf between science and 
religion, between reason and faith, which prompted his acceptance of a more 
spiritual and Romantic form of belief and the dualism that it required. Like Baden 
Powell, he resisted attempts to harmonise scripture with science and saw them 
instead as falling in different dimensions of human experience. This reflected a 
dualism which he shared with Kant and the Idealists of the later nineteenth 
century. 
         Kenrick’s thought was in many respects like that of the Unitarians James 
Martineau and James Hamilton Thom, whose adoption of a more spiritual faith 
had transformed Unitarianism.  Also, by the 1860’s Kenrick’s opinions had 
revealed themselves to be sympathetic to aspects of that Broad Church 
theological ‘revolution’ which had expressed itself in Essays and Reviews. His 
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affinity with Jowett’s essay was predictable, of course, for it had revealed 
opinions which had been familiar to Unitarian biblical critics for at least seven 
decades. In general terms, with regard to race, theology and philosophy, 
Kenrick’s thought had discarded many aspects of the eighteenth century Age of 
Reason and had become integrated with a more Romantic intellectual milieu. 
        Most significant of all, however, was a re-emergence in the thought of John 
Kenrick of a frame of mind very different from the monism of Joseph Priestley.  
Kenrick had come to separate science and faith and the world of nature from the 
world of man.  Consequently, by the middle decades of the nineteenth century, 
Kenrick’s thought took account of that division between the physical and the 
spiritual worlds which had been the defining factor in the dualism of Richard 
Price.  In this particularly fundamental respect, by the end of his life Kenrick had 


















 An important point to consider in this final analysis of the nature and depth 
of the intellectual transition of the Unitarian John Kenrick from an  Enlightenment 
to a more Romantic and Idealist frame of mind is the relationship between 
context and the individual. Certain aspects of the context within which Kenrick’s 
religious thought and historical biblical method was formed engaged with other 
influences in his scholarly life. These included German thought, English 
Romanticism and the new scientific discoveries of the mid nineteenth century. 
        On the question of context, the Socinianism of the late eighteenth century 
was epitomised by the thought of Joseph Priestley, the most influential religious 
radical of his time. In terms of general historical principles, Priestley’s thought 
was concerned with universal values and an optimistic, linear view of progress of 
mankind towards perfection in the future. For Priestley, moral and cultural 
diversity were aberrations in the universal scheme of things and secular history 
itself provided lessons for mankind.  
In theology, however, Priestley’s desire was to prove the irrationality of 
many orthodox doctrines, but in particular those which supported the divinity of 
Christ. This belief was underpinned by every aspect of Priestley’s thought : his 
necessitarian philosophy, moral system, natural philosophy and political theory 
all blended together in his monist perspective on the nature of existence.  
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Priestley’s mind encompassed one great unbroken, linear flow of cause and 
effect which integrated God, man, nature, mind and body and even life and 
death. It differed fundamentally from the dualist perception of reality proposed by 
Richard Price, which meant that that the metaphysical gulf between Priestley and 
Price represented a clear division in late eighteenth-century radical thought.  
 It was this frame of mind of Priestley’s, very influential amongst his 
contemporaries and successors, which supported the Socinian theology and its 
tradition of rational, historical interpretation of the scriptures.  Priestley, having 
shown in metaphysical terms how it was that Christ was a simple human being, 
now wished to prove it historically, for in Priestley’s view the idea that Christ had 
been pre-existent and divine was the greatest corruption to have  distorted the 
Christian religion. Consequently, the way forward was to explore the scriptures in 
a rational and unbiased way. The objective was a search for proof that there had 
existed in the early days of Christianity a pure and primitive faith untainted by 
corruption and that this form of belief could be recovered.  
         Consequently the ‘shape’ of the Socinian frame of mind at this time was 
constructed around concepts of a search for the origins, or the ‘primitive nucleus’ 
of Christian truth, untainted by subsequent corruptions.   This was accompanied 
by a conviction that the meaning of scripture should never be twisted, distorted or 
‘bent’ to accommodate the requirements of doctrine, the power of the orthodox 
churches, or indeed anything else.  This set of precepts was as fundamentally 
important to the mind of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth-century 
Socinian scholar as the belief itself that Christ had been no more than human. In 
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the scholar’s mind, these rules of faith and interpretation meant that he rejected 
the theological ‘systems’ of dogma which seemed to have perverted the original 
historical truth revealing the nature of early Christianity and Christ himself.  
          In the Socinian biblical - historical frame of mind there was a rejection of 
the dogmatic or the abstract in favour of the concrete historical reality of the 
gospels.  Nothing ‘external’ in the form of human systems or presuppositions 
should intrude upon the historical integrity of the time and circumstance of the 
events of the gospel, or on the concrete historical situations in which the gospels 
were written. In other words, the scholars of the radical English Enlightenment 
had created for themselves a method in biblical criticism which was characterised 
by a search for origins and a strong feeling for the integrity of the historical reality 
which had to be evaluated and investigated on its own terms. Unlike Priestley’s 
views on secular history, its emphasis was on the search for historical origin, and 
on the elimination of intrusive systems and abstractions in favour of concrete 
realities and circumstances. Indeed in some respects it was a frame of mind 
which was ideally suited to the development of new historical ideas. Although 
there had been an interest in historical criticism within radical theological circles 
in the latter decades of the eighteenth century, the ideas of Joseph Priestley, 
supported in metaphysical terms by his materialist philosophy, and in theology by 
his analysis of the formation of ‘corruptions’, 1 brought it into sharper focus and 
drew it to the attention of a wider circle. This was the context within which John 
Kenrick’s early thought was formed.   
                                                 
1 See Joseph Priestley, A History of the  Corruptions of Christianity (London, 1871). 
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         However, from his intellectual beginnings in a strictly rationalist context 
concerned with universal values and timeless truths, Kenrick came to favour 
concepts of the uniqueness and diversity of historical forms and their organic 
modes of development. Through the medium of ancient myth and the traditions 
of nations he came to appreciate the idea of cultural relativism, and his toleration 
of the religious practices of primitive ages indicated that he held a view that 
values were created within a specific historical context. His integration of history 
and myth were underpinned by that form of English Romanticism which had 
adapted the mechanisms of associationism to the creations of human 
imagination. He also discovered  frame of mind on his part which understood the 
development of languages from different sources in a historical way. Ideas of the 
organic development of language and nations were conducive to the formation of 
a new consciousness which appreciated the flux and change of human history 
and the concept of the birth, life, decay and death of nations.  
In the field of literature he rejected the rigid standards of taste imposed by 
neo-classicism and instead celebrated the Romantic idea of natural, 
spontaneous human creativity. His biological approach to the problem of the 
origins of man led him to believe in separate origins of different racial groups and 
consequently pointed elements of his thought on this subject towards the racial 
theories of the later nineteenth century. His separation of religion and science 
and his preference for the idea of a religion of feeling which could not be 
challenged by reason was a rejection of Priestley’s great synthesis of God, man 
and nature. It also concurred with the Romantic rejection of natural law in favour 
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of human experience. This acceptance on Kenrick’s part that reason could not 
provide answers for that heartfelt emotion which underpinned the foundations of 
religious belief meant that there had developed in his thought a dualism between 
the physical and the spiritual worlds which were similar to elements of the 
thought of Richard Price. 
Thus John Kenrick became a Unitarian Romantic, much like his younger 
contemporaries in the Unitarian movement, James Martineau and John Hamilton 
Thom. Influenced by Coleridge and Immanuel Kant, Martineau had led a 
movement to transform Unitarianism’s dry, Priestleyan rationalism into a more 
spiritual form of belief. Although he came to such an intellectual position by a 
very different route, Kenrick’s thought formed a new structure in accordance with 
Martineau and Thom, and also with the post-Kantian Idealism of the mid-
nineteenth century which interested thinkers such as Baden Powell, Benjamin 
Jowett and Henry Mansel.  
 How all this came about in the thought of John Kenrick was a complex 
process which involved many diverse influences. Clearly, German thought had a 
major effect on John Kenrick’s intellectual development. This was evident from 
his correspondence with G.W. Wood concerning the purchase of German books 
over a long period of time. Also, his interest in German thought over the five 
decades of his productive life may be judged by a comparison between the 
German content of the library of Exeter College,2 which he attended as a 
teenager, and that contained in his own personal library, sold after his death in 
1877. In the Exeter catalogue of 1800, which listed more than 1,800 works by 
                                                 
2 Exeter College Library List, Harris Manchester College Library, Oxford, MS. MNC Misc. 4. 
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just under 900 authors, there appeared only a few works by German writers such 
as Bengel, Michaelis and Mosheim. Contrastingly, when Kenrick’s own library  
was auctioned almost eight decades later, in 1878, the catalogue showed that of 
the 1,500 works listed, around forty five per cent of them were sourced in the 
German-speaking states. 3 The direct influence of German ideas on John Kenrick 
was particularly apparent with regard to his approach to language, and literature 
also.  His thoughts on the development of languages over time and of their 
separate origins, their organic development and their interaction with human 
thought were very similar to the ideas of German philologists such as Herder, 
Humboldt and Jacob Grimm. In his understanding of the new forms of literary 
criticism Kenrick may be compared, for example, with Wilhelm von Schlegel. 
 Indeed, it is also true that Kenrick’s individual engagement with the 
complex series of influences which dominated his intellectual development 
towards a more Romantic frame of mind began in a significant way with the 
German scholar Heyne’s approach to the interpretation of classical myth.  In this 
particular case, however, Kenrick’s own rules of Unitarian historical biblical 
criticism came to the fore. It is possible to see in his essay of 1816 a striking 
example of the interplay between the ideas of the context of his Unitarian faith 
and a new intellectual formation. Nowhere is the process of interaction between 
one set of ideas and another clearer than in this area of Kenrick’s early 
scholarship. Kenrick integrated the thoughts of the German classicist C.G. Heyne 
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on the interaction of history and myth and the local origins of myth with aspects 
of his own Unitarian approach to biblical criticism. 
        This was a turning point which had major implications for his thought.  The 
‘springhead’ of religious truth in the Unitarian sense became analogous in 
Kenrick’s mind with the primitive, uncorrupted origins of myths, which in the 
classical sense were localised. On this basis Kenrick historicised the myth, with 
the result that there was established a new appreciation of cultural relativism. 
From the tenets of Unitarian criticism also came a separate analogy, between the 
‘corruptions of Christianity and the ‘corruptions’ of myth. While the former had 
been brought about by neo-Platonists and the false doctrines of orthodox 
Christianity, the ‘corruption’ of these localised myths was effected by Homer 
himself, who along with other ancient writers had created artificial systems of 
mythology which obscured the truth of their origins and true nature.  
 The importance of history in the discovery of truth, another fundamental 
Unitarian belief of the time, was a major factor in Kenrick’s conviction in the truth 
of the interaction of history and myth and was underpinned in philosophical terms 
by English Romanticism. This meant that sense experiences related to historical 
reality could become in whole or in part those products of the human imagination 
known as myths. It was this belief in the interaction of history and myth on such a 
basis which led Kenrick to historicise the fabulous tales of ancient times, and this 
in turn created a sense of cultural and moral relativism in Kenrick’s thought. 
 From then on, ideas of diversity, uniqueness and separate origins were 
never far away and they reflected his opinions on both the origins of language 
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and the origins of man. However, his idea that an acceptance of the Hebrew 
chronology meant that the races of man must have originated separately was 
derived from more complex issues.  History could not prove man’s origins, so 
Kenrick resorted to the biological argument and as a result he tended to side with 
physiologists such as Agassiz, who believed that races had originated in different 
localities. The problem of men’s origins, the truth or otherwise of the Book of 
Genesis and a host of other questions raised by the geology, physiology, 
ethnology, philology and theology of the mid-nineteenth century appeared  
insoluble.  Kenrick, however, resolved the difficulties which had arisen, in his own 
mind at least. 
       With regard to the advances of science, he brought into play his Unitarianism 
once again, this time with regard to the integrity of scripture. He criticised 
contemporary writers such as William Whewell and John Pye Smith, who tried to 
harmonise science and scripture by re-interpreting the latter in various ways.  
These practices were in conflict with  Kenrick’s Unitarianism, for the idea that 
scripture could not be ‘bent’ for any purpose was a fundamental rule of 
interpretation. For Kenrick, the harmonisation of religion and science had 
become impossible, and consequently this was one factor which helped to 
convince him that the ultimate solution was to separate them and to favour a 
more spiritual and emotional faith which needed no empirical proof. Thus, 
although ideas which Kenrick formed during his transition to a more Romantic 
form of thought were from many sources, it is clear that some of these were 
adapted, integrated and re-formed in great part by the Unitarianism to which he 
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remained faithful all his life. The results of the contextual influences on Kenrick’s 
thought were to some extent paradoxical.  His unshakeable faith in the integrity 
of scripture, for example, was an opinion which had been formed in the ultra-
rational Priestleyan milieu.  Half a century later, Kenrick’s defence of scripture 
against attempts to blend it with mid-nineteenth-century science had the ultimate 
effect of assisting him to make the decision that, in order to save religion, the 
faith on which it depended ought to become part of a spiritual dimension which 
had no requirement for the approval of reason. 
 How far had Kenrick travelled away from the towering influence of Joseph 
Priestley along the road to historicism and Romanticism? While Priestley’s 
approach to secular history was concerned with mechanisms and universal 
mores, Kenrick’s came to be dominated by organic imagery and historicist 
themes of relativism in cultures, values and languages.  The processes of 
associationism in Priestley were absolute, while those dynamics in Kenrick’s 
thought came to be like that of the modified English Romantic idea which linked 
empiricism and imagination. Most significantly of all, however, while Priestley’s 
perspective on the world was monist, Kenrick’s thought became affiliated with a 
new dualism which granted freedom from reason for the emotions, feelings and 
spirituality of religious belief, which itself contained its own inherent truth.  
      Although Kenrick moved towards a Romantic frame of mind in these 
respects, he never reached the position of German historians who questioned 
the existence of a uniform human nature. Like most English thinkers, he retained 
the idea of a common nature in man which agreed with his idea of mankind 
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belonging to one species. This opinion on human nature never appeared in his 
work as a major statement, but the indications were clear when, writing of the 
variety of the customs of ancient nations, including Rome, he thought that there 
was ‘a remarkable amount of correspondence arising from the uniformity of 
human nature’. 4 Thus although Kenrick’s frame of mind never achieved an 
affinity with the extremes of German Romantic thought, he nevertheless reached 
a point similar to that of many writers and historians of his time in England. 
Compared, however, to his radical Enlightenment background, he had come a 
long way from a Priestleyan world which had been dominated by monism and 
reason. 
 The main thrust of this thesis has been to establish some links between 
the radical English Enlightenment and the Romantic Age through a study of one 
scholar. However, the thesis has also served to highlight aspects of this period 
which have been sadly neglected by modern historians of ideas. Despite the 
importance of their historical criticism, the radical Socinian scholars of late 
eighteenth-century England have received little credit for their efforts from 
modern writers, even those of their own ilk.  In just under ninety years of 
publication, from 1915, of the Transactions of the Unitarian Historical Society, 
there has been virtually nothing written on the subject of the historical biblical 
                                                 
4 John Kenrick, ‘New Year’s Day in Ancient Rome’, in A Selection of Papers on Subjects of Archaeology 
and History, Communicated to the Yorkshire Philosophical Society (London, 1864), p. 221. This paper was 
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criticism undertaken by the scholars of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries. 5  
         Although Priestley, Thomas Belsham, John Kentish and John Kenrick 
himself were innovators on the subject of historical criticism, the importance of 
their ideas and the uniqueness of their approach has been virtually ignored even 
by writers who concentrate on that particular intellectual community in the same 
period. In one fairly recent, very comprehensive study on Rational Dissent, a 
dozen essays deal with the origins of the intellectual movement and its regional, 
educational, political, legal, social, theological and cultural characteristics. Sadly, 
however, in this otherwise excellent volume the subject of radical scholarship in 
historical biblical criticism is conspicuous by its absence. 6 It is therefore to his 
credit that Dennis G. Wigmore-Beddoes, in his study of the affinity between 
Unitarianism and liberal Anglicanism in the nineteenth century, appreciated to 
some extent at least the scholarship of the former. 7 He discusses John Kenrick’s 
opinion on the priority of the gospel of Mark and notes Kenrick’s emphasis on the 
point that the biblical critic must deal with the evangelists as human biographers 
who were exposed to the ‘influences of their age, their country, and their family 
                                                 
5 For one exception, see John McLachlan, ‘Joseph Priestley and the Study of History’, Transactions of the 
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6 Knud Haakonssen (ed.), Enlightenment and Religion : Rational Dissent in Eighteenth-Century Britain 
(Cambridge, 1996). 
7 Dennis G. Wigmore-Beddoes, Yesterday’s Radicals : A Study of the Affinity Between Unitarianism and 
Broad Church Anglicanism in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, 1971), pp 28-50. Here, the author refers 
to the work of Timothy Kenrick, Charles Wellbeloved, Thomas Belsham and John Kenrick with reference 
to higher criticism. 
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connections’. This, Wigmore-Beddoes concedes, was an advanced position for 
the middle of the nineteenth century. 8
 Neither has the relationship between Unitarians and Germans been given 
very much attention by historians.  The radical English scholars and their 
German counterparts in this period had much in common despite the great 
differences in their theological and philosophical backgrounds. Both wanted to 
save religion by bringing it into line with reason, and both employed a similar 
methodology to achieve their objectives. There was a certain amount of 
expediency involved on the part of the Unitarians, but this only confirmed the 
strength of their religious convictions and their commitment to proving the tenets 
of their rational faith.  What was of significance in this scholarly relationship was 
the fact that the Unitarians, the most rational of intellectual groups within the 
English Enlightenment context, were in close contact over several decades with 
a group of scholars whose historical criticism is now seen as prefiguring the 
German historicism of the nineteenth century. 9 These are two areas in the 
history of ideas of the period which deserve closer attention. 
 Conversely, the thesis has shown that J. W. Burrow is entirely correct to 
argue that the understanding of the ideas of an individual is intensified by close 
attention to the writers within the context which formed the background to his 
own intellectual development. 10 It is now clear that  fundamental tenets of the 
context of Unitarianism and its ideas about the interpretation of scripture were 
important in the development of Kenrick’s thought towards a Romantic 
                                                 
8 Ibid., pp. 34-35. 
9 Peter Hanns Reill, The German Enlightenment and the Rise of Historicism (Los Angeles, 1975). 
10 J.W. Burrow, A Liberal Descent : Victorian Historians and the English Past (Cambridge, 1981), p. 5. 
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perspective. It was the basis from which he re-shaped and re-interpreted the 
characteristics of some of the intellectual  influences he encountered. 
Consequently, this method is one which should not be ignored in future studies of 
individual intellectual development. 
 The other contention here is that a study of an unknown writer has great 
value with regard to the understanding of the assimilation of new ideas. It has 
usually been the case that only the great names of philosophy and theology have 
been granted such close analysis. However, a case study in transition such as 
this with regard to the historian John Kenrick, which highlights in microcosm the 
effects on a single individual of intellectual change, has the advantage of being 
able to show how change is real and tangible.  The sweeping generalisations and 
concentration on ‘great thinkers’ of works on the Enlightenment by Ernst Cassirer 
11 and Peter Gay 12 can never reveal much about the mechanisms of change or 
convey the concrete, very personal and individual reality of the workings of the 
single mind at a specific moment in time when the integration of two sets of ideas 
results in a train of thought entirely new. 
 The deconstruction of general studies of the Enlightenment and 
Romanticism 13 has made great strides in the last three decades. Roy Porter’s 
studies of both philosophical movements in national context have done much to 
show in great clarity the diversity of these movements in thought. 14  However, 
                                                 
11 Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment (Boston, 1965). 
12 Peter Gay, The Enlightenment : An Interpretation. The Rise of Modern Paganism (London, 1966) and 
Peter Gay, The Enlightenment : an Interpretation. Volume 2: The Science of Freedom (London 1970). 
13 See the introduction by John B. Halsted (ed.), in Romanticism (London, 1969). 
14 Roy Porter and Mikulas Teich (eds.), The Enlightenment in National Context (Cambridge, 1981) and also 
Roy Porter and Mikulas Teich (eds.), Romanticism in National Context (Cambridge, 1988). 
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the most significant progress with regard to the interpretation of the 
Enlightenment in particular in recent times has been made in an increased 
attention to religion as a factor in intellectual change. B.W. Young’s study, in 
particular, has contributed a great deal to this religious perspective. 15 The most 
significant work, however, is Reill’s. It not only considers the continuity of 
Enlightenment and Romanticism in the German context from a religious point of 
view involving biblical criticism, but also from analysis of a specific group. Once 
again, this portrays the reality of change in ways of thinking rather than, as in 
general accounts, the mere supposition that it takes place. 
 The above analysis of John Kenrick’s transition from Enlightenment to 
Romanticism is structured around another specific group, the set of writers which 
formed the context from within which Kenrick’s intellectual development took 
place. The changes in ideas from one frame of mind to the other are confined, 
however, to himself alone. It is hoped that by this method two key points have 
been made. The first is concerned with the importance of context, for in this case 
it clearly shows how Unitarian ideas, confronted with different views, adapted 
these and helped to mould new intellectual positions on important issues. The 
second point to be emphasised is that only a microcosmic study such as this is 
able to convey the real, individual nature of intellectual change. 
        Finally, this study has traced the development of the thought of an individual 
from the context of the most rational of English Enlightenment groups to a new 
frame of mind characterised by the historical and creative ideas of the Romantic 
                                                 
15 B.W. Young, Religion and Enlightenment in Eighteenth Century England : Theological Debate from 
Locke to Burke  (Oxford, 1998). 
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Age. It shows a rejection by this thinker of the radical monist intellectual position 
of Joseph Priestley in the late eighteenth century and an acceptance instead of a 
post-Kantian dualism and Idealism favoured by the nineteenth. Indeed, in many 
respects, Kenrick’s thought by this time was reminiscent of the dualism of 
Richard Price, who argued against Priestley’s monist perception of existence.  In 
charting John Kenrick’s intellectual journey, this thesis has opened up a new 
pathway through the maze of intellectual complexities which litter the main route 







 This form of shorthand was used by John Kenrick, Thomas Belsham, 
Richard Price and many other Unitarian scholars.  It was popular and employed 
extensively in Dissenting academies throughout the eighteenth century and well 
into the nineteenth.  It has proved to be a real hindrance to modern researchers, 
for a large proportion of the unpublished material relating to Kenrick and others 
was written in this way. For example, in the library of Harris Manchester College 
in Oxford there are fourteen boxes of manuscripts written by Thomas Belsham, 
almost all of them in Rich’s shorthand. 
 This method of recording notes was devised by one Jeremiah Rich in the 
mid-seventeenth century. Rich wrote out sermons and prayers in tiny spaces on 
paper in the form of shorthand he had devised. He died in 1660 and his system 
was first published in 1669. Later editions followed, but copies of Rich’s little 
books are now very rare. 1 Rich’s shorthand was updated first by the 
Nonconformist divine Philip Doddridge, 2 and later by the Unitarian minister Lant 
Carpenter (1780-1840) of Bristol. These two later versions of Rich’s shorthand 
alphabet are very similar and make it possible for the modern scholar to 
understand at least the principles which guided the hand of these shorthand 
writers. 
                                                 
1 Jeremiah Rich, The Pens Dexterity Completed: or, Mr. Riches Short-Hand now perfectly Taught, Which 
in his life-time was never done, Fourth Edition (London, 1676). 
2 J. Wood (ed.), Rich’s Shorthand, Improved by Dr. Doddridge (London, 1830). 
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 There is a large amount of material in the form of lecture notes written by 
John Kenrick in Rich’s shorthand in the Kenrick Papers in Dr Williams’s Library. 
There are, for example, fifteen notebooks containing closely written notes in 
shorthand, 3 which refer to French, Spanish, English, German and Italian history 
and literature. One of the most interesting of these is a notebook containing forty-
six pages of shorthand on German literature. 4 There is a bundle of loose folios 
containing the notes Kenrick took during his study trip to Germany in 1819-1820 5 
and a selection of other notebooks full of notes on ancient history and addresses 
to students at Manchester College during his years as professor of history. These 
shorthand writings contain a large amount of material of great value to the 
modern researcher interested in this period of the history of ideas in general and 
in John Kenrick and Unitarianism in particular. 
 The notes are not completely unintelligible to the modern scholar who has 
no knowledge of how to understand this shorthand. It was the general practice of 
Rich’s shorthand users to write out in full the titles of the subject matter, proper 
names and difficult words in order to avoid confusion. Accordingly, these pages 
are peppered with such names, which provide good clues as to what was the 
general nature of the contents of the lengthy shorthand passages. This was the 
case in the forty-six pages of shorthand on the subject of German Literature, 
which contain almost one thousand lines of shorthand in Kenrick’s tiny hand.  
Reading those names from the very beginning to the end of this forty-page 
section gives one at least an idea of the content of his lecture notes. Kenrick’s 
                                                 
3 Kenrick Papers, DWL, 24.107 (25-39). 
4 Ibid., 24.107 (32). 
5 Ibid., 24.107 (41). 
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analysis of German literature begins with some background of the last conflict 
with Rome, through the Middle Ages and the legends of the early German 
peoples, to the eighteenth century and finally discusses the writers, philosophers 
and critics of his own time, including Herder, Kant, Hegel and Fichte. The twenty-
three right-hand pages of the notebook contain the bulk of the general text of the 
shorthand, while the left hand pages are used for extra notes and references. 
The following are the names and important words which are visible on right hand 
pages. They are recorded here as accurately as possible and as they appear on 
the pages of the notebook.  I have inserted dashes to indicate the words which 
are distinguishable amongst the lines of shorthand, and spaces have been left to 
denote the end of each page and also to make the list more readable. There is 
the occasional ordinary word written in full, but it is impossible to know whether 
these are connected to the previous word or the one which follows. All this 
method can hope to achieve is to give some indication of the general thrust of the 
notes :  
 
Danube – Rh[ine] – Vistula – Tac[itus] Germ 2 – Wehrmann – Rhine – Tac. – 
Teutschen & Deutschen – Tuisto – Hermiones – Isarones – Adelung – Italy 
– Teutones – Hellenes – Angles – Saxon – Teut. – Baltic – Pytheas – 
Guttones – Cimbri – Holstein – Cimmerians – Sweden and Denmark – Baltic 
– Danube – Teutonic – India – Tac[citus] – Rhine – Teut – Vistula – Danube 
– Poland –Danube – Euxine – Nice – Euxine – Huns – Cappadocian – 
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Codex Argentius – Upsala – Sweden – Wolfenbüttel – Milan – Adelung – 
Marsh – Hochdeutsch – Teut. – Heruli & Vandals – Alemanni – Franks – 
Saxon – Westphal – Angles- Scand – Doric & Ionic – Alem & Frank – Saxon 
– Scand – Baltic – Ionians – Flemish – Aix La Chapelle – Göttingen & 
Wittenburg – High Dutch – Dutch – Holland – Isadoras – Ottfried – 
 
Charlemagne – Germany – Hildebrand – Grimm – Charlem – feudal – Saxon 
– Franconian – Europe – Italy –Otho – Saxons – James – Sco – Frankish – 
Franc – predominance – Conrad – Henry – Otho – Cathed. In Strasburg – 
1015 – Italy – Swabian – Hohenstaufen – Swabian in Alemanni – 
Minnesingers – Godfrey [of] Bouillon – Troubadours – Conrad – Hohenstr. 
– Bernard – Godfrey – Spain – Italy – Minnesingers – 
 
Science – latinizing – Privince of Turin – provençal – Minnesingers – 
nobility – Henry – Fred. – Conrad – Troubadeur – Swabian – Swabian & 
Swiss – Thuringia – Wartburg – Minnesingers – Provençal – Teutonic – 
jealousy – chivalry – chivaliry – Troub. – trochaic & iambic – Mnsinger – 
Swabian – Wolfram – Eschenbach – Henry – Rüdiger – Zurich – Swabian – 
Romances – 
 
Parcivel – Wolfram & Eschenbach – cycle – Charlemange – Heldenbuch – 
Nibelungen Leid – Attila – Huns & Theodoric – Goth – Swabian – chivalry – 
Nibelungen – Brunhildis – Siegfried – Nibelung. –Swabian – Nib-Lied – 
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unavenged – Homeric epos – genius – Swabian – Trouveurs – France – 
Troubadours – didactic – Swabian – Esopian – anthology – Arienus – 
Edelstein – Rodolph [of] Hapsburg – Hohenstr. – Luther – Italy –  
 
Golden Bull – Florence – Modena & Ferrara – Vienne – Hung – Polish – Max 
1 – Vienna – 1333 – Heidel. 1346 – Mastersingers – Swabian – Minnesingers 
– Minn. – Mentz – Meistersingers – Strasburg – Augsburg – Nuremburg – 
Ulm – Swabian – Schulfrund – Schüler – Tabulatur – Minnesingers – 
Dominian – Tauler – Tauler – 
 
Quakers – Methodists – Tauler – rhapsodical – Augsburg – Reformation – 
Luther – Wittenburg – Van der Freiheit einis Christen Menschen – Upper 
Saxony – Lower Saxony – Luther – Reformer – 
 
Holbein,  Dürer & Lucas Cranach – Roman – Venetian – Flemish – Tasso & 
Ariosto – Italy – Italians – Sweden – France, England – Silesia – Slavonic – 
Poland – Bohemia – Austria – Silesia – Bohemians – Ferdinand 2 – Silesian  
 
Manhood – Heinsius & Grotius – gymnasium – Aristarchus – lingua 
Teutonica – St. Arno of Cologne – der Teuschen poeteray [sic]– prosody – 
Alexandrine – Saxony – Luther – epigrams – Antigone [of] Sophocles – 
Seneca – Silesia – rhythms – Hoffman – Quintilian – Italians – Silesia – 
Hoffman – Louis xiv – Leibniz – Chri. Wolf – Leibniz – Halle – 
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 Vocabulary – met. – philol. – Cortus – Fabricius – Gesner & Ernesti – 
Göttingen – Halle – Göttingen – Hamburg – English – Horace – epochs – 
Hamburg – Horace – Lafontaine – French – lyric – masc. and fem. rhymes – 
 
Haller – Berne – Göttingen – die Alpen – Haller – Swiss – die Ewigkeit – 
Hagedom – Haller & Hagedom – Gottsched & Bodmer – Gottsched – 
Leipzig – Gottsched – Gottschedian – Swiss – Bodmer – Zurich – Breitinger 
– Gottsched – spectator – Bodmer – Milton – Bodmer – Gottsched – 
Schwabe – Friller – Klopstock – Weiland – Gleim - Bodmer – Haller – Milton 
& Klopstock – Gottsched – Bodmer - Schlegel’s – Klopstock – Gellert-  
 
Bodmer – Milton’s P. L. – Gottsched – Schwabe – Haller – Milton – 
Klopstock – Gellert – Saxon – Gellert – Schlegels – Klopstock – academical 
– personal – 
 
Klopstock – Milton’s Paradise Lost – Gottsched – Bodmer – Copenhagen – 
Denmark – Hamburh – Milton – Klopstock – Saviour – Hell – Milton – 
Jewish Sanhedrin – Milton – infinite – anthropomorphic – immaterial – 
 
monotony – hexameter – Gottsched – Kl [Klopstock] – rhyme – Denmark – 
Wieland – Voltaire – hallucination 
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Weimar – F. Schlegel – Ariosto – didactic – Wieland – Horace – Lucian – 
 
Shakespeare – Lessing  - drama – Leipzig – Breslau – Berlin – Hamburg – 
Wolfenbüttel – fragmente – Reimarus – Hamburg – Lessing – Lessing – 
Hamburgische Dramaturgie – Aristotole’s Poetic – 
 
Lessing – Lessing – Nathan [the Wise] – Laocoön – Virgil – 
 
aesthetic – phychological – analysis – Lessing – psychology – Lessing – 
controversy – Lessing – Fr. Schlegel – Lessing – Herder – Herder – Prussia 
– Konigsburg – Kant – fragments – Göttingen – Weimar – Herder –  
 
Lessing – Herder’s Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit – 
Herder – humanity – conservative – Herder – didactic – 
 
Ideen – Churchill – Herder – Lutheran – symbolical – Herder – Lessing & 
Herder – beaux esprits – Prussia – Parisien – Weimar – collisions – 
 
Ernesti – Leipzig & Heyne & Göttingen – philologers –Winckelmann – 
archaeology – Kant – Kritik der Reinen Vernunft  - 1781 – Kant – Fichte – 
Schelling – Schleiermacher – Hegel – Schiller – Göthe – Göthe – Klopstock 
– Göthe – Klopstock – Göthe – Schiller –Wallenstein – Weimar. 
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 Although it is possible to see the subject matter of Kenrick’s lecture notes 
on German Literature from a list of names, this cannot shed much light on the 
actual meaning and analysis of the content.  It would be possible, however, for 
the determined modern-day scholar to go a step further and try to decipher the 
shorthand itself. Despite its rather daunting appearance, the principles behind it 
are not complex.  It is based upon a number of very definite outlines, either 
horizontal or vertical, which denote the consonants, while the vowels are 
indicated either by dots alone or by the position of one outline in relation to 
another.  Some years ago Beryl Thomas completed a transcription of the journal 
of Richard Price with great success. 6 The task, however, was not an easy one 
and took a very long time. In her article, she explained that although the basic 
elements that Price used could indeed be identified as those in Rich’s system, 
there were symbols which were idiosyncratic, and variants which Price found 
convenient to use. 7 As in the emergence of the character of a person’s own 
handwriting, the use of a form of shorthand over a period of years will inevitably 
result in a personal style familiar to the user alone. Identifying the words 
represented by idiosyncratic symbols involved the laborious process of 
establishing a meaning which made sense in all the contexts in which the symbol 
occurred. Thus, although the transcription of Rich’s shorthand is by no means 
impossible, it is a very long process, even for an experienced reader.  For the 
novice it often takes many hours simply to decipher the meaning of two or three 
outlines. 
                                                 
6 Beryl Thomas, ‘Richard Price’s Shorthand’, PPN, 4, 1980, pp. 40-42. 
7 Ibid., p. 40. 
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     The following transcription by Beryl Thomas, who has also transcribed 
shorthand written by Thomas Belsham, is of a passage relating to Herder in 
Kenrick’s notes on German Literature.  The passage has been typed in single 
spacing so that it may be compared more easily with the same passage in 
shorthand, which has been attached at the end of the transcription.  Words in 
italics indicate that the meaning of the outline is unclear and the reader has done 
some guesswork, while a series of three dots denotes that the outline in question 
is unintelligible, either because the writing is faded or due to the fact that it simply 
cannot be understood. It is possible to follow the general flow of the transcribed 
notes, but they are often interrupted by a word or phrase which does not seem to 
be appropriate, and consequently the meaning is not always clear. However, to 
decipher these notes of Kenrick’s on Herder to the extent that she has, Beryl 
Thomas has achieved a great deal. This was the first time Beryl Thomas had 
ever tackled John Kenrick’s shorthand, and I am very grateful for her efforts.  
 
 In the prose work of Herder, his Ideen zur Geschichte der Menschheit 8has 
retained the highest reputation. Many persons sought for a philosophy of 
history but they had generally adopted some arbitrary definition and 
limitations as to the purposes of philology and then made it their business, 
in their science of history, to show the concordance of cause to the 
products  of the earth, which they had thus assumed to be the main 
purpose [of philology]. 
Herder finds the comprehensive principle to which the various and at first 
sight contradictory appearances of history, the rise and conquering of 
nations, the new integration of wealth, knowledge and power from one 
generation to another, the multiplicity of law, government and religion in 
the progress of what he called humanity, which includes in it peoples, 
civilisations in the limitless sense which we commonly view it, of the tastes 
of life, but the improvement above all in his moral and philosophical nature. 
                                                 
8 Johann Gottfried Herder, Reflections on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind was first published 
1784-1791 and appeared in English in 1800. 
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“It is a revolting state, says he, in the evolution of the church to see 
people’s ruins heaped upon ruins either beginning … The bond of culture 
alone forms these ruins into a whole in which individual human forms 
indeed are forever vanishing, but the spirit of humans  ever lives and is 
ever active.” 
In proof of this he shows the world in which he is placed and the relation of 
his faculties to it, their superiority of argument and the causes which are 
provided in their nature attached or the authority which acts upon his 
senses. To exist, the desire of improvement ; he shows by what powers he 
is fated  to the cruel state, to humanity and religion and that from the 
nature of his faculties he is essentially aggressive. He then composes his 
stories of the history of mankind with the …tradition of their existence and 
appraises it to the fall of the Roman Empire simply upon its result, in the 
15th book in the propositions.. That the distinctive forces to which humanity 
is subject are from their nature weaker than the conservative, that reason 
and justice are the first … of his welfare, that a benevolent … presides over 
the destinies of man and that there is no human error agency, no purer, 
more durable and … than in labouring in conformity with its destiny. Such 
views are just, as they are moral and elevating, they place history in its true 
relation to philosophy … and their influence may be traced in the greater 
comprehensiveness with which the German historians at last after 
centuries included in their stories  of political history.   
The style of Herder in his earliest works is very peculiar,  full of figures, 
abrupt and rhetorical, as if the crudeness of his feelings purposely 
corrupted his …away from their straight … path, and even later on it was 
too full of sentiment and figure to be well admired by a didactic pessimist 
and the too rhetorical speech in which it is written is one reason probably 
why his Ideen when translated into English which it was by an author the 
name of Churchill had so little success. Herder had an importance here in 
promoting the great change in theological values which took place in the 
middle of the last century in Germany. From what has been said of the 
spirit of his philosophy it must be quite evident that he could never respect  
the doctrines of the Lutheran church in that precise dogmatic form in 
which the symbolical books presented them. He could reconcile religion 
with philosophy in no other way than by forming the ideas and antiquated 
books of church doctrine in with a new and living principle. In the great 
change which was then taking place some regarded the …articles of the 
church as a burden and a constraint upon freedom of choice and 
generosity of sentiment and sought to rid others of …at least, but Herder, 
who had a deep feeling of religion and was especially permeated with love 
and admiration for the benevolent morality of the gospel, and the character 
of its founder to bring the doctrine of the church into harmony with his 
feelings and convictions, by people laying aside what was incompatible of 
accommodation and giving a … and more comprehensive form to what 
ever was considered more the mystery explanation. He asked  his 
countrymen to harmonise more with reference to their literary merits than 
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they had ever done before, and as expressing like the corresponding 
productions of other nations and the peculiar values, sentiments and 
extent of knowledge which prevailed in the age in which they were 
respectively written. With his fine taste, his animation and his eloquent 
style it might have been expected that he would excel as a pulpit orator, but 
this was not the case. Though privileged by an avidness, whose education 
and recommendation might have justified the adoption of either a 
temperamental or an argumentative style, he did neither but too the plain 
time of earnest contemplation and …expressed in the simplest languages. 
He was listened to with attention from his character, his spirit and his 
sincerity but his candid presentation bore little mark of his characteristic 
talents. The earliest of them do show the most that radical zealous spirit 
which Lessing and Herder had, in many ways adapted by their respective 
tastes and talents, introduced into theology was eagerly followed and 
adopted by their countrymen, till at length it became possible  to say very 
little was left of the old evidence of ecclesiastical doctrine. But the aspects 
of philology in Germany were quite different from that which it assumed in 
France ; even those of the Germans who allowed themselves the least 
latitude in theological values could never become scoffers at religion as 
with the faults of the beau esprits of France during the corresponding 
period. However little they might retain of positive belief in the historical 
evidence or the miraculous sayings of revelation, they evidently felt the 
great truths of natural religion and did homage to the moral worth and 
importance of the scriptures and of the founder of the Christian religion. 
… was more religious than before but it …accommodated itself to that new 
form of religion which had become prevalent ; it was popular among the 
great who generally followed German literature, and were devoted admirers 
of the French in everything, that any thing of the …of French authorship 






Bodleian Library, Oxford 
The library’s Modern Manuscripts section keeps a hand-written list of 
books in John Kenrick’s study, a list which he compiled from 1869. See John 
Kenrick, ‘Catalogue of Books in My Study, Begun October 26, 1869’, Bodleian 
Modern MSS, MS. Don.e.119. 
Glasgow University Library, Special Collections and Archive 
      These contain material, including lecture notes and some correspondence 
relating to John Kenrick’s teachers at Glasgow College in the years 1807-1810, 
whose material is to be found in collections under their own names. They include 
testimonials regarding Kenrick from James Mylne, who was Professor of Moral 
Philosophy from 1797 to 1839 and John Young, Professor of Greek from 1774 to 
1821. The sources also contain copies of some letters from John Kenrick to his 
brother George and his great uncle, Samuel Kenrick of Bewdley (1728-1811).  
Harris Manchester College, Oxford  
       There are a number of sets of lecture notes, some in longhand and others in 
shorthand, taken by students at Manchester College over the years of Kenrick’s 
professorship.  There are letters scattered throughout the various collections, but 
the most significant part of the material related to John Kenrick is a long series of 
 434
letters to the Manchester College trustees George William Wood (1781-1843) 
and William Rayner Wood (1811-1884), which reveal something of the business 
of Manchester College, York and Kenrick’s interest in German scholarship. 
John Rylands University Library of Manchester, Unitarian 
College Collection 
    This body of material, which has never been properly catalogued, has some 
lecture notes. It contains, for example, John Kenrick’s, Lectures on Early Roman 
History, notes taken by G.W. Wood at Manchester College, York, 1842. It also 
contains letters from Nathaniel Lardner to George Benson and a variety of 
material related to both early and later Unitarianism. 
Kenrick, Mrs Anne, Private Collection 
      The diaries of Rebecca Kenrick, a cousin of John Kenrick, are contained in 
some private family papers owned by Mrs. Anne Kenrick, of Edgbaston, 
Birmingham. They give some sketchy details about one or two incidents in the 
life of ‘cousin John’ in his later years and about the lives and connections of other 
members of the Kenrick family. 
Liverpool University Archives, Beard Correspondence and 
Rathbone Papers 
      The Rathbone Papers and the Beard Correspondence have some letters 
written in the 1860’s and 1870’s from Kenrick to the Unitarian ministers, J.H. 
Thom and Charles Beard, who was editor from 1864 to 1879 of the Theological 
Review, a journal to which Kenrick contributed in his later years.  
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 University College London Library, Sharpe Papers  
      This collection contains correspondence of John Kenrick’s father, Timothy 
Kenrick (1759-1804) and other members of the family. It also holds personal 
papers of John Kenrick and his wife Laetitia, including letters and the 
autobiographical notes on his early life which Kenrick wrote for his wife. [John 
Kenrick’s Account of his Early Life, Written for his Wife in 1870-1872 and copied 
by Elizabeth Reid in 1878, Sharpe Papers 189/2.] In addition, there are 
catalogues of Kenrick’s library, most of which was sold after his death in 1877. 
The notebooks  containing his ‘Lectures on English Literature’, in two parts, UCL, 
Sharpe Papers 186/187. N.D., have proved enlightening. 
 Dr Williams’s Library, London 
       The library holds the largest collection of unpublished manuscripts, 
notebooks, correspondence and personal papers which relate to John Kenrick. 
Included in the collection are fifteen notebooks, eleven lectures, a bundle of 
notes taken in Germany and a dozen addresses to students at Manchester 
College, York, all of which are in shorthand (see Appendix) and which form a 
large amount of material.  In longhand there are 15 notebooks on history and 
literature and a bundle containing longhand drafts of eleven papers read before 
societies, including ‘Causes Which Have Retarded the Civilization of Africa, 
DWL, Kenrick Papers, 24.107.49 (a). The essay is not dated, but probably was 
written in the 1840s.  Also in longhand, there are a number of early essays, the 
majority of them dated 1808 and 1809, two of the years he spent at Glasgow 
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College. This bundle contains essays mentioned in the text of the thesis and 
includes, for example, ‘Illustrations of the Origin of the Passions from the 
Doctrine of the Association of Ideas’, 29 December 1808, DWL, Kenrick Papers, 
24.107.50 (d), and the later essay, ‘A Specimen of the Application of Historical 
Principles to the Explanation of the Greek Mythology’, DWL, Kenrick Papers, 
24.107.50 (n), 1816. 
 
Published Works by John Kenrick  
 
Review Article of Novum Testamentum Græce. Textum, ad Fidem Codicum,  
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